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ABSTRACT. 
The aim of this study is to anälyse Britain's 
relations with Ibn Saud between 1926 when he conquered the 
Hejaz and 1932, when reconciliation between the Saudis and the 
Hashemites was achieved. From analysis of the policy-making 
process it is hoped to establish the causes of Britain's 
involvement in Arabian. affairs and the part which Britain played 
in the creation of Saudi Arabia. 
My thesis is, divided into six chapters. Chapter I 
covers early attempts made by Britain and Ibn Saud towards the 
establishment of a close relationship, and examines the reasons 
which retarded these endeavours until 1925. 
Three main stages can be noted in Anglo-Saudi relations 
during the period under review: 
1- January 1926 to May 1927. During this stage Ibn Saud 
was busily engaged in establishing his authority in the 
Hejaz seeking for this purpose support from Britain, from 
other Great Powers and throughout the Muslim World. 
Chapter 2 investigates the attitudes of the British Government 
and of the British Muslims, particularly the Indians, towards 
the Saudi conquest of the Hejaz. Chapter 3 analyses the 
making of the treaty of Jeddah (1927) throwing new light 
on British interests in Arabia and the means of protecting them. 
It also explores the British decision-making process. 
2- June 1927 to-, December 1930. With Anglo-Saudi relations now 
established on an equal footing, fresh troubles, in November 
1927, arose on the border areas with the Mandates and 
immediately threatened all the agreements reached. Chapter 4 
analyses the ensuing crisis and the unresolved dilemma 
posed by the Ikhwan and the frontier posts question. Chapter 
5 examines the hitherto unexplored area of contacts and 
deliberations-which led to Anglo-Saudi collaboration in 
suppressing the Ikhwan rebellion. 
3- January 1930 to-December 1932. The opportunity was now more 
favourable for Britain to promote reconciliation between 
the Saudis and the Hashemites. Chapter 6 is entirely 
devoted to this successful achievement. 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
Conventions 
Introduction 
Chapter One: Britain and Arabia, 1910-25 
Chapter Two: Britain, British Muslims and 
the Saudi Conquest of the 
Hejaz, 1925-26 
Chapter Three: The Making of the Treaty of 
Jeddah, May 1927, March 1926- 
May 1927 
Chapter Four: 
Chapter Five: 
Anglo-Saudi Dilemmas: The 
Ikhwan and the Frontier 
Posts, November 1927 - 
December 1928 
Anglo-Saudi Cooperation over 
the Liquidation of the Ikhwan 
Rebellion, January 1929 - 
January 1930 
Chapter Six: Peace-Making between Ibn Saud 
and the Hashemites, 1930-32 
Conclusion and Epilogue 
Bibliography 
Appendices 
4 
6 
8 
15 
88 
153 
208 
296 
354 
430 
435 
452 
-2 
3 
Appendices: 452 
A. The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 1915 453 
B. The Haddah Agreement, 2 Nov. 1925,456 
C. The Bahrah Agreement, 1 Nov. 1925 460 
D. British Draft Treaty for Jordan's 463 
Guidance During His Negotiations with 
Ibn Saud, Dec. 1926 
E. Draft Treaty presented by the King of 465 
the Hejaz, 4 Dec. 1926. 
F. Treaty of Jeddah, 20 May 1927, together 468 
with notes Exchanged 
G. British Representatives in-the Middle 476 
East 
H. Biographical Notes 478 
Maps: 
1. Arabia 14A 
2. Northern Arabia: bedouin tribal areas 70A 
and related landmarks 
3. North-Western Arabia: Nejd-Hejaz-Transjordan77A 
frontier 
4. The Ikhwan raids on the Busaiyah post 215A 
1927-28 
5. Tribes in Saudi Arabia 269A 
6. The frontier posts: A British scheme for 271A 
the defence of Southern Iraq 
7. The Southern desert of Iraq: 271B 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is the outcome of five years of 
research under the supervision of Professor P. J. V. Rolo 
to whom I am greatly indebted for his invaluable guidance, 
support, criticisms, encouragement and inexhaustable 
patience. 
I would like to thank both Sir John Richmond 
of Durham for his valuable guidance and Mr. Albert 
Hourani for assistance in my research at the Middle 
East Centre, St. Antony's College. 
I would also like to thank Mr. Oliver Goulden 
for translating extracts from Oriente Moderno, Miss 
Clare glevin and Mr. Ian Rowney for reading the 
typescript of my thesis. I would also like to thank 
Mrs. Marjorie Steele for doing the preliminary typing 
and Mrs. Carolyn Busfield for doing the final typing. 
I owe a debt of gratitude to both Mrs. Margaret 
Carrie and Mrs. Cannie Ross for their help to me and 
my family. I am especially indebted to my wife and 
our twins for sharing the trials of my work. 
It is a pleasant duty to express my appreciation 
to all those institutions which assisted me. I am 
grateful to the Egyptian Ministry of Education for 
granting me a scholarship which enabled me to pursue 
my research. I am also grateful to the Department of 
4 
5 
History and its secretaries for looking after me during 
my stay at Keele. I am also grateful to Keele 
University Library, its Deputy Librarian and the staff 
of the Department of Inter-Library Loan. I wish also 
to thank the staff of the following institutions for 
the help they offered me; The Public Record Office, 
London; The Library of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, London; The Library of the School of 
Oriental Studies, Durham; The Library of the University 
of Manchester; The Library of the University of 
Birmingham; and the Library of the Middle East Centre, 
University of Oxford. 
CONVENTIONS 
The following conventions have been generally 
adopted throughout the thesis. 
Transliteration: 
When an Arabic name or word or location has a form 
which is generally accepted in English I have normally 
used it. In some cases, however, I have preferred to 
render certain names and locations in their correct 
Arabic pronunciations. In the case of names like 
al-Rashid or locations such as al-Madinah I have felt 
it more accurate to preserve the prefix 'al' as part 
of the word since it is so in Arabic. Locations and 
tribe names which end in their Arabic form with the 
letter 'P' were accurately transliterated by adding 
an 'h' rather than an 'a' to the word such as Haddah 
and 'Utaibah. I have given a full transliteration of 
the titles of Arabic works and names of their authors 
according to the system I mentioned above. I have 
tried to use as few Arabic words as possible in the 
main body of the text. 
Abbreviations: 
I have used as few abbreviations as possible, 
indicating after first use of full name or title, 
where I would subsequently abbreviate. 
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Quotations: 
Quotations are reproduced exactly as in the source, 
but any word appearing in'brackets is my own. There 
are many variant spellings in English of the same 
Arabic name or word in the original sources. Since the 
sense is always clear I have preferred not to burden the 
quotations with the addition of the correct transliteration 
used in my own text. 
Appendices: 
Some of the appendices are a direct reproduction of 
the original texts. Others are compiled from different 
sources. I have included 'biographical notes' at an 
appendix for easy reference and to save footnote space. 
Footnotes: 
Authors' surnames are given without their initials. 
Their works are designated in full at-their first 
appearance - thereafter a brief title has been given. 
When a footnote refers to more than one source, the first 
of them relates, where relevant, to a quotation. For 
the sake of accuracy I have referred to documents by the 
individual paper-number, the file-number, the index 
number and the volu me-number. When simultaneous 
reference is made to documents in the same file or 
volume, I have not repeated the file or volume number. 
Bibliography: 
The bibliography includes full titles and the 
places and dates of publication of the editions"I have 
used. All works are alphabetically indexed. 
Introduction 
the 
From the 16th Century onwards/European maritime 
Powers, and particularly Britain, became increasingly 
interested in Arabia's coasts. By the outbreak of 
World War I Britain had succeeded in establishing her 
autnority and influence in Aden, in the Trucial Coast 
the 
and in Kuwait, leaving /suzerainty of the Ottoman 
Empire unchallenged along the coasts of the Hejaz, 
the Yemen and al-Hasa. Central Arabia, however, where 
the ottoman Caliph's authority was recognized, remained 
isolated from contact with any outside Powers. It was 
left to European travellers in the 19th and 20th 
centuries to discover the heart of Arabia. Their 
enterprise began to fill in the blank map of Central 
Arabia and to provide fascinating accounts of tribal- 
life and nomadic customs. Among those travellers was 
Captain William Henry Irvine Shakespear - the British 
Agent at Kuwait, who in 1911 drew Britain's attention 
to the growing influence of 'Abd al'Aziz Ibn 'Abd 
al-Rahman Al-Saud and sought permission to make official 
contact. This was refused on the ground that Britain 
had no interests in Central Arabia. 
By capturing al-Hasa from the Turks in 1913, 
Ibn Saud now held power in a coastal area and so achieved 
a place, which the outbreak of the War in 1914 was to 
magnify, in Britain's policy calculations. Shakespear 
8 
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was now instructed to make immediate official contact and 
to conclude a treaty of alliance. Although the treaty 
was made, no close relationship developed because, with 
the progress of the war, Britain's interest shifted 
decisively towards the Sharif of Mecca. 
After the war it was again Ibn Saud who forced 
Britain to take notice when, after conquering Hail 
in 1921, he brought his Ikhwan warriors to the borders 
of Britain's newly established Mandates. A definition 
of boundaries between these Mandates and Ibn Saud's 
possessions was urgently needed. For the first time 
the situation in Central Arabia directly concerned 
British interests. Indeed, Ibn Saud's ambitions and 
those of his Ikhwan followers now posed a direct threat. 
Britain's endeavours to establish settled borders on 
the European model conflicted with nomadic practice and 
protracted negotiations ensued. Though a compromise in 
vague terms was reached, areas of dispute, aggravated 
by Ibn Saud's own feud with the Hashemites, remained open. 
While Britain continued to try to resolve these 
problems, Ibn Saud, once again, forced attention on 
himself when, in 1924, he started his conquest of the 
Hejaz. Deciding to remain neutral in that struggle, 
Britain sought immediate assurances from Ibn Saud 
concerning the Mandates and eventually, in November 
1925, the Haddah and Bahrah agreements were signed. 
As the conqueror of the Hejaz and future guardian of 
the Holy Places of Islam, Ibn Saud could no longer 
be regarded as a petty Arabian chief. His attitudes 
now were important not only in relation to the Mandates 
but also to Britain's wider Imperial interests 
throughout the Islamic world. 
The situation on the spot was both changing and 
filled with complexities. The detail which often 
seemed to baffle Britain's policy-makers is 
difficult to unravel without an understanding of desert 
politics and of the relationship between Ibn Saud and 
the Hashemites and other neighbouring 
Arab rulers and between him and the various groupings, 
in particular the Ikhwan, among his own people. British 
policy-making was further complicated by the number of 
departments concerned; the Foreign office directly 
for Arabia; the Colonial Office for the Mandates; the 
Air Ministry for their defence; and the India Office 
directly because of its Gulf responsibilities and 
indirectly because of its concern about the Holy Places 
of Islam. Although some coordination had been achieved 
by setting up the Middle East Department under the 
Colonial Office in 1921, points of view continued to 
differ and decision-making was always laborious. 
In spite of this handicap and of all the local difficulties 
Britain's dialogue with Ibn Saud was maintained and most 
of the issues were successfully negotiated. 
To appreciate the development of this new 
relationship with Ibn Saud the following factors must 
constantly be borne in mind: 
1. The whole question of Islamic public opinion 
within the British Empire. 
2. The local leaders in the Middle East and their 
conflicting ideas and ambitions. 
3. Bedouin society with its changeable loyalties 
and tribal feuds. 
During the 1920s and early 1930s Britain's dominant 
position in the Middle East was virtually unchallenged 
by any of the other Great Powers. For various reasons 
neither France, nor Italy, nor Russia, nor the United 
States emerged as serious rivals. British policy-makers, 
therefore, seemed to have a clear field. In what amounted 
otherwise to an almost complete power vacuum Ibn Saud 
had little option but to incline towards Britain. 
Britain, however, only gradually came to appreciate 
the value of establishing close relations with him. The 
success of subsequent negotiations depended less on policy 
decisions in London than on the diplomatic skill of 
individual negotiators on the spot and on Ibn Saud's 
own imperative need to secure British backing. Among 
the British envoys Sir Gilbert Clayton, by his personal 
dedication to the cause of Anglo-Saudi friendship, by 
his patient manoeuvering and by his appreciation of some 
of the realities of Bedouin society, played the outstanding 
role. 
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This study is not intended to provide an account 
of-Ibn Saud as the creator of the Kingdom of-Saudi Arabia, 
but is confined to the development of Anglo-Saudi 
relations and to Britain's part in the making of the 
Saudi Kingdom. Inevitably involved as an Imperial 
Power, as a Mandatory Power and as an Islamic Power, 
Britain's contribution to Ibn Saud's achievement was 
incidental rather than deliberate. Britain was not 
disposed to let his ambitions threaten her own interests 
and effectively blocked his road, as she had Mohammad 
Ali's in the 19th century, when these appeared in danger,. 
Support for Ibn Saud was clearly conditional on restraint, 
which unlike Mohammad Ali he accepted, where his dream 
of wider Empire was concerned. What would have happened 
without Britain to hold-back Ibn Saud? Would he have 
been able, with Ikhwan allegiance no longer in question, 
to conquer the rest of the Arabian Peninsula including 
Syria and Mesopotamia? If so, it is fascinating, if 
idle, to speculate on how different the whole subsequent 
course of Middle East history might have been. 
Four studies have been recently published which 
deal, either directly'or indirectly, with the creation 
of Saudi-Arabia. 
1 
None of them examines British 
policy-making in the period under consideration. I met 
Miss C. Helms in the summer of 1979. She told me that she 
was particularly interested in the geographical, religious 
and anthropological factors which involved political 
consciousness and was not interested in a historical 
approach. -I had no access, however, to her thesis before 
its publication in 1981. I was interested to find that, 
although looking at Saudi Arabia from quite different 
angles and using different primary sources, our general 
conclusions were very similar. Her main source was the 
India Office, Library documents whereas I relied mostly 
on the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Air Ministry, 
and Cabinet Office records in the Public Record Office. 
Material was of course sometimes duplicated because copies 
of correspondence had been exchanged and therefore 
sometimes we have made identical quotes. But there is 
very little overlap because she has concentrated on the 
1. These are: 
1. Troeller, G. G., The Birth of Saudi Arabia: 
Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud 
(London 1976) 
2. Iqbal, M., Emergence of Saudi Arabia: A 
Political Study of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud 
1901-1953 (Shringar 1977) 
3. Habib, J. S., Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: 
The Ikhwan of Neid and Their Role in the Creation 
of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930 (Leiden 1978) 
4. Helms, C. M., The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: 
Evolution of Political Identity (London 1981) 
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internal factors leading to the 'cohesion' of Saudi 
Arabia from the beginning of the century to 1929 
whereas I have confined myself to Britain's involvement 
between 1926-32. In fact we are only concerned with 
the same period during the years 1926-29 and here I 
have discovered no contradictions in our findings. My 
own final draft was complete before I read her book and, 
while gaining valuable background knowledge from it, 
I found no occasion to change or modify anything which 
I had written. 
As already indicated the bulk of my own research 
has been in the Public Record Office. I have been 
through all the F. O., C. O., Air Ministry and Cabinet 
files for the period 1926-32. I felt that there was 
no need for me to delve in detail into the India Office 
papers, particularly since copies of any significant 
communications were available in the Foreign office 
papers, and since the role of the India Office in 
Middle East policy-making declined after 1921. I have 
consulted the private papers of the key figures in 
Arabian affairs. I have also endeavoured to consult 
all publications (books and articles) written by 
participants in Arabian affairs. 
L: abia 
Source .: dnira2 ty, : las tern 1zGbiz ýýznd t: ze ? ed Sea. 
BRITAIN AND ARABIA, 1910-1925 
Anglo-Saudi Relations and the Making of the 
Treaty of Darain, 1910-15 
Arabia during the First World War and after, '1915-20 
Reorganization of the Middle East Policy-Making 
System, 1920-21 
The Nejd Northern Frontier Delimitation and the 
Frontier Disputes, 1921-25' 
Analo-Saudi Relations and the Making of the Treaty of 
Darain, 1910-15 
The first meeting between Ibn Saud and any official 
British representative took place when he visited the Shaikh 
of Kuwait in 1910. Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, the British 
Political Agent there, welcomed the chance thus provided to 
make contact with the Amir of Nejd, who happened to be a close 
contemporary in age and who had already aroused his interest 
and curiosity. He was evidently much impressed by Ibn Saud, 
who made the most of his opportunity to convey, however 
informally, to a representative of Great Britain his own 
burning ambition to restore the Kingdom of his ancestors in 
Arabia. 
1 
Since his appointment as a British Agent at Kuwait in 
1909, Shakespear had gradually extended his sphere of interest 
into Central Arabia. His love fcr travelling into the desert 
"had filled up large blanks on the map". 
2 Having previously 
served in Persia and Muscat, and now, from Kuwait, he made 
annual excursions into the unknown hinterland. These travels 
'provided an occasion for further meetings with Ibn Saud. For 
instance, in March 1911, during the course of an extended 
tour to the South, a meeting occured, which was to have 
momentous consequences. Shakespear was obviously impressed, 
1. Winstone, Captain Shakespear (London 1976) p. 18. 
2. Carruthers, 'Captain Shakespear's Last Journey', 
Geographical Journal, LIX (1922) pp. 321- 34,401- 18. 
and the outline of a new British policy in Arabia was formulated 
in his mind. Subsequently, he was repeatedly to press his views 
on the British Government. Shakespear listened to Ibn Saud's 
story from his own lips. The Amir expressed regret that Britain 
had not responded to overtures previously made indirectly, bys 
his father, in 1904 when a British Agent was first appointed 
in Kuwait. He spoke of-his ambition to drive the Turks from 
al-Hasa and al-Qatif and of his desire for recognition by 
Britain. Shakespear rightly assumed that the Amir had 
concluded that any expedition against the Turks "would be 
fruitless until the ability of the Turks to bring in troops by 
sea, was limited, and that was only possible through the 
English". 
1 
Convinced that the Amir was genuinely seeking British 
recognition, Shakespear informed London of this approach. 
The reaction was negative. Ibn Saud As ambitions and his 
possible means of gratifying them seemed totally irrelevant, 
in the context of British interests. Britain's concern was 
with the coasts and not Central Arabia. The maintainence 
of good relations with Turkey in the Gulf area was too 
important to jeopardize by giving gratuitous encouragement, to 
one of her potential enemies. 
1. Shakespear to Cox, 8 April 1911, quoted in: Busch;. nBritain 
and the Persian Gulf (London 1967), p. 340. Shekespear 
reported fully on his meeting with Ibn Saud in 1914, see: 
Memo. 2, The Chief Political officer, in charge Iraq section, 
Arab Bureau to the Director, Arab Bureau, Cairo, 12 January 
1917, (Philly Papers) 15/4, St. Antony's College, Oxford 
(Thereafter: 'Arab Bureau Memo. ) 
2. Troeller, 'British Policy towards Ibn Saud 1910-1926', 
Cambridge Univ. -Ph. D. thesis 1971), p. 66. "The 
thesis has been 
published under the title: The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain 
and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud (London 1976) without change ; 
Arab Bureau Memo'. 
Turkey, at that time, was already facing the emergence 
of an Arab nationalist movement in Syria. While Arab 
Q 
discontent grew, Turkey also became involved in/war with 
Italy to save Tripoli and then in the Balkan wars. Ibn Saud 
welcomed Turkey's difficulties and felt, early in May 1913, 
that the moment was opportune to expel her forces from al-Hasa. 
His operations were successful even without the assistance which 
he had tried to obtain from Britain. This secured for Ibn Saud 
the first of his two main objectives. For Britain, however, 
cooperation with Turkey remained the top priority, and on 29 
July, negotiations, started in 1911 to settle interests in the 
Gulf area, culminated in a convention. In that convention 
al-Hasa was defined as parttof the Ottoman=, saniag of Nejd. 
1 
Since Turkish suzerainty over'Nejd was. only nominal, Ibn Saud's 
seizing of al-Hasa seemed implicitly to be recognised by Turkey. 
Once Ibn Saud had gained control of a coastal area, he 
wrote from "the land of his fathers and grandfathers" to Sir 
Percy Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf, on 13 June: 
"in view of my friendly feelings I desire to be on the same 
terms with you as existed between you and my ancestors". 
Recognition by Britain seemed to him important not only for 
the securing of his present gains but for the achievement of his 
future ambitions. Britain, however, was only prepared to 
"continue to maintain the friendly relations which have been 
sustained in the past", should he "abstain from all action 
1. See Memorial of_ the r. Govt. o¬ Säudi Arabia, (Cairo 1955) ii, 
p. 376 (Thereafter: Saudi Memorial); See also: 
Arab Bureau Memo. The convention concerns the boundaries of 
Kuwait, Quatar and Bahrain as well as Turkey's recognition of 
Britain's position in the Gulf. It was never ratified because 
when this was due the two Powers were only hours away from war. 
For text see: Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London 1964) 
p. 107. For Ibn Saud's own preparations to conqur al-Hasa see: 
Attar, s-aar a -j zirah (Beirut 1972) pp. 393-409. 
calculated to disturb the status quo or to create unrest 
among Arab Principalities". 
l 
In fact, the sudden invasion of al-Hasa by Ibn Saud created 
a delicate situation for Britain. Having just concluded a 
settlement with Turkey it was difficult for Britain to raise 
the question of the status of Nejd and possible recognition of 
Ibn Saud, without running the risk of jeopardising Anglo-Turkish 
relations. The British reply, sought, therefore, simply to 
protect British interests in the Gulf as defined by the Anglo- 
Turkish convention of 1913. 
Having now failed to secure British backing Ibn Saud did 
not dare formally to throw-off his Turkish allegiance. On the 
contrary, he reverted to diplomacy with Turkey and claimed to be 
maintaining loyalty to the Sultan. 
2 
. 
Secretlyyy however, he 
made his concept of independence known to the Arab nationalists. 
He'also continued to entertain hopes of a changing British 
attitude. On Britain's part, there was a growing awareness that 
Ibn Saud had emerged as the most powerful ruler in Central Arabia. 
In fact Britain had never had an Arabian policy, but she had 
reacted to events in Arabia whenever they seemed to affect her 
Gulf-interests. 3 The case for establishing a direct relationship 
1. Quoted in: -Kelly, op. cit., p. 108. 
2. Qasei, al-khalif al-arabi, 1914-1945 (Cairo 1973) pp. 4-5. 
3. Hourani, The Decline of the West in the Middle East - 1', 
International Affairs, 29 (1953) pp. 22-42; Troeller, op. cit. 
pp. 78-79,81-83; Cunningham, 'The Wrong Horse -a Study of 
Anglo-Turkish Relations before the First World War', St. 
Antony's Papers, xvii (1965) pp. 56-76. 
with Ibn Saud now seemed to commend itself. 
1 
Accordingly, - a major step was taken when Cox instructed 
Shakespear and Trevor, the Political Agent in Bahrain, to 
meet Ibn Saud in December 1913 in order to explain to him the 
British position and to assess his readiness to co-operate 
with Britain's policy in the Gulf. At this first formal 
meeting Ibn Saud showed the British Political Agents six points 
suggested by the Turks to be included in a proposed treaty with 
him. Presumably he deliberately revealed the draft to gain 
Britain's confidence and to secure their involvement, even 
proposing that Britain should be invited to mediate in the 
settlement. Three pf. these points were prejudicial to British 
interests. Ibn Saud was to commit himself (i) to exclude all 
foreign merchants and agents from al-Hasa; (ii) to refrain 
from communicating with foreign powers; (iii) to undertake not 
to grant concessions to any foreign company. 
2 The immediate 
result of this meeting was to strengthen the friendly relation- 
ship already established between Shakespear and Ibn Saud. This 
was to prove useful for British interests and policy in the Gulf. 
The Foreign Office protested on 9 March 1914 to the 
Turkish ambassador in London against the three points above 
1. See full account in: 'Memorandum on British Commitments 
to Bin Saud' by: Political Intelligence Department, 
Foreign Office, 28 Jan. 1927, E594/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
(Thereafter: F. O. Memo. ); See also: British Documents 
on the Origins of the War, (London 1938) X, pp. 190-4. 
2. F. O. Memo. 
mentioned. Turkey was reminded that British interests in Ibn 
Saud's territories had been defined in the png1o-Turkish 
convention of 1913 as follows: Ibn Saud should not meddle in 
the affairs of the Gulf Emirates; he. should co-operate in the 
observation and maintainance of the Maritime Truce; and British 
traders should be freely admitted to his province. Significantly 
it was urged that Turkey should "refrain from hostile action by 
sea against El-Hasa coast without first consulting us [the 
British] and giving us an opportunity of friendly mediation". 
1 
While Ibn Saud was asked to postpone the conclusion of the 
proposed agreement with Turkey, another Anglo-Turkish convention 
was concluded in March 1914, by which British and Turkish spheres 
of influence in south western Arabia were defined. Britain 
therefore now favoured Turko-Saudi. understanding. This decision 
provoked differences between London and India over Ibn Saud's 
status. While London considered his expansion to the Gulf 
coast as a'useful barrier between the Trucial Oman and the 
Ottoman influence in the north, India's fears about his ambitions 
in the Gulf area increased. Taking no initiative in Gulf affairs; 
Britain informed Ibn Saud that she could not assist him in any 
struggle against Turkey, because they had already come to a 
comprehensive understanding on Arabian affairs. 
2 
Britain's 
policy was in fact still wavering. There were conflicting 
views in the Foreign office and, as one critic minuted: 
1. Quoted in, Troeller, ö . cit., p. 90; see also F. O. Memo. 
2. See: Qasem, o . cit., pp. 1-14; Kelly, op. cit., p. 111; Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates (London 1978) pp. 170-171. For the 
Saudi point of view see: Saudi Memorial, ii, pp. 384-99. 
"I have always felt that the policy we are pursuing 
towards Ibn Saud is fraught with grave danger to the 
integrity of Turkey, 'and I was always personally 
strongly opposed to the intervigws which took place 
between him and our officials, " 
Thus, to Ibn Saud only one option - the Turkish option 
seemed open. Negotiations with the Turks proceeded smoothly, 
and on 15 May a treaty was-signed. , Accordingly he was offered 
"the Vilayet of Nejd .... for life". He accepted the title of 
"Wali and Military Commandant of Nejd" and engaged to fly a 
"Turkish flag". Foreign correspondence was to--be conducted 
solely through the Porte- and in case of war he was "to come 
to the assistance of the Sultan". 
2 Ibn Saud agreed to these 
terms only because "he was assured privately that even the 
small measures of sovereignty accorded to Turkey could never 
be claimed". 
3 The treaty was, however, put to the test 
by the outbreak of the First World War and found wanting as 
will be seen. 
Shakespear, still in favour of supporting Ibn Saud, agreed 
that "Turkey has not the power to coerce Arabia". He indicated 
that "a combination of all the Arab tribes" was possible, and 
"the expulsion of Turkish troops and officials" from the Arab 
lands, and "the establishment of an independent Arabia" under 
1. Quoted in Saudi Memorial, ii, - p. 393. 
2. For a summary of the trdaty see: F. O. Memo. 
A confirmation of the appointment of Ibn Saud as Wali 
of Nejd was made by the Turkish Ambassador in London in 
a note to F. O. on 9 July 1914. See: Kelly, op. cit, 
p. 110. Apparantly Ibn Saud did not sign the treaty 
although it had been sent to him for signature. The Saudi 
Govt. later confifined this. See Saudi Memorial, ii, p. 931; 
see also: Attar, op. cit., pp. 406-409. 
3. Saudi Memorial, ii, p. 931. 
Ibn Saud's leadership remained the Arabs' best hope. He 
wrote to the India Office: 
"I have heard the subject discussed so often 
along these lines, and by so many widely 
separated chiefs, that I cannot avoid the 
conclusion that the Turkish government is 
riding for a very bad fall. " 
Sir Arthur Hirtzel, permanent secretary at the India 
Office, replied on 18 June to Shakespear that: "if 
H. M. G. are to support Ibn Saud, his interests must somehow 
be harmonised with those of the Turks, or at least shown 
not to conflict with them. "2 
However good Shakespear's judgement was Britain's 
relations with both Ibn Saud and Turkeylad to be revised 
when the war broke in Europe. The Turkish question 
accordingly took on a new dimension. If Turkey joined 
Germany, it was then argued, Britain's whole position 
in the Middle East would be threatened. Against that 
contingency 'it was decided that no time must be lost in 
seeking both reliable allies in Arabia and a knowledgeable 
emissary to make contact. Implementatt. on of this decision 
to support military operations against Turkey and to 
counteract the effect of the Ottoman Caliph's proclamation 
of a jehad (Holy War) 
3 became even more urgent. in November 
when Turkey and Britain were formally at war. From Britain's 
1. Quoted in: Winstone, o . cit., pp. 190- 91. 
2. Ibid., see also: Arab Bureau Memo. 
3. For Holy War in Islam: 'i ehad', see: Khadduri, War 
and Peace in the Law of Islam (London 1979), 
chapters 5 and 6, pp. 55-82. 
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point of view I Ibn Saud as far as any military operations 
in Mesopotamia were concerned and the Sharif of the Hejaz, 
Husain, Ibn Ali, as-far as any Eguptian based operation was 
concerned, were two, key figures among Arab leaders. 
While the British policy-makers were evaluating 
Britain's position during the autumn of 1914, Shakespear 
was welcomed to Whitehall "with open arms". He was no 
longer "the meddling nuisance who sought to change Britain's 
entire policy". It was quickly decided that he should go 
back to Arabia with the title of "Political officer on 
Special Duty" responsible directly to Sir Percy Cox and 
charged with the task of preventing the outbreak of unrest 
in Central Arabia, "and in the event of war with Turkey 
to ensure that no assistance should be rendered from that 
quarter". He was given the authority to negotiate with Ibn 
Saud an agreement to that effect. Before his arrival in 
Arabia, war had been declared. 
1 
Ibn Saud was, accordingly, 
informed of Shakespear's impending visit and offered 
guarantees for his defacto position vis ä vis Turkey. Turkey 
herself lost no time in approaching Ibn Saud, who took 
advantage of the general situation to open hostilities against 
Ibn al-Rashid. The Turkish mission failed to reconcile the 
two Arab chiefs, because of Ibn Saud's insistance on the 
reduction of his family's traditional enemy to a "rightful 
1. Winstone, o . cit., pp. 193-194; see also: Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs (London 1971), P. M. 
state of vassalage". Until he achieved this purpose, Ibn 
Saud made it clear that he could spare no troops for Turkey 
in Iraq. l At this early stage of war Ibn Saud's attitude 
was one of neutrality, even before he was approached by any 
British official. 
When the British message of 3 , November reached Ibn Saud 
with promises and guarantees for his independence, he replied 
that he would be "one of the greatest helpers" to the British 
side, and he remained "unshaken" in his long-standing desire 
to meet Shakespear. Meanwhile, the Shaikh of Kuwait used his 
good offices to encourage Ibn Saud to take the same pro-British 
attitude as he and the Shaikh of Mohammarah. 
2 
On Shakespear's arrival in Kuwait, on 7 December, he 
found that a message from Ibn Saud awaited him suggesting an 
urgent meeting. 
3 
At the same time he found both the Shaikh 
of Kuwait and Cox fully engaged in preparing to receive Lord 
Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, then on his way to the Gulf 
to secure Arab co-operation for Britain. Shakespear was asked 
to wait for the Viceroy, 
4 but he preferred to proceed directly 
to Ibn Saud. On 31 December, he found the Amir in a bad mood, 
1. Arab Bureau Memo.; F. O. Memo. 
2. Messages between the Sheikh of Kuwait and Ibn Saud are 
cited in: Winstone, op. cit., pp. 196- 97. For the 
attitude of the Shaikh of Mohammarah, see: Qasem, 
OP-cit., p. 12. 
3. Winstone, op. cit., p. 198. 
4. See an account of Lord Hardinge's trip to the Gulf in his 
My Indian Years (London 1945) pp. 111- 14; see also: 
Qasem, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
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for during Shakespear's absence in London, difficulties 
had arisen between the Amir and the British agents at-Kuwait 
and Bahrain (Gray and Trevor). Showing sympathy for Ibn 
1 
Saud, as was indicated by a despatch to Cox, their discussions 
proceeded. The Amir described the offer of 3 November as 
"vague" for it did not define Britain's obligation. Shakespear 
understood that Ibn Saud 
"had no intention of abandoning his [actual] neutral 
position with freedom to make his own arrangements with 
the Turks until he held a signed and sealed treaty with 
the British Government; nor would he move a step 
further towards making matters either easier for 
us [Britain] or more difficult for the Turks so far 
as the present war was concerned, until he obtained 
in that treaty some very solid guarantee of his 
position with Great Britain practically as his 
suzerain. " 
For Ibn Saud there was, in fact, no compelling reason 
to join either party. He had just dismissed the Turkish 
deputation empty handed and, he felt himself entitled to 
insist upon explicit guarantees of recognition and security. 
3 
Although he was personally inclined to join the British, and 
risl( Wahhabi displeasure since the Wahhabis regarded even 
the Turks as infidels, he was also determined to look for the 
I- 
best bargain. It seemed foolish to be satisfied with verbal 
assurances or vague written promises from Britain, when he had 
1. As there was no British representation in Ibn Saud's 
dominions, he had to make his contacts with the British 
through the British Agents in Bahrain and in Kuwait. 
2. F. O. Memo.; see also: Arab Bureau Memo.; Winstone, 
-OP. 
cit., pp. 200-201. 
3. On meeting Ibn Saud, Shakespear found Sayyed Taleb of Iraq 
trying to persuade him to remain loyal to the Porte. 
See: Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, p. 232; Wilson, 
Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914-1917 (Oxford 1930) pp. 18-19. 
See Art. 12 of the 15 May 1914 Treaty. 
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little to loose from maintining his present nominal allegiance 
to Turkey: ' Clear and definite recognition of his independence 
must at least be demanded of Britain. To this end he was 
prepared to negotiate with Shakespear after only six months 
of signing an accord with Turkey, and at a time when Turkey 
by every possible means was anxious to gain his active 
support in the war; 
Fully understanding the Amir's attitude, Shakespear 
asked him to formulate his desires in a draft proposal. Ibn 
Saud complied and on 4 January 1915 the draft proposal was 
submitted to Cox. Having considered it, Cox wrote to 
London asking for authority to negotiate on that basis with 
Ibn Saud. 
1 
Shakespear's own comment on Ibn Saud's proposals was 
that the Amir had asked for little more than he had been promised 
by the 3 November letter. Nevertheless if these proposals 
were meant to apply to the'future as well as to the present, 
there would be positive consequences for Britain. He listed 
the-advantages that Britain would gain if she agreed to Ibn 
Saud's terms as follows: Britain would be the only Great 
Power controlling the Arab littoral of the Gulf; she would 
also be able to control the arms traffic; Britain could make 
use of Ibn Saud's influence over Muslim opinion in Arabia; 
finally, there was no doubt that the security of the trade 
route would be guaranteed and commercial benefits gained. 
2 
1. F. O. Memo. 
2. Ibid. 
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While waiting for a British reply and with Shakespear 
in attendance, Ibn Saud tried to demonstrate his strength 
by launching a'military attack on the pro-Turk Amir of Hail. 
Unexpectedly, Ibn'Saud was defeated and Shakespear was killed 
in the battle of Jarab on 24 January 1915. Jarab was a very 
costly operation at which Ibn Saud lost not only a friend, 
but also the chance of leading an Arab revolt against Turkey. 
For such a role Ibn Saud had been preparing himself1 with the 
help and encouragement of Shakespear. The battle certainly 
left Ibn Saud in a worse position than before; his prestige 
was weakened; his role in Arabian affairs was reduced; and 
the 'Ujman2 rebellion engaged him for the following twelve 
months. The progress of the Mesopotamian campaign and 
3 
the occupation of Basra'helped to diminish any serious need 
for his aipport, since he was no longer in direct contact 
with Turkish troops. Moreover, azd this came later, Ibn 
Saud's two main rivals (Sharif Husain and Ibn al-Rashid) 
took opposite sides; the one pro-British and the other 
pro-Turk. This made his own position of neutrality easier 
4 
to maintain. 
1. Ibn Saud took the initiative at the beginning of the war 
and sent messages to the Shaikhs of Arabia to unify their 
attitudes for the sake of Arab interests. See: Qasem, 
o . ci ., p. 19. 
2. For the 'Ujman see: Busch, op. cit., p. 246, note 53; American 
Consul (Baghdad)to Secretary of State (Washington) 14 Feb. 
1929, cited in: Ibrahim al-Rashid, Documents on the History 
of Saudi Arabia, (Salisbury 1976) iii, pp. 16-20. (Thereafter: 
D. H. S. A. ) 
3. Arab Bureau Memo.; Wilson, Loyalties, p. 31; Freeth, Kuwait 
was my Home, (London 1956) p. 32. 
4. Toynbee, 'The Rise of the Wahhabi Power', Survey of Inter-- 
national Affairs 1925, i (1927) p. 283, (Thereafter: Survey 
1925); Wilson, op. cit., chapter I; Busch, op. cit., Chapter 1; 
Attar, op. cit., 482-84. 
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What part he might have played, during the early war 
years, if his friend Shakespear had not been killed and if 
he had not been defeated at Jarab remains a fascinating 
question for speculation to students of modern Arab history. 
Ibn Saud, however, played a role of his own choice and, as 
the following decade would have shown Jarab was an 
ecception in his war game. 
In the event, although defeated at Jarab, his operation 
more or less succeeded in putting a pro-Turk force out of 
action. Ibn al-Rashid would surely have joined the main 
Turkish forces in opposing Britain's Mesopotamian campaign. 
This was not the only benefit to-Britain. Four months later 
in June 1915 Ibn Saud concluded an agreement with Ibn al-Rashid, 
defining, in vague terms their territorial boundaries and 
establishing what was hoped to be "uninterrupted brotherhood 
and friendship" between themselves. The agreement might have 
been expected to neutralise Ibn al-Rashid and so gain for Britain 
by peaceful means what Ibn Saud had failed to obtain by war. 
According to the text: 
". I, Bin Rashid, will not interfere with Bin 
Saud at all. Nor shall I act treacherously with 
him vis a vis the Turkish Government. It is 
incumbent upon me to incline with him to whichever 
Government is allied with him, ¶nd I have no 
intention to oppose his views. " 
These terms hardly seem to be those acceptable to a war victor. 
And it is, therefore, probable that, although suffering heavy 
losses and in particular that of his friend Shakespear, Ibn 
1. For text see: Arab Bureau Memo. To my knowledge this 
is the first indication to this agreement. 
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Saud never really suffered a defeat at Jarab as-serious as 
was surmised by the British and'as has since been believed. 
The'validity of the agreement itself, however, was 
open to question since it was doubtful, in a tribal society, 
that Ibn al-Rashid, even if he had wished to do so, could keep 
such promises. -"-In fact there is evidence to show that he 
secretly supported the''Ujman'rebellion which Ibn Saud almost 
immediately was required to face. It-'was this rebellion, on 
top of the Jarab defeat, which effectively prevented Ibn 
Saud from playing any direct part in the Anglb-Turkish war. 
The death of Shakespear temporarily suspended the 
conclusion of the proposed agreement'between Britain and Ibn 
Saud. . -But-at Ibn Saud's request, Captain Gerald Leachman 
was appointed-to replace Shakespear. 
1 Leachman failed to 
move Ibn Saud any further from his neutral attitude and 
accordingly the notion that he might have an active 
supporting part to play'in the war was, for the'time being, 
shelved. 
The' idea of making a treaty with Ibn Saud remained under 
discussion and "in the interest of peace and order it would 
be essential ' for the Power--that controls the Gulf to'have 'a' 
working arrangement with him [Ibn Saud]". 
2 Accordingly 
Cox was authorised on 6 February to start negotiations with 
Ibn Saud, and he drew up a-seven article treaty and despatched 
it to the Amir on'24 April. Ibn Saud replied with a modified 
I 
1. Bray, A Paladin of Arabia, the Biography of G. E. Leachman 
(London 1936) p. 259; Winstone, o . cit., pp. 215-216. 
2. F. O. Memo. 
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draft. -By-the end, of June Cox was optimistic that agreement 
could be reached and, after delays mainly due to communication 
difficulties, the treaty was signed-on 26 December at Darain. 
l 
In-the-first article of the Treaty, the British Government 
"acknowledge and admit that Nejd, El-Hasa, Qatif and Jubail 
and their dependencies ... are the countries of Ibn Saud ... 
as the independent ruler ... and after him his sons". In the 
event of aggression by any foreign Power against his 
territories, Britain, was to-aid Ibn Saud (article 2)., The 
Amir pledged himself not to enter into relations with any 
foreign Power, except Britain (article 3). -He-also undertook 
(in. the fourth article) not to cede territory nor to grant 
concessions to any foreign Power without the consent of the 
British Government. He undertook to keep open, within his 
territories, the roads leading-to the-Holy Places 
(article 5),. He furthermore undertook to refrain from all 
aggression against-the territories ofýKuwait and the other 
Gulf states (article 6). Finally, the two parties agreed , 
to convert this temporary treaty into amore comprehensive 
one at a later date. 
_ 
From the British point of view the treaty with Ibn Saud 
completed arrangements, -guaranteeing British control, already 
made with the Arab rulers on the.. littoral of the Gulf. In 
2 
1. Ibid. The treaty was ratified on 18 July 1916. 
For text see Appendix A. 
2. Qatar was the only gap yet to be filled in the Gulf treaty 
system. on 3 Nov. 1916 a treaty was signed between Britain 
and Qatar. See: Azzam, 'The International Status of the 
Persian Gulf States', Revue Egyptienne de Droit International, 
XV (1959) 20-70; Busch, Qp. cit., pp. 230-231. 
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making the'treaty, 'however, Britain also became involved, and 
now for the first time, in the affairs of Central Arabia. 
At the time, and in the midst of war exigencies, this 
departure from previous practice-did not seem-to be a matter 
of much significance. In fact it was eventually to prove a 
major turning point in the development of British policy. 
The treaty has been seen as humiliating to Ibn Saud 
and a great mistake on his part. His advisers, it'is argued, 
were not fully aware of the real. value and of the importance 
of their country and hence yielded to Britain's pressure. 
1 
These views take little account of the realities of the 
situation. , However worded, the treaty provided a base for 
Anglo-Saudi relations. Ibn Saud gained more status than he 
had achieved by his agreementýof-15 May 1914 with the Turks, 
in that he was recognised as an independent ruler and this 
was mainly what he had been seeking from Britain. In return 
he had accepted limited ties which affected his relations 
with his'Eastern neighbours. Elsewhere he was free to exercise 
his diplomatic and military skills in pursuit of whatever 
objectives"he. might wish toýchoose. - 
ýý . 
1. Wahba, jazirat al-arab fi al-garn al-ishreen (Cairo 
1956) p. 257; Qasem, op. cit., p. 29; 
Williams, Ibn Saud, the Puritan King of Arabia 
(London 1933), p. 96. 
Arabia during the First World War and after, 1915-20 
The idea of an Arab rebellion against Turkey-was first 
suggested when Shakespear reported on his-meeting of 1911 with 
Ibn. Saud. Traditional British attitudes towards Turkey 
were still strong enough for this notion to fall on deaf ears. 
But with the outbreak of the war with Turkey it gained 
enthusiastic approval in London. 
' Unfortunately for him, 
Ibn Saud missed the chance of leading such a revolt by his 
defeat at Jarab. Thus lowered in Britain's estimation Ibn 
Saud almost remained in abeyance while Cairo was already in 
secret correspondence with Sharif Husain. Husain, it was 
believed, as a keeper of-the Muslim Holy Places and a member 
of the Hashemite family of the Prophet Mohammad "could 
exert throughout the Muslim-world a moral influence which 
would, and did, make a very great influence ... ". 
2 If his 
friendship could be secured, the British assumed that Husain 
would oppose the most serious danger to the Allies - the 
jehad which had been announced by the Sultan and Caliph of 
Turkey to provoke Muslims under British Control mainly in 
3 Egypt and India. Husain was also a possible candidate 
1. Winstone, Captain Shakespear, p. 216. Winstone emphasized 
this point of view to The Sunday Times of 10 May 1981. 
2. Hogarth, 'Wahabism and British Interests', Journal of 
British Institure of International Affairs, IV (1925) 
pp. 70-81; see also: Attar, op. cit., pp. 485-86. 
3. For India's attitude towards the revolt, see: Busch, op. cit., 
pp. 164- 71; Troeller, 'Ibn Saud and Sharif Husain, a Comparison 
in theirlmportance in the early years of the First World War', 
Historical Journal, XIV (1971) pp. 627- 33; Sachar, The 
Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924 (London 1970) p. 123. 
as an'Arab Caliph of Islam, Cox had earlier conceived of Ibn 
Saud in this role but, as Ibn'Saud had then pointed out to him, 
first 1 
the Wahhabis did not recognise any Caliph after the/ four. 
The Hejaz was strategically important for Britain. With 
Husain's cooperation Britain could guard against the possible 
use by Germany of the eastern'coast of the Red Sea'as a 
submarine base, and could also prevent the Turks from making 
use of the Hejaz Railway'which was a branch of the Baghdad 
Railway. In hostile hands, the Hejaz Railway could cause 
problems forBritain's position in Aden and in East Africa. 
Thus Husain was'now''the best choice. 
Accordingly, the focal point of British policy in Arabia 
quickly moved from Eastern Arabia, which was within India's 
sphere of authority, to the-Hejaz, which fell within Cairo's 
orbit. Any approaches to Husain would, therefore, depend not 
on Cox, who had just concluded a treaty with Ibn Saud, but 
on the Arab Bureau's staff. 
2 
the context of this study it would be superfluous 
to include any detailed account of the revolt. Some points, 
however, do need to be explored to clarify the objectives of 
Britain's policy in'Arabia and to explain the subsequent 
course of Britain's relations with Ibn Saud. 
1. Quoted in: Kedourie, In the A nglo-Arab Labyrinth, the 
McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 
1914-1939 (Cambridge 1976) pp. 50-51. 
2. Collins, An Arabian Diary, Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton 
(Berkeley 1969) p. 23. 
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By the outbreak of the War, the Arab revolt` against 
Turkey was simmering. Secret societies had been created 
to secure "the liberation and'independence"'of the Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and "to resist foreign 
penetration of whatever kind-or form". 1 ' The War-stirred 
Arab hopes and various contacts between Arab leaders and 
Britain were established. The Imam of the Yemen and Ibn 
al-Rashid of Hail soon decided to remain loyal to the Porte. 
Britain's negotiations with Husain proved difficult and pro- 
tracted. The Sharif first hesitated between the conflicting 
views of'his own sons. Faisal favoured standing by Turkey, while 
Abd-Allah favoured supporting-'the British. The nationalists 
in Syria were prepared to negotiate with either side on the 
basis of their own plan. They had stated their conditions 
in the form of'a protocol and deputed the'Sharif to negotiate 
on its terms with the British. They wanted Britain to 
recognise the independence of'the Arab countries lying in 
the whole of Arabia and Syria except Aden. They also wanted 
the abolition of Capitulations already granted to foreigners, 
and "the conclusion of a defensive alliance between Britain 
and the future independent state". In return, they were 
prepared to grant Britain "economic preference"2. Husain 
1. See text of al-Fatah resolution in: Antonius, The 
Arab Awakin : The Story of the Arab National Movement 
(London 1938) p. 153. Arabia had witnessed an earlier 
attempt during the 19th century when the Wahhabi movement 
had originally emerged. Although the movement had been crushed 
by Mohammad Ali of Egypt, Mohammad Ali himself raised the flag 
of rebellion against the Sultan soon afterwards until driven 
back into allegiance by the European Powers. 
2. Antonius, The Arab Awaking, pp. 157-158 
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accordingly resumed negotiations with: Cairo. Between July 
1915 and January 1916, Sir Henry McMahon, the then High 
Commissioner, exchanged with him eight letters known as: 
`McMahon-Husain Correspondence'. In these letters the two 
parties were trying to define their positions towards each 
other in order to decide the conditions upon which the Sharif 
would join the Allies. 
In his first letter of 14 July 1915 Husain sought to gain 
the endorsement of Britain for the proposed Arab state as 
defined by the protocol of Damascus. 
l McMahon replied on 
30 August with vague and indecisive terms. Negotiations 
about frontiers, he argued, "would appear to be premature and 
a waste of time ... " in the heat of war. Negotiations then 
entered into labyrinths of drafting refinements. When Husain 
insisted on definite frontiers to the Arab state, McMahon 
excluded "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts 
of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo... " Although Husain 
refused McMahon's argument on 5 November and warned, at the 
beginning of 1916, that he would not abandon his claim to the 
whole of Syria, he soon afterwards made his fatal mistake 
when he agreed to postpone the question of frontiers until 
after the war. 
2 
Having appeared to have burned his fingers with Turkey and 
1. Ibid., pp. 164-165,414-415. 
2. Ibid., 413-427. 
needing to look to his own security, Husain had no. other 
alternative but to raise the flag of the Arab Revolt on 10 
June-1916. According to Aziz Ali al-Misri (the leader of the 
nationalist society, al-'Ahd) nobody among the nationalists 
who had deputed Husain to negotiate knew 
"whether Sharif Husain'had raised the revolt to 
to prevent the occupation of the Hejaz by a 
foreign Poweror to defy the Sultanis authority 
in order to achieve independence. " 
Although Aziz al-Mizri was appointed by British advisers in 
Cairo for the job of Husain's Chief of Staff, he was reluctant 
to serve the Sharif and mistrusted him. When persuaded by 
Britain to agree, his doubts were not resolved even when he 
met Husain personally. He resigned his post to be succeeded 
by Jafar al-Askari. In October, Ronald Storrs, oriental 
secretary in Cairo, accompanied by T. E. Lawrence, arrived in 
Jeddah to co-ordinate Britain's part in the revolt. Lawrence 
remained behind to fulfil his legendary role as liaison 
officer. 
2 Thus, as Philby later commented, "it was left 
to Lawrence and the army of the Hejaz to accomplish what in other 
circumstances ... might have been accomplished by Ibn Saud 
and Shakespear". 
3 
1. Khadduri, 'Aziz Ali Misri and the Arab NationaliEtMovement', 
St. Antony's Papers, xvii (1965) pp. 140- 63; See also Antonius, 
The Arab Awaking, pp. 118- 25,159- 61,212; Hourani, The 
Emergence of the Modern Middle East (Oxford 1981) pp. 70-72. 
2. For evaluation and criticism of Lawrence and his writings see: 
Trover, 'In Wisdom's House, T. E. Lawrence in the Near East', 
Journal of Contemporary History, xiii (1978) pp. 585-606; 
See also, The Sunday Times, 10 May 1981. 
3. Philby, The Heart of Arabia (London 1922) 1,386. 
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At the end of the year Sir Gilbert Clayton, Director 
of Military Intelligence at the Arab Bureau (Cairo) which 
mastermined. the plan, could boast that "the Sharif's revolt 
has shattered the solidarity of Islam ... [and] has emphasised 
the failure of Jehad". From the political point of view, 
Clayton claimed that the revolt 
"carries on and completes-our policy in Arabia, as 
exemplified in the agreements with the Hadramout, 
Oman, Muscut, Kuwait, [Asir] and with IbnýSaud. With 
the last named it gives Great Britain a hand of 
influence running across Arabia from the Red Sea 
to the Persian Gulf as a bir to the progress of hostile 
activity and penetration. " 
On the other-side of theýAbrabian Peninsula-Ibn Saud's 
role in the general war remained less significant than had 
been expected. His energies were absorbed in local tribal 
conflicts, first with the 'Ujmän and then with the Murrah 
tribes. India's attitude, too, helped to isolate him from 
taking. any active part. The shortage of money and guns were 
a real handicap. The memory of his defeat at Jarab had 
not yet been erased, and any future adventure needed to be 
well calculated. 2 Furthermore, and this was important, Ibn 
Saud mistrusted Britain for giving leadership of the Arab 
Revolt to his ancestral enemy (Sharif Husain) who "might 
proceed to claim authority over-parts of Nejd" or assume 
superiority over other Arab rulers. When the Sharif 
1. Quoted in: Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, p. 136. 
2. See: F. O. Memo.; Arslänian, 'British Wartime Pledges 
1917-1918: The Armenian Case', Journal of Contemporary 
History, xiii (1978) 517-30. 
first sought Ibn Saud's help, the later insisted on obtaining 
from the Sharif a written undertaking that "the Sharif would 
abstain from trespassing in his [Ibn Saud's] territory or 
interfering with his subjects". Husain's-reply in September 
was "unconciliatory and aroused his lively indignation". 
The British{Government, aware of the old feuds and jealousies 
between the two leaders, felt that it was necessary both for 
the Arab cause'and for British interests that they "should 
work together and in co-operation with us". 
1 Britain's 
hopes and those of Ibn Saud were dismayed when Husain pro- 
claimed himself 'King of the Arab Countries'. Britain felt 
constrained to protest against the title out of deference 
to French susceptibilities and to those of other Arab leaders. 
Eventually Britain compromised with Husain and recognised him 
as 'King of the Hejaz'. Husain's ambitions "deeply wounded" 
Ibn Saud's Arab pride. His growing suspicions of Husain 
were reciprocated. 
Husain saw in him a leader of the Wahhabis whose ambitions 
constituted a permanent threat to the Hejaz. 
2 
1. Arab Bureau Memo. 
2. See: Sharif Abdullah to Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Washington), ( no date ), a, 1-Rashid, D. H. S. A., 
1.35-36; American Vice-Consul (Cairo) to Sec. of State 
(Washington), 7 Nov. 1917, Ibid., pp. 31-33; Admiralty, 
Western Arabia and the Red Sea (Oxford 1946) p. 295; 
Collins, An Arabian Diary, p. 24; Dawn, 'The Amir of 
Mecca . al-Husayn Ibn-Ali and the Origin of the Arab Revolt', Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, civ (1960) pp. 11-34; Baker, King Husain 
end the Kingdom of Hejaz (Cambridge 1979) Chapt. 10, 
pp. 97-120; Kedourie, op. cit., pp. 192-'93. 
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Cox decided to talk directly to Ibn Saud to take him out 
of this futile situation and to revive his active role in the 
war. This decision stemmed from a correspondance between himself 
and the Wahhabi leader. Cox in his endeavours to protect an 
Arab Amir in India's sphere of influence against possible 
aggression from another Arab King in Cairo's orbit, argued 
on 8 September 1916 that Ibn-Saud 
"should be informed definitely that no present or 
future understandings between us and the Sharif should 
prejudice our adherence to therterms of articlg 1 and 
2 of our treaty with him of 26 December 1915. " 
The terms of that treaty, he suggested, should be made known 
to the Sharif in order to inform him of British responsibilities 
towards other Arab leaders. The India and Foreign offices 
telegraphed the Viceroy on 19 September that the idea of an 
Arab state or confederation of states "was not dead", and 
agreed to the reference of article one only "as we could not 
admit that article two was binding on us as against other 
Arabs". The Foreign and India offices' interpretation 
2 
of article two meant that Britain neither would nor should 
aid Ibn Saud against the Sharif. They pressed their 
understanding that the word "foreign" applies only to non-Arabs. 
They also insisted, for the time being, to witthold knowledge 
of the text of the treaty from Husain. 
3 It was then agreed 
that the feud between'the two Arab rivals was damaging to 
1. F. O. Memo. For text of Arts. 1 &2 of 1915 Treaty see Appendix A. 
2. F. O. Memo. 
3. Busch, op. cit., p. 244. The treaty was later made known 
to Husain, see: F. O. Memo. 
British war-time interests and ought to be settled. This 
had in fact been the objective of Cox's proposals. 
In the meanwhile, communications between Cox and Ibn Saud 
continued. The latter sought, in September, to meet Cox to 
discuss with him the proposed co-operation with Britain. 
Accordingly, they met on 11 November at 'Uqair where Ibn Saud 
explained his position in detail. Cox was able to give the 
Amir "the fullest reassurance". This was followed by a visit 
to Kuwait on 20 November. Cox again scored a success when 
"the three chiefs, Kuwait, Muhammerah and Ibn Saud, swore 
together that they would work with us [Britain] for the 
achievement of a common end". These verbal assurances were 
met by similar verbal assurances to Ibn Saud that "his rights 
had been carefully reserved in all dealings which the British 
Government had held with the Sharif". 
1 With the help of 
Miss G. Bell, Cox prepared a Durbar for the three chiefs 
at which Ibn Saud was made a Knight Commander of the Most 
Honourable Order of the Indian Empire (K. C. I. E. ). Furthermore, 
he was taken to Basra on 26 November, where he visited a 
British base and was presented with a sword of honour and a 
message of welcome-from the-Army Commander. There he was urged 
to send one of his sons-and some followers on a conciliatory 
mission to the Sharif. 2. 
1. 
2. 
Arab Bureau Memo. 
F. O. Memo.; Arab Bureau Memo.; Busch, op. cit., pp. 246- 47; 
Winstone, Gertrude Bell (London 1978) p. 188. Winstone 
quoted Bell's admiration of Ibn Saud as follows: "We had 
an extraordinarily interesting day with Ibn Saud, who is 
one of the most striking personalities I have encountered". 
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"The Kuwait Durbar", it was argued, "and Ibn Saud's visit 
to Basra have placed us in a singularly strong position". 
Cox, and India in general, were becoming increasingly' 
enthusiastic about the value of Ibn Saud, who undertook to 
maintain 4,000 men under arms to fight Ibn al-Rashid. In 
return he was given 3,000 rifles with ammunition, and granted 
a monthly subsidy of £5,000 to cover the expenses he will 
incur in maintaining his men in the field. According to A. T. 
Wilson (Cox's deputy) Ibn Saud's visit was "an event 
of far-reaching importance which, had our activities in 
Arabia been directed from Basra instead of from Egypt, might 
have been the occasion for a fresh orientation of policy". 
1 
This was the first open demonstration of India's backing for 
Ibn Saud. 
The Cairo-India policy of preventing Ibn Saud and the 
Sharif from quarrelling with each other by keeping them busy 
in the Great War was successful. But good relations with 
the Sharif and with the Arabs were soon to be threatened by 
two major British policy decisions: the Sykes-Picot 
agreement of May 1916, which was made despite pledges already 
given to the Arabs; and the Balfour Declarion of 2 November 
1917, which reinforced the Sharif's fears of Britain's policy 
2 in the Middle East. The two decisions, when made known in 1917, 
1. Arab Bureau Memo.; See also Wilson, Loyalties, pp. 160,285; Busch, op. cit., p. 246; Toynbee, Survey 1925; Monroe, Philly 
of Arabia (London 1974) p. 70. 
2. See: Antoni us, op. cit., chapter 8; Sachar, op. cit., pp. 158-175; Busch, op. cit., pp. 181- 88,191; Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World; The Cairo Conference of 1921 (London 1970) Chapt. I, pp. 1-17; Chory, 'An Arab view on the situation in Palestine', International Affairs, 
xv (1936) pp. 684- 99. 
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caused a shock to the Arabs. For themselves it was too late 
to change their position. Mark Sykes himself was sent to meet 
the Sharif and to allay his fears. Later, on 4 January 1918 
Dr. Hogarth was sent to Jeddah to reassure Husain. 
' Husain, 
however, could not be reconciled. His dreams of an Arab 
state had vanished. 
The development of Britain's policy during the war in 
the Middle East provoked doubts that the emergence of independent 
Arab countries, or a united Arab state would materialise and 
a realisation that a united Arab state to the east of Egypt 
was no longer contemplated at all by Britain. As early as 
12 November 1915, Clayton wrote to Wingate that; 
"India seems obsessed with the fear of a powerful and 
united Arab state, which can never exist unless we are 
fools enough to create it. " He added, "It will have to 
be our business to see that it does not ever become 
a possibility, gwing to backing one horse to exclusion 
of the others. " 
Echoing the same tone, Sir Arthur Hirtzel'wrote in February 1916, 
"A strong Arab state might be more dangerous to 
Christendom than a strong Ottoman state, & 
Lord Kitchener's policy of destroying one 
Islamic state merely for the purpose of creating3 
another, has always seemed to me disastrous ... " 
Among the various British authorities, individual critics 
of Britain's "unrealistic policy" were beginning to emerge. 
1. Klieman, op. cit., pp. 141- 45; Monroe, op-cit., pp. 78-81. 
2. Quoted in:, Kedourie, op. cit., p. 120. 
3. Quoted in: Busch, op. cit., p. 92 
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The Director of Military Intelligence, for instance, had observed 
in connection with the Sykes-Picot agreement: "I must confess 
that it seems to me that we are in the position of the hunters 
who divided up the skin of the bear before they had killed it". 
l 
Troubles seemed to be growing between Cairo and the Sharif. 
Britain's policy had become wide open to criticism among the 
Arabs, who felt that they had been deceived. Britain was 
negotiating with different parties for the same Arab territories. 
As Britain's policy never had been clearly thought out in the 
Middle East, and as the Foreign office was by its nature "empirical' 
Britain paid more serious attention to questions of Ango-French 
rivalry and alliance than to the vague terms given to Arabs and 
to Jews. 2 
As relations with the Sharif deteriorated, the search 
for a more reliable leader began. The way had already been 
paved by the 'Ugair, Kuwait and Basra meetings. Now, in 
June 1917, Cairo planned for a mission by Storrs to Ibn Saud 
in order to discuss with him various matters concerning 
the Amir's relations with Britain's allies in Arabia, as well 
as his attitude towards her enemies. From Baghdad, Cox sent 
an aide memoire for Storrs guidance. "Nothing but good", 
it was hoped, could come out of Storrs visit to Ibn Saud. 
Unfortunately for Storrs, he returned back after only two days 
with heatstroke. 
3 
1. F. O. Memo. 
2. See: Hourani,. 'The Decline of the West in the Middle East=2' 
International'Affairs., xxix (1953) pp. 156- 83. 
3. Aide Memoire for Storrs regarding the affairs of Ibn Saud (Philly Papers) 15/4; See also: Wilson, op. cit., p. 305; Busch, 
op. cit  pp. 248- 50; Kedourie, op. cit., pp. 186- 87. 
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Baghdad maintained its belief that Ibn Saud should 
assume a more active role and advised Cairo that attempts 
for conciliation should not be abandoned. This belief was 
strengthened by reports that "Ibn Saud had become the religious 
and secular leader of all central Arabian tribes except those 
dependent on Ibn Rashid -of-Hail ..., and the 
'Ajman of 
Mesopotamian borderlands". 
1 
In the autumn of 1917 Cox 
sent Philby, a political officer of the Indian Civil Service, 
on a mission2 to see both Ibn Saud and the Sharif. At the 
same time an Egyptian official was to come to Jeddah for a 
similar conciliatory purpose. Philby's main purpose was to 
arrange with Ibn Saud a more active role against Ibn al- 
Rashid since the arrangements made earlier by Cox provided less 
help than Ibn Saud really needed. The mission's objective, 
however, related to the same points for which both Shakespear 
and Cox met Ibn Saud. 
The task of the mission was not easy. Communications 
were difficult and sometimes impossible. Both Husain and Ibn 
Saud were in different frames of mind. Again, Cairo and 
Baghdad differed over whether or not the mission should be 
pursued to the very end. Facing with these difficulties and 
with incoherent policies, Philby shouldered the whole responsibility 
and went beyond the instructions he had been given. 
1. Monroe, op. cit., pp. 58C59. 
2. Philby has recorded an account of his twelve months mission in 
three vols. The first two are entitled The Heart of Arabia (London 1922) the third is called Arabia of Me aa is 
(London 1928). The mission has also been discussed in: Busch, 
op. cit., pp. 243- 63; Monroe, op. cit., pp. 58-94; Troeller, Qp-- 
cit., pp. 91-138; Silverfarb, 'The Philby Mission to Ibn Saud, 
1917-18', Journal of Contemporary History, xiv (1979) pp. 269-86. 
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At the end of November he found Ibn Saud's situation 
critical for the following reasons; (i) shortage of arms and 
money; (ii) increasing opposition among his people to dealing 
with Christians; (iii) the fact that he was surrounded by 
rivals and enemies (the Shaikh of Kuwait, the 'Ujman, Ibn 
al-Rashid, and King Husain). In order to secure his own position 
and to initiate an offensive against Ibn al-Rashid, Ibn Saud 
would need, as Philby estimated, ¬50,000 per month (100("/ 
of his current subsidy) in addition to an initial sum of ¬20,000 
and modern rifles. He sent this estimate to Cox stating that 
an expedition against Hail was worth undertaking and that 
"something big can be achieved". 
1 
On 9' December, '" he left for Taif in the Hejaz. There 
he found no sign of Storrs; and so he went on to Jeddah where 
he arrived on 31-December. At the British Agency headquarters 
in Jeddah,, after two months of continuous desert travel, he 
enjoyed a spell of relife, comfort and luxury. He caught up on 
news of world events and of the progress of the war. In" 
particular, he learned that Storrs had been appointed the first 
Governor of Jerusalem, and that Hogarth was on the way to Jeddah. 
The purpose of Hogarth's visit was not simply to see Philby 
but also to try to mollify King Husain after the shock of the 
revelation of the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour declaration. 
Hogarth and Philby saw the King together. The meeting proved 
fruitless, partly because the King was in an angry mood and 
partly because Philby's attitude increased that irritation. 
1. Silverfarb, 'The Philby Mission'. 
-47- 
Philby became more distressed when he learned that Cairo had 
reversed its policy and no longer supported an offensive 
by Ibn Saud, partly because of the changed military situation 
in the Middle East, and partly because of their anxiety about 
the possibility of changing the balance of power in Arabia in 
favour of Ibn Saud if he was supported on such a large scale. 
Eventually, Philby was obliged to leave for Egypt as Husain 
refused to allow him to cross the Hejaz borders and return 
to Ibn Saud. 
l 
After his Cairo trip, Philby returned to Ibn Saud with less 
to offer than he had promised. Sympathising with Ibn Saud, 
Philby tried to reassure him. He explained that the trip to 
Cairo had enabled him to discuss the Amir's case with the 
authorities there. This afforded little consolation to Ibn 
Saud. Nevertheless, by April Philby did manage to persuade him 
to attack Hail. Realising that he would not be allowed to 
prolong his mission much further and anxious, for reasons of 
personal ambition, to conclude with some concrete achievement 
he offered Ibn Saud a loan of ¬20,000 on condition that he 
immediately began operations against Ibn al-Rashid. Furthermore, 
he promised the Amir that his future status would be rocognised 
by the British Government. Urfortunately for both Philby and 
. now Ibn Saud, the whole idea behind the original mission was/finding 
little support either in Cairo or in India. 
2 
1. Ibid; Monroe, op. cit., pp. 66-81 
2. Busch, o . cit., pp. 248-50; Monroe, o . cit., pp. 83-6. 
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For his part, Ibn Saud, like the Sharif, had grown 
suspicious of the British. He spoke out in a letter to Philby 
dated 25 July, remarking that: 
"The British Government has become two governments; 
that of Egypt, which goes by the words of the Sharif ... 
right or wrong, and that of Iraq which receives my 
enemies [with open hands] and prevents me from 1 
punishing them [the 'Ujman and Ibn al-Rashid]". 
In order to clarify his position over any obligation to the 
British Government, Ibn Saud, in the same letter, asked Philby 
to let him know the British attitude on certain points; 
1- Whether Cairo could prevent the Sharif from taking any 
aggressive action against him. 
2- Whther the British Government could prevent the wandering 
'U jman and Shammar tribes from crossing into his 
territories. 
3- Whether Baghdad could help solve his differences with the 
Shaikh of Kuwait over the blockade. 
4- Whether the British Government would be prepared to pay 
him the whole cost of the military operations he would 
undertake to take Hail. 
In August 1918, Philby returned to Baghdad reiterating 
arguments in favour of getting Ibn Saud to take Hail, and the 
Sharif to take al-Madinah. Then Central Arabia could be 
divided between the two rulers, who would be kept dependent on 
Britain. Regarding the proposed frontiers in Central Arabia 
1. Ibn Saud to Philby, 16 Shawwal 1336 J6(Philby Papers) 15%2; 
See also Monroe, op. cit., pp. 90-1. See text of an agreement 
between Britain and the Shaikhs of the 'Ujman, 4 March 1918 
(Philby Papers) 15/4. This, 
' 
agreement made allies of the 
'Ujman during the war only. 
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he suggested that Khurmah be awarded to Ibn Saud, and the 
'Utaibah plain behind Mecca to King Husain. Unlike the Cairo 
view, he pointed out that the existence of Ibn al-Rashid 
would only complicate any post-war settlement. At Baghdad 
he found himself the only supporter of his own plan. 
1 
Relying only on Philby's promises of arms supply, and 
cautious about the consequences, Ibn Saud began minor operations 
against Hail in September. Soon afterwards, his army trickled 
back without taking the town because he had received news that 
his western borders had been attacked by the Sharif's army. 
Consequently, Ibn Saud's own theatre of war was transferred from 
Central Arabia to his western borders with the Hejaz. The 
Philby mission proved a failure; neither was Hail taken nor 
the Sharif reconciled. The general war ended, the local war 
started and as Philby remarked "a year's work collapsed 
before my eyes". 
2 
Now, not Hail, but the two little villages of Khurmah 
and Turabah became in the focus of Ibn Saud's interest. The 
Nejdis never abandoned their claim over these places, since 
they lay to the. east of the mountain Hadhn and since Hadhn had 
always been the boundary between Nejd and the Hejaz. 
3 In 
the absence of Saudi sovereignty over Nejd, the Hejaz ruled 
the villages. The Ikhwan, Ibn Saud's followers, were now able 
to attract the support of the Khurmah dwellers. Khaled Ibn 
1. Busch, op. cit., p. 253; Monroe, op. cit., p. 91. 
2. Quoted in; Monroe, op. cit., p. 92. 
3. Al-Rihani, t'ariekh Nejd al-hadieth wa mulhagateh, 
(Beirut 1954) II, p. 249; Attar, pp. cit., pp. 417-47. 
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Luayy, appointed by Husain to govern the village of Khurmah, 
turned to Ibn Saud, Worried about his eastern frontier, 
Husain sought Britain's support. 
1 Because this territorial 
dispute had religious as well as political implications, 
Britain preferred non-intervention. Her whole attitude towards 
these rival allies was also at stake; Remembering, too, the 
alarms caused in the 19th century2 throughout Islam by the 
Wahhabi seizure of the Holy Places, Britain hastened to send 
3 
messages urging conciliation to both rulers. 
Husain, however, 'insisted on fighting" and Ibn Saud 
reproachfully warned Britain that he could not maintain good 
relations with him. 
4 Ibn Saud asked for Britain's under- 
standing of his difficult position among many rivals. 
5 
He must, he argued, either be allowed to defend himself or to 
be guaranteed by Britain against aggression.. Having stated his 
position Ibn Saud, nevertheless, declared willingness to accept 
Britain's arbitration. He even concurred to a British proposal 
1. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 287; Busch, op. cit., p. 257. 
2. Abdul-Bari, 'The Early Wahhabis and Sharifs of Makkah', 
Journal of Pakestan Historical Society, iii (1955) pp. 91-104 
3. See: Troeller, op. cit., chapter 4. 
4. Philby, 'The Triumph of the tahhabis', journal of the Central 
Asian Society xiii (1926) pp. 293-319 (Thereafter; The 
Triumph of the Wahhabis) 
5. See: Busch, op. cit., p. 262. 
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to write a friendly letter to Husain who was, however, in no 
mood for conciliation. 
The British diplomatic efforts ended in March 1919 with a 
decision that "our policy is Husain policy". Britain, still 
needed Husain's support for an eventual peace settlement as he 
was a figure of far greater consequence where British interests 
were concerned than Ibn Saud. Consequently it was proposed that 
Ibn Saud should be required to abandon Khurmah under threat of 
forfeiting his subsidy. 
2 
Philby, opposing this policy, was 
given the opportunity to state his opinion, "Ibn Saud", he 
said, "would not only ignore the order to relinquish Khurmah, 
but would defend it to the last if Husain attempted to occupy it. " 
He insisted that "Ibn Saud would win". 
3 
Apparently Philby's 
view carried weight and no move was made until the end of May. 
Husain now threatened to abdicate if Britain did not give him 
full support. So an interdepartmental meeting was held and 
alternative proposals were drawn up. Finally recognising that 
the matter was more than a conflict over boundaries it was 
decided that Britain should stick to her former policy of non- 
intervention in Central Arabia, and that Ibn Saud should be 
pressurised by reducing his subsidy by 50.4 
1. q Philby, 'The Triumph of the Wahhabis'. 
2. Ibid; See also: Busch, op. cit., p. 259; Troeller, op. cit., 
Chapter 4. 
3. Philby, 'The Triumph of the Wahhabi s' . 
4. Ibid; Busch, Qp. cit., p. 260. 
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The feud was then intensified and a direct conflict 
had now become inevitable. Amir Abd-Allah Ibn al-Husain, 
while trying in May 1919 to regain Turabah, suffered heavy 
loss and barely escaped being killed himself. This result alarmed 
both the British and the French representatives at the peace 
conference in Paris. The Wahhabis could, if they wished, 
advance towards the Holy Places, or even towards Syria. In 
the meanwhile, fear of a possible Wahhabi advance spread all 
over the Hejaz. Ibn Saud was warned to withdraw otherwise the 
rest of his subsidy would be discontinued and he would lose 
advantages which he had enjoyed under the treaty of 1915. 
He halted his advance, as the time was not ripe for further 
action. 
1 
But the battle of Turabah had revealed the weakness 
of King Husain, just as four years earlier, the battle of Jarab, 
had proved the weakness of Ibn Saud. As for Britain, the 
stronger party was the one which was the more desirable as 
an ally and the more dangerous as an enemy. 
The wisdom of Philby's advice seemed evident and'he was 
appointed Curzon's messenger to Ibn Saud in June, 1919. 
Consequently, Ibn Saud agreed to act according to Britain's 
wishes and postponed his pilgrimage, which might have proved 
provocative in the existing state of tension, for the following 
year. Most significantly an invitation for his son Faisal to 
1. American Consul (Aden) to the sec. of State (Washington) 
20 Sept. 1919, aL-Rashid, 12. H-S. A., I, pp. 37-40; Philby, 
The Triumph of the Wghhabis; Toynbee's Survey 1925, p. 288; 
Klieman, op. cit., pp. 23-24; also: Attar, op. cit., 417- 47. 
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London was issued. The visit took place in September with 
Philby as the Amir's guide. The Amir, on his arrival, was 
officially welcomed at the request of the Cabinet by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and by others interested 
in middle Eastern affairs. 
1 
A number of Ibn Saud's requests, carried to London by 
Amir Faisal, were discussed at an interdepartmental 
meeting on 24 November. These were (i) protection of his 
independence; (ii) his boundaries should contain Khurmah 
and Turabah (iii) the embargo on the pilgrimage should be 
removed (iv) a subsidy to repair the damage to his territories 
should be paid; (v) Philby should be appointed British Political 
Agent in his territories. In an endeavour to maintain the 
policy of non-intervention, Curzon's suggestion that the two 
rivals should meet was accepted, and consequently Ibn Saud was 
invited to meet Husain in the Hejaz. He felt that it would 
b suit his dignity to attend his rival's court and therefore 
refused the invitation. Privately, he complained to Colonel 
Dickson, on 5 February 1920, that lack of British support 
for his cause made his people and himself angry at British 
policy which deprived him of the fruits of his victory over 
Husain, and of any hope of extending his boundaries to Syria, 
1. CAB 23,12/622 (2), 18 Sept. 1919; Doughty to Lawrance, 
1 Dec. 1919, Lawrance, Letters to Lawrance (London 1962) 
pp. 39-40; Philby, 'The Triumph`; Williams, Ibn Saud, the 
Puritan King of Arabia (London 1933) pp. 120-22. 
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which had always been considered by him "the northern landing 
stage of Nejd. " -In another endeavour, the India Office 
suggested an H. M. Battleship as a-neutral place for the 
meeting. Husain now began to show more flexibility by 
allowing the Wahhabis-to enter Mecca-for the pilgrimage. There, 
a meeting between his own representatives and those of Ibn Saud, 
was to be arranged. -When'that meeting took place no final 
settlement was achieved, but at least an armistice was signed. 
l 
Britain's diplomacy still aimed, to maintain the status quo 
in Arabia. Husain's adherence to the general peace settlement 
in the Middle East', and in-particular to Britain's proposed 
Palestine and Iraq Mandate, '-was needed. But this policy was 
not without its British critics. Gertrude Bell, for instance, 
wrote to Lawrence in June 1920: "you can't guard the Hejaz by 
backing Husain and dropping I[bn] Saud]-., Alternatively she 
suggested "You can do-it by keeping on the best of terms 
with I[bn] Saud] and he certainly, now-; `& always shows 
: -himself ready to meet our advice". She rested'her case 
on the fact that Ibn Saud was "the stronger of'the two". 
2 
Although Ibn Saud had generally acted in accordance with British 
wishes in the past this could not be'regarded-as a guarantee 
of his future conduct. That would depend on British policy. 
And policy currently pursued, as Gertrude Bell argued, was 
unlikely to preserve his allegiance. 
1. See: Troeller, op. cit., chapter 4. 
2. Bell to Lawrence, 10 July 1920, cited in: Letters to 
Lawrence, pp. 12-13. 
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While Ibn Saud's &-ar began to shine after the end of 
the great war, Husain started to face the bitter reality of his 
situation. Although the armistice of 1918 had been followed by 
an Anglo-French Declaration defining the object of the, two 
governments as "the establishment of national governments and 
administrations, deriving their authority from the initiative 
and free choice of the indigenous populations". 
1 Practical 
the 
Anglo-French policy caused harm to /Arab cause of independence. 
At Versailles the Allies met to decide the future of the Arab 
lands. No agreement was reached. Faisal Ibn al-Husain returned 
to Syria, and on 20 March 1920 he was elected King of Syria and 
Palestine. The French and British Governments repudiated his 
election. One month later on 24 April, the San Remo Conference 
decided the fate of the former ottoman territories. Accordingly, 
Northern Syria'as alloted to France and Southern Syria (Palestine 
and Transjordan) and Iraq were alloted to Britain. Faisal as 
well as the Arab nationalists rejected the decision. A national 
military uprising was soon crushed in July ; Faisal found it 
difficult to remain in Damascus and left for exile. 
2 
1. Quoted in: Edmonds, 'Gertrude Bell in the Near and Middle East', 
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vii (1969) pp. 229- 
44. The text of the Declaration is also cited in: Antonious, 
op-cit., Appendix E, pp. 435-"36, with little difference in 
translation; see also: Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London 
1954) p. 48. 
2. There is much written about Anjo-French diplomacy in the Middle 
East. It is our concern here to find about the effect of Faisal'sI 
tragedy on Anglo-Hejazi relations. Indeed the Faisal affair led 
among other things to a rift in, Anglo-Hejazi relations. For 
this and for the Hejazi attitude towards the Mandate system see: 
Note from the Hejaz Delegation concerning Mandates in Arab 
Nations, Despatch of U. S. Embassy, Paris, 19 May 1920, cited in 
al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., i, pp. 50-53. See also: Memorandum to the 
Allied Powers on behalf of H. M. King Husain, 10 March 1921 
Cited ' in: ibid. , pp. 67-70; Jawdat, _Zekrayat:: Ali%Jawdat (Beirut 1967), pp. 73-76; Hourani, op. cit., pp. 51-55. 
. In Iraq a similar armed uprising against the British 
Mandate was very costly for Britain. Her losses exceeded those 
suffered during the Arab revolt. Immediate changes needed 
to be rn ade . Cox was called back from Persia to replace Wilson 
as Civil Commissioner in October. 
"The new"line of policy", he wrote, "which I had 
come to inaugurate involved a complete and necessary rapid 
transformation of the facade of the existing administration 
from the British to [the] Arab. " 
The question of nominating a King for Iraq remained to be settled. 
It had been agreed that 'Abd-Allah should fill this role. But, 
after Faisal's dismissal from Syria, Britain felt under an 
obligation to gratify his ambitions elsewhere and the possibility 
of setting him on the Iraqi throne came under consideration. 
This meant that some compensation would be needed for Abd-Allah. 
Husain, angrily watching these developments and opposing the 
principles of the Mandate system, felt that the Arab goal of 
independence and unity was becoming increasingly remote. 
1 
Moreover, he resented the fact that he had been treated as less 
than an ally at the Peace Conference and that his self-appointed 
title of King of Arabia found no support by any European Power. 
Furthermore, Britain had kept silent while France crushed his 
son's regime in Syria but had supported Zionist development in 
Palestine. In addition to his grievances against both Britain 
and France, Husain's prestige in the Muslim world as protector 
of the Holy Cities was becoming more difficult to maintain. 
1. Lady Bell, The Letters of Gertrude Bell (London 1927) i-i", - 
pp. 526-30; Doughty to Lawrence, 29 Aug 1920, Letters to 
Lawrence, p. 41; Jawdat, op. cit., p. 8; Klieman, op. cit., 
pp. 19-76. 
His inability to crush the Saudi menace was humiliating. 
) 
Britain's problems in the Middle'East were also great. 
In addition to the uprisings against the Mandates, there was the 
national movement in Egypt for the end of the Protectorate. 
Problems in Arabia itself remained unsolved although Britain 
was the only Great Power there, and enjoyed unchallenged 
influence; France's sphere of influence was restricted to 
Syria. Italy had been warned off in the Red Sea, and 
Turkey had been forced to evacuate the remaining pockets in 
al-Madinah and the Yemen. But thelocal conflicts remained 
unsolved. Husain, Ibn Saud, Ibn al-Rashid, al-Idrisi and the 
Imam 
"all had yet to work out their final destinies in 
Arabia, and it remained to be seen whether Britain 
could actually influence, or indeed2would desire to 
influence their respective future. " 
Thus an effective system for co-ordinating andadministering 
British policy needed to be sought. 
1. Arsalaniaz 'British War-Time Pledges'; Klieman, op. cit. , p. 79. 
2. Busch, op. cit.; pp. 263-64; See also: Kliman, op. cit., 
p. 79; Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 272; Philby, 'The Triumph 
of the Wahhabis. 
laeorganization of the Middle East policy-making system, 
1920-21 
Middle Eastern affairs remaind until 1921 in the hands 
of various government departments. Egypt, the Yemen, Asir, 
Persia, Syria and the Hejaz were the responsibility of the 
Foreign Office. Palestine and Mesopotamia were controlled 
by the War Office. The Gulf Emirates, Aden, Nejd and Hail 
fell under the jurisdiction of the India Office. This division 
of responsibilities despite consultations between the departments 
hampered both the formulation of a comprehensive Middle East 
policy and any good understanding of the nature of local disputes. 
During the war, the Foreign office via Cairo supported the 
Sharif while India via Baghdad supported Ibn Saud. In the 
implications of policy Cairo seemed to be favouring Pan-Arabism. 
This conflicted with the Pan-Islamism which India had always 
favoured. The Sharif, because of Cairo's strong support 
was encouraged to play an active role, while Ibn Saud although 
approached several times by India's officials, was given too 
little support even to play a minor role. This in addition to 
their old feuds inspired hatred and jealousy between the 
rulers of Eastern and Western Arabia. India had always 
considered the whole of the Arabian Peninsula as their own 
particular concern. Cairo's activities in the Hejaz had, 
therefore, been regarded in India as an encroachment on her 
sphere of influence. Although seeking to serve the same 
British interests the Foreign Office and the India Office 
varied greatly in their methods and approach. This engendered 
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differences which sometimes-seemed as bitter as those 
bwetween the local rivals themselves. 
1 
By mid 1920 it was recognized that this state of affairs 
must be remedied. The Mesopotamian uprising and the failure 
to-maintain Husain's loyalty were among reasons urged, the 
change in Britain's policy. A single office to hold 
responsibility for Middle Eastern affairs was needed. The 
process of change was instituted at three levels simultaneously, 
in the Cabinet, in the Foreign Office, aid in Parliament. In 
the Cabinet it was'agreed that Mesopotamia under the Mandate 
should be transferred to the Colonial Office and that the 
transference of the military responsibility for maintaining 
order there should be given to the Air Ministry as soon as 
possible. 
2 This, however, would clearly affect the future 
course of Anglo-Saudi relations. It was proposed that the 
Colonial Office should set up and supervise a Middle Eastern 
department, but doubts were raised about this since none of 
the areas controlled by Britain during the war in the Middle 
East had ever been a colony. The proposal it was argued, 
1. See: Lady Bell, The Letters of Gertrude Bell, ii, p. 526; 
Mejcher_ , 'British Middle East Policy, 1917-21, the 
Interdepartmental Level', Journal of Contemporary History, 
viii (1973) pp. 81-101; Rothwell, 'Mesopotamia in the 
British War Aims, 1914-18', Historical Journal, xiii 
(1970) pp. 273-94; Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in 
the Arab World, chapter 5, pp. 77-103; Busch, . cit., 
pp. 265-66; Knightly, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of 
Arabia (London 1969) Chapter 10, pp. 132-52; Winstone, 
Gertrude Bell (London 1978) p. 185. 
2. Klieman, pp. cit., p. 87. 
"would look like the annexation to the British Empire of 
mandated territory". The case was then put that the Foreign 
Office should be responsible for this new department because 
Palestine, Egypt, the Hejaz and'Persia were already the 
responsibility of the Foreign Office. After six months 
of argument with Churchill, then still war Minister, playing 
a commanding role in the debate on Middle Eastern affairs 
and in hoping to cut government expenditure in Iraq, the Cabinet 
met on 31 December, and agreed: 
"that responsibility for the whole of the administration 
of the mandatory territories ... should be concentrated in a single department .... The new department should be set up as a branch of the Colonial office, which 
should be given some new title ... 'pepartment for 
Colonies and Mandated Territories'. " 
On 9 January 1921, the Cabinet was informed of Milner's 
resignation. Churchill was now the obvious replacement as 
Colonial Secretary. If he were to take over he was anxious 
to debate to co-ordinate Middle East policy and yet he was 
aware that this would be difficult since territories under the 
rule of Ibn Saud, and King Husain, as well as the Gulf Emirates 
were neither mandates ror colonies, and would not fall within 
the sphere of Colonial Office responsibility. On 11 January 
the India Office warned, "unless the whole of Arabia is placed 
under the office which administrates the mandate for Mesopotamia, 
we must ask that India be left in the position which it has 
held for over a century". 
2 
1. Mejcher, 'British Middle East Policy 1917-21'; See also: 
Klieman, op. cit., pp. 90-93. 
2. Melcher, op. cit. See also: Busch, pp. cit., p. 456, 
Klieman, op. cit., pp. 90-91. 
The India office proposal was welcomed. Accordingly, 
it was decided that the new-department should be redesigned. 
was 
"The Middle East Department"/formally set up on 1 March. Sir J. 
Shackburgh was appointed undersecretary in charge of the new 
department. Its sphere of control covered the whole of the 
Arabian Peninsula with Persia to the east and Egypt to the 
west. The Political Resident in the Gulf was to be appointed 
by India as before, "but [he] should be authorised to 
communicate: direct with the Colonial office on matters 
concerning the Arabian littoral". For the sake of traditional 
relations between India and the Gulf, administrative and purely 
local matters were to be of the functions of India. Relations 
with Ibn Saud were to be conducted by the new department 
through the Political Resident at Bushire. 
1 
Churchill's first step was to summon a conference to 
consider British policy in the Middle East in general and to 
solve the Hashemite problem. Baghdad was first suggested as 
a venue but Cairo was preferred. To Cairo, Churchill invited 
everybody who might have a contribution to make to the 
proceedings. The Cairo conference opened formally on 12 
March 1921, in Samiramis Hotel on the Nile. It was attended 
by forty experts in Middle Eastern affairs. 
2 Gertrude Bell 
was there. She wrote: "it has been wonderful, we covered 
1. Mejcher, pp. cit., note 41. 
2. Klieman, o p. cit., pp. 96-105; Busch, o . cit., pp. 464-74; Winstone, Gertrude Bell, pp. 232-34; Philby, 'Transjordan', 
Journal of the Central Asian Society, xi (1924), pp. 297-312. 
more work in a fortnight than has'ever been got through in 
a'year". 
1- 
As Dr. *Busch remarked, -in the concluding words of 
his most valuable study: 
"It was therend of years of debate and controversy 
and confusion, as it was the beginning of years of 
debate and controversy and confusion. It was also the 
start of an Arab State system, disunited, subordinate to 
different mandatory-powers, and faced with serious problems 
of economies, frontiers, minorities, and political groups. 
Still it was-'a'state system, and for better or worse, 
that system still survives ... after the2meeting of the 'Forty Thieves''at Cairo in March 1921. " , 
A key issue'of7the conference was to decide whether - 
Faisal Ibn 'al-Husain should become ruler of Iraq on the 
understanding that, he would accept the Mandate System. The 
issue had been considered'in London, and Faisal had 
been given a hint. -In Cairo every minute detail relating 
to Faisal, Iraq-and the Mandate was discussed'. ' The choice 
of Faisal was confirmed. ` Both Cox and G. Bell were asked 
to return to Baghdad to prepare-. the ground for Faisal's 
arrival as the first King of Iraq., This they successfully did. 
Cox found it necessary to inform Ibn Saud in April that 
the British Government "were disposed to admit and support 
the candidature of Faisal to the throne of Iraq". Ibn 
Saud, although privately opposed-to'a Hasemite regime in Iraq 
felt compelled to declare his acceptance of the British decision. 
On 12 June 1921 Faisal left Jeddah for Iraq accompanied by 
K. Cornwallis as his private adviser and, while in the Gulf 
1. Quoted in: Winstone, Gertrude Bell, p. 235. 
2. Busch, op. cit., p. 474. See also: Sachar, op. cit., pp. 379-80; 
Klieman, op. cit., p. 107; CAB 23/24, Cabinet 14(21), 22 
March 1921. 
he exchanged friendly letters with Ibn Saud. Faisal, 
meeting with a cool reception on his arrival in Iraq from 
Philby, adviser for the interior, was later enthroned on 
23 August as king. 
l 
While the Cairo Conference was in session 'Abd-Allah, 
originally promised the rulership of Iraq, was hurrying north- 
ward to Syria in order to attack the French whose hostility 
had proved fatal to his brother Faisal. He entered Amman 
while the conference was still in progress. Churchill 
left Cairo for Jerusalem and summoned 'Abd-Allah to 
meet him there. The step aimed at avoiding a possible- 
Anglo-French clash. The meeting that took place on 28 March 
was a complete success for Churchill. 'Abd-Allah was promised 
a monthly salary of X5,000 to rule the newly envisaged state 
of Transjordan as a Hashemite Amir but within the mandated 
territory of Palestine. This policy was later approved, and 
in April 1923 Sir H. Samuel announced at Amman the recognition 
and the existence of an independent government in Transjordan 
under the rule of 'Abd-Allah. 
2 
ft 
1. Dobbs to Amery, 'A Short History of Iraq-Nejd Relations 
from about the time of the fall of Hail to Ibn Saud's 
Protest against the Establishment of the Iraq Police 
Post at Busaiyah', 14 April, 1928, E6316/1/91, F. O. 
371/12993 (Thereafter: Dobbs, A Short History of Iraq-Nejd 
Relations); See also: Jawdat, gp. cit., pp. 143-47. 
2. See: CAB 23125(3), 11 April 1921; Klieman, op. cit., 205-35; 
Philbp, 'Transjordan' Glubb, Britain and the Arabs (London 
1959), pp. 163-66; Busch, op. cit., pp. 471-75; Knightley, 92. 
cit., pp. 143- 45; Attar, op. cit., pp. 627-31 
Unlike Iraq, Transjordan had no historical identity as a 
nation. The area, inhabited by penniless tribes, was now also 
a place of refuge for a mass of Syrians. Its undetermined 
and 
boundaries were threatened to the north by the French/to the 
south by King Husain, who claimed the whole territory as a 
province of the Hejaz, and to the-East, soon afterwards, by 
the hostile ruler of Nejd. Not surprisingly 'Abd-Allah 
found his promised dominion difficult to manage. ' Even at 
that stage and as Philby recorded, "the British in Palestine 
and London discussed the possibility of ousting him ['Abd-Allah] 
and joining Transjordan to Palestine". 
1 
The idea, however, 
was not pursued and Churchill's plan remained in operation. 
Accordingly, 'Abd-Allah's rule in Transjordan was confirmed, 
and Faisal was installed in Iraq. 
Ibn Saud and King Husain were not neglected. Churchill 
proposed to the Cabinet of 22 March 1921, "to increase Bin 
Saud's subsidy to 1100,000 a year ... conditional on his 
maintaining peace with Mesopotamia, Kuwait, and Hejaz. " The 
proposal aimed at keeping the momentum of the new British 
policy going without disturbances. A similar sum would be 
paid to King Husain "conditional on improved arrangements for 
the pilgrimage, recognition of the peace treaties, and 
exercise of his influence in bringing about peace in the Arab 
countries 
? 
The question of subsidy was urgently reconsidered 
by the Cabinet on 11 April. Ibn Saud was known to be preparing 
1. Philby, 'Transjordan; Monroe, op. cit., p. 155. 
2. CAB 23/24, Cabinet 14 (21), 22 March 1921 
to invade Hail. This he had been encouraged to do in wartime 
but now Hail was regarded as a useful buffer state between 
Ibn Saud and his Hashemite neighbours. If he conquered Hail, 
he might be tempted, by his followers, to intrude upon 
Mesopotamia and the Hejaz. 
l 
In fact, Ibn Saud found himself in 1921 surrounded by 
unfriendly rulers. Against Britain's wishes, he decided 
to exploit this. situation for his own benefit. He had 
established himself after. Khurmah as the most powerful Arab 
ruler. 
2 He had prepared the ground for more victorious 
operations by occupying the Asir highlands and the oasis nearby 
in the summer of 1920.3 In the spring of 1921 he assumed 
the title of "Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies". The 
significance. of this step was to give Nejd an international 
status comparable_with. that of her neighbours. 
4 In April 
he sought Britain's recognition of his new title but Britain 
remained silent until 22 August, when his campaign against Hail 
was proceeding successfully. 
5 The strength of his position 
1. CAB 23/25(2) 11 April 1921; Philby, Saudi Arabia 
(London 1955) p. 280. 
2. Monroe, op. cit., p. 127. 
3. Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 279. 
4. Ibid., p. 282. 
5. Dobbs, 'A Short History of Iraq-Nejd Relations', 
E2316/1/91, F. O. 371/12993 
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was confirmed with the capitulation of the City of Hail on 
2 November 1921.1 
The Sharifian-Rashidi alliance, established early in 1920, 
had proved a total failure. Husain was powerless to help Ibn 
al-Rashid to avoid the collapse of his state. Any British 
aid for which he might have hoped could hardly be forthcoming 
while he was engaged in protest against the mandatory system 
which Britain was now busily establishing. In these 
circumstances all the Ikhwan leaders rallied to Ibn Saud, 
including Faisal al Dowaish, who had assisted in the capture 
of Hail. Ibn Saud wasalso supported by Nuri al-Sha'lan, 
the leader of the Rwalah tribe of'the Syrian desert, who 
hoped with the help of the French to annex al-Jauf to his own 
territories in Transjordan. 
2 
While in Beirut in 1908, the American Consul-General 
wrote: 
"... However, the relative position of the two 
centres (Hail and Riyadh) may at any time undergo 
a radical change ... and the House of Jbn Saud 
may yet outshine any other in Arabia. " 
The Consul's foresight proved correct in die course, and he 
again wrote from Constantinople on 17 December, just after 
the fall of Hail, reminding his government of what he had 
said and adding : "recent events, however, seem to indicate 
1. Collins, op. cit., p. 29; for the conquest of Hail See: 
Attar, op. cit., 449- 66. 
2. Williams, op. cit., p. 176. 
3. American Consul (Beirut) to Sec. of State (Washinton) 
23 July 1908, cited in; a. 1-Rashid D. H. S. A., I, 
pp. 1-29. 
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that the new Sultan cherishes plans of further expansion of 
his dominions". 
l 
The British policy of preventing Ibn Saud from getting 
into proximity to the mandatory territories now proved a 
failure. The existence of Hail as a buffer state had come 
to an end, and opened the way to fulfilment for Ibn Saud of 
"one of his great ambitions of his life". 
2 The immediate 
consequence of the fall of Hail and of the controlling, 
by the Ikhwan, of the two main desert roads from Central 
Arabia to both Iraq and Syria, was the spread of chaos 
and disorder among the tribes in a large area connecting 
Hail with Iraq and Transjordan. This emphasized Britain's 
urgent need to secure a settlement with Ibn Saud. 
1. American Consul (Constantinople) to Sec. of State 
(Washington) 17 Dec. 1921, cited in Al-Rashid, 
D. H. S. A., I, pp. 71-72. 
2. Philby, 'The Triumph of the Wahhabis'. 
The Neid Northern Frontier Delimitation and the Frontier 
Disputes, 1921-25 
Cox congratulated Ibn Saud on his victory. Meanwhile, 
he sought an arrangement for an early meeting between the 
Sultan of Nejd and the King of Iraq under British auspices. 
It was hoped that a clear understanding might be established 
regarding the frontier between their two countries. This 
initiative stemmed from King Faisal's proposal of December 
1921, but was hurried by Ibn Saud's territorial expansion 
and by Britain's desire to define the territories under her 
mandate. Gertrude Bell had been busy in December 1921 
"making out the southern desert frontier of Iraq with the 
1 
help of a gentleman from Hail and [the] chief of Anizah". 
Ibn Saud, whose ambitions were vast, was reluctant to commit 
himself to a definite frontier, at least for the time being. 
Playing for time, he insisted that the establishment of the 
principles for an agreement should be made first. He conceived 
a frontier as being determined by tribal rather than geographical 
lines. Accordingly, Cox proposed that certain tribes 
(Montafiq, 'Anizah and Dhafir) should be recognized as 
belonging to Iraq, and that the line of the frontier should 
those tribes' 
be determined in accordance with prescriptive rights to watering 
places. Ibn Saud concurred with the general idea behind 
this proposal. 
2 
1. G. Bell to her father, 4 Dec. 1921, The letters of 
Gertrude Bell, ii, pp; 628-29. 
2. Dobbs, 'A Short History of Iraq-Nejd Relations', 
E2316/1/91, F. O. 371/12993. 
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The frontier question was however, still far from easy 
to solve. It was enormously complicated by conflicting claims 
and by tribal feuds. Ibn Saud missed no chance to persuade 
the tribal chiefs to come into his fold. He received Ibn 
al-Suwait of the Dhafir and gave him presents as token of 
good relations. As evidence of their loyalty the Dhafir 
would pay tribute to Ibn Saud's representative. He was 
aware of tribes' fashion of sport -raiding . The Ikhwan 
tribes, still full of enthusiasm and victory, continued their 
raids against the non-Ikhwan. This religious factor among 
Ibn Saud's warriors was being well used to further 
of his political ambitions. Fearing the ruthless Ikhwan, 
the Iraqi tribes left their grazing areas for the benefit 
of their raiders. Of course Ibn Saud was pleased by the 
actions of his victorious tribes. But their success became 
more limited when a Camel Corps to protect the Iraqi frontier 
tribes was established. 
1 
The border situation was worsened by Ikhwan raids during 
the spring of 1922, and by their firing at a Royal Air Force 
plane. Cox made a show of force in reply and ordered the 
bombing of Ikhwan camps, and warned Ibn Saud of the serious 
consequences of any further Ikhwan raids. In reply, Ibn Saud 
gave assurances that the Ikhwan had acted without his 
authority, and promised to punish those who were proved guilty. 
2 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid.; see also: G. Bell to her father, 14 March 1922, 
The Letters of Gertrude Bell, Ii, 635-36; 'Nejd proposed 
Green Bo. dt` (Phil bj Papers) 16/3; see Attar, op. cit., 
pp. 637-40 for text of exchanged letters over the dispute. 
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In the difficult task of restoring stability to Iraq, Cox 
found the consequences of Ikhwan attacks particularly 
embarrassing. They provided political fodder for the 
Shi'ah of Iraq, who were traditionally hostile to the 
Wahhabis, in their opposition to Britain's mandate. The- 
danger of a violent anti-British demonstration was 
obvious. In fact no disturbances occurred, but a legacy 
of resentment remained among the inhabitants of southern 
Iraq. 1 
In this unpromising atmosphere communication between 
Cox and Ibn Saud on the frontier question was, nevertheless, 
continued. Now, Ibn Saud "was disinclined" to accept 
settling the frontier on the basis of Cox's proposals. His 
reluctance could, however, according to Cox, probably be 
overcome at a conference. In that hope Cox laid down a 
provisional frontier line to be observed pending the 
conclusion of further negotiations. He notified Ibn Saud 
of this and asked him accordingly, to recall his tribesmen 
north to the line which "included in Iraq the wells and 
pasturages belonging to the Dhafir, Anizah and Muntafiq 
tribes! '. 2- 
So, the ground was prepared for a meeting, at Muhammarah, 
, on 
the first of May 1922. Ibn Thanayan, a highly educated 
Nejdi, represented Ibn Saud. He was given "precise instructions" 
1. 'The Iraq Nejd Frontier', Journal of the Central Asian 
Society, xvii (1930) pp. 77-92; Toynbee, Survey 19 2, pp. 333. 
2. Dobbs, ý'-A Short History of Iraq-Nejd Relations'; also 
Attar, op. cit., pp. 640-42. 
i 
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and limited authority. Sabih Nashat represented King 
Faisal with wide authority to discuss, in addition to the 
frontier, various matters concerning normal relationships 
between two neighbouring countries. 
1 
After five days of 
discussions under the auspice of B. H. Bourdillon, a High 
Commissioner representative, the treaty of Mohammarah was 
signed. The first article has a special importance as it 
would cause many problems between Iraq and Nejd. It gave 
the Dhafir, Anizah and Montafiq to Iraq and left to Nejd 
only a section of-Shammar, But "the wells and ranges 
customarily used by the several tribes should be recognised 
as falling respectively within the territory of the 
state to which the particular tribe had been assigned. "2 
This judgment facilitated a quick agreement. The final 
frontier line was left, to a joint Iraqi-Nejdi commission 
presided over by a British official. Certain wells and 
pasture grounds were identified as being common to the tribes 
of the two countries. This decision was the origin of the 
concept which was to become accepted of neutral zones between 
Arabian frontiers. 3 
1. Ibid.; 'Nejd proposed Green Book'(Philby papers) 16/3; 
American Vice Consul (Jerusalem) to the Sec. of State 
(Washington) 5 Sept. 1922, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., 1, 
pp. 90-95. 
2. See Arabic text of the treaty in Attar, op. cit., 
pp. 643-46; see also, Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 334; 
Statement by B. H. Bourdillion, 6 Nov. 1929, Documents 
on International Affairs (1929) pp. 260-63. 
3. See map p. 70A which illustrates the difficulties of 
drawing a frontier line in Northern Arabia. 
The treaty at the time appeared to be a British 
diplomatic victory. For Cox, it was a wise attempt to solve 
a complicated tribal problem and a daring attempt to lay down 
a practical frontier line in a region inhabited by seasonally 
migrating pastoral tribes. It was also the first real post- 
war effort to create a frontier. 
1 
But this satisfaction 
was to be short-lived. Ibn Saud refusing to ratify the 
treaty, informed the High Commissioner that Ibn Thanayan 
had exceeded his authority in signing it. 
2 Accordingly 
Ibn Saud continued to act as if nothing had changed. 
Consequently the situation deteriorated with continuous 
raiding from the two sides. In June Ibn Saud urged a 
meeting with Cox "as difficulties with the Hejaz, 
Transjordan and Iraq were hampering the development of Nejd". 
The High Commissioner, busy negotiating the Anglo-Iraqi 
treaty of 1922, agreed in principle. 
Later in September Cox instructed Dickson to prepare 
the ground with Ibn Saud for a meeting at 'Uqair. The 
meeting took place in November, and, since its purpose was 
to settle the Nejd-Iraq and Nejd-Kuwait frontiers, Cox 
brought with him an Iraqi and a Kuwaiti representative. 
Discussion did not proceed smoothly. The Sultan fought 
hard for tribal boundaries, as a definite line on the map 
was unrealistic in an area inhabited by seasonally migrating 
1. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 333; Williams, op. cit., p. 147. 
2. Dobbs, 'A Short History of Iraq-Nejd Relations'; 'Nejd 
Proposed Green Book', (Philby Papers) 16/3. 
tribes.. Ibn Saud's rejection was based on a feeling that 
he would thereby be recognising the establishment of a ring 
of new states ruled by his enemies. Eventually at a 
private meeting, Cox succeeded in putting pressure on Ibn 
Saud and on 2 December an agreement was reached and two 
protocols were signed. They became known as the 'Uqair 
protocols. By these protocols the Iraq-Nejd and the 
Nejd-Kuwait frontiers were finally defined. 
1 
These 
boundaries have remained until today with only one change, 
that is the dividing of the Kuwait-Nejd Neutral Zone between 
the two countries. 
2 
The 'Uqair meeting was a major diplomatic success for 
Cox. Ibn Saud ratified the Mohammarah Treaty and finally 
accepted the frontier lines that he had so strongly opposed. 
Both the treaty and the two protocols were to be taken 
together as a single agreement. The idea of a meeting 
between Ibn Saud and King Faisal was also revived. According 
to Gertrude Bell, Sir Percy Cox returned to Iraq on 11 December 
1922 
"with treaties all signed and finished in his hands ... 
Ibn Saud is coming to Iraq in the spring to visit the 
King [Faisal] under Sir Percy's auspices. ... Sir 
Percy was magnificent ... Ibn Saud is convinced that 
the future of himself and his country depends on our 
[British] goodwill and that he will never break with 
us. 
1. For the 'Uqair Protocols, see; Dickson, Kuwait and Her 
Neighbours (London 1956) pp. 267- 78; Rihani, Ibn Saud his 
People and his Land (London 1928) Chapters 8&9; Rihani, 
tarikh Neid al-hadith wa mulhagateh (Beirut 1928) pp. 278-84; 
Rihani, 'A report on Arabia', cited in, a. 1-Rashid, D. H. S. A., 
1, pp. 113- 37; Attar, op. cit., 646-50. 
2. El-Ghoneimy, 'The Legal Status of the Saudi Kuwaiti Neutral 
Zone', International and Comparative Law quarterly, xv 
(1966), pp. 690-717. 
3. G. Bell to her father, 16 Dec. 1922, Letters of Gertrude 
Bell ii, p. 659; see also: Cox to Shuckburgh, 25 July 1928, 
C. O. 732/33. 
Two days later she wrote "It's really amazing that anyone 
should exercise influence such as his [Cox]... I don't 
think that any European in history has made such a deeper [sic] 
impression on the Oriental mind". 
l Commenting on his Work 
at 'Uqair, Cox wrote, "I had left no stone unturned in the 
difficult endeavour to promote cordial relations between 
the two potentates [Faisal and Ibn Saud], both allies 
of HM's Government ... "2 
Ibn Saud never abandoned his ambitions. He grudgingly 
accepted the frontiers as defined by the Treaty of Mohammarah 
and `the protocols of 'Uqair, but succeeded in securing for 
his tribes watering and grazing rights on the other side 
of the frontieraccording to articles 2 and 3 of the 
protocol. 
3 
Unfortunately for all the parties concerned, the 
latest agreements were not by themselves enough to guarantee 
peace or fixed frontiers in the desert, and neither side 
in the event proved able to fulfil its obligations. Large 
numbers of Shammar-Nejd refugees started to raid their 
former home from Iraq during the spring of 1923. Ibn Saud 
protested to Cox. Cox was too busy to take action. He 
was arranging the Iraqi internal affairs and preparing for his 
final departure which took place on 3 May. Pending retirement 
1. G. Bell to her father, 18 Dec. 1922, Letters of Gertrude 
Bell, pp. 260-61. 
2. 
_ 
Cox, A Historical Summary to the Background of Bell's 
Letters, Letters of Gertrude Bell ii, pp. 504- 41. Quote 
on p. 535. 
3. 'Nejd proposed Green Book, (Philby Papers) 16/3; Bourdillion 
statement, 6 Nov. 1929, D. I. A., pp. 260-63. 
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from the service "I was content to leave the direction of 
current affairs in the experienced hands of my counsellor 
and successor, Sir Henry Dobbs. 
Cox retired leaving the main political issue unresolved. 
In fact, he had not tried to solve the larger quarrel between 
the Sultan of Nejd and the King of the Hejaz, nor to 
consider the Nejd claims over al-Jauf and Wadi Sirhan which 
was indeed Ibn Saud's gateway to Syria. 
Al-Jauf had always been a contested area in the heart 
of the Syrian desert. It had witnessed many trials of 
strength during the previous two decades. 
2 Now, the conflict 
was between Nejd and Transjordan. Britain was in favour of 
Transjordan's claim. The area was of strategic importance 
for British Imperial interests, since the Government of India 
had never abandoned the notion of a railway through the 
British controlled territory from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. 
Major A. L. Holt, a British engineer, was sent in 1922 to the 
northern Arabian desert on a special mission in order to 
explore the possibility of constructing a railway line 
between Baghdad and Haifa or Aqaba. Finishing his mission, he 
1. Cox, 'A Historical Summary to the Background of Bell's 
Letters', The Letters of Gertrude Bell, ii , p. 541; 
Dobbs, 'A Short History of Iraq-Nejd Relations', E2316/l/9i, 
F. O. 371/12993; 'The Iraq-Nejd Frontier', Journal of the 
Central Asian Society, xvii (1930) pp. 77-92. 
2. For more about al-Jauf see: Philby, 'J auf and the North 
Arabian Desert', Geographical Journal, 7xii (1923) pp. 241-59; 
Philby, 'Transjordan', Journal of the Central Asian Society, 
xi (1924) pp. 296-312; Holt, 'The future of the Northern 
Arabian Desert', Geographical Journal, lxii (1923) 
pp. 259-71; Monroe, op. cit., pp. 114-36. 
reported that, the future of the Northern Arabian desert 
"lies in its value as a potential line of communication". 
According to his calculations the proposed line would save 
two weeks , or four thousand miles compared with 
navigating around the Arabian Peninsula. 
1 The French in 
Syria and Ibn Saud disliked the British idea, 
2 because 
both had ambitions to annex this desert. 
Thinking of extending their influence to the desert 
oases, the French had supported Nuri al-Sha'län of the 
Rwalah in his seizure of al-Jauf from Ibn al-Rashid during 
the conflict with Ibn Saud in the autumn of 1921. But 
since Nuri had become Ibn Saud's neighbour, fearing Wahhabi 
attacks, -he now'sought British support. In principle, the 
British were prepared to respond in order to keep the Wahhabi 
influence and that of the French out of the valley. 
Accordingly, Philby, then chief British representative in 
Transjordan, was asked to establish close contact with Nuri 
al-Sha'lan , and to pay a visit to al-Jauf. Philby did so 
in the spring of 1922 accompanied by Major Holt of the 
Iraqi railways. Nuri then agreed to accept Transjordanian 
for 
suzerainty in return Mransjordan defending his territory 
against any Wahhabi attack. 
3 
1. Holt, o . cit; McCallum, 
'The Discovery aid Development of the 
New Land Route to the East', Journal of the Central Asian 
Society, xii (1925) pp. 44-67. An enormous amount o 
documents, traced in the C. O. files in the P. R. O. London, 
covers much of the story of the Land Road and Railway 
projects between Baghdad and Haifa, see for example, C. O. 
732 vols: 27,39,47,48,50,51,55,56. 
2. Monroe, op. cit., pp. 120-21. 
3. See full account on Philby's visit in his: 'Jauf and the 
North Arabian Desert'. 
Ibn Saud's anxiety to establish close contact with 
Syria and to control the desert road through al-Jauf 
was evident. For economic and strategic reasons he 
watched British moves with suspicion. He felt that 
Britain's plans ran counter to his own interests. British 
expectations on the other hand, even before the fall of 
Hail, were that Ibn Saud would "have influence ... over 
the whole of the western half of the Syrian desert ... the 
whole desert between Syria and Mesopotamia will be his and 
he will be the one person with whom Mesopotamia must be 
in quarrel ... "1 From Britain's point of view it 
seemed urgently necessary to resist any Wahhabi_aggression 
against Transjordan. 
Philby, whose function was to consolidate 'Abd-. Allah's 
rule in Transjordan, did his best to reorganise military 
defence against Ikhwan attacks from the southern end of the 
Wadi, the whole of which both he and Lawrence had agreed 
should be Abd-Allah's "from end to end". In summer 1922, 
it was reported that the situation was well in hand. But 
in the autumn, Wahhabi. attacks reached the vicinity 
of Amman. 
2 Consequently, the Wadi tribes submitted to 
the Ikhwan and renounced their allegiance to Nuri al-Sha'lan . 
By the end of 1922, Ibn Saud's forces occupied all the 
desert oases. 
3 Nuri appealed to 'Abd-Allah. The latter 
turned to the British who responded with military support 
1. Quoted in Troeller, op. cit., p. 228. 
2. Philby, 'Transjordan'; American vice Consul (Jerusalem) 
to the Sec. of State (Washington) 22 Aug. 1922, cited in 
al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., i, pp. 88-89. 
3. Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 283. see map p. 77A. 
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against recurring Ikhwan raids. 
l 
In October 'Abd-Allah was in london "to receive the 
prize of independence promised him in return for good work". 
2 
Philby was supposed to deal with 'Abd-Allah's requests but 
in fact the whole matter was left to Clayton. During the 
course of discussion it emerged that 'Abd-Allah was not 
adamant in his demand for the annexation of al-Jauf to 
Transjordan. Clayton recorded "it appeared that the Amir 
would be willing to relinquish Jauf, provided that he were 
assured that the districts Kaf - Azrak - Burka were retained 
within the limits of Transjordan .. "3 Both Britain and 
'Abd-Allah, however, shared the opinion that Ibn Saud must 
not extend his influence from al-Jauf towards the Hejaz 
Railway between Maan and al-Madinah. 
The question of al-Jauf was carefully considered during 
the ensuing negotiations for an Anglo-Transjordanian treaty. 
It was affected by two independent factors: 
(i) "Imperial interests in regard to the projected trans- 
desert railway". 
(ii) "The gradual spread of the Wahhabi faith" and its 
dangerous consequences. On the first count it was agreed 
that Britain's influence in Transjordan should be peacefully 
extended to Wadi Si. rhan. Philby favoured the notion, 
4 
simply 
1. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 339; Collins, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
2. Philby, 'Transjordan'. 
3. Clayton to the M. E. Dept. (C. O. ) 22 Oct. 1922, (Clayton 
Papers) 471/3, School of Oriental Studies, Dhrum Univ. 
4. Points for discussions with Amir 'Abd-Allah and Philby 
(Clayton Papers) 471/3. 
because he had always believed that Transjordan was too 
small a territory to constitute an independent state and 
that it ought either to be joined to Palestine or to the 
Hejaz. He concluded his observations: 
everybody seems to agree that these two 
countries [Palestine and Transjordan] are 
essentially one ... what we have done is to 
separate a naturally single territory into 
three parts namgly Palestine, Syria and 
Transjordan .. " 
Philby had himself previously put forward the idea of 
joining Transjordan to the Hejaz under some form of 'Abd-Allah 
regency. This idea, however, had been opposed by both Dobbs 
and Samuel. But Clayton still regarded it as worthy of some 
further discussion with Philby and 'Abd-Allah. The latter 
seemed to have been interested but in no hurry to proceed 
any further in the matter. 
2 
On the second count al-Jauf, in Ibn Saud's hands, 
would be a "grave danger" as it would become a centre of 
Wahhabi activities. The Transjordan delegate at the 
negotiations suggested that Ibn Saud "should be pressed 
to evacuate Jauf and that it[shouldj be left under the 
Shalans". Clayton, in no position to give promises, 
argued that the maintenance of al-Jauf by Transjordan 
would be a "source of weakness". However he had no 
authority to reach any other conclusion until he had received 
the decision of the Middle East Department on the matter. 
3 
1. See: Philby, 'Transjordan'. 
2. Points for discussions with Amir 'Abd-Allah and Philby 
(Clayton Papers) 471/3. 
3. Clayton to M. E. Dept. (C. O. ) 28 Nov. 1922, (Clayton 
Papers) 471/3. 
In November-1923, the British Government decided 
that: Transjordan should have access to the Gulf of 'Aqaba; 
Nejd should be prevented from reaching the Hejaz Railway; 
the Hejaz should recover the Khurmah and Turabah territories; 
and Wadi Sirhan then could be excluded from Transjordan. 
Accordingly, the Colonial office telegraphed the following 
to the British Resident at Bushire: 
the Kaf [the nearest point of Wadi Sirhan to 
Transjordan ]would be given up for Akaba by 'Abdullah_, 
Khurma and Taraba would be given up by Ibn Saud for 
Kaf, and any claim to territory north of Mudawara 1 
would be given up by Husain for Khurma and Taraba ." 
This policy of give and take appeared to the British 
policy-makers to be a means of gratifying all the parties. 
But the success of this policy still depended on their 
agreement which was not forthcoming. 
Tension continued during 1923, and the treaty of Nbhammarah 
and the 'Uqair protocols proved a failure. As far as the 
Bedouin were concerned the treaty and the protocols were 
matters personal to the rulers and in no way binding on 
themselves. The Ikhwan continued their raids not only 
northwards but also to the west. 
Considering these developments in the internal 
a 
Arabian situation asreal threat to her interests, Britain 
abandoned her non-interference policy and decided to'invite 
the Hejaz, Transjordan, Iraq and Nejd to Kuwait in December 
1923 for a round table conference under British auspices. 
1. C. O. to the Resident (Bushire) 8 Nov. 1923 (Clayton 
Papers) 471/2. 
This intervention took place at a time when neither Ibn 
Saud nor King Husain felt under obligation to work ' 
harmoniously with Britain. By cutting off Ibn Saud's 
subsidy, Britain had taken/untimely decision. In March 
1923 the Cabinet had decided that, "a single payment of 
150,000 will be made to him [Ibn Saud] for the year 1923/24, 
but after 31 March 1923 his subsidy will be discontinued". 
1 
Philby condemned the decision as it could have been 
of dangerous consequences for British policy. Now Ibn Saud 
had nothing to gain by cooperation, and 
"if a spontaneous understanding was not achieved 
among the parties themselves [at Kuwait], but was 
forced upon them, it would not be accepted by Ibn 
Saud ... and if the conference failed to arrive at 
an agregd settlement, Ibn Saud would march on the 
Hejaz". 
Husain's subsidy had already been terminated since he 
had refused to comply with British policy aims in the 
Middle East. The Cabinet decided to offer only a lump sum 
of £50,000 if and when he signed a satisfactory treaty with 
Britain. 
3 
But his attitude remained unchanged. However 
excellent the idea of the Kuwait conference was, since it would 
allow the Arabs to settle their own matters themselves, 
there was indeed little prospect of this in the absence of 
co-operation by Ibn Saud and by King Husain. The conference, 
1. 
_ CAB 
23/45,17 (23), 28 March 1923. See also: The Times 
13 March 1928, for the subsidies paid to Ibn Saud. 
2. Philby, 'Arabia Today', International Affairs, xiv (1935) 
pp. 619-34 
3. CAB 23/45,17 (23), 28 March 1923. 
therefore, was foredoomed to failure. 
It opened on 17 December without Hejazi representation. 
The delegates of Neid, Iraq and Transjordan found themselves 
immediately at loggerheads on the main points at issue. 
Ten days later the conference broke up termporarily to 
enable theoblegates to consult their governments. Again 
it was resumed on 16 January 1924 for another fruitless 
ten days. At the final attempt which was due to begin in 
March, it was hoped that King Husain would send his 
representative and all parties would then reach an agreement. 
Instead, the Nejd delegation returned with notes that the 
Shammar refugees were raiding into Nejd, and Faisal al-Dowaish 
threatened reprisals against Iraq. In fact hope was lost 
when al-Dowaish attacked Iraqi tribes on 14 March and when 
Iraq refused to continue . the negotiations. 
There was already 
no Hejazi representative to the conference, and no Nejd- 
Transjordan agreement had been reached over Wadi-Sirhan. 
1 
The conference had failed, but "more serious than failure ... 
was the evidence of growing intransigence and aggressiveness 
on the Wahhabi_.. side". 
2 Philby's expectations proved 
correct. As he later remarked 
"The failure of the past'frw years has been directly 
traceable to grave mistakes of policy based on 
misunderstanding of the psychology of Central Arabia, and 
that a continuance of that policy must result in chaos 
and disaster. " 
1. Dobbs, 'A Short History'; al-Rihani, Tarikh Neid, pp. 
287-91; Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 340; Attar, op. cit., 
pp. 608-10. 
2. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 341. 
3. Philby, 'The Triumph of the Wahhabis'. For more about the 
Kuwait Conference see a complete file in Air 5/332. 
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As attempts at conciliation between Ibn Saud and all his 
Hashimite neighbours now proved a failure, Britain began 
to retreat from her role in trying to make a desert policy; 
the treaty of Mohammarah and the protocols of 'Uqair had not 
been respected at any time in the past; no definite frontier 
between Nejd and Transjordan had been agreed upon; King 
Husain was not able to recover his lost territories, nor was 
he able to defend himself; the treaty of Darain 1915, 
neither mentioned the Nejd-Hejaz frontier nor prevented Ibn 
Saud from attacking the Hejaz; Anglo-Hejazi relations were 
at a turning point; Ibn Saud had nothing to gain from Britain 
after the termination of his subsidy. No longer under any 
obligation he felt free to follow his own desires. He chose 
to take the Hejaz. 
1 
The story of the Hejaz war does not need to be pursued 
in detail. It will suffice to introduce a summary of the 
developments which may be useful when considering British 
policy. When Ibn Saud launched his campaign on the Hejaz in 
August 1924, Britain felt that she was, this time, not 
committed to support Husain and declared neutrality. The 
roots of this decision go back to the early post-war period 
when differences emerged between Husain and Britain and 
was confirmed by the Kuwait Conference when the British line 
was "to allow the Arabs to settle the matter for themselves 
or to fight it out for themselves. "2 Lacking British support 
1. For the motive behind the Hejaz war see; Attar, pp. cit., 
pp. 681-706. 
2. - Philby, 'Arabia Today'. European representative at Jeddah 
declared neutrality in a letter dated 4 Nov. 1924, Umm al-Qura 
No. 2,19 Dec. also No. 3,26 Dec. 1924; Attar, op. cit., 
pp. 737,810-11. 
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Husain ceased to inspire any confidence among his own 
followers. Pressed to abdicate he did so on 3 October1 
in favour of his son Ali who inherited a hopeless position 
and soon showed himself/to defend even those territories 
still nominally under his control. The war continued 
throughout 1925. Peace missions failed to reconcile the 
two rivals. 
2 When rumours reached London about the fall of 
the Hejaz, the Cabinet of 29 September 1924 confirmed a 
former warning to Ibn Saud that "he must not interfere with 
British subjects in Mecca or elsewhere". He was also informed 
that a ship had been sent to Jeddah with a view to the 
withdrawal, in an emergency, of British subjects, whether 
pilgrims or residents. 
3 
Unlike her aloofness in the Hejaz war, Britain took a 
positive interest in the dispute over the Iraq-Nejd and Trans- 
jordan-Nejd frontiers. In Iraq the High commissioner himself 
supervised the situation by arrangements with the Iraqi 
Government. The Royal Air Force assumed responsibility to 
defend the country. 
4 
When ex-King Husain had fled to Aqaba 
1. On 3 Oct. a Hejazi assembly met in Jeddah, requested 
Husain's abdication, see Arabic text to the communique 
in: al-Rihani, Tarikh Neid, pp. 304- 05. See Husain's 
acceptance pp. 306- 07; see also; al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., i, 
pp. 174-77, Attar, on. cit., pp. 721-32,739-55. 
2. Rihani conducted a peace mission between Ibn Saud and Ali, 
see: American Consul (Beirut) to the Sec. of State (Washington 
cited in al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., ii, pp. 22-43. King Fuad of 
Egypt made another endeavour see: Acting High Commissioner 
(Alex. ) to Acting British Agent (Jeddah) 14 Oct. 1925 
(Clayton Papers) 471/6; also sayed Taleb and Philby as well 
as the Imam of the Yemen made their own, see-. Attar, op. cit., 
pp. 810-19,851-54. The Russians too kept'their endeavours 
for reconciliation see: Umm al-Aura No. 20,8 May 1925, 
No. 24,5 June 1925. 
3. CAB 23/48,51 (24), 29 Sept. 1924. 
4. Bourdillon, B. H., (for the High Commissioner, Iraq) to Amery 
C. O. ), 12 March 1925, (Clayton Papers) 471/5; see also, 
Dobbs, 'A Short History. 
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and had continued to give support to the Hejazi army, the 
British position was threatened especially when Ibn Saud 
justified his acts as follows: 
We have become firmly convinced that the sole 
course of the prolongation of the present war ... is 
the Sharif Husain who has taken up his residence in 
Aqaba and is furnishing the army of the Government of 
Jeddah with men and arms and supplies and money ... 
We have therefore decided to take a new step which 
will be most influential in its effect, wide in its 
scope and powerful in its result... We have decided 
to despatch a division of our army in the direction 
of Aqaba because Husain is living and fighting there... "1 
Britain acted quickly in order to prevent Ibn Saud from 
taking 'Aqaba. it was proposed that; Husain should be 
removed from Aqaba to Cyprus, that Aqaba should be annexed 
to Transjordan for strategic reasons and that negotiations 
should be opened as soon as possible with Ibn Saud. 
Britain- accordingly decided to send to Ibn Saud 
and to ex-King Husain notifications of the British intentions 
regarding Husain and Aqaba. In the meantime Ihn Saud was 
reminded that Aqaba "lies within a boundary within which he 
had been informed in October last that an unprovoked aggression 
on his part would be regarded as an attack upon territory 
for which His Majesty's Government are responsible ... "2 
In aidition, the British Government would take the necessary 
steps to prevent or eject his forces if they attempted to 
enter the port. Britain, however, was 
1. Ibn Saud to the British Agent (Jeddah) 14 May 1925 
(Clayton Papers) 471/5. 
2. CAB 23/50,27 (25), 27 May 1925; See also Young to 
Clayton, 31 July 1925, (Clayton Papers) 471/6; Philby, 
'Great Britain and its Arabian Problems', (Philby Papers) 
18/9, Umm al-Qura, No. 31,11 Aug. 1925. 
"ready bnd anxious to consult with him [over] 
the actual delimitation of the frontier between 
Nejd and Transjordan, as well as the settlement 
of all outstanding questions between himself and 
Transjordan and Iraq, and that they were willing 
to initiate immediate negotiations with him ... 
either in London, or elsewhere. " 
On the first of July the Cabinet approved the following 
recommendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence: 
1. Aqaba "will no longer be available for pro-Hejaz 
intrigues and will be incorporated in Transjordan Administration". 
2. Ex-King Husain should be induced to leave Aqaba by 17 
July 1925. 
3. The British Authorities in Transjordan "should take 
steps to extend the administration to include Maan" as well 
as Aqaba and the administration "should be conducted from 
Maan with no officials stationed at Aqaba". 
4. A British ship should visit Aqaba after the departure 
of Husain. 
2 
By the end of July 1925, in accordance with these 
decisions, Husain had been removed, and Aqaba had-been 
annexed. Ibn Saud strongly objected to the annexation 
but in vain. On 31 July, Herbert Young wrote to Clayton: 
1. CAB 23/50,27 (25) 27 May 1925. 
2. CAB 23 /50,32 (25), 1 July 1925; see; Umm al-Qura, 
No. 29,17 July, 1925; Attar, op. cit., pp. 858. 
"Negotiations should be opened as soon as possble 
with Ibn Saud with a view to delimitating the exact 
frontier between Nejd and Transjordan and also 
clearing up certain outstanding points between 
Nejd and Iraq ... the conversations should be conducted by someone whose name is well known to the Arab yorld 
and upon whose judgment he can himself rely ... It 
He finally asked Clayton if he "would consider undertaking 
this duty". 
In fact, the British never thought that the fall of Husain 
could happen so quickly. As they were taken by surprise, they 
avoided taking any action to save the Hejaz nor were they under 
an obligation to do so. 
It became an urgent matter" Toynbee wrote, "for 
Great Britain to reach an agreement with Ibn Saud in 
regard not only to the Nejd-Transjordan frontier but 
to the tribal regime along the border between Ibn 
Saud's dominions and both the areas under British 
mandate. If Jiddah and Medina were to fall before 
these issues between Ibn Saud and Great Britain were 
settled, the Wahhabi ruler might be tempted ... to 
settle the problems of his northern frontiers by the 
sword -a development which would place GrZeat Britain 
in an exceedingly difficult position ... " 
Only then, did Britain discover that she must rapidly 
readjust her policy towards Ibn Saud. The result was a 
totally new departure. Ibn Saud was no longer a petty: 
ruler, but the future King of Arabia. His relations with 
Great Britain on this new basis are the object of this study. 
1. Young to Clayton, 31 July 1925 (Clayton Papers) 471/6. 
This invitation was repeated to Clayton several times. 
2. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 343. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Britain, British Muslims and the Saudi Conquest of 
the Heiaz, 1925-6 
Clayton's first Mission to Ibn Saud and the end of 
the Hashemites in the Hejaz, October - December, 1925 
Britain's Recognition'of Ibn Saud in the Hejaz, 
January - April, 1926 
Muslim Attitudes towards the New Situation in the 
Hejaz, 1926 
Clayton's first Mission to Ibn Saud and the end of 
the Hashemites in the elaz, October - December 1925 
Although Britain had decided to pursue a policy of 
official neutrality towards Arabian affairs and, accordingly, 
Husain had been left to his inevitable fate, she could not, 
if her interests as a Mandatory Power were to be protected, 
afford to remain entirely aloof. Two main issues, involving 
the Mandates, remained unresolved after the Kuwait Conference 
and both concerned Ibn Saud whose cooperation became essential. 
Therefore it was decided to send a highranking envoy to Ibn 
Saud to secure peace on the Nejd boundaries with both Iraq 
and Transjordan, and to delimit a frontier line between 
Transjordan and Nejd. To this task Sir Gilbert Clayton 
devoted his life. 
Clayton started his mission in October 1925, when Ibn 
Saud's warriors were victoriously advancing into the Hejaz. 
On his way to meet Ibn Saud at Bahrah, which he had already 
occupied, Clayton explained to the Hejazi officials that 
his mission was not concerned with the current war and that 
Britain insisted on remaining strictly neutral since the 
dispute was of a religious nature. As Sir Austin Chamberlain 
twelve months later stated before the Imperial Conference: 
"The policy of His Majesty's Government has all along 
been to refrain from taking sides in the religious 
disputes which centre round the Holy Places. All 
that we desire is that British subjects going on 
pilgrimage stall do so under the best possible 
conditions. " 
1. A statement by Sir A. Chamberlain to the Imperial 
Conference, 20 Oct. 1926, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1939, ed. W. N. Medlicott and others 
(Ser. 1A, ii, 1968) p. 937. (Thereafter: D. B. F. P. ) The 
Saudis were delighted by Britain's neutrality see: 
Umm al-Oura Nos. 2,19 Dec. and 3,26 Dec. 1925. 
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But, he added, from the political point of view, Britain could 
not entirely disinterest herself from the current development 
between Nejd and the Hejaz for a simple reason that "Nejd 
borders upon the British mandated territories of Iraq and 
Transjordan, and the Hejaz has a common frontier with 
Transjordan. " Chamberlain's statement implies that Britain 
weld have been prepared to play a mediatory role. But 
responsibility for that would have been undertaken 
by the British Agent in the Hejaz and not in any circumstances 
by Clayton. The account which he gave of his brief to the 
Hejazis was, therefore, correct. The British attitude 
now differed from that adopted by Cairo during the Arab Revolt. 
Britain was no longer concerned about whether the Hejaz was 
under the control of the Hashemites or of Ibn Saud. But, 
as the future ruler of-the Hejaz, Ibn Saud, whose cooperation 
Britain required, achieved a new importance. Clayton, who while 
as 
in the Arab Bureau, had viewed Ibn Saud /a minor figure, was 
now crossing the Hejaz to negotiate with a powerful leader. 
On 10 October, Clayton reached Ibn Saud's camp at Bahrah. 
Formal negotiations started the following day and lasted 
for over three weeks. 
1 The question of the Nejd-Transjordan 
frontier was at the top of the agenda for strategic reasons. 
The Hejaz was expected to fall at any time and then-Ibn Saud 
might turn his victorious warriors towards the north soon 
1. Report by Sir Gilbert Clayton on his mission to negotiate 
certain agreements with the Sultan of Nejd, and instructions 
issued to him in regard to his mission, P. R. O., F. O. 371/11473 
(A copy of which is traced in the Sudan Archive, Clayton 
Papers, 471/7, School of Oriental Studies, Durham University), 
(Thereafter: 'Clayton Report'). 
afterwards. For the same reasons, Britain wanted to 
include 'Kaf in Transjordan and to stop Ibn Saud's advance to the 
south of the village in order to prevent him from having 
corridor territories between Iraq and Transjordan. 
1 
(This was a slight change in the British position towards the 
matter; Kaf had been offered to Ibn Saud by a Colonial 
Office proposal in November 19232 within a general desert 
settlement which included the Hejaz. ) ! -. 
., r'", -,..; 
.. 
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I 
Britain's new attitude was adopted after two visits 
made by G. Antonius to the area just before Clayton began 
his mission. Antonius returned to suggest that not only 
should Kaf be given to Transjordan "but also the northern 
half of the Wadi Sirhan". He justified his proposal by 
several reasons, (i) strategically it would be easy to 
defend Transjordan against raids coming up the Wadi towards 
Amman. This was also emphasised by the R. A. F. authorities. 
(ii) Economically the area was "the natural and customary 
roaming ground of two of the main tribes concerned namely, 
the Rwala and the Bani Sakhr", which were supposed to be 
Transjordanian. (iii) Politically both the Rwalah and Bani 
Sakhr had "remained untouched by Wahhabi propaganda" and it 
was desirable to keep them so. 
3 
1. C. O. to-Clayton, 10 Sept. 1925, Appendix 'Clayton Report'. 
2. C. O. to the Resident (Bushire) 8 Nov. 1923 (Clayton Papers) 
471/2. 
3. Memo. by Antonius on the eastern frontier of Transjordan, 
Annex. 3 'Clayton Report'. 
(iv) Historically, it may be added that Kaf had been "in 
possession of NuriSha'lan and his family for a considerable 
time, and Jauf itself was captured from Ibn Rashid by Nuri 
Sha'lan during the war [of 1921] and was only quite 
recently taken from him by Ibn Saud. " The exclusion of Ibn 
Saud from Wadi Sirhan had been suggested earlier by a British 
Official in Transjordan for the same reasons mentioned by 
l 
Antonius '. 
Ibn Saud's attitude was different. "Iraq and Transjordan", 
he argued, "should be separated from each other, partly because 
of the presence of the two brothers [Faisal and Abd-Allah], 
and partly because of the inherited rights of Nejd". He 
stressed the-point that Britain had promised him the whole of 
the Wadi, up to Kaf. 
2 He, too, based his claim on geographical, 
economic and administrative grounds. Free access across the 
Wadi, he argued, 'must be guaranteed and his historical rights 
must be preserved in any settlement. He stated that: 
"Kaf and its surrounding villages are intimately 
connected with the rest of the Wadi Sirhan, and 
are-an indispensable economic factor in the life 
of the Wadi. We do not think it right that these 
considerations should be neglected merely for the 
sake of ensuring communication and other interests. " 
1. C. H. F. Cox to Antonius .9 Sept. 
1925, Annex 3 'Clayton 
Report'. 
2. Memo. 1, presented by the Sultan of Nejd on 11 Oct. 1925, 
Annex. 4, 'Clayton Report'. 
3. Memo. 2, presented by the Sultan of Nejd on 12 Oct. 1925, 
Annex, 4, see also: Record of proceedings, 1st and 2nd 
meetings, 'Clayton Report', Ibn Saud was still insisting 
on tribal bases for the delimitation of the frontier. 
See above chapt. 1, PP. 68 ff . 
There was no doubt that Britain realised the 
importance of Kaf to Ibn Saud. She had been ready to cede 
it to him, but now preferred to hold the matter in reserve 
as a bargaining card. 
1. 
Clayton maintained this position 
at the negotiations in order to make sure that Ibn Saud's 
security measures in the area would not lead to offensive 
action. Unaware of the game Britain was playing, Ibn Saud 
fought the battle hard for Kaf, but in reasonable and 
measured terms. He wanted either that Britain "should 
prevent any danger arising to him or should allow him to 
repel that danger himself". 
2 
Clayton recognised the justice of Ibn Saud's argument. 
A personal friendship between the two men began to develop. 
In his report of the proceedings Clayton stated that the 
Sultan of Nejd 
"had performed a wonderful task in restoring and 
expanding the fortunes of his family and of his country 
but that very expansion must inevitably bring him into 
closer contact with the outside world, and he would then 
feel increasingly the need of a powerful friend to assist 
him in dealing with forces to which he had not hitherto 
been exposed. His Highness had already signified his 
strong desire for a cgomplete friendship and co-operation 
with Great Britain. " 
Ibn Saud had expressed his desire for Britain's 
friendship for pragmatic reasons, Britain similarly needed 
his co-operation for the sake of her own imperial interests. 
His dominions were entirely encircled by . British 
1. Clayton to C. O. 25 Nov. 1925, 'Clayton Report'. 
2. Record of proceedings, 2nd meeting, 'Clayton Report', 
3. Record of proceedings, 3rd meeting, 'Clayton Report'. 
possessions or spheres of influence in India, *the Gulf, 
Aden, the Red Sea, Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine, Transjordan 
and Iraq. The mutual advantage of friendly relations 
seemed obvious. Having reached this conclusion, prospects 
for agreement seemed much fairer, although the Kaf question 
remained to be determined. 
1 
At their fourth meeting Clayton began to shift from 
his original position. He had tested "the genuineness of 
Ibn Saud's professions and gauge[d] the length to which he 
was prepared to carry resistance". This was confirmed at 
the meeting when Ibn Saud introduced another document to 
support his claims to Kaf. Clayton aimed at gaining some 
further bargaining advantage before proceedingvith direct 
discussion of the Kaf issue. As he later explained his 
object was to induce in Ibn Saud and his advisers "such a 
frame of mind as to consider it a concession which placed 
them under obligation of furnishing adequate guarantees in 
return". This delayed the direct discussion until 25 
October, when Clayton drafted an agreement covering the 
2 
whole of Transjordan - Nejd relations. 
Ibn Saud, although not in complete agreement with the 
draft, considered it a "great step forward". He proposed 
only a few amendments, and, on 27 October, he presented his 
1. Ibid. 
2. Clayton to C. O. 25 Nov. 1925; see also, Memo. 3, presented 
by the Sultan of Nejd on 14 Oct. 1925, Annex 4; Draft 
agreement concerning Transjordan presented to the Sultan 
of Nejd on 25 Oct. 1925, Annex 5, 'Clayton Report'. 
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counter draft agreement. 
1 The gap was narrowed and Clayton 
decided to cede Kaf in return for particular British objectives, 
namely "the immunity of Transjordan from aggression, the 
preservation of established rights, and the protection of 
tribes against disruptive propaganda". As regards Ibn 
Saud's urgent demands for contiguity with Syria, Clayton had 
offered his trading caravans "certain restricted facilities 
of transit into and from Syrian territory". 
2 On 2 November 
the Haddah agreementteas signed. It was only concerned with 
Nejd-Transjordan frontier issues, although most of the Hejaz 
was by now under Ibn Saud's de facto control. 
The agreement may be summed up as follows: Kaf formally 
became a part of Ibn Saud's territories (art. 1). But Ibn 
Saud was prevented from establishing any fortified posts in 
the area (art. 2). The Governor of Wadi Sirhan should 
remain in contact with the British representative in 
Transjordan in order to avoid future misunderstandings (art. 3). 
The established rights, in the territory of either party, 
of tribes which were under the jurisdiction of the other 
party, were to be maintained (art. 4). Raiding from one 
side of the frontier to the other was to be considered an 
act of aggression (art. 5 ). A special tribunal was to be 
set up for punishing the guilty tribes, who violated the 
accord (art. 6). Tribes must not cross the frontier without 
1. Draft agreement concerning Transjordan presented by 
the Sultan of Nejd on 27 Oct. 1925, Annex. 6, 'Clayton 
Report'. 
2. Clayton to C. O. 25 Nov. 1925, 'Clayton Report'. 
permission (art. 7). The two governments of Nejd and 
Transjordan undertook to discourage emigration across the 
borders (art. 8), and they were not to communicate with 
the Shaikhs of tribes subject to the authority of the 
other government (art. 9). The forces of'either government 
were not to cross the frontier without consultation with 
the other government (art. 10). Shaikhs of tribes who have 
their own flags were not to display them in the'territory of 
the other state (art. 11). Freedom of passage was to be 
accorded by the two governments to travellers and to 
pilgrims (art. 12). Freedom of passage, across the corridor 
connecting Transjordan with Iraq, was to be secured at all 
times by the British Government for the merchants of Nejd 
between Nejd and Syria in both directions (art. 13). The 
agreement was to remain in force as long as Britain was the 
Mandatory power in Transjordan (art. 14). 
l 
Clayton summarised the substance of theagreement 
when he wrote: 
this agreement provides ... for the cession of 
Kaf and that portion of Wadi Sirhan to the south 
of Kaf to Ibn Saud, but maintains the northern 
frontier and the southern portion of the western 
frontier of Nejd as fixed by His Majesty's 
Government. In addition, it excludes practically 
the whole of the four Wadis from Nejd, which 
represents a gain to Transjordan in comparison 
with the frontier previously offered to Ibn Saud. 
The immunity of Transjordan from aggression, the 
preservation of established rights and the 
protection of tribes against disruptive propaganda 
are secured, as far as possible ... " 
1. ---For an English text of the agreement see: Appendix B, 
For an Arabic text see: Umm al-aura, No. 60,19 Feb. 1926. 
2. Clayton to C. O. 25 Nov. 1925, 'Clayton Report'. 
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During the time when discussions over Kaf were 
suspended, the negotiators had turned to the other 
main issue: that of the Iraq-Nejd frontier. Clayton 
hoped that he could succeed where the Kuwait Conference 
had failed, even though his terms of reference were the 
same. Where the actual frontiers were concerned he had 
no room for manoeuvre. He, therefore, took both the 
treaty of Mohammarah 1922, and the 'Uqair protocols 1923, 
as bases for discussion. Meanwhile, the Iraq Government 
authorised an Iraqi official to furnish Clayton with "full 
details regarding claims and counter claims advanced in 
respect of past raids, as [sic] also with the views of the 
Iraq Government regarding a final settlement of such claims". 
l 
Britain preferred, however, that Iraq, like Transjordan, should 
not entertain direct negotiations with Nejd. The whole 
matter therefore remained in Clayton's hands. 
At this juncture Britain and Ibn Saud's interests in 
securing peace and tranquility on the border appeared identical. 
Their difference arose over methods of achieving that end. 
The objective, Ibn Saud insisted, "would not beattained 
unless one principle was laid down and acted upon by both 
parties, the principle he advocated was to make the tribes in 
both countries responsible to their governments". Clayton 
pointed out that this very priciple had blocked agreement 
at the Kuwait conference. Ibn Saud, with memories of the 
1. C. O. to Clayton, 10 Sept. 1925, Appendix, 'Clayton Report'. 
Shammar experience in mind and perhaps motivated by a wish 
to let tribal allegiances determine borders, defended his 
position by complicated reference to past incidents and 
episodes concerning the tribes. Clayton, only beginning 
to discern what lay behind Ibn Saud's attitude, tried to 
explain the Iraqi point of view and stressed their willingness 
"to undertake to discourage tribes from coming into their 
country". The good will of both governments, he argued, 
would prove more important for maintaining peace in the 
future rather than the establishment of a rigid and contentious 
principle for determining government attitudes. Failing to 
convince Ibn Saud, 'he finally proposed to draw up a draft 
agreement, "It would", he said "embody what the Iraq government 
was prepared to do and, while it would not go so far as his 
Highness wished, it would go a long way in the direction of 
his'wishes". 1 
At their next meeting, with Clayton's draft now available, 
2 
the discussion continued with Ibn Saud still raising practical 
difficulties in relation to the possible movement and behaiiour 
of the tribes and indicating'his doubts as to wld her Iraq 
would be able to control the situation on her side of the 
frontier. Clayton argued that "it was beyond the wit of 
men to devise any instrument which could work successfully 
unless both parties were prepared to do their best to co-operate". 
1. Record of proceedings, 5th meeting, 'Clayton Report'. 
2. For text see: Annex. 10, 'Clayton Report'. 
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He did not elaborate on means of securing such 
co-operation. By clinging to generalities, Clayton 
hoped to avoid getting involved in what he described to 
Ibn Saud as "the intricacies of tribal raids and customs" 
where obviously he felt that he was bound to be out- 
manoeuvred. Warning Ibn Saud that he "had gone as far 
as he could in regard to the principle to which he [Ibn 
Saud] attached so much importance", he left the way open 
for Ibn Saud to provide counter-proposals on the basis 
of the draft. At this stage Clayton was beginning to lose 
confidence of achieving success and so was pleasantly surprized 
when Ibn Saud concluded the proceedings with the assurance 
that "When I left I should take with me a promise that could 
be honoured and fulfilled". 
' Ibn Saud was as good as his 
word and at their next meeting, on 21 October, yielding 
eventually to Clayton's pressure, he accepted the substance 
of the original draft. 
2 
Accordingly on 1 November the Bahrah agreement was signed. 
3 
The first seven articles of the Bahrah were similar to articles 
5- 11 of Haddah. They constituted a kind of regulating 
principle for the tribal system on either side of the frontiers. 
The principles of articles 1,5,6 and 7 had already been 
agreed upon in Kuwait; on the two points which had caused 
1. Record of proceedings, 6th meeting, 'Clayton Report'. 
2. Record of proceedings, 7th meeting, 'Clayton Report'. 
3. For an English text of the agreement see Appendix C. 
For an Arabic text see: Umm al-Oura, No. 60,19 Feb. 1926. 
a deadlock at Kuwait, namely the extradition of refugee 
tribes and the conditions on which armed contingents might 
be called up, Clayton "was able to persuade Ibn Saud to 
recede from his former position and accept the point of view 
of the Iraq Government (art. 8). A clause whereby the 
two governments undertook to negotiate an agreement for 
the extradition of common criminals was inserted (art. 10). 
A proposal for the imposition of guarantees, rejected by 
Ibn Saud's delegation at Kuwait, was accepted by him in 
this agreement. (art. 9). 
1 
The conclusion of the two agreements of Bahrah and 
Haddah was a diplomatic victory for Clayton personally and 
for the British as the Mandatory Power in Iraq and Trans- 
Jordan. From the Imperial point of view, they were the 
first moves in the right direction Transjordan and Iraq 
retained a common frontier. Thus the Cairo-Baghdad air route 
was safeguarded, as also were the proposed Baghdad-Haifa 
or Aqaba railway and car route. It was also hoped that the 
two agreements would lead to the establishment of better 
relations between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites. 
2 
The two agreements were "a mixture of the traditional 
3 law of the desert with international law", but they were 
1. Clayton to C. O., 25 Nov. 1925, 'Clayton Report'. 
2. See: Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 345; Memo. on the foreign 
policy of H. M. G. (undated) D. B. F. P. 1919-39 (ser. IA, 
i, 1966) pp. 861- 64; American Vice Consul (Aden) to 
Sec. of State (Washington) 25 Oct. 1927, al-Rashid, 
D. H. S. A., ii, pp. 111- 29. 
3. Williams, op. cit., p. 184. 
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agreements between governments and not between tribes 
to whom the notion of national frontiers was unknown. 
Their reactions would decide the future of the agreements. 
Ibn Saud had been pressurised to yield on certain matters, 
but how much confidence did he have, when he signed these 
agreements, in his ability to fulfil his obligations or 
in his Ikhwan to accept them? Moreover, did Britain really 
succeed in securing her Imperial interests, and if so, what 
was the price? These were open questions. 
1 There will 
be answers in chapters 4,5 and 6. For the moment all 
that could be concluded was that the agreements gave Britain 
a working base from which she could pursue her hitherto 
"mismanaged policy", and that they would "not fail to leave 
their impress upon the development of Great Britain's future 
policy in the Middle East", although they represented 
"nothing unusual" in the diplomatic relations between Britain 
and Arabia. 
"They [Haddah and Bahrah] have long been under consid- 
eration by the Arab experts of Downing Street, and 
Sir Gilbert Clayton ..., was only responsible for 
putting into technical shape and wording what had 
been achieved through a protracted negotiations. 
But having been concluded ... these agreements are 
a landmarlý of great consequence in a complex diplomatic 
chapter. " 
1. See chapters 4 and 5 below. 
2. L., 'Downing Street and Arab Potentates', Foreign Affairs, 
V (1927) pp. 233-40. Arabic translation ofthis article 
is cited in Al-Manar, xxviii (1927-28) pp. 54-62. 
After his success with Ibn Saud, Clayton, who had inspired 
the Foreign Office with confidence in his ability as a 
negotiator with the Arabs, turned south to conclude 
similar agreement with the Imam of the Yemen regarding his 
frontier with Aden. See Memo. of the foreign policy of 
H. M. G. (undated) D. B. F. P. 1919-39 (ser. iA, i, 1966) pp. 
861-64; American Vice Consul (Aden) to Sec. of State 
(Washington) 25 Oct. 1927, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., ii, pp. 
111- 29; Collins, op. cit. pp. 191-261. 
Between the end of Clayton's mission on 3 November and 
the fall of Jeddah into Ibn Saud's hands on 21 December, 
1 
events in the Hejaz "succeeded each other with Kaleidoscopic 
rapidity". 
2 
The submission of Jeddah as the last Hashemite 
garrison and the abdicatbn of King Ali were the closing episodes 
of Hashemite rule in the Hejaz. This end was reached 
peacefully through the good offices of Jordan, the British 
Agent at Jeddah, whose action had ended British Official 
neutrality in the Hejaz war. 
British neutrality had, more or less, been maintained 
till 9 December 1925, when King Ali, under the pressure 
of the Saudi siege, requested Jordan's advice. In view 
of his Government's official attitude, Jordan was reluctant 
even to offer advice. Facing a continuously critical 
situation, All verbally3 and later officially requested 
Jordan to act as intermediary for the surrender of Jeddah. 
"I have decided to withdraw and leave the country ... 
to reside in Transjordan or Baghdad or Palestine. 
I should like that His Britanic Majesty's Government 
would mediate in the matter of surrendering the 
country in such calm and peaceful manner that will 
guarantee the comfort and safety of all [the Hejazis]. "4 
1. See: American Vice Consul (Aden) to Sec. of State 
(Washington) 23 Dec. 1925, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., ii, p. 50. 
2. Jordan (Jeddah) to F. O., Jeddah Report for Dec. 1925, E367/ 
367/91, F. O. 371/11442. The British Agent and Consul at 
Jeddah had been required to prepare a monthly report 
about internal and external affairs of the Hejaz and to 
despatch this to the Foreign Office. These reports are 
highly important for they provide the Agent's general 
view of Arabian affairs. For reasons of simplicity 
each report will be contracted thereafter as: 'Jeddah 
Report'in addition to the date and number of the volume 
in the F. O. papers . 
3. Jordan to Chamberlain, 28 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91, F. O. 371/11432 
4. King Ali to Jordan, 14 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91, F. O. 371/11432 
On the following day, ' 15 December, the King made his 
intention known at a council held at Jeddah. The King's 
wish was immediately communicated to the Foreign Office, and 
on 16 December Jordan was instructed to mediate. At once, 
he wrote to Ibn Saud asking for an urgent audience at Ragama, 
2 
eight miles from Jeddah. Ibn Saud, though busy directing the 
attack against Jeddah and almost on the point of having attained 
his war-aims, agreed to the meeting. 
3 At the meeting Ibn 
Saud was informed of Ali's intention. After a lengthy 
conversation of a most amicable nature, they reached an 
agreement based on Ali's conditions which had been submitted to 
Jordan on 14 December. This agreement can be summed up as 
4 
follows: In consideration of the abdication of King Ali and of 
his leaving the Hejaz, the Sultan of Nejd on the one hand under- 
took to guarantee the personal safety of-the Hejazis and to grant 
them an amnesty; to allow all'officers and soldiers who wished 
to leave the country to do so; to distribute amongst all the 
soldiers in Jeddah a sum of £5,000; to retain in their 
posts capable civil government employees; finally, to 
allow King Ali and the family of al-Husain to take with 
them their personal belongings and property. On the other 
1. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 309. 
2. Jordan to Ibn Saud, 16 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91;, F. O.. 
371/11432; see also Umm al-Aura, No. 52,27 Dec. 1925, 
for text of the invitation; Attar, op. cit., p. 879. 
3. Ibn Saud to Jordan, *l6 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91, F. O. 371/11432; 
also: Umm al-Qura,, No. 52,27 Dec. 1927; Attar, op. cit., 
p. 880. 
4. King Ali to Jordan, 14 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91, F. O. 
371/11432; Attar, op. cit., pp. 880-83. 
hand, King All undertook to hand over all the prisoners 
of war he might have. All soldiers of the Hejaz had to 
surrender to the Sultan of Nejd with their arms without 
damaging or disposing of war materials which they already 
had. Finally, all steamers in possession of the Hejaz were 
to pass into the possession of Ibn Saud. 
1 
It was left to Jordan to translate this agreement from 
the realm of theory to that of fact. At his own request he 
was given letters from both Ibn Saud and Ali to the Hejaz 
defence garrison commanders and to Ibn Saud's commanders in- 
structing them to cease hostilities and to ensure the safety 
of all soldiers and residents. Consequently, Jeddah 
surrendered on 21 December and Yanbo on 22. With the 
surrender of the last garrison, Ali left Jeddah on 22 December 
on H. M. S. "Cornflower" to exile in Iraq. 
2 
As an indication of his own new status in the Hejaz, 
Ibn Saud, to whom foreign. representatives had never been 
accredited while he ruled in Nejd, addressed a note on 
Christmas Day, to-all foreign representatives in Jeddah 
informing them of the end of the war and of the abdication and 
3 
departure of King Ali. 
1. Agreement forwarded by Ibn Saud to Jordan, 17 Dec. 1925, 
E363/11/91, F. O. 371/11432. 
2. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 18 Dec. 1925; King Ali's notice of 
withdrawal from the Hejaz, 19 Dec. 1925 E363/11/91, " F. O. 
371/11432; American Vice Consul (Aden) to Sec. of State 
(Washington) 29 Dec. 1925, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., ii, p. 55. 
3. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 25 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91, F. O. 371/11432. 
With Ali's departure and with the surrender of his 
forces virtually complete , Jordan's duties had now come to 
an end. When he visited Ibn Saud on the day of Ali's 
departure, the Sultan of Nejd on behalf of himself, of his 
people, and of the Muslim world, warmly thanked Jordan 
and the British Government for their successful attempts 
to achieve peace in the Holy Land. Anxious to establish 
a close relationship with Great Britain, Ibn Saud was 
reported as saying that 
"... his sincere friends were the British only, and 
that he had and would have no relations with any other 
European Power ... [and that he was] 
in full accord with 
his friends and allies the British people, whose politics 
were'his politics ... and that as long as the British 
respected two things which he held dearer than life ... 
[they were] his religion and his honour, there would 
always be the closest ties of friendship bTtween 
himself and his people and Great Britain". 
Britain's new policy, which had contributed to the 
peacemaking, was commended by King George, when he expressed 
his pleasure at learning that "the war has reached its 
conclusion and that his representative was enabled to contribute 
towards the prevention of bloodshed". 
2 The roots of 
this new policy lay in growing differences between Britain and 
Husain. It was on account of these that Britain declined to 
help him or to protect his regime and did not even maintain 
the strict neutrality that she had declared. Many British 
officials felt that they had made a mistake in originally 
supporting Husain. In retrospect for instance, D. G. Hogarth, 
i 
1. Jordan to Chamberlain, 28 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91, F. O. 371/11432 
2. Jordan to Ibn Saud, 20 Jan. 1926, E1398/11/91, F. O. 371/11432. 
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regarded as one of the main Arab experts in 1925, expressed 
his regret for backing the wrong horse as "we [British] 
were not looking beyond the war". 
1 Philby also concluded: 
"we mistook our men". 
2 Sir Gilbert Clayton, who had served 
with Hogarth in the Arab Bureau, remained among the 
defenders of Britain's war-time policy. "I have" he 
declared in a lecture given in December 1928, "heard the 
opinion expressed that we backed the wrong horse, Husain 
instead of Ibn Saud". But countering that view, he replied 
that, 
"although the two horses ran at the same meeting, 
they did not run the same race. We put our money 
-on both, and in neither case did we lose it. Ibn 
Saud could not have influenced the course of 
operations in Palestine any morS than Husain could 
have helped us in Mesopotamia". 
In closing his lecture, Clayton, confidently left the matter 
to the verdict of history. 
Archives are now open, and the history of Anglo-Arab 
relations during the first world war has been extensively 
reappraised. Clayton has been mcused of "advancing and 
promoting particular politics". In his "Anglo-Arab Labyrinth", 
Kedourie comments that "Clayton acted in concert with Storrs 
to try and move Kitchener to approach the Sharif as the future 
1. Hogarth, 'Wahhabism and British Interests', Journal of 
British Institute of International Affairs, iv (1925) 
pp. 70-81. 
2. Philby, 'The Triumph of the Wahhabis'. 
3. Clayton, 'Arabia and the Arabs', Journal of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, viii (1929) pp. 8-20. 
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Arab chief". 
1 
They wished to open up before the Sharif 
the prospect of religious as well as secular leadership and 
indeed Kitchener wrote on 31'October 1914 to the Sharif 
commenting suggestively that: "It may be that an Arab of 
truth will assume the Khalifate at Mecca and Medina :.. "2 
The revelations now available about Clayton's decisive r 
role may help to explain why he was so anxious to spring 
to the defence of Britain's war-time policy against its 
early critics. 
In the war situation, although there seemed to be a 
choice between backing Ibn Saud or Husain, the arguments 
in favour of Husain clearly proved the stronger. After the 
end of the war circumstances, obviously, were completely 
changed. Decisions arising from war-time necessity provided 
a poor base for any coherent long term-policy. But, in 
the absence of any such policy, Britain's responses fluctuated 
with the changing local scene. For this reason, -as Hourani 
has remarked, Britain's post war policy in the Middle East 
seemed "incompatible with the needs and with the real basis 
of Britain's position, and that incompatibility showed 
itself in a number of great contradictions which ran all 
through her actions". 
3 Hourani correctly concludes that 
"a policy of waiting until the last moment before reaching a 
decision, and then deciding in the light of tactical considerations 
1. Kedourie, op. cit., p. 41; see also: Sachar, op. cit., p. 120. 
2. Quoted in: Schar, op. cit., 'p. 125. 
3. Hourani, 'The Decline of the West in the Middle East - II', 
International Affairs, xxix (1953) pp. 156- 83. 
was not appropriate to the situation ... ". Husain was 
abandoned because Ibn Saud was the stronger. This was 
typical British policy and Hourani argued that "the tendency 
to support both parties to a dispute until the moment of 
inescapable choice, and then to incline towards the stronger, 
was fatal .. "1 Whatever view may be held of the long-term 
consequences of Britain's decision to back Ibn Saud in 1925 
there is no doubt that immediate local considerations rather 
than any coherent plan prompted the change. 
Regarding Ibn Saud as the stronger contender Britain 
shifted even from the position of strict neutrality which 
she had at first claimed to be adopting. Evidence of. this 
emerged gradually. 
Firstly, there was the British attitude towards Aqaba 
andMaan which were originally districts of nothern Hejaz. 
Britain decided on 1 July 1925, that Aqaba and Maan were to 
be incorporated in the Transjordan Administration2 for 
strategic reasons relating to the security of British. 
interests in Palestine and in Sinai, as well as to safeguard 
Imperial interests. 3 King Ali's refusal to cede Aqaba 
was brushed aside. British military forces and the local 
forces of Transjordan were sent to annex the district to the 
Palestine Mandate, "notwithstanding the fact that they had 
declared their neutrality in the [Hejaz] war .. "4 
1. Ibid. 
2. CAB 23/50,32(25), 1 July 1925, See Chapter I above p. 85. 
3. Plumer (Jerusalem) to Amery (C. O) 27 Jan. 1927,929/27; 
Lord Lloyd (Cairo) to Chanberlain (F. O. ) 31 Dec. 1926, 
No. 821, F. O. 371/12247; also; Philby, 'The Triumph of the 
Wahhabis'. 
4. Philby, 'Arabia-Today'. 
This British pressure compounded Ali's difficulties as he 
lost southern territories to his enemies and northern territories 
to his friends. 
Secondly, the official meetings held at Bahrah, a de jure 
Hejazi territory, meant indirect support for Ibn Saud and was 
in fact a breach of British neutrality. This can also be 
seen from Clayton's comments on his meetings with Ibn Saud. 
For example, Clayton wrote "it was obvious that he [Ibn Saud] 
had performed a wonderful task in restoring and expanding 
the fortunes of his family and of his country". 
' The same 
impression is given by Clayton's emphasis upon Ibn Saud's 
importance to British interests in the Red Sea despite the 
fact that Ibn Saaud's territorial expansion had not yet 
reached the Red Sea coast. 
-Thirdly, this kind of British neutrality was seen by 
Amin al-Rihani, a friend of Ibn Saud, as a policy of indirect 
help to him. This help was given because Ibn-Saud proved 
himself the stronger. "Britain is still", Rihani wrote, 
"pursuing the same old policy of helping-. - one 
Ameer- against 
the other". Rihani, who had himself tried to operate as 
a peacemaker between Ibn Saud and Ali, concluded in a 
report about his efforts: 
"I think it a shame that the allies, particularly 
England and France, who needed the Arabs during the [Great] 
War and were ready to take [sic] any treaty with them, 
should now abandon them and2stand arms folded watching 
them slaughter each other". 
1. Record of proceedings, 3rd meeting, 'Clayton Report'-; 
The Times 23 Oct. 1925 defended Britain's attitude; 
see comment in Dmm al-Oura, No. 43,25 Oct. 1925. 
2. 'Efforts of Rihani to bring about peace between Ibn Saud and 
Ali', American Consul in Charge (Beirut) to Sec. of State 
(Washington) 23 Sept. 1925, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., ii, pp. 22-43: 
ö ethetwe, t-In týie'MiýdgeCEas9; f g. also: Hourani, 'The Decline 
- 110 - 
Finally, while Britain had refused ä request for 
mediation, made separately by both, King Ali and Ibn Saud 
during Clayton's mission, 
1 
she agreed to act as a mediator 
once King Ali had decided to abdicate and to leave the Hejaz. 
In other words Britain acted when the end she had desired 
appeared on the, horizon. 
The per which Britain had exercised in Arabia during 
the war left her with responsibilities which she was either 
unwilling or unable to undertake. She had con tr: buted little 
to stability in Arabia after the war. The diplomacy of gold 
which had been used to keep the peace in Arabia during the 
war was now stopped and British policy was geared to 
immediate British interests rather than to general peace. 
Britain had drawn frontiers wherever she wanted them in Arabia 
and whenever it suited her. The balance of power there had 
been made and altered in order to harmonise with British policy 
in the Middle East. As the Foreign Office explained 
"At first sight it would seem that British policy is 
altruistic, but in truth ... [H. M. G. ] cannot lay this 
unction to their souls. The fact is that war and rumours 
of war, quarrels and friction, in any corner of the world 
spell loss and harm to British commercial and financial 
interests. It is for the sake of these interests that 
we endeavour to pour oil on troubled waters ... war in 
the Near East or the Baltic concerns us as much as it 
would concern Romania or Norway. This is the explanation 
and the reason of our intervention in almost every dispute 
that arises ... without our trade and our finance we 
sink to the level of a third-class Power ... " 
1. Collins, op. cit., pp. 92-101. 
2. Memo. on the Foreign Policy of H. M. G. (undated) 
D. B. F. P. 1919-1939, (ser. 1A, 1,1966) pp. 846-81. 
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Britain, at the beginning of 1926, was left with only one 
strong ruler in the area (Ibn Saud) and her relations with 
him had become closer since he had extended his authority 
from the Arab Gulf to the Red Sea, and from the hinterland 
of the Aden protectorate to the territories under British 
mandate in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. 
Britain's Recognition of Ibn Saud in the Helaz, 
January - April 1926. 
In his hour of victory, Ibn Saud entered Jeddah on 
23 December 1925, accompanied by his troops. A reception 
was held in the presence of the notables of the city as well 
as the foreign representatives, while the population flocked 
to see the spectacle. 
1 
A new era, not only for the Hejaz, 
but for the whole of Arabia had begun. 
Immediately order in the military, economic and civil 
affairs had to be restored after a long period of war and of 
chaos. Aware of antagonism throughout the Muslim world, Ibn 
Saud declared as his first slogan: "The Hejaz is for the 
Hejazis". He then called representatives from all over the 
Hejaz to form a national assembly which met at the Great 
Mosque in Mecca in order to decide the future of their 
country. 
2 
At the meeting, they passed a resolution, which was 
directly based on Ibn Saud's declaration to the effect 
that: the Hejaz should belong to the Hejazis, who should 
have the right of self-determination; Mecca should be 
their capital, and the title of "King of the Hejaz" should 
be conferred upon the Sultan of Nejd : [Ibn Saud] on condition 
1. Jordan to Chamberlain, 28 Dec. 1925, E363/11/91, 
F. O. 371/11432; Umm al-Aura, No. 52,27 Dec. 1925. 
2. kldah. Rip, Jan. 1926, F. O. 371/11442; Attar, op. cit., pp. 
888-9. 
that he governed in accordance with the Quran, the Sunnah 
and the code of conduct of the early Muslims. The resolution 
was then presented to Ibn Saud with its terms embodied in an 
act of bay'a (allegiance) to, which he agreed and signed. 
The public ceremony of the bay'a took place on 8 January. 
1 
Accordingly, on thefollowi ng day, Ibn Saud assumed the title 
of "King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Neji and its dependencies". 
2 
Thus, it was decided that the Hejaz administration should 
be kept separate from that of Nejd., Public security and 
communications, however, were to be safeguarded by Ibn Saud's 
army. The King then appointed a constituent body of 51 members. 
Amir Faisal was nominated, on 13 January, head of the 
Provisional Government and Viceroy. 
3 
In the process of settling Hejazi affairs, Ibn Saud 
found himself, for the first time, in diplomatic contact with 
a number of foreign Powers. Accordingly, he invited their 
representatives and the Eiropean residents in Jeddah in 
addition to the notables of the city to a banquet on 22 January, 
when he addressed the company on the subject of his desires 
and hopes for the Holy-Land. He promised his best efforts 
to secure peace and prosperity. He expounded the view that 
"the Western World owes much to the. Arabs", adding that 
1. See; Umm al-Aura, No. 55,15 January 1925; Al-Manar, xxvi, 
(1925-6) p. 710; Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 309-10; 
Attar, op. cit., pp. 889-91. 
2. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 9 Jan. 1926, E734/7/91, F. O. 371/11431. 
It 
ý ; G, 
, r, 
3. Jordan to Chamberlain, 11 Jan., 1926, E245/7/911 F. O. 371/11434- 
viiuu at-vura, LVV. o O, LL Jan. 192b; Toynbee, Survey 1925, 
p. 310; Oriente Moderno, vi (1926) p. 103. 
"we have our obligations to the honourable foreign 
governments, by which we will stand, and they have their 
obligations towards us". He turned to the Muslim 
representatives and called for brotherhood among the Muslim 
people. He also urged foreign governments to facilitate 
the passage of pilgrims to the Holy Land. Finally, he showed 
his readiness to establish good relations with all foreign 
Powers when he dramatically concluded: "the heart of an 
Arab and Muslim is good soil, and if it is watered with 
kindly consideration, it will produce good crops", 
1 
and 
so in his speech the new King outlined his concept of 
future relations with the outstide world. 
A new situation existed in Arabia which found 
itself united under the leadership of the-Sultan of Nejd. 
He had succeeded where ex-king Husain had failed. 
Immediate reactions outside Arabia were generally less 
favourable in the Muslim countries2 than in the non-Muslim .3 
Taking the lead, the Russians hastened to accord de-jure 
recognition to-the new regime in the, Hejaz on 16 February 
1926. At the Russian Consul's request, the recognition 
was kept confidential until the British Government had notified 
Ibn Saud of their recognition. Only then was it published 
1. Jeddah Report, January. 1.926.; 
No. 57,29 Jan. 1926. 
also Umm al-aura, 
2. See below, PP-124 ff - 
3. Philby, 'The Triumph of the Wahhabis'. 
in the Hejazi semi-official newspaper, "Umm al-Qura". 
l 
The question of British recognition was first 
considered on 20 January. Both the Foreign and Colonial 
Offices were in agreement about de-jure recognition of 
the new situation in the Hejaz and of Ibn Saud's new 
title. The government of India, highly concerned about 
2 
the Holy Land, was more hesitant. The Viceroy advised 
caution and delay over the de-jure recognition. He 
suggested that it would be preferable for the British 
Government "to follow lead of representative[s] of 
[the] Muslims rather than to take lead themselves". 
3 
Jordan, in Jeddah, was in favour of the new developments. 
He urged "full recognition", because "nothing can be gained 
by delay". The proposed visit of`Ibn Saud to the British 
ship "Emerald" would, as Jordan suggested, be a suitable 
occasion to inform-the'King of Britain's formal recognition. 
He emphasised the close relations between Britain and the 
new King, who would surely regard British recognition as 
4 
an "accomplished fact". The doubts of the government of 
1. See: The Soviet Consul (Jeddah) to Ibn Saud, 16 Feb. 1926; 
Jordan to Chamberlain, 9 March 1926, E2069/7/91, 
F. O. 371/11431; Umm al-Qura, No. 62,5 March 1926. 
2. F. O. to the Viceroy, 20 Jan. 1926, E471/7/91; F. O. 371/ 
11431. 
3. Govt. of India to 1.0., 27 Jan. 1926, E801/7/91; I. O. 
to F. O. 28 Jan. 1926, E652/7/91, F. O. 371/11431. 
4. Jordan to F. O., 11 Feb. 1926, E1052/7/91, F. O. 371/ 
11431. 
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India were, save for a reservation concerning mention 
of . the Holy 
Places, gradually'resolved. 
1 
- Accordingly, 
on 25 February, the Foreign Secretary telegraphed Jordan 
authorising him to "address-a note to Ibn Saud, using [the] 
style of 'His Majesty' and informing him that H. M. G. 
recognise him as King of the Hejaz". In consideration of 
the government of India's wishes, Chamberlain added that 
since Britain regards "the regime of the Holy Places and 
all religious questions connected therewith as matters 
solely concerning' Muslims . 4.. H. M. G. neither ought nor 
L 
desire, to express -an opinion".. 
2 Immediatly, : Jordan 
informed Ibn Saud of the British recognition. When H. M. S. 
"Emerald"-arrived off Jeddah on 1 March, Ibn Saud-was 
officially invited by its captain, on the same day, to a 
visit during which the King/fsented with a handsome clock 
as a souvenir of his visit. On the evening of the following 
day-the King gave a banquet-to the officers of the ship 
and the British residents at Jeddah. 
3 
It is pertinent to inquire: why Great. Britain 
now so favourably inclined towards Ibn Saud? The 
answer can be derived from a study of Anglo-Saudi relations 
during the ' Saudi Hashemite conflict, and the realisation 
that the changes brought about by Ibn Saud's victories would 
f1 
1. I. O. to F. O., "23 Feb. 1926, E1252/7/91, F. O. 371/11431. 
2. Chamberlain to-Jordän, 25_=Feb. 1926, E125277/91, F. O. 371/ 
11431. + 
3. Jordan to -Ibn-Saud 
(no date) E2066/7/91, F. O. 371/11431; 
Jeddah'Repört, March 1926_ .; Umm al-Qura, No. 62, 5 March 1926. 
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make Arabia more stable and would improve the prospects of 
peace in the area. Before 1925 Britain regarded Ibn Saud 
as a petty ruler with whom they could deal on an ad hoc basis. 
By the end of 1925, his'status had changed and a more 
formal relationship was required with the man, "who had 
fashoned an Arabian Kingdom from the sands and stones 
of the desert". 
' In so far as he had unified-Arabia 
this could be regarded as a positive advantage for British 
interests. Britain hoped that endemic tribal warfare would 
cease, and that she-would no longer be plagued by its 
consequences in an area still regarded as vital for 
communications with India. 
On the other hand, the reverse side of this coin was obvious. 
The emergence of Ibn Saud's power in Arabia, with its 
shores washed by the water of the two main ways to the east 
(the Red-Sea-and the Gulf), could threaten Britain's strategic 
interests on land as well as on sea should Ibn Saud make 
an alliance with a hostile Power. The natural conclusion 
was that Britain should recognise him and make an ally of 
him, -especially as at that time some other great Powers 
like Italy and Russia were active in seeking influence in 
Arabia. All these considerations were strengthened by 
British estimates of the man himself. It was felt that Ibn 
Saud had been frank in his dealings with Britain, and-that 
on the-basis of his frankness "friendly co-operation" would 
1. Collins, op. cit., p. 15. 
prove easy to establish. The King had consistently 
expressed his hope for permanent and close relations 
with Britain, referring for his part to Britain's "open 
and frank" attitude which "hid no ulterior motives". ' 
r' 
Ibn Saud's anxiety to maintain good relations with 
Britain had been illustrated, for example, when he 
relayed to Jordan an approach made to him by the 
Russians. According to Ibn Saud's account to Jordan, 
a Russian envoy came to him, during the course of 
hostilities with the Hashemites in the Hejaz, and asked 
him about his greatest desire on earth. Ibn Saud was taken 
by surprise at the directness of the question, but 
answered "... money ... arms... " and the envoy added 
"aeroplanes and guns also if you wish". Ibn Saud, 
becoming more surprised, turned to his visitor and said: 
"yes, but what do you want from me? " The Soviet envoy 
directly answered "to make trouble with the British". 
2 
If the story was true, Ibn Saud certainly showed how much 
he valued close relations, with Britain by repeating it. 
There is, of-course, also the possibility that Ibn Saud 
invented or embroidered the story in order, indirectly, 
to indicate his own need-for military supplies to the British. 
3 
1. See: Jordan to Ibn Saud, 13 Feb. 1926; Ibn Saud to Jordan, 
19 Feb. 1926, E180/180/91, F. O. 371/11437; J. R., Aug. 1926, 
F. O. 371/11442. 
2. Jordan to Chamberlain, 29 Dec. 1925, E364/180/91, F. O. 
371/11437. 
3. At the time Britain did not respond see: Memo. on the 
foreign policy of H. M. G. (undated) D. B. F. P. 1919-39 
(Ser. 1A, 1,1966) pp. 863-64. 
British recognition, once accorded, implied a regular 
channel of communication. Ibn Saud had never had a permanent 
British representative in Nejd. In the past he had to make 
contacts through the British Agents in Kuwait or in Bahrain, 
and sometimes through the British Resident at Bushire. Only 
on urgent questions had the British Government sent him 
special envoys, such as Shakespear, Leach-man, Philby 
and Clayton. These arrangements had not proved altogether 
satisfactory. The lack of a representative in personal 
touch with Ibn Saud had given rise to various misunderstandings 
and disputes. The real wishes and intentions of Ibn Saud 
had often been obscure to the British Government. 
During the Bahrah negotiations of 1925, London 
suggested that "the time has now come to station a permanent 
representative at Ibn Saud's capital". Accordingly Clayton 
was instructed to convey Britain'. s. wish"to Ibn Saud 
and to discuss with him the practical. means for establishing 
a British representation in his territories. 
"His Majesty's Government are desirous of 
making arrangements which would enable them to 
be kept permanently in touch with him.... Land]. 
are anxious to be on cordial terms with His 
Highness aid to co-operate with him wherever. 
possible". 
London preferred to reserve a final decision until 
conditions in Arabia became stable and until objection 
against-the step was overcome. It was claimed that al-Riyadh 
.. ý was an. unccenfortable place.: _for 
whoever might be appointed. This 
1. C. O. to Clayton, 10 Sept. 1925, Appendix, 'Clayton Report'. 
objection hardly seems valid since British travellers were 
already accustomed -toadventuring into the Arabian desert, 
and since a number of British officials'had visited the Amir's 
capital. For the'time being it'was suggested that 
arrangements should be made for periodical visits to be paid 
by a British officer to Ibn Saud. This suggestion seemed, 
at the time of the-war in Arabia, the most likely to be 
followed, and it was approved'in principle. By the conquest 
of the Hejaz, however, Ibn Saud had become more easily 
accessible. 
For his part Ibn Saud explained at Bahrah his wish 
that his-contact with the British Government be carried 
out through the medium of--the Foreign office and not 
through Colonial, -Office channel. 
1 When Clayton=reported 
Ibn Saud's wish, to London, the Hejaz had fallen into 
Saudi hands and it seemed logical that Ibn Saud-as-King of 
the Hejaz should deal with the Foreign Office through the 
British Agent at Jeddah but, as a Sultan of Nejd, he was 
still expected to deal with the Colonial Office through the 
British Resident in the Gulf. This system seemed unsatisfactory 
to Ibn Saud, who-made no secret of his objections to the 
Colonial Office involvement in his affairs-as an independent 
ruler. , 
1. Record of proceedings, '. Clayton Report'. 
. The matter was of sufficient importance to be 
discussed-at an interdepartmental conference on 12 March. 
In a memorandum on the Agenda of the conference V. Mallet, 
a-Foreign office representative, acknowledged that Ibn Saud's 
wish to communicate only with the Foreign Office would 
be for the benefit of both Ibn Saud and the British 
Government. In practice; he continued, both the Foreign 
Office and the Colonial Office were in close liaison and 
"the one department does not act before receiving the 
concurrence of the other". He outlined three methods of 
dealing with the situation. Firstly the Foreign Office 
might assume entire control of relations with Ibn Saud 
and this was in accordance with his own known wishes. 
Secondly the Colonial-Office might do so. But, in that 
case, the'Colonial"Office could not avoid involvement in 
Pilgrimage matters and it would become necessary for the 
British Consul at'Jeddah to be responsible to-the 
Colonial Office. This arrangement would be-most unwelcome 
to Ibn Saud. If neither of-these methods proved acceptable 
the only solution would be to establish Foreign Office 
contact via the Consul in Jeddah and to retain existing 
Colonial Office, communication-channels. While favouring his 
first proposal Mallet accepted that there might be Colonial 
Office objections since Nejd bordered on British Mandates 
and Gulf States which came within its sphere of responsibility. 
In that case he indicated a preference for his last proposal. 
This final proposal seemed desirable since Ibn Saud had to spend 
the pilgrimage season in the Hejaz and, the rest of the year 
at al-Riyadh, but still had no British, representative there. 
l 
At the conference of 12 March, in the presence of 
representatives from the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, 
the India Office and the Air Ministry,, Sir John Shuckburgh 
(the Chairman) recommended acceptance of Mallet's first 
proposal that the channel of communications between the 
British Government and Ibn Saud should be through the 
Foreign Office. But he nevertheless stipulated that "in 
all questions affecting purely Arab-politics, the Colonial 
Office should be regarded as the responsible British 
authority". In, making, this reservation Shuckburgh was 
reflecting the views of his own chief, Amery, the Colonial 
Secretary. Shuckburgh also suggested that the Foreign 
Office should be primarily responsible for Ibn Saud's 
foreign relations. In effect Shuckburgh's proposals meant 
the continuance of the status quo ", except. that the channel 
of communication via Bushire would be, eliminated". 
2 
British policy regarding the Hejaz and Nejd affairs was 
still to be concerted between the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office. 
Further discussion of the question of channels of 
communication was postponed until the conclusion of a revised 
treaty which was already-under discussion. 
3 But Clayton's 
1. Memo. by V. Mallet, 8 March 1926, E1738/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11437. 
2. Minutes of a conference held at the C. O., 12 March 1926, 
E2026/180/91, F. O. 371/11437. 
3. See chapter 3 below. 
views on the interim decision reached were then sought. 
On the other hand, aware of the distaste that the 
independent Arab rulers had expressed to him at the idea 
of having the Colonial Office for their channel of 
I 
communication he approved the notion of establishing a 
Foreign office facade. He stressed the importance of 
controlling Arab Affairs from London and argued against any 
continuing direct role for the Government of India, as still 
applied in the case of Aden. India's only concern, he 
maintained, should be with access for Muslims to the Holy 
Places. 1 
While future Anglo-Saudi relations, as a result of 
Britain's recognition of Ibn Saud were under consideration 
in London he had already won recognition also from Russia, 
France and the Netherlands. Although these four Great 
Powers ruled over the vast majority of Muslims, Ibn Saud 
still felt the need to be recognized by the Muslims 
themselves. And to this he now turned his-own attention. 
1. Clayton to Shuckburgh, 21 April 1926, E2580/180/91 
F. O. 371/11437. 
Muslim Attitudes towards the New Situation in the 
Hejaz, 1926. 
Since the Empire contained the largest single group 
of Muslims, Britain had a considerable say in the affairs 
of the Holy Places of Islam, either directly on behalf 
of her Muslim subjects or indirectly through the subjects 
themselves. The safety of her pilgrims, for example, had 
to be assured by direct contact with the Hejaz Government. 
Once Ibn Saud had conquered the Hejaz, immediately Britain 
. r: 
informally recognised his authority there for obvious 
political reasons. Both Britain and Ibn Saud were aware 
that the presence of the Wahhabi Ikhwan in the Holy Land of 
Islam would have serious religious implications. Wahhabism 
was not popular with the majority of huslims who regarded 
Wahhabis as a fanatical sect. There was anxiety with 
Wahhabis in control about traditional rights of free access 
to Mecca. As a gesture of protest, some Islamic countries 
prevented their nationals, from visiting the Hejaz after 
it had fallen into Ibn Saud's hands. Others called for 
the Hejaz to be ruled by an international Islamic government. 
Concerned about the future of the Hejaz and agitated by the 
events which had taken place there, Muslim countries remained 
reluctant to recognise Ibn Saud. Britain hesitated preferring 
to let Ibn Saud be formally recognised by a Muslim 'country 
first. But no such recognition was forthcoming and the lead 
was taken by the Russians. This prompted a quick British 
recognition. Britain's backing widened the gap between Ibn 
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Saud and the other Muslim countries. As opponents of 
British imperialism they could hardly look with favour 
on Ibn Saud as a future guardian of the Holy Places 
when he seemed so eager to cultivate friendly relations _ 
with Britain. For Ibn Saud, who was effectively in 
control of the Hejaz, Muslim attitudes were a matter of 
major concern. He therefore decided that it would be 
politic to make no personal claims but to consult other 
Muslims about the future of the Holy Places. 
Among those other Muslims there were, of course, 
some one hundred million in British India and large numbers 
in other parts of the world under British rule or influence. 
Muslim attitudes, therefore, were also a matter of concern 
to Britain. The religious aspect of the Hejaz question was 
bound in the circumstances to influence Anglo-Saudi relations. 
During the Hejazi war, Ibn Saud had declared to the 
Muslim world that he had no personal ambitions in the Holy 
places, but only sought to liberate them from the corruption 
of the Hashemites. Having occupied Mecca on 13 October 1924, 
Ibn Saud published a proclamation to the whole Islamic world 
requesting Muslims to send their representatives to Mecca to 
discuss with him the future of the Hejaz. This open 
invitation met with little response. The Egyptians, 
for example, were busy preparing for the Khilafat Conference 
which was due to meet in Cairo in the spring of 1925.1 The 
Arabian peninsula Shaikhs, for different reasons, "prayed him 
1. Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 81-90, Umm al-Qura, No. 18, 
7 April, No. 30,24 July, No. 45,6 Nov. No. 47,25 Nov. 
1925; 41-Manar, xxix (1928-29) pp. 167,273-4; Revue 
du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) pp. 29-122. 
to have them excused". The Turks officially declined the 
invitation. Only the Indian Khilafat Society responded 
positively and in December 1924 sent a delegation in order 
to secure certain political and religious ambitions in the 
Hejaz. Thoy hoped if Ibn Saud as well as the Hashemites 
could be driven out that the Ali brothersl might find 
a golden chance to establish an Islamic Republic there. These 
ultimate ambitions of course conflicted with Ibn Saud's 
and with the Hejazi's interests. At this mature they 
2 
seemed very remote. 
It was the approach of the pilgrimage season of 1925, 
which focused Muslim attention on the situation in the Holy 
Land. The war was suspended during the season to allow 
access to pilgrims and a proclamation was published, on 
3 25 February 1925, informing all Muslims that Ibn Saud would 
not only welcome pilgrims but also guarantee their safety. 
In spite of this guarantee many individual Muslims seem 
to have been deterred by the dangers of the situation. 
Furthermore many governments prohibited their Muslims 
from participating in the pilgrimage. But the Government 
of India twice declined as had been suggested in April and 
May either to prohibit the pilgrimage or to assume 
1. Mohammad and Shawkat All were prominent Islamic leaders 
in India. See Appendix H. 
2. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 304; Umm al-Aura, No. 54,8 Jan., 
No. 56,22 Jan. 1926; Attar, op. cit., pp. 896-907. 
3. Umm al-Qura,. No. 12,27 `. Feb. 11925. 
responsibility for any Indian who might venture upon it. 
l 
The India Government's attitude was based on anxiety 
to avoid imputation of having put any ban on a religious 
practice and necessity of appearing to antagonize Ibn Saud. 
Between those who were positively prevented and those who 
were discouraged by the danger, only a few remained to under- 
take the pilgrimage. 
When the suspended Hejazi war was resumed, the Islamic 
world became even more concerned about the future of the 
Holy Shrines. On 20 August 1925, during the Wahhabi attack 
on al-Madinah, the Hejazi Government (Hashemite) announced 
that the tomb of the prophet had been struck by Wahhabi 
projectiles. According to Toynbee, "the report sent a 
wave of indignation through the Islamic world". 
2 
Immediate reaction came from Egypt. King Fuad sent a personal 
telegram to Ibn Saud requesting an assurance that religious 
monuments in al-Madinah would be safeguarded from injury. 
Ibn Saud, fearful of repercussions telegraphed the 
required assurance on 4 September, and allowed two missions 
one from Egypt and one from Persia3 on a visit of inspection. 
Ibn Saud's military success was now virtually complete and 
so he was able, with confidence, to guarantee the safety of 
the Holy Shrines. 
4 
1. Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 305-6. 
2. Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 306-7; Williams, op. cit., pp. 
75-77; Umm al-Aura, No. 86,6 Aug. 1926. 
3. Al-Manar, xxvii (1926-27) p. 15; Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 300- 
4. Jordan to Chamberlain, 11 Aug. 1926, E5064/20/91, 
F. O. 371/11433. 
In January 1926, two unofficial Indian deputations 
arrived in the Hejaz, not only to investigate the tomb 
incident but also for their own political and religious 
objectives. The Khilafat Society delegation had formerly 
been among Ibn Saud's partizans, but they had been'disturbed 
by the incident of the tomb and were even more angered 
by the proclamation of Ibn Saud as "King of the Hejaz". 
While condemning the behaviour of the Wahhabis they 
suggested that the Hejaz should be administrated by a 
democratic commission representing all-Muslims. 
1 
The 
other deputation, the Khuddam al-Haramain society, always 
antagonistic to Ibn Saud, declined to recognise him in the 
Hejaz and referred to this presence there as "a blow 
to many Indian Muslims who consider the Holy Land of 
Islam their own peculiar property"; they refused even to 
attend his reception upon thdr arrival in Jeddah. During 
their stay in Mecca they appear to have lost no opportunity 
of intriguing against him and his followers, calling on 
him to leave the Hejaz with his army. 
2 
They also spread 
rumours questioning his ability to guarantee security in 
the Hejaz. Losing his patience, Ibn Saud ordered them to 
leave the Hejaz. Before doing so, they distributed 
pamphlets deliberately calculated to cause division among 
the Hejazis. 
3 
On their return to India, it was reported in 
1. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
2. Jeddah Report, Feb. 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
3. Jeddah Report, March 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
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mid June' that the Khuddam al-Haramain had called for 
public demonstrations to express Muslim anger against 
Ibn Saud and Wahhabi vandalism. 
Demonstrations, anyway, were already spreading. 
The Maharaja-of Mahmoud Abad made his first public 
appearance in eight years at a mass meeting to condemn 
the Wahhabis. The meeting expressed great concern about 
the Hejaz and made various resolutions: 
In the first place it was agreed that 
"this Muslim mass meeting representing Muslims 
of different position and schools of thought 
expresses its deep resentment and anger . 
and strongly condemns all these who have hurt 
the sacred sentiments of the majority of the 
Muslims by their acts of vandalism and those 
who have encouraged2or abetted these 
sacrilegious acts". 
In the second place, the Maharaja issued the following 
warning to the British Government: 
"Recognizing the fact that the British Govern melt which 
is the custodian of the interests of ten crores of 
Muslims of India has already entered into such 
treaties with Ibn Saud as have obviously brought him 
and his territories under British control ... this mass 
meeting of Musalmans of Lucknow warns the-IBritislil 
Government that the recent activities of the Sultan of 
Nejd and his subordinates ... have most seriously 
wounded the religious feelings of the Muslim public. 
They hasten to declare that this Najdi vandalism is all 
the more deplorable in so far as it has followed the 
conclusion of the above mentioned agreement and as 
such has gone a long way to create misgivings in the 
public mind rewarding the British attitude and policy 
in the Hejaz". 
1. The Central Kadimul-Haramain Committee of India to the 
Political Sec., Govt. of India, extract from the Indian 
Daily Telegraph, 15 June 1926, No. p. 23364, F. O. 371/11433. 
2. Ibid. 
3. A 'Crore' equals ten millions. 
4. The Central Kadimul-Haramain Committee of India to the 
Political Sec., Govt. of India, No. p. 2364, F. O. 371/11433. 
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The maharaja in his speech declared that "no Muslim ... 
can watch in silence" and hinted that while there was 
a's-uspicion in the public mind about Britain's complicity 
in the W ahhabi scheme .... the whole Muslim world 
resented non-Muslim interference in the affairs of 
the Hejaz". 1 
A third resolution proposed to ban pilgrimage to 
the Hejaz "unless and until all [demolished] sacred 
buildings ... are permanently restored to their 
former 
position and shape". The meeting also decided to send a 
message to the Islamic Conference at Mecca to the effect 
that "Indian Muslims can have no confidence under any 
circumstances in Ibn Saud or other Nejdis... " This was 
followed by an appeal to all Muslim Governments to employ 
every possible measure to free the Holy Land of Islam. 
Probably unaware of the fact Britain had already, recognised 
Ibn Saud's position in the Hejaz, the meeting passed a 
resolution requesting the British Government 
"not to recognise under any circumstances Ibn Saud 
as the ruler of the Hejaz nor to give him any help 
to keep the control of the Holy places in his hands 
nor to put any obstacles in they way of the Nejdis 
being ejected from the Hejaz". 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
Finally, Britain and the civilised world were urged "to 
cut off their political connections from the ruler 
responsible for ... vandalism and to recall all their 
consuls". 
A similar meeting took place in Rampur where Muslim 
leaders approached the Nawab about the "monstrous deeds 
of vandalism committed in the Hejaz by Ibn Saud", who 
had "wounded their feelings" by demolishing the tomb of 
the prophets family. For his part, and on behalf of the 
Muslims of British India, the Nawab telegraphed to the 
Viceroy on 21 June asking Britain to take action against 
Ibn Saud and promising readiness to "collect funds for the 
restoration of the demolished tombs". 
1 
In reply, the Viceroy expressed, by telegraph, his 
sympathy with the Muslims of British India and indicated 
that the British Government would not depart from its 
established policy by intervening _ politically 
in a matter purely religious. But he promised to pass 
their view on to the British Government for "information 
and consideration". 
2 
This hostile campaign spread over most of India. 
Indian Muslims carried their bitterness into the Hejaz 
itself during the pilgrimage season. According to Jordan, 
1. The Nawab of Rumpur to the Viceroy, 21 June, 1926, 
No. P2533, F. O. 371/11433. 
2. The Viceroy to the Nawab of Rumpur, 24 June 1926, 
No. 552, F. O. 371/11433 
"the whole of the Indian pilgrims" were against Ibn 
Saud. 
1 The majority of Muslims all over the world 
expressed similar feelings against the Wahhabis and 
concern about the future of the Hejaz. These hostile 
feelings were carried to the Holy Land by the ordinary 
pilgrims and by the Muslim representatives to the 
Islamic Conference. 
Confronted by increasing opposition from different, 
parts of the Islamic World, Ibn Saud repeatedly announced 
that the Hejaz was for the Hejazis and that the Islamic 
World was to be invited to make its own decisions over 
religious matters. In his mind only Hejazis were to be 
involved in the choice of a ruler to the Hejaz and that 
ruler would govern according to the Shari'a, refraining 
from making relationships with non-Muslim Governments. 
In order to confirm this position, he addressed a circular 
note to certain'Islamic Governments on 26 October 1925 
expressing'no desire to make himself "master of the Hejaz 
or to take dominion over it", but explaining that the Hejaz 
was "a trust" placed in his hands "until the moment when 
the Hejazis shall elect a ruler from among themselves". 
Most significant in his note, Ibn Saud said that the new 
elected ruler should "work under the control of Muslim people". 
2 
1. Jordan to F. O., 8 June 1926, E3556/20/91, F. O. 371/11433. 
2. Quoted in Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 308-9. 
Ibn Saud again received no answer, but, according to Jordan, 
"a confused babble of sound". 
l 
Having been chosen King on 8 January 1926 by the Hejazis, 
and soon afterwards recognised by four Great Powers, Ibn 
Saud decided to devote his energies to the protection and 
care of the Holy Cities. In this he was pressurised by his 
fanatic followers and prompted on by his own ambitions, 
which now clearly included guardianship of the Holy Places. 
2 
Although the bay'a had freed Ibn Saud-from his former 
commitments to-the Muslim World, his position even in the 
Hejaz remained uncertain. A conciliatory gesture 
towards the Hejazis by establishing local consultative 
councils was not enough. Some-conciliatory gesture 
towards the Islamic World was necessary. This could be made 
by reviving his former plan. Accordingly, on 28 April 1926 
he telegraphed fresh invitations to an Islamic Conference 
at Mecca, for the beginning of June, "to consider the 
service of the Holy Places, to secure their future and to 
increase the means of comfort for pilgrims". 3 
1. Jeddah Report, April 1926, F. O. 371/11442; see also: Attar, 
o . cit., pp. 896-903. 
2. Jeddah Report, April 1926, F. O. 371/11442. Jordan said 
that Hafez Wahba had revealed Ibn Saud's intention towards 
the Hejaz to the British Agency Staff. This attitude 
was stressed by: Iqbal, Emergence of Saudi Arabia, 
(Srinagar, 1977), p. 196, and by: Revue du Monde 
Musulman, lxiv (1926) p. 12. But Attar in his Sagr al- 
jazirah , pp. 896-903, says that it was the Hejazis them- 
selves who insisted that Ibn Saud be their King in order 
to prevent the Hejaz being ruled by non-Arabs (Indians). 
3. Jeddah Report, April 1926, F. O. 371/11442; also: Toynbee, 
Survey 1925, pp. 311-12; Oriente Moderno, vi (1926) pp. 103, 
285; Revue du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) p. 12; Al-Manar, 
xxvi*(1925-26) p. 1954, and xxix, pp. 167-73. 
Obviously the original objective'of the conference 
had been modified. This time the political position of the 
Hejaz was not mentioned directly. In fact, the main reason 
behind the invitation was economic. As a result of the Hejaz 
war, Ibn Saud was running short of financial resources and 
could not fulfill his obligations regarding the Holy Places 
without Muslim financial help. 
1 
The response to this invitation revealed the amount of 
anger in the Muslim world at the annexation of the Hejaz. 
Representatives from all over the Muslim world, except Persia, 
decided to attend the proposed conference. By June 1926 
they were arriving at Mecca. Aware of their views about the 
Hejaz, 'Ibn Saud used all his influence to prevent discussion 
among the delegates on political or religious matters and 
warned them notto interfere in the Hejaz's internal affairs. 
2 
From the political point of view Ibn Saud, still worried about 
his own sovereign status and political position, wanted to 
avoid any reopening of these issues. Meanwhile he was aware 
that delegates would not miss the opportunity to turn both 
the pilgrimage season and the conference into an anti- 
British demonstration. The Indians and the Tavanese, in 
particular, were the most vocal and were expected to put 
1. A statement by Sir A. Chamberlain to the Imperial 
Conference, 20 Oct. 1926, D. B. F. P. 1919-39 (Ser. 1A, 
ii, 1968) pp. 919- 58. 
2. Jordan to Chamberlain, 23 June 1926, E4186/20/91, 
F. O. 371/11433; Timm al-Oura, No. 71,14 May; No. 72, 
21 May; No. 73,28 May 1926. 
their grievances against Britain and Europe before. the 
representatives of the Islamic world. This of course would 
put Ibn Saud in a critical situation because of his friendly 
relationship with Britain. 
1 From the religious point 
of view, Ibn Saud feared that the differences between 
the Wahhabi faith and other Muslim sects might lead to open 
discussion. The opponents of the Wahhabis could use Wahhabi 
vandalism in the Holy Places as an argument against Ibn 
Saud's claims that the Hejaz was safe in his hands. This 
attempt to prohibit discussion did not save him from all 
criticism since it was not possible to impose a total ban 
on these topics among such a large gathering of pilgrims. 
The Indian Khilafat Society, for instance, expressed quite 
openly that co-operation between India and the Wahhabis 
was impossible "as no Indian could accept either their 
doctrines or what amounted to their ignorance". 
2 
Other 
Muslims shared the same opinion. 
3 
The reason for trying to inhibit discussion of Hejazi 
internal affairs was that the Muslim world remained reluctant 
to recognise Ibn Saud's authority. His previous declarations 
that the Hejaz was for the Hejazis took on a sinister light 
and he was suspected of-having manipulated the whole enterprize 
1. Jeddah Report, May, 1926, F. O. 371/11442; The Times, 
21 July 1926. 
2. Jordan to Chamberlain, 23 June 1926, E 4186/20/91, 
F. O. 371/11433. 
3. Umm al-Qura, No. 69,30 April, No. 73,28 May 1926. 
to secure his own election as King., Although he had formally 
been given a bay'a by the Hejazis themselves, 'many Muslims 
insisted that the fate of the Holy Places was_. a matter of 
concern to them also and that they should have been 
consulted. Aware of this argument and expecting an open 
discussion on the matter both among the pilgrims and at the 
conference, Ibn Saud also tried to ban this topic. But his 
attempt met with criticism and opposition. The Ali brothers, 
for instance, challenged Ibn Saud personally on various 
occasions. Mohammad Ali reminded him that he would never have 
conquered the Hejaz without help received from India. When 
the King pointed out that he "won the Hejaz by sword", 
Mohammad Ali dramatically replied "yes, but with money we 
shall take it from you". The chief objection to Ibn Saud 
was the wahhabi connection. And on a later occasion, Mohammad 
Ali went so far to say that if only the Wahhabis were less 
fanatical, "Ibn Saud could be the most useful man to the 
Indians, as he had great ambitions". 
1 
Although the general 
mood was antagonistic, Ibn Saud had some supporters among the 
Javanese, the Egyptian Khilafat delegation, the Palestinians, 
the Syrians, the Indian Hadith Society, 
2 
and Rashid Rida as an 
Islamic reformer, as a writer and as a close friend to Ibn Saud. 
1. Umm al-Aura, No. 74, June 1926; 
Jordan to Chamberlain, 23 June 1926,, E4186/20/91, F. O. 
371/11433. The Ali Brothers never ceased their campaign 
against Ibn Saud for making of himself King of the Hejaz, 
as they believed that kingship was a novelty in Islam. 
See: Al-Manar, xxix (1928-9) p. 163. Rashid Rida defended 
Ibn Saud against Ali's allegations in Al-Manar, xxix 
(1928-29) pp. 162-80. 
2. The Times, 21 July 1926. 
Prior to the conference anti-British and anti-Saudi 
feelings gained ground among the pilgrims. "The unity of 
the East", a slogan put forward by Russian elements in Mecca, 
found great support among all Muslims and was not objected to 
by Ibn Saud's side. Although vague and undefined, the 
British Agent at Jeddah counted it as a victory for Bolshevik 
propaganda against Britain and the West. Ibn Saud's failure 
to open the conference on the original day (1*June) provided 
more time for his opponents to consolidate their position. 
But he tried to benefit from the postponement of the 
conference by attempting to secure the adherance of more 
delegates including Indian Khilafat Society leaders. After 
initial failure and thanks to the influence of the Egyptian 
Khilafat Society, the Ali brothers agreed to the views put 
forward by the Hejazi party to preserve the unity of Islam. 
l 
With this important backing secured for Ibn Saud the 
conference opened on 7 June. It was attended by 59 delegates 
most of whom represented societies rather than governments. 
2 
In his inaugural address, 
3 
read out by Hafez Wahba, Ibn Saud 
modestly said, "God gave us victory and helped us to purge 
1. Jordan to Chamberlain, 23 June 1926, E4186/20/91, 
F. O. 371/11433. 
2. Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 312-13; The Times, 9 June, 23 July 
1926; Revue du Monde Musulman lxiv (1926) pp. 125-27; Umm 
al-Qura, No. 75,11 July 1926; Jordan's report on the 
Conference, 15 July 1926, E4677/20/91, F. O. 371/11433. 
Delegations from India, Egypt, Java, Palestine, Beirut, 
Syria, the Sudan, Nejd, the Hejaz, Russia, Turkey, the 
Yemen, and Asir attended the Conference. 
3. For text of the speech see: Umm al-Aura, No. 75,11 June1926; 
Attar, op. cit., pp. 913-17; The Times, 23 July 1926; Revue 
du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) pp. 128- 31; Oriente Moderno, 
vi(1926) pp. 310-12. 
this sacred land ... and enabled us to fulfil our promise 
towards the people of Islam". Proud of his success in 
gat1 ing representatives of the Muslim world and in providing 
an Islamic forum for the first time, he urged Muslims to 
assemble yearly at Mecca to discuss Muslim affairs. He then 
reminded the conference of the limitations on discussion, of 
political matters which he had already, however unsuccessfully, 
proposed and which he now wished to impose. Notwithstanding 
Ibn Saud's attempt so. drastically to limit the scope of the 
conference, the delegates, as it will be seen, could not be 
restrained from discussing matters about which they obviously 
felt concerned. 
Following the speech the conference procedures were 
formalised: Sharif Sharaf''Adnan a Hejazi1 was elected 
President and an Indian and a Russian were elected Vice- 
Presidents. Although assurances were given that the Russian 
delegation was a purely religious party and in no way concerned 
with the dissemination of the Bolshevik propaganda, the British 
acting consul expressed great concern about possible Soviet 
influence. The administrative staff were completed by Tawfiq 
al-Sharif from Asir being elected Secretary General. A 
subject committee was also appointed to draw up the agenda, 
which concentrated upon the improvement of local conditions 
1. Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah) to Chamberlain, 13 July 1928, 
E3496/677/91, F. O. 371/13012. 
l. 
and facilities in the Hejaz 
In fact the conference discussed numerous subjects and 
tackled a number of problems concerned with the Islamic 
world. This chapter is only concerned with those aspects 
of the crnf-erence which affected British Imperial interests 
in the East and Anglo-Saudi relations. 
Implications for Britain developed when the conference 
constituted itself into a permanent organization called mittamar 
a1- alam al-islami, 
2 
which was to assemble yearly at Mecca3 
during the pilgrimage season in order to pursue the following 
objectives: 
"a) De permettre aux Musulmans de se connaitre mutuellement; 
b) D'examiner et d'ameliorer la situation des Musulmans 
aux divers points de vue religieux, social, moral et 
economique; 
D'examiner et d'etablir la securite au Hedjaz, d'y 
assurer le confort et 1'hygiene, d'y developper les 
moyens de communication, de faciliter le pelerinage, 
de faire disparaitre toutes entraves a 1'accomplissement 
de ce devoir religieux, de garantir 14integrite du 
Hedjaz et de sauvegarder ses droits". 
In case of war, it was suggested, delegations might be 
prevented from reaching Mecca by the British who would fear 
the establishment of a common Islamic front against them. 
Mohammad Ali, who since 1910 had been under the impression that 
Britain was an enemy of Islam, 
5 turned the attention of the 
1. See: Jordan to F. O., 9 June 1926, E3578/20/91; Jordan's 
Report on the Conference, 23 June 1926, E4186/20/91, 
F. O. 371/11433; Umm al-Ours, No. 75,11 June 1926, No. 76, 
15 June 1926; Revue du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) p. 132; 
The Times, 23 July 1926. 
2. See: Art. 1 of the Status of the Conference, Revue du Monde 
Musulman, lxiv (1926) p. 213. 
3. Ibid., Art. 3. 
4. Ibid., Art. 2. 
5. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924, 
the Hague 1972) p. 110. 
conference to this-potential obstacle and repeated that 
the British Government was the Muslim's "greatest enemy, 
. who has down-trodden India and Egypt and many other Moslems 
all over the world". Accordingly, it was agreed that in 
case of war the conference could meet in any independent 
Islamic state. Nevertheless the annual conference was 
1 
regarded as a success for Ibn Saud, - Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah, 
who attended the conference as a private member, argued 
that Ibn Saud's foresight had (enabled him to realise the 
importance of calling such a meeting annually. Ibn Saud, 
he claimed, believed that these gatherings could exercise a 
tremendous influence upon 100 million Muslims under the 
British flag, in addition to 150 millions in other countries. 
The spirit of fraternity and unity amongst all Muslim sects 
could thus be fostered and create a force with which Europe 
2 
and particularly Britain would have to reckon. If this 
interpretation of Ibn Saud's position was correct, the matter 
olwiously was one of major concern for Britain; particularly 
since there was a suspicion that Russia was encouraging the 
anti-British aspects of Islamic unity. 
Great endeavours were made by Ibn Saud's agents at the 
conference in order to secure a resolution to restore to the 
Hejaz the Awqaf al-Haramain (religious trust foundations 
1. Quote from: Jordan's Report on the Conference, 23 June 1926, 
E4186/20/91, F. O. 371/11433. See Arts. 3& 4 of the Status 
of the Conference; The Times, 23 July 1926. 
2. Philby supported this point of view in a letter to the 
editor of The Times, 11 Aug. 1926. 
belonging-to the Holy Places) which were sited in other 
Islamic countries. 
1 The Government of the Hejaz assumed 
that the Awqaf funds from all over the Muslim world, estimated 
at about 110 millions per annum, should be made available for 
improving conditions in the Holy Places. 
2 The most important 
waqf in question was the Hejaz Railway. This subject had 
been opened during the Haddah negotiations of 1925. Ibn Saud 
then stated his attitude towards the question as follows: 
"We should be as jealous of its [the Hejaz Railway]safety 
as anyone else, even though it may not be under our administ- 
ration, for it is a Moslem Wagf leading to the Holy Places and 
entitled to every protection". 
3 
The British felt that they 
were obliged to maintain direct control over those portions 
of the Hejaz Railway which lay within their mandated 
territories. 
4 In December of the same year, Ibn Saud 
requested from Britain to help having the railway repaired 
and reopened. This was not without its complexities; it 
implied consultation within the government5 and also with 
1. See: Revue du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) pp. 149- 55. 
2. 
Eý82B/9gPotÖ n3l7li23erence, 
23 June 1926, 
3. Memo. No. 2, by Ibn Saud, 13 Oct. 1925, Annex. 4, 
'Clayton Report'. 
4. Mayers (Beirut) to Chamberlain, 5 Feb. 1926, E1113/306/91, 
F. O. 371/11440. 
5. See: I. O. to F. O. 14 January 1926, p2/26; C. O. to F. O. 
20 January 1926, C1266/26, F. O. 371/11439. 
the French, who had transferred the administration of the 
Syrian section of the railway to a French company, nevertheless, 
the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League had recognized 
that the railway was--a public trust and not the property of 
the governments through whose territory it ran. 
1 
At the Mecca Conference, Amin al-Husaini of Palestine, 
who in 1924 had opposed the French annexation of the Syrian 
portion2 of the railway, led the debate on the restoration 
and re-opening of the whole of the Hejaz Railway. Accordingly 
a resolution was passed calling upon the Executive Committee 
of the conference and the Government of the Hejaz to demand 
from both the French and British Governments, the surrender 
of those sections of the railway which lay in territories 
under their mandate. If they refused, the Hejaz should 
appeal to the League of Nations and to the Hague Tribunal 
if necessary. 
3 
For humanitarian reasons and perhaps in deference to 
British susceptibility, the conference adopted an anti-slavery 
resolution. A commission was to be appointed to inquire into 
Lavery and the slave trade. The following resolution was 
accepted: 
1. Toynbee, Survey 1925, Note 3, p. 317. 
2. Umm al-Qura, No. 190,10 Aug. 1928. 
3. Jordan's Report'on the Conference, 23 June 1926, 
4186/20/91, F. O. 371/11433; Umm al-Aura, No. 77, 
18 June 1926, No. 190,10 Aug. 1928; Revue du Monde 
Musulman, lxiv (1926) pp. 155-62,176,192-94, 
202-04; Oriente Moderno, vi (1926) pp. 353-64. 
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"La Commission, ayant discute la proposition ci-dessus, 
a decide'sa presentation au Congres avec avis tendant 
a ce que le government du Hedjaz soit prie d'interdire 
tout exclavage ayantl lieu au Hedjaz contrairement aux 
regles de la Chara. " 
One of the most important conference issues which 
concerned Britain was the Aqaba-Maan question. The two 
districts had always been considered part of North Hejaz. 
The region had been claimed by Britain for Transjordan 
in 1925. ' Ibn Saud's preliminary efforts had failed to 
recover the area for the Hejaz. At the Mecca conference, 
although political issues were banned, Ibn Saud, through one 
of his main supporters, Rashid Rida of Egypt, suggested a 
resolution to the effect that the Aqaba and Maan areas were 
Hejazi territories. The two brothers ex-King Ali and Amir 
Abd-Allah had arranged between themselves an agreement by 
which the former relinquished them to the latter. Because 
Ali was not the legal King of the Hejaz, aabecause the 
territory of Transjordan was under a non-Muslim country 
(Britain) Rashid Rida argued that every Muslim ought to do 
all in his capacity to secure the areas in question for the 
Hejaz. This proposal met with opposition from the 
Egyptian delegation who protested that this was a political 
matter and not within the scope of the conference terms of 
reference; in this they were supported by the Afghan and 
1. Brien 
eu 
oaerno, 26}XýY. 3 3264! %Nb4e, 
Survey 1925, p. 317; Simon, Slavery (London 1930) 
pp. 49-60. See also Chapter 3 below. 
Turkish delegations. In spite of these protests, the 
conference continued its discussion of the matter and 
resolved in favour of the Hejazi claim, instructing the 
Hejazi Government to recover the areas "by all means", 
and to appeal for-help from all the Muslims. 
1 
Indeed, 
Rashid Rida played an important role at the Conference 
in favour of Ibn Saud. Not surprisingly, Rida's early 
! td ". - 
sympathy with Hanbalism enthusiastically. -to support 
It 
the revival of Wahhabism and the policy of its leader 
(Ibn Saud) and defend them against charges of heresy. 
Rida's support of Ibn Saud both in Al-Manar and at the 
Conference led to hints that he had been bought. He 
strenuously denied this. 
2 
As part of his anti-British campaign, Mohammad Ali 
proposed a discussion on the liberation of the Arabian 
Peninsula, and in his mind this included all the Asian 
Arab . states, 
from foreign influence. Personally he vowed 
to secure the evacuation of Aden by the British. In spite 
1. Umm al-Qura, No. 84,23 July 1926; Jordan to Chamberlain, 
28 July 1926, E2921/20/91, F. O. 371/11433; Revue :. -du 
Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) pp. 207-09; Al-Manar, xxvii 
1926-27) pp. 471-3, Oriente Modern , vi (1926) p. 360. 
2. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Oxford 1962) 
p. 231; Al-Manar xxviii (1927-28) pp. lff , 465ff. Jordan 
reported to London in July that Ibn Saud distributed large 
sums of money to all and sundry of the delegates with few 
exceptions to gain their goodwill, and in order to secure 
them for propaganda purposes in their respective countries. 
Rashid Rid received 12000, Amin al-Husainireceived £1000, 
others received £200-L600. Jeddah Report, July 1926, 
F. O. 371/11442. 
of his eloquence Mohammad Ali found no solid support for his 
views among the delegates. This was partly because of differences 
of opinion in defining the boundaries of the Arabian Peninsula 
and partly because of reluctance to commit themselves to an 
objective which seemed so far beyond their resources. But, 
although refusing to deliver an opinion, the conference did 
agree to leave the matter open for further consideration by 
a commission which had already been formed. 
1 Mohammad Ali 
was so angered by this weak response that he resigned his 
membership of the commission. 
2 
The conference also discussed the question of foreign 
representation in the Hejaz. The idea was put forward that 
no non-Muslim representatives could be admitted but that 
foreign countries could be allowed representation if Muslim 
representatives were chosen. Mohammad Ali was reported as 
sarcastically commenting that: 
"Great Britain can find Moslem Indians to be 
Governors of provinces, and leaders of the 
Assemblies, can she not find one to represent 
her in the Hejaz instead of polluting týis holy 
land with the presence of a Christian". 
1. Jordan to Chamberlain, 28 July 1926, E2921/20/91, Jordan's 
Report on the Conference E4186/20/91, F. O. 371/11433; 
Revue du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) pp. 163-6; For 
definition of the Arabian Peninsula and differences about 
this see: Toynbee, 'A problem of Arabian Statesmanship', 
Journal of the Royal Institute of Internatinnal Affairs, 
viii (1929). pp. 367- 75; also; Clayton, 'Arabia and the 
Arabs', Journal of the R. I. I. A., viii (1929) pp. 8-20. 
2. Revue du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) p. 166. 
3. Jordan to Chamberlain, 23 June 1926, E4186/20/91, 
F. O.. 371/11433. 
However, after much discussion this topic like the previous 
one, was eventually dropped without any definite resolution. 
Economic concessions to non-Muslims in the Hejaz 
were prohibited by the conference in order to avoid 
any foreign interference in the Holy Land. If the 
presence of non-Muslims proved necessary for the 
development of the country they must be subject to 
Islamic law. 
l 
Ibn Saud deliberately raised the qty stion of foreign 
capitulatory rights proposing their abolition. Because of 
his own previous attempts to ban political discussions 
he now found little support among the delegates and no vote 
was taken on his proposal. 
2 
Such, in brief, were the matters raised at the Conference 
which directly or indirectly concerned Britain. The degree 
of that concern was in some cases magnified beyond any 
previous anticipation by the way in which discussions developed. 
Apart from matters of specific interest to Britain the holding 
of such a conference, the first of its kind, uas in itself 
significant, if only because of the establishment of an 
Islamic League. 
3 
1. Jordan's Report on the Conference, 15 July 1926, E4677/20/91, 
F. O. 371/11433; Umm al-Aura, No. 79,2 July 1926; Revue 
du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) pp. 173-4. 
2. See next chapter for Ibn Saud's struggle for the abolition 
of the Capitulations in the Hejaz. 
3. It was decided at the Conference that the future allocation 
should be as follows: India 4, The Hejaz, Turkey, 
Java and China 3 each, other Muslim countries 2 each. 
See: Jeddah Report, June 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
The Conference passed off with little condemnation of 
Britain's eastern policy, thanks to Ibn Saud's limitation of 
the agenda to the welfare of the pilgrims. In order to 
achieve this end he interfered directly in the work of the 
Conference as when he sent the following message to the 
delegates: 
"Nous desirons seulement attirer votre attention sur 
certaines questions en notre qualite de l'un dell chefs 
musulmans responsable des affaires de ce pays". 
While interfering to block certain topics of discussion on the 
principle of the limitations which he had laid down, Ibn Saud 
did not himself abide by those limitations. On the contrary, 
he contrived to introduce some political discussions and, in 
so doing, achieved his own ends. For instance, he succeeded 
in preventing all foreigners, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, 
from establishing any rights to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the Hejaz. He had stressed this point prior to 
the conference, he again repeated it in his inaugural 
address and later, on 2 July, he emphasised that "Nous 
n'admettons aucune intervention etrangere en ce pays sacre, 
de quelque nature qu'elle soit". 
2 
As Iqbal concluded: 
"The delegates left the Hejaz to the newly crowned King 
to rule it in consonance with the dictates of the Quran 
and the Surn ah and to establish the limits imposed by 
Allah, in every corner of the vast stake, wherein would 
reign justice, tranquility and peace". 
1. Revue du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) p. 189; see also: 
Umm al-Aura No. 80,6 July 1926; Al-Manar, xxix (1928-29) 
pp. 167-8. 
2. Revue du Monde Musulman, lxiv (1926) P. 191. Full text 
of Ibn Saud's letter, pp. 189- 92. 
3. Iqbal, -_Emergence of Saudi Arabia, p. 204. 
Thus, by his firm resistance, Ibn Saud defeated the hopes 
which had been engendered by the Indian delegates to use 
the conference in order to create an international Islamic 
Hejaz or at least a democratic Hejaz. By failing to make 
any formal pronouncement about the political future of the 
Hejaz, the conference had implicitly recognized Ibn Saud's 
absolute authority. Indeed some delegates went so far as 
to address him as "the King". 
l 
In his search for economic support Ibn Saud did secure 
a promise that Awqaf funds would be sent annually to the Hejaz. 
In theory this would considerably "augment the revenues of 
2 
the country and enrich the rulers and administrators". 
In fact little could be. expected from many of the delegates 
who remained angry that they had been prevented from having 
a say in the future of the Hejaz. Aware-of this fact, Ibn 
Saud was resigned to reliance on his own resources. Indeed 
if this was the price for personal ascendancy in the Hejaz, 
3 
he would welcome it. -In Toynbee's words: 
"Though the Mecca Congress had proved unexpectedly 
successful, the Wahhabi domination over the Islamic 
Holy Land continued to produce discord in the Islamic 
World and to embarass the efforts of thosa Muslims 
who were working for Islamic solidarity". 
1. When the word 'King' was first mentioned by Mohammad 
Ali it caused an uproar. See Jordan's Report on the 
Conference, 23 June 1926, E6168/20/91, F. O. 371/11433. 
2. Jordan's Report on the Conference, 23 June 1926, op. cit. 
3. See: Iqbal, op. cit., p. 205; The Times, 23 July 1926. 
4. Toynbee, Survey 1925. p. 319. 
His conclusion was correct and the Indian delegations 
went back home to demonstrate their anger for the failure 
to prevent Ibn Saud ruling in the-Holy Land. 
1 
In the meanwhile, Ibn Saud decided to go ahead with 
plans to consolidate his position internally and externally. 
His intention of sending his son, Faisal, and ,a small goodwill 
mission to convey gratitude to Britain, France and Holland 
for their formal recognition remained firm despite Muslim 
opposition to his dealings with non Muslim Powers. Faisal 
was also to visit the Soviet Union. On this point Ibn- 
Saud sought Jordan's opinion and Jordan advised him to drop 
the idea for the ostensible reason that Moscow was too cold. 
Confidentially, on London's instructions, Jordan told the 
King "that the visit might not be regarded favourably by 
nations who have not recognised the Soviet Government". 
2 
The motives of the proposed visits were to seek political, 
economic and moral support by which Ibn Saud could counter 
propaganda made by his Muslim opponents and consolidate 
his temporal and religious powers in the Holy Places. 
3 
A 
1. For division of attitudes in India towards Ibn Saud's 
role in the Hejaz see: Al-Manar, xvii(1926-27) pp. 548-55, 
634-40,713-14; Umm al-Oura, No. 93,24 Sept., No. 98, 
30 Oct., No. 99,5 Nov., No. 101,19 Nov. 1926, No. 109, 
14 Jan. 1927; Oriente Moderno, vii (l927) p. 136; 
See above pp. 128 - 32 . For Philby's attitude towards 
India's hostile campaign see: American Vice Consul 
(Aden) to Sec. of State (Washington). 31 Oct. 1927, 
al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., ii, pp. 140-5. 
2. Jordan to F. O. 11 Aug. 1926, E4735/11/91, F. O. 371/11431. 
3. Jeddah Report, Sept. 1926, F. O. 371/11442; Ummal-Oura, 
No. 90,3 Sept. 1926. 
favourable opportunity arose when he received an invitation 
to inaugurate the first Mosque built in London by the 
Ahmadiya community. Ibn Saud, proud that his representative 
should open a Mosque in the capital of the British Empire, 
1 
now favoured'a public state visit. 
This was not at first welcomed by the Foreign office, 
as new bases for relations with Ibn Saud had not het been 
worked out. In addition, the King and the government would 
be away from London in the summer. 
2 So Faisal's visit 
remained an unofficial one. Ibn Saud's request3 that Jordan 
should accompany the Amir throughout the tour in Europe was 
rejected, but the Foreign office agreed that Jordan might 
accompany Faisal during his London visit. The Amir 
was to arrange for himself the rest of his European trip. 
4 
On this basis, accompanied by Jordan and Abd_A3.. 3ah al-Damluji 
(the Hejaz-Nejd Minister for Foreign Affairs), Faisal left 
Jeddah on 8 September. ' On his arrival in Engbnd fifteen 
days later he was given a good reception; and on 11 October 
he discussed current Arabian Affairs and Anglo-Saudi 
rela tions. with Sir Austin Chamberlain. 
5 
1. See: The Times, 2,4 Oct. 1926. 
2. F. O. to C. O. & I. O. 16 Aug. 1926, E4735/7/91, F. O. 
371/11432. 
3. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 15 Aug. 1926, E5285/7/91, F. O. . 71/11433. 
4. F. O. to Jordan, E4836/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
5. See: Record of Conversation on 11 Oct. 1926 between Amir 
Faisal and the Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs, 
D. B. F. P. 1919-39, 
_(Ser 
1A, ii, 1968) pp. 824-26 
While the political and diplomatic aspects of the visit 
went as hoped, the rest of the visit went wrong. The press 
in London published articles to the effect that the new Mosque 
would be used for Christian, Jewish and Muslim worship. When 
news of this reached Ibn Saud through the Cairo press, he 
was taken by surprise and wanted to instruct the Amir to 
decline the invitation to open the Mosque. 
1 However, pressure 
from Muslims in London and India was placed upon Ibn Saud not 
to opt out of the ceremony. Still anxious about being 
involved, the King telegraphed his son that if the Mosque 
was to be "for all religions" the Amir would have to decline, 
but if it was ascertained that the Mosque was "for different 
Muslim sects only", then the Amir could use his discretion 
and perform the ceremony of opening. 
2 
These instructions 
however, did not reach the Amir in time. Accordingly he lost 
the opportunity, when it was left to a-former president of the 
Punjab legislative council to take the lead at the ceremony. 
3 
At the end of his three week visit, Faisal was made an honorary 
Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. 
4 
1. The Ahmadiya Imam was making arrangements for addresses 
to be given by non-Muslim religious-teachers on the tents 
of their respective faiths, and invitations of the kind 
were being addressed both to Anglican and to Jewish 
dignitaries. That was why Ibn Saud suspected their faith. 
See: The Times, 2,4 Oct. 1926; Umm al-Qura, No. 97, 
22 Oct. 1926. 
2. Jeddah Report, Oct. 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
3. Umm al-Qura, No. 98,30 Oct. 1926. 
4. Williams, op. cit., pp. 190-200. 
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While the Amir was touring Europe, Jordan remained 
in London to discuss the proposed Anglo-Saudi treaty. He 
then accompanied the Amir on his return trip to open proposed 
discussions with Ibn Saud for the new treaty as soon as he 
got back to Jeddah. 
1 
1. Jeddah. Report, Nov. 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Making of the Treaty of Jeddah, May 1927, 
March 1926 --May 1927 
- The First Phase, March 1926, - January 1927 
- The Second Phase, January - May 1927 
;,. 
The Making of the Treaty of Jeddah, the First Phase, 
March 1926 - January 1927. 
The rapid changes in Ibn Saud's position required parallel 
changes in his status. In 1915 Britain recognised him "Ruler 
of Nejd El-Hasa, Qatif and Jubail". 
1 
In his capacity as King 
of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd in 1926, Ibn Saud sought 
Britain's recognition for his new status in the form of a 
treaty. This desire was conveyed to Clayton during the Bahrah 
negotiations in 1925.2 Although Clayton reported Ibn Saud's 
wish soon afterwards, discussions were not started until March 
1926 when London had become fully convinced that, under the 
new circumstances, urgent revisions to the treaty of 1915 
had now to be made. Accordingly, a polite message to that 
effect was sent to Ibn Saud early in April. 
3 
Meanwhile a 
number of inter-departmental meetings took place in the Colonial 
Office in order to prepare the ground. At the first meeting 
(12 March 1926) the following points were considered suitable 
for inclusion in the treaty: - 
a- declaration of perpetual peace and friendship; 
b- recognition by Ibn Saud of H. M. G. special position in 
the neighbouring Mandated Territories; 
c- agreement by Ibn Saud not to interfere with Arab 
Rulers with whom H. M. G. were in treaty relations; 
d-- settlement of the Trans-Jordan-Hejaz Frontier; 
e- something on the lines of Article 5 of 1916 Treaty 
(pilgrimage); 
f- promise by Ibn Saud to co-operate in the suppression 
of the slave trade and to recognise the practice of 
consular manumission at Jeddah. 
1. Preamble of the 1915 Treaty, See Appendix A. 
2. See: Clayton to C. O., 24 Nov. & 16 Dec. 1925, E332/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11437. 
3. F. O. to Jordan, 6 April 1926, E2026/180/91; Jordan to 
Ibn Saud, 8 April 1926 E2918/180/91, F. O. 371/11437. 
4. Minutes of the 12 March Conference, E2026/180/91; F. O. 371/11437 
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The inclusion of all these points at this stage in the 
proceedings reflected some divergence of opinion between the 
departments concerned and between them on the one hand and 
Ibn Saud on the other. Consequently, further discussions 
and consultations with the authorities on the spot were 
required. Clayton, for example, advised on 21 April, 
l that 
an outline of the conference recommendations should be 
communicated to Ibn Saud for consultation about the bases. 
Clayton's own appreciation of the situation in Arabia, which 
was always liable to change, caused him to be wary about 
delays in decisions which could prove prejudicial to British 
policy. "Other Powers", he argued, "may enter the field". 
2 
Accordingly, a message was sent to Ibn Saud on 24 April, 
assuring him of a favourable outcome in the matter. With his 
eye on Arabia as a whole, Clayton indicated a major British 
interest when he drew attention to the Yemen. He observed 
that the prospective treaty with Ibn Saud was likely to have a 
very salutary effect on the Imam and might make him more 
amenable. Clayton, still affected by his failure to win over 
the Imam, urged the British policy-makers to aim at friendly 
relations, not only with Ibn Saud but also with his rival-the 
Imam. 
Commenting on the second point, Clayton warned that any 
attempt "to induce Ibn Saud to recognise the Zionist obligation ... 
1. Clayton to Shuckburgh, 21 April 1926, F. O. 371/11437, 
also (Clayton Papers) 472/1. 
2. This was an indication to the Italian intervention in the 
Yemen. 
would be disastrous and ... would destroy his position by 
bringing down upon him-. universal Moslem criticism". He also 
warned against forcing a clause into the treaty by which Ibn 
Saud was to commit himself to a policy of non-interference 
in the affairs of the Gulf States. 
' He thought that such an 
undertaking should be limited to a general recognition by 
Ibn Saud of any treaty Britain had or might have with other 
Arab rulers. In addition he thoucjit that Ibn Saud's possible 
aggressive actions against those rulers could best be dealt 
with by certain measures to be designed when required.; 
Clayton cautiously considered the suggestion of protecting 
Ibn Saud and his territories against foreign aggression. This 
matter had been rejected by the Air Ministry at the Inter- 
departmental meeting without explanation. Clayton agreed with 
the Air Ministry, and stressed that protection extended to one 
ruler in Arabia could not easily be denied to another. In 
this Clayton was correct. He had learned a lesson from the 
Saudi-Hashemite hostilities and was anxious to avoid any 
future embarrassment to Britain if similar hostility arose 
again between these two strong rulers of Arabia (Ibn Saud 
and the Imam of the Yemen). He finally recommended a non- 
personal treaty with Ibn Saud. 
For his part, Ibn Saud was anxious to obtain a meeting 
with a British negotiator to discuss the--basis of the new 
treaty before the following June, when the Mecca Conference was 
1. Any hostility between Ibn Saud and other Arab ruler 
with whom Britain had treaty relations would illustrate 
the difficulty of Bfitain's position. Clayton reached 
the conclusion that a non-interference commitment by 
Ibn Saud would be a possible source of future embarrassment 
to Britain. 
to meet. 
1 
Since the Hejaz question'as the main issue of 
the conference, Ibn Saud's eagerness to gain prior 
recognition of his position in a new treaty is understandable. 
Once this desire had been conveyed to London, immediate 
efforts were made to speed the proceedings. The British wanted 
to aid Ibn Saud to consolidate his position in the Hejaz, as 
they believed that by could then balance anti-British feeling 
in many parts of the Islamic world. At the same time the danger 
of any hostile elements coming to power-in the Hejaz would 
be eliminated. The British were, of course, aware of the 
Ali brothers'ambitions in the Holy Land. 
On 20 May another interdepartmental meeting reconsidered 
the situation in the light of Clayton's advice about Ibn 
Saud's desire for a quick resolution of the matter. Clayton, 
who by now had returned to London, was invited to convey his 
views in person. At the meeting discussions went smoothly 
except on two points. The first, controversial when, 
previously discussed, was the protection of the Gulf Shaikhs 
from the growing power of Ibn Saud: in other words, how-to 
prevent him from aggressive encroachment as had been laid down 
in article 6 of 1915 Treaty. It was argued that any such 
provision would now be unwelcome to Ibn Saud and, even if 
included, could constitute no effective deterrent should Ibn 
Saud became determined to absorb the neighbouring Arab Emirates. 
These arguments proved decisive and the clause was dropped. 
Instead it was agreed, on Clayton's suggestion, that copies 
1. IbnýSaud to Jordan, 4 May 1926, No. 57, F. O. 371/11437. 
See Chapter 2 above. 
of all the existing treaties between Britain and the Arab 
Shaikhs should be communicated to Ibn Saud. The significance- 
of this proposal was that Ibn Saud would have to think twice 
about notions of extending his power over these Emirates as 
he could not feign ignorance of Britain's commitments towards 
them, or object to any steps which she might take to oppose 
him. 
l 
The second point in contention related to Britain's' 
political and economic representation in the Hejaz and whether 
to allude to this in the proposed treaty, Ibn Saud, no.. doubt, 
would produce a counter proposal if the British negotiator 
insisted on gaining a concession on this point. Therefore 
the Foreign Office resisted the idea as it might lead 
to similar requests from the other-Arab rulers who had no 
representation in Britain. 
2 
The progress and results of these discussions were reported 
both to Chamberlain (Foreign Secretary) and to Amery (Colonial 
Secretary) soon after the meeting so that they could issue 
instructions to Jordan (the Political Agent at Jeddah), who 
was believed to be persona grata with Ibn Saud, to commence 
negotiations. 
3 Although the debate had come to these decisions 
in London, India's attitude delayed the actual start of 
negotiations. The Viceroy argued that the proposed treaty 
was premature and that the Islamic world was not prepared to 
1. Minutes of the 20 May Conference, C9757/26, F. O. 371/11438. 
2. Ibid. 
3. See: F. O. to C. O., 30 June 1926, E3843/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11438. 
receive news of more British support to Ibn Saud after'the 
latter's act of vandalism in their Holy Land. He urged London 
not to take any positive steps until it was possible to make 
a comprehensive estimation of Muslim opinion. 
1 Presumably, 
the Viceroy preferred to wait for reactions to the outcome of 
the Islamic conference at Jeddah which had just finished its 
meetings. Thus Ibn Saud's desire to gain British support 
prior to the conference proved impossible. On the other hand, 
if the British Government then decided to go ahead with plans 
already made, the Viceroy advised that the Hejaz should not be 
included in the new treaty since the old one was-'only concerned 
with Nejd; otherwise the treaty should be made personal to Ibn 
Saud-for a limited period. He justified this suggestion by 
stressing the growing opposition of Muslim India to Ibn Saud's 
rule in the Hejaz, and upon Muslim scepticism about Ibn Saud's 
long-term ability to restrain Wahhabi fanaticism. The Viceroy 
explained that Britain lacked experience in dealing with the 
Wahhabis_and, therefore, a short-term treaty with Ibn Saud 
was preferable: Britain could then be able to reconsider her 
position in the right of general Muslim opinion. 
On the same basis, the Viceroy viewed the question of 
protecting British-Muslim subjects in the Hejaz, a matter for 
which the British authorities were anxious-to obtain-from Ibn 
Saud guarantees in: the form of an article in the new treaty. 
1. Viceroy to 1.0., 12 July 1926, No. C1213s, F. O. 371/11438, 
also (Clayton Papers) 472/2. Obviously Islamic reaction 
in India influenced the British decision makers towards 
Ibn Saud. For reaction to Wahhabi vandalism see: Jordan 
to F. O. 9 June 1926, E3578/20/91, F. O. 371/11433. 
Traditionally Britain and other European Powers relied on 
Capitulatory rights to secure their own interests and 
subjects. The Capitulations in question had been granted 
to Britain by the Porte in the sixteenth Century. Accordingly, 
British subjects had enjoyed "a wide range of extra-territorial 
privileges, including immunity from taxation and sequestration 
and rights of consular jurisdiction". 
l 
Efforts to secure 
the Capitulatory rights with King Husain as successor 
to the Porte in the Hejaz during the peace settlement had 
failed. As part of the bargain with him in 1923, "the 
Ottoman Capitulations were to be abolished in name and rein-_ 
troduced in substance in King Husayn's dominions". 
2 
The 
failure of British diplomacy to reconcile Husain did not 
affect the existing Capitulations. When Ibn Saud came to 
power in the Hejaz he missed no opportunity to point out 
that there was no law in the Hejaz but the Sharia . As he 
wrote to the British Agent on 14 May 1926: 
"I wish to assure you certainly that absolute justice 
will be enjoyed by everybody, and you know that this 
country is a holy one which has certain religious 
conditions ought to be regarded and it is not possible 
to have in it any rub contrary to the Islamic Sharla 
Laws". 
1. "The Capitulations were a complicated system of bilateral 
arrangements governing the relations of the Porte with the 
outside world. They restricted Turkish trading rights; 
her right to impose customs and harbour dues, and her 
right to export Turkish goods. They gave to foreign 
nationals a wide range of extra-territorial privilege ... " See: Montgomery, 'The Making of the Treaty of Sevres 
of 10 August 1920', The Historical Journal xv (1972), 
pp. 775-87; see also: Niksel,. 'The Turko-British Pact', 
Asiatic Review, xxxv (1939), pp. 561-71. 
2. Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 294. 
3. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 14 May 1926, E3472/3472/91, 
F. O. 371/11450. 
Thus, the British authorities were aware of Ibn'Saud's intentions 
concerning this particular matter, 'but they still insisted on 
maintaining "inherited" rights. For his part, the Viceroy warned 
against pursuing this policy, for the exercise of these privileges 
in the Holy Land of Islam would agitate the Muslim world against 
Britain. He thought it would be wiser to aim at securing limited 
powers of consular intervention at least while Muslim India con- 
tinued to take such'a'close interest in the situation'in the Hejaz! 
Separate discussion on the preliminary draft treaty 
revealed departmental division on the issue of the security of the i; 
!i 
TJ-'I- T --A -A +-Iý ý+-o'4-4 ce" 'f Tlri4-icln Miicl-Inc 4-hcrc T"A4n 11L, JlY . LJCLLlt1 Qlll. l I.. 11G t"JLV L. GG L. iV31 VL LL 11.. 1u11 L'LLAJ111LLV VLl4. iL G" iLiL, liü 
wanted no intervention in the application of Muslim Law, or in the 
sovereignty of the Hejaz. The Foreign Office led the opposition 
to India's views and its reluctance to give any appearance of 
intervention. It argued the necessity for maintaining the 
Capitulatory rights in the Hejaz and accused the Government of 
India of adopting contradictory attitudes. It also pointed 
out that India's present stance differed substantially from that 
indicated by their earlier comment on article 3 in the draft 
treaty. 
2 The Foreign Office resisted any attempt to whittle 
down Capitulatory rights as defined-in article 6ý 
3 
which 
1. Viceroy to 1.0., 12 July 1926, C1213s, F. O. 371/11438. See 
examples of practicing Capitulations by European Powers in 
E3472/3575/3472/91, F. O. 371/11450. 
2. F. O. comments on preliminary draft treaty with Ibn Saud, 
(undated) E4266/180/91, F. O. 371/11438; Viceroy to I. O. 
12 July 1926, F. O. 371/11438. 
3. This article reads as follows: Ibn Saud was to agree that in 
any case when a British subject was 'pplaintiff or defendant, 
a British Consular representative shall be entitled to attend 
the Ne di or Hejazi courts during the hearing of the case, and 
where 
the 
Brittish a ent wishes ttq make di RA t' re resent- ations ... judgement shall be adjourned ahd shall not be 
executed while such representations are being made, and in 
no case shall the execution of judgement proceed except after 
permission of His Majesty'. E5347/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
ý;, 
was regarded as the "absolute minimum" needed to secure 
British subjects and rights. The point was frequently made- 
that the British Government had never admitted the abolition of 
Capitulations in the Hejaz, although-they were no longer 
enjoyed in Turkey itself. With the passage of time those 
rights had become a matter of "custom and-usage". On. that 
basis the Foreign Office, had already put forward the idea that 
a British consular representative should be entitled to attend 
the local courts and to make diplomatic representations to the 
King of the Hejaz. 
1 
This proposition was now reaffirmed . 
Still reluctant to agree, but by way of compromise, the Government 
of India suggested a substitute clause providing for "most 
favoured nation" treatment for British subjects. 
2 
Apart from these differences between India and the Foreign 
Office, the India Office, though favouring India's views in 
general, expressed considerable doubt about two points raised 
by the Colonial office on 15 July. The first was whether a 
redraft of article 5 of the 1915 treaty would in practice 
either secure}for British Muslims "any greater freedom for 
religious observance in the Hejaz or secure for the British 
Government any appreciable measure of gratitude", while it 
appeared highly probable that it would involve the British 
Government in Hejazi domestic affairs. Furthermore, Ibn Saud 
1. F. O. to C. O., 26 Oct. 1926, E5918/180/91; F. O. to Jordan 
3 Nov. 1926, E6118/180/91; F. O. Comment on the draft treaty 
(undated) E4266/180/91; Memo. by Mallet (F. O. ) 13 Oct. 1926, 
E5794/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
2. Viceroy to 1.0., 12 July 1926, F. O. 371/11438. 
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was not-thought likely to agree to such an inclusion. The 
second point at issue related to the facilities given to the 
British Navy in the Gulf by the Anglo-Turkish convention of July 
1913. The Colonial Office believed that a provision in the 
prospective treaty should be inserted to ensure the 
"prescriptive rights of the British Government in regard to the 
policing, lighting and buoying of the Persian Gulf". 
' 
This 
provision seemed to the India Office. "unnecessary and inadvisable" 
They argued that the British rights in this question rested on 
"usage and acquiescence" and not on treaties. 
2 
Since agreement between the departments of state. concerned 
about a suitable text for the proposed treaty was obviously 
still far off, yet another Interdepartmental Conference was 
deemed necessary. At the Conference (which met on 11 August) 
it was agreed that the Foreign Office attitude towards the 
forms of the treaty should be adopted and, accordingly, the 
treaty should neither be personal to Ibn Saud nor even refer 
to him by name. Taking the advice of the India Office, it 
was agreed not to send copies of the existing treaties between 
Britain and the Gulf, States to Ibn Saud, because 
"the obligationsof the British Government to the 
various Rulers of the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf 
were so vague that the proposed communication of the 
texts of the treaties with these Rulers to Ibn Saud 
would not appear likely to have the effect of impressing 
on him the danger that aggression on [sic] those Chiefs 3 
would bring him, into conflict with the British Government". 
1. C. O. to 1.0., 15 July 1926, C13138/26, F. O. 371/11438. 
2. I. O. to C. O. 28 July 1926, P2343/26, F. O. 371/11438. 
3. Minutes of the 11 Aug. Conference, E4920/180/91, -F. O. 
371/11438 
The alternative resolution suggested by the India Office 
simply was that Ibn Saud should be required to preserve the 
status quo. This allowed for the possibility of reproducing 
article 6 of the 1915 treaty. 
1 Clayton sounded a note of 
caution considering it "inevitable that Ibn Saud would 
attempt to spread his influence in the territories in question, 
and that it would be dangerous to commit H. M. G. to any course 
of action as a situation similar to that in Aden Protectorate 
might then very well arise in the Persian Gulf". This warning 
obviously carried weight and the conference came to the 
general conclusion that: 
"It would be unwise to commit H. M. G. to recognise 
the extent of Ibn Saud's domains or to commit H. M. G. 
to protecting territories outside those domains since 
it was questionable whether, in fact, military protection 
would be given to the Chiefs of the Persian Gulf should 
Ibn Saud attempt to overrun them; and that H. M. G. should 
be left free to take what action they considered 
necessary in particular cases. In negotiating the 
revised treaty with Ibn Saud, who was probably fully 
aware of H. M. G. 's obligations in Eastern Arabia, it 
could be pointed out that it was not necessary to 
define the authority of either party save in regard to 
Palestine, TransJordan and Iraq where a special 
position was created by the2 relations of H. M. G. 
and the League of Nations. " 
After the Conference had completed its deliberations a 
number of reports which helped to reopen discussion, were 
received. The Political Resident in the Gulf reported a 
number of Ibn Saud's infringements of article 6. His 
object in so doing was to demonstrate that the existence 
1. Accordingly Ibn Saud was to 'refrain from all 
aggression-on or interfere with, the Gulf States. 
2. Minutes of the 11 Aug. Conference. 
of the article in question was not proving effective in 
the prevention of aggression by Ibn Saudagainst the Gulf 
States. Since 1915, he continued, neither Ibn Saud nor his 
men in the eastern province of al-Hasa had respected the 
undertaking not to intervene in the affairs of the Gulf 
Emirates. In 1922, Ibn Saud had included the Qatar Peninsula 
within a tract of Nejd territory for which he was prepared' 
to negotiate an oil concession with the Eastern and General 
Syndicate, Sir Percy Cox had immediately intervened and had 
reminded Ibn Saud of his undertaking in the treaty which Cox 
had personally negotiated with him. Since then the mir of al- 
Hasa, acting upon Ibn Saud's instructions, had sought to 
include in Nejd both Trucial Oman and Independent Oman, 
exploiting internal unrest throughout the Sultanate. The 
Resident, therefore, now recommended retaining article 6 of 
the 1915 treaty, but also suggested that a stronger political 
influence than that of the "Arab Residency Agent", should be 
introduced into the Trucial States. He believed that the 
presence of a British Officer would encourage the chiefs 
to resist Wahhabi propaganda. 
1 This comment influenced the 
departments concerned to recommend the maintenance of article 6. 
The High Commissioner for Palestine took advantage of 
his right to comment, indicating that questions of access to 
the Islamic Holy Places and the protection of Pilgrims 
were only of concern to Muslims and tlat Britain's interest 
1. Political Resident (Bushire) to C. O., 9 June 1926; High 
Commissioner (Iraq) to the Govt. of India, 19 Jan. -923; 
Amir of al-Hasa to the Ruler of Debai, 27 Nov. 1925, 
E6118/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
should be restricted to the safety of her own subjects. 
He argued thatit would therefore be better to rely upon 
ordinary international sanctions rather than to include 
a specific article in the treaty. 
1 
The High Commissioner for Iraq, too, sought to clarify 
whether Iraq needed to be concerned about the new treaty 
with Ibn Saud. He was anxious in particular to know 
whether or not British underi ings to Iraq were binding on 
its government while acting on his advice. The High 
Commissioner's wariness was aroused by Ibn Saud's claims 
that certain sectionsof Southern Iraq's tribes had come 
under his authority and by his continuing attempts to 
establish his authority over them. 
2 
This seemed a potential 
source of future conflict. 
Since the revision of the treaty had been under con- 
sideration questions, comments, analyses and criticisms had 
multiplied in all directions- and thus although some progress 
had been made, there was relatively little to show for all 
the paperwork generated. It seemed to the Colonial office 
that they were still working in the dark since they had 
little indication of Ibn Saud's own ideas or of what he was 
likely to accept. Why, it was felt, waste further time on 
deliberations when any agreed solution might yet be rejected 
by Ibn Saud. Expert intelligence was urgently required. 
1. High Commissioner (Palestine) to C. O., 16 Aug. 1926, 
E4865/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
2. Dobbs (Baghdad) to Amery, 17 Aug. 1926, E8492/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11438; Roswan, 'Tribal Areas and Migration 
Lines of the North Arabian Bedouins', Geographical 
Review, xx. (1930), pp. 494-502. 
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In the meanwhile, the Colonial office seized the 
opportunity of Jordan's presence in London during Amir 
Faisal's visit to Britain1 to call for an Interdepartmental 
meeting on 6 October. Two alternatives were considered 
at the meeting regarding the most suitable way in which 
Jordan could pursue discussions with Ibn Saud. The first 
was that he should be furnished with a draft treaty, leaving 
it to him to work out the best means of securing Ibn Saud's 
signature; the difficulty about this approach wasthat 
there was still no agreement on the "cut and dried" terms 
which might consitute a final text. Furthermore Jordan's 
own liberty of action2 would thus be severely circumscribed 
and, in fact, he refused to proceed on these lines. The 
second alternative was to provide him with a "comprehensive 
letter of instructions, telling him in general terms what 
ends H. M. G. desired to secure", and leaving to him the way 
in which to achieve them. Jordan and Clayton both favoured 
this second alternative, the former suggesting, at the same 
time, that it would be useful for him to have at least ` 
some draft articles for his own guidance. This method had 
proved successful in the negotiations with Turkey and was 
recommended for use again here. 
3 
1. See Chapter 2 above. Jordan was nominated at the 
conference of 20 May as Persona grata to Ibn Saud and 
best able to negotiate the treaty with him. 
2. Clayton pointed out that among the reasons which caused 
his failure to win over the Imam of the Yemen in 1925/26 
was that he was more or less tied down to the terms 
of a draft treaty. 
3. Minutes of the 6 Oct. Conference, E5915/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11438. 
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On examining the existing draft treaty, Jordan pointed 
out that the Capitulatory rights clause seemed to him likely 
to create an obstacle to any negotiations, since Ibn Saud 
had never admitted their existence in the Hejaz. 
1 
He 
advised total deletion of the clause. In fact, as he explained, 
he had always been able to act as if the Capitulatory rights 
had existed and he saw no reason why this should not continue 
to be the case in the asbence of any specific provision. 
Early in May Jordan had written: "the question of 
Capitulations in the Hejaz under the new regime has been left- 
in abeyance by myself and my colleagues so as not to further 
embarrass the local authorities". But when a certain Indian 
Muslim (Ahmad Suleiman) was accused of writing antagonistic 
articles in Indian newspapers, and arrested on arrival in the 
Hejaz, Jordan, at Suleiman's request had intervened. In a 
message to Ibn Saud he reminded the King of the Capitulatory 
rights and requested the handing over of Suleiman to the 
British Agency. Although Ibn Saud argued against the continuance 
of Capitulations, he was prepared to free Suleiman at Jordan's 
request, maintaining that the arrest had a necessary formality 
in order to safeguard his prestige and his country's security. 
Jordan's act was then approved by the Foreign Office. In 
similar cases, however, his French and Italian colleagues had 
been unable to get any satisfaction from Ibn Saud. They 
had proposed joint representation to Jordan but London had 
1. Ibid; Memo by Mallet (F. O. ) 13 Oct. 1926, E5794/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11438. 
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then instructed him to refrain from raising the question with 
Ibn Saud since the whole matter would be coming up for 
consideration in the proposed new treaty. 
1 
Appreciating the motives behind Jordan's reluctance to 
include any formal reference to the Capitulations but still 
uncertain as to how to proceed, the conference deemed it 
wise to concentrate its attention on points where Britain and 
Ibn Saud were most likely to be in agreement, leaving more 
difficult questions to be explored later. Jordan, however, 
pressed his point, stressing that, in the light of the 
friendly relationship between Britain and Ibn Saud, the 
privileged position which the British had previously enjoyed 
in the Hejaz could still be taken for granted. In his view 
even the inclusion of a "most favoured nation" clause 
replacing Capitulations might question this state of affairs 
and could thus prove counter productive. Although Jordan; '-. 3 
argument, against the clause was accepted, the Foreign office, 
still hesitating about dropping it altogether, turned the 
question over to their legal advisers for investigation of 
possible wider consequences. 
2 
The Foreign office feared that, 
if the Capitulations clause was omited or even weakened, countries 
like Egypt and Persia could argue that their courts of Law were 
1. Ibid. Jordan confirmed that he had managed to arrange 
matters that no trial of British subjects by Shari'a 
courts had taken place. See the following documents as 
examples: Jordan to F. O. 12 May, E3472; Ibn gaud to Jordan, 
14 May E3472; Ahmed Suleiman to Jordan, 15 May, E3491; 
F. O. to Jordan, 24 June, E3638; F. O. to Jordan, 14 July, 
E4138; C. O. to F. O. 31 July, E4536; Memo. by Spring-Rice 
(F. O. ) 9 July, E4165; Italian Embassy (London) to F. O., 
7 June, E3575; Jordan to Chamberlain, 28 May 1926, 
E3638/3472/91, F. O. 371/11450. 
2. Minutes of the 6 Oct. Conference.., E5915/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11438. 
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by no means inferior to those of the Hejaz, and so this 
could lead to the sweeping away of capitulations in those 
countries. Therefore, the Foreign office again insisted 
that any proposed omission of that clause from the treaty 
should not be taken to indicate any final abandonment of 
the claim to capitulations in the Hejaz, and "would not 
debar ... 
[Britain) from reviving that claim at a later date 
in concert with the other Capitulatory Powers". With this 
reservation, the conference agreed that the protection of 
British subjects in the Hejaz should rely upon the existing 
practice of direct intervention by the British Consul at 
Jeddah. 1 Accordingly the clause was dropped and an 
eight-article draft treaty was drawn up2 and approved, but 
only as document for Jordan's guidance. 
But still the final decision could not be taken without 
the approval of the Secretaries of State. Although approving 
the document, Chamberlain made some observations which 
reflected his anxiety. He recommended that the disputed 
clause be retained as long as possible, unless the whole 
negotiations were thereby being jeopardised. In that case, 
in the interests of concluding the treaty, Jordan was 
empowered to dispense with any such provision, but was to 
stress that its omission would not materially prejudice any 
1. Ibid; also Memo. by Mallet, 13 Oct. 1926, E5794/180/91, 
F. O. 371/11438; Marlowe, Spoiling the Egyptians (London 
1974) pp. 68-74. 
2. See: F. O. to Jordan, 3 Nov. 1926, E6118/180/91, F. O. 
371/11438; E6650/180/91, F. O. 371/11439. 
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claim that Britain might wish to make that the Capitulations 
existed. 
1 
. 
Jordan left London en route for Marseilles, where he 
rejoined Amir Faisal for the return journey to Jeddah, with 
full powers to negotiate directly with Ibn Saud along the 
lines recommended by the conference and with instructions 
to bear in mind the later observations of the Foreign Office. 
In spite of the laborious process which had led to this 
result, the matter had remained one for discussion only at 
departmental level and was not apparently deemed to be of 
sufficient importance for any reference, at this stage, 
to the Cabinet. A policy of sorts had emerged, but the 
responsibility for its successful implementation now seemed 
to depend entirely on Jordan's skill in exploiting the 
relationship which had already been established with Ibn Saud. 
On his arrival at Jeddah, Jordan received a formal 
letter of instructions, confirming the results of his London 
visit. 
2 
Also at Jeddah he was joined by George Antonius 
the loan of whose services had in the meanwhile been 
negotiated by the Colonial Office to provide help with 
translation work and also to advise. 
3 
On 23 November the 
1. F. O. to C. O., 20 Oct. 1926, C19237/26; 
F. O. to C. O. 26 Oct. 1926, E5918/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
2. F. O. to Jordan, 3 Nov. 1926, E6118/180/91, F. O. 371/11438- 
3. F. O. -to`, Jordan (undated) E4836/180/91; F. O. 371/11438; 
F. O. to C. O., 26 Oc tý. 1926, E5918/180/91, F. O: __371/11418. 
delegation left for Wadi al-Aqiq (14 miles south-west 
of al-Madinah) where Ibn Saud was camping. There, for 
the next three weeks, unproductive negotiations took place. 
l 
Consequently, Jordan, as he telegraphed, had been "forced 
to suspend negotiations owing to Ibn Saud's objections to 
several articles in the draft treaty and his desire to 
include others of contentious nature". He stressed, 
nevertheless, that "relations have been most friendly 
and resumption is provisionally fixed for next March". 
Meanwhile, he considered it essential to return to Britain 
to report in detail. 
2 
On 13 January Jordan made a verbal report on his 
mission at a meeting held at the Colonial Office, and on 
26 January Jordan and Antonius submitted their written 
report which included, as appendices, Ibn Saud's counter 
proposals. It is possible to follow in some detail the 
difficulties encountered in the negotiations. In the search 
for peace between Nejd and territories under British Mandate, 
agreement had been reached despite differences on its 
implementation, and on the wording of the final text of 
article one. Presumably, the British draft had been left 
deliberately vague in order to meet a potential Wahhabi 
1. See: Jordan and Antonious to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927, 
E477/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
2. Jordan to F. O., 12 Dec. 1926, E6860/180/91, F. O. 371/11439. 
The Foreign office, disappointed at this news, wanted to 
accuse Ibn Saud, at whose request the negotiations had been 
initiated of precipitating their failure. But it was agreed 
to await Jordan's report before making a judgment. Later 
some doubts were expressed about the suitability of re- 
starting negotiations through Jordan. The Consular Department 
preferred to arrange a transfer should this be deemed 
advisable. See: F. O. minutes on Jordan's telegram of 12 
Dec. 1926, E6860/91, F. O. 371/11439. 
- 173 - 
threat to the mandatory territories bordering with Nejd. 
The British wanted Ibn Saud "... to use all possible 
means to prevent his territory being used as a base for 
activities directed against the present or future 
1 
tBritish) interests ... " Ibn Saud maintained that these 
terms were of a far reaching character, and that in 
practice it would be difficult for the two Governments to 
abide by them without resorting to exceptional measures. 
He sought a definition for the word "activities" and 
suggested the equally vague "unlawful activities" instead. 
Accordingly, both parties undertook 
"to maintain good relations with the other, 
and to endeavour by all the means at his [sic] 
disposal to prevent his territories being used 
as a base for unlawful activities di5ect [ed] 
against the interests of the other". 
This text seemed sufficient to protect British interests 
not only in the mandated territories but also on the seas 
from Ikhwan raids. 
On the other hand efforts to obtain Ibn Saud's formal 
recogrition of Britain's special position in the mandated 
territories were frustrated. He took pains to persuade 
the British that his reluctance was not motivated by any 
wish to query the situation. On the contrary, the Haddah 
and Bahrah agreements were tantamount to a definite recognition 
1. Art. I of the British draft, E6118/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
2. Jordan and Antontius' to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927, 
E477/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
of the British position in those territories; and he for his 
part "had no intention of questioning that position". Although 
this was not quite correct since Palestine was not included in 
the agreements mentioned, he pointed out that he could not accept 
the insertion of such an article in the proposed treaty because 
any formal recognition "would inevitably be associated in the 
minds of people with the controversy relating to pledges given 
to the Sharif Husain in 1915". 
1 It may be recalled that the 
area in question had been promised by Britain to Sharif 
Husain as a part of a great Arab state and it was understandable 
that Ibn Saud should not wish to be involved in a conflict 
to which he had never been a party. No Arab ruler had ever 
accepted the British Mandate in Palestine and any recognition 
of this would give sanction to the Balfour Declaration which 
was to secure the establishment of the Jewish national home 
in Palestine a sensitive issue over which he could not escape 
bitter Muslim criticism. 
2 Furthermore, it was known that Ibn 
Saud had outstanding claims to territories presently under 
Mandate namely the Aqaba and Maan districts. He was not 
prepared to abandon those claims nor indeed could he have 
easily done so as part of bargain with Britain since he 
had been instructed by the Islamic Conference of 1926 to recover 
Aqaba and Maan for the Hejaz. 
3 In deference to Ibn Saud's 
1. Ibid. 
2. See: Minutes of a meeting held at the C. O., 13 Jan. 1927, 
E479/119/91, F. O. 371/12244; Art. ii of the Mandate for 
Palestine; Chory, 'An Arab View of the Situation in 
Palestine', International Affairs, xv (1936), pp. 684-99. 
3. See chapter 2 above. 
wishes, Jordan agreed to drop article 2. But. this still did 
not satisfy Ibn Saud. The question of boundaries between 
Transjordan and the Hejaz remained to be settled. 
During the course of negotiations at Bahrah, though 
the Hejaz-Transjordan frontier was not included, Clayton had 
been instructed to inform Ibn Saud verbally of the British 
designs for a future settlement. He indicated that the 
frontier line "should eventually be drawn from a point on 
the Gulf of Akaba through a point on the Hejaz Railway 
south of the station of Mudawwara, to a point situated 
approximately at the instruction of meridian 38°E with 
parallel 29°35'N". 
1 
This boundary definition to be 
included in a separate protocol, 
2 
was now pressed by Jordan 
on Ibn Saud with a warning that Britain would in no circumstances 
accept any modifications. 3 
Inevitably Ibn Saud raised the question of Aqaba and Maan 
which he now formally claimed. Deadlock ensued. After 
prolonged discussions he concluded that the time was not yet 
ripe for any further negotiations over this matter since they 
could only lead to concessions on his part which he did not 
wish to make and would be unpopular with Islamic opinion. 
As a token of goodwill he declared that he was prepared to 
pledge his word of honour that "until a settlement had been 
1. 'Clayton Report', F. O. 371/11437. 
2. For text see: F. O. to Jordan, 3 Nov. 1926, enc. 8, 
E6118/180/91, F. O. 371/11438 
3. See map p. 77A. 
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reached, he would not raise the subject or question the 
occupation and administration of the district by the officers 
of His Majesty's Government". 
l 
In return for the dropping 
of the whole of article two, he was also prepared to make the 
following general pledge: 
"I [Ibn Saud] do not intend any harm whatsoever to 
British interests by not recognising the special 
position in mandated territories, but ... the present 
circumstances compel me to abstain from intervening in 
matters with the previousýistory of which I have had 
no personal connection... " 
Referring to the Aqaba -Maan question, Ibn Saud added "... there 
is no possibility of settling the--matter at present; and ... 
it is necessary in the common interest, to postpone its 
settlement". Acceptance of the omission of the article and 
of the cancellation of the protocal was, however, left to 
the British Government for consideration. 
Turning to the Eastern frontier, the British proposal of 
including article 6 of the 1915 treaty in the new one was not 
welcomed by Ibn Saud, who regarded it as incompatible with his 
dignity as an independent ruler. He declared only his readiness 
to agree upon the sense of the article. He was-., reluctant 
to accept the phrase: "to refrain from all aggression or 
interference". Instead he suggested "to maintain relations 
of frie-Aship", which was finally a6cepted. 
3 
1. Jordan and Antonius to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927, 
E477/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
2. Draft letter from the King of the Hejaz relating to 
the Hejaz-Transjordan frontier and to Mandates (undated) 
Annex. 6, E477/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
3. Jordan and Antonius to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927; 
Minutes of the 13 Jan. 1927, conference at the C. O., 
E479/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
While territorial disputes were the concern of articles 
1,2,6 and the protocol (which have already been discussed), 
articles 3,4 and 5 were devoted to decide the status of 
British subjects in Ibn Saud's dominions. According to 
article 3 of the British draft he was to "facilitate the 
performance of the pilgrimage by British subjects and British 
protected persons of Moslem faith" and to protect them during 
their visit to the Holy Land. The article which was drawn 
up in line with the Viceroy's recommendations, reflected his 
fears of possible reprisals by Ibn Saud against the anti-Wahhabi 
Indian elements while on the pilgrimage. By making the 
safety of pilgrims a matter of treaty obligation, Britain was 
hoping to avoid any need to become involved in any controversy 
over individual cases which would have conflicted with her 
traditional policy of non-intervention in Islamic matters. 
When Ibn Saud was presented with this article at Wadi 
al-Aqiq, he rejected it at once, regarding it as proposing 
a new form of Capitulations. He had always maintained that 
religion and politics were one and indivisible. In conformity 
with the Shari Ibn Saud insisted (as usual) that there would 
be no laws in the Holy Land except the Sharia. His point of 
view was partly accepted by the British negotiators, but they 
pointed to differences between Wahhabis and other Muslims 
over interpretation of the Shari'a. He was given examples 
from the anti-Wahhabi movements in India, in Iraq and in Egypt 
and warned that if Britain accepted his views entirely she 
might face criticism from other Muslims who would easily find 
excuses to believe that Britain had favoured the Wahhabi sect 
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Ibn Saud insisted on the Shari'a. A resolution that 
British subjects would be treated in the Hejaz 'in the same 
way as other Muslims was finally accepted. 
1 
Article 4 was in fact an extension of article 3. It 
confirmed the existing practices relating to the belongings 
of pilgrims who died in the Hejaz and who had no legal 
trustee there at the time of their death. There was no 
doubt that the Shari'a must be obeyed, and this Antonius 
was at pains to confirm and elucidate. With his help a 
clause was devised determining that the belongings 
in question'will not be handed over to the British 
authority until formalities required by the relevant 
Shari'a laws will have been accomplished". 
2 
At an early stage, it had been decided to drop the 
article about Capitulations because Ibn Saud was unlikely 
to accept it. On the other hand, "His Majesty's Government 
are advised that the ommission would not materially prejudice 
any claims which they may be in a position to make that the 
Capitalations are still in existence". 
3 
Some legal power 
were essential to maintain the spirit of the Capitulations, 
and it was suggested that the two parties should agree 
"to recognise the national status" of each other's subjects 
who might be within the other's territory. 
4 
But even this 
1. Ibid; also Ibn Saud's third and final draft treaty, 
See Appendix E. 
2. Ibn Saud's final draft treaty, Appendix E. 
3. F. O. to Jordan, 3 Nov. 1926. 
4. Text of the British draft treaty, See Appendix D. 
proposal was rejected by Ibn Saud, and the contents of 
article 5 proved one of the main obstacles to the conclusion 
of a treaty. Ibn Saud and his advisers strongly rejected the 
inclusion of a "national status" clause as it could be 
interpreted as a veiled reassertion of the validity of the 
Capitulations. Such a clause, they argued, could only be 
acceptable with added qualification that "the subjects would, 
while residing in the territories of the other state, be 
subject to local laws and tribunals". Otherwise the whole 
article must be deleted. In spite of repeated pressure 
from the British negotiators, Ibn Saud stuck to his guns, 
while they found themselves unable to agree to his amendment. 
By doing so, they would then "surrender the juridical privileges 
contained in the Capitulations". 
l 
and this clearly lay beyond 
their instructions. The issue was left unresolved. 
A question of general interest in the civilized world - 
slavery2 (and the slave trade) formed article 7 of the British 
draft. Britain hoped to obtain Ibn Saud's undertaking on 
two points: 
1. "to cooperate with his Britanic Majesty in the suppression 
of the slave trade". 
1. Jordan and Antonius to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927. 
2. Slavery is 'a status or condition of a person over whom 
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised'. See: Greenidge, 'Slavery 
in the Middle East, Report by the Secretary of the 
Anti-Slavery Society'(London), Middle Eastern Affairs, 
vii (1956) pp. 435-41. For wider knowledge of 
slavery see: Patterson, 'On Slavery and Slave 
Formations', New Left Review, cxvii (1979), pp. 31-67. 
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2. "to recognise the right of manumission" of British 
Consular officers at Jeddah and elsewhere. 
Britain's anti-slavery campaign in Arabia went back to the 
19th Century. During the 1820's Arab Shaikhs in Trucial 
Oman undertook not to carry off slaves or to sell them. 
These British efforts continued and later in the last 
decade of the Century, other European Powers joined Britain 
in a combined act to prohibit slavery in all its forms. 
During the first half of this century the campaign reached 
its highest level. On Britain's initiative, the League of 
Nations issued an anti-slavery resolution which met with 
unanimous acceptance. In the following year a temporary 
slavery commission, formed to investigate, to gather 
information and to make recommendations, was able to prove 
that "evil is deep-seated and widespread.. " in Africa, the 
Middle East and China. This League of Nations anti-slavery 
campaign came into force a hundred years after the first 
bill for the total abolition of slavery within the British 
Empire had been passed in 1833.2 
1. Text of the British draft treaty, Appendix D. 
2. For Britain's efforts to suppress slavery see: 
Instructions concerning the search for Dhow by H. M. 
ships for slaves and arms (in the Persian Gulf and the 
Red Sea), 1931, E4368/16/91, F. O. 371/15275; Memo-on 
slavery and slave trade in the Hejaz and Nejd, 6 March, 
1930, E1541/1054/91, F. O. 371/14476; De Jong, 'Slavery 
in Arabia', The Moslem World, xxiv (1934) pp. 126-. 44; 
Harris, 'Freeing the Slaves', The Contemporary Review, 
cxxviii (1925), pp. 743-50; Newman, 'Slavery in Abyssinia', 
The Contemporary Review, cxlviii (1935) pp. 650-57; 
Lord Noel-Buxton, 'Slavery in Abyssinia', International 
Affairs, xi (1932), pp. 512-26; Harris, 'Slave Trading 
in China', The Contemporary Review, cxxxvii (1930), pp. 
174-80. 
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Although other European Powers showed less interest, 
Britain anxiously observed the Arabian slave-traffic, where 
Mecca was the largest market for the trade. But because 
slavery was permitted in Islam, Britain's anxiety to intervene 
was moderated, due to the religious aspect of the matter. 
Bond reported: 
"The practice of slavery in the Hejaz and Nejd 
presents certain distinctive features peculiar 
to this country. The conditions in Arabia are 
very different from thos: prevailing in most, if 
not all, other countries where slavery exists ... " "The Government of the country is a strong theocracy, 
and the Koranic Law recognises slavery as an 
institution, although it attempts in many ways to 
limit its extent and to provide for the welfare of 
the slaves themselves ... " 
In fact, however, there were many abuses contrary to the 
spirit of the ghari'a. Slaves were often ill-treated 
and frequently took refuge at the British Agency in Jeddah. 
Ibn Saud took no action to remedy the conditions of the 
slaves, probably because the matter affected to a great degree 
his own comfort, prestige and influence. Slavery was deeply 
rooted in the social system of Arabia and any attempt to 
challenge this system would have only resulted in a loss of 
authority. Obviously, Ibn Saud could never be expected to 
play a leading part in any abolitionist campaign. In 1926 
he recognised in principle the case for abolition, but he 
could not go beyond a statement of principle, "without 
causing much trouble and possibly a revolution" in his country. 
He had expressed the hope that change would come from events 
1. Memo-on Slavery and slave traffic in-the Hejaz-Nejd, 
6 March 1930, E1541/1054/91, F. O. 371/14476. 
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outside Arabia. If the supply of slaves was stemmed the 
whole practice would gradually die out. But even here he could 
not be expected to co-operate directly, because he could take 
no action without obtaining a fatw -a from the 'ulama' and 
they were only entitled to adjudicate on illegal slavery. 
The Foreign office appreciated Ibn Saud's difficulties and hoped 
that the King could eventually abolish the trade and gradullly 
prohibit the importation of slaves. But he wasinformed that 
the British Government "could not give up the right of 
manumission". The King who was anxious to terminate all, 
foreign privileges, indicated unwillingness to cooperate 
in any way unless the right of manumission was given up. 
l 
Although Ibn Saud's views were thus already known to 
London, the Foreign office instructed the British delegation 
to the Wadi al-Aqiq negotiations to accept no modifications 
on the British draft article which contained the two points 
metitioned above, without reference to the Secretary of State 
in person. 
2 This attitude provided no room for Jordan to 
manoeuvre given Ibn laud's insistence on maintaining his 
position regarding manumission. He argued that if he were 
to lean towards the British point of view, he could only 
admit the existing of manumission3 as a matter of agreed custom 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. O. to Jordan, 3 Nov. 1926, E6118/180/91, F. O. 371/11438. 
3. The British Agents at Jeddah had already been practicing 
manumission in the Hejaz, and Ibn Saud was aware of this. 
At least 40 slaves had been repatriated during the year 
1926. Jeddah Reps. Jan. to Nov. 1926, F. O. 371/11442. It 
also has been seen that Jordan reported some of the cases 
at which he practised manumission, See: E479/119/91, 
F. O. 371/12244; E1541/1054/9, F. O. 371/11476. 
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rather than acquired right. In that event the British 
Consular authority would be required adequately to 
compensate the owners of liberated slaves. 
' 
With 
differences unreconciled, the matter remained unresolved. 
Having concluded discussion on all the British 
points, Ibn gaud raised the following topics which were 
of particular interest to him: 
1. Recognition by Britain of his independence; 
2. The supply of arms and ammunition by Britain; 
3. Britain's co-operation to obtain for the Hejaz the 
revenues of the Awqaf al-Haramain from countries under 
British control or influence; 
4. The restoration to the Hejaz of the Hejaz Railway- 
Apart from the first point which was easily accepted, the 
other three caused long debate. 
Arms supply was one of tle main points upon which Ibn 
Saud had hoped to win Britain's support. Leaving the 
matter outside the treaty might cause him future truble 
if and when Britain thought of reimposing her arms embargo. 
On the other hand its inclusion would have a salutary effect 
upon his rivals among the Arab rulers. At the same time, 
such a provision could balance the Italian undertaking 
given to the Imam of the Yemen under the recent treaty of 
"amity and commerce". 
2 
If Britain was not willing to 
1. Jordan and Antonius to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927. 
2. See: Minutes of the 13 Jan. 1927 Conference at the C. O. 
E479/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. Ibn Saud was jealous of his 
rival the Imam of the Yemen who had succeeded in 
concluding a treaty with Italy. See Arts, 2,3 and 4 of 
the treaty, Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1928, 
pp. 307-19. (Thereafter: Survey 1928) 
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guarantee arms supply Ibn Saud requested "full liberty 
to purchase and import arms" from wherever he could. Moreover, 
Britain should also undertake to remove the embargo on such 
arms. 
l Although his demands met with sympathy and it was 
hoped that London would raise no objection, the British 
delegation was reluctant to include such a clause in the 
treaty. 
2 
The third point raised by Ibn Saud related to the 
revenues derived from certain religious endowments, known 
as "Awqaf al-Haramain", which were founded at different 
times in various Muslim countries for the specific purpose 
of providing a lasting revenue for the upkeep and improvement 
of al-Haramain. These endowments usually took the form of 
real estate property, administered from within the country 
in which it lay and the revenues of which were handed over 
to the principal ruler of the Hejaz. Ibn Saud's grievance 
was against those countries which lay under British influence 
1. See: Ibn Saud's draft treaty of 4 Dec. 1926, Annex. 5, 
E447/119/91, F. O. 371/12244; also; Minutes of the 7 Feb. 
1927 meeting at the C. O., E827/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
2. Jordan and Antoni us-, to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927. 
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such as Egypt, 
1 Palestine2 Iraq and India. They had been 
witholding the revenues in question and he wished the British 
Government to assist him in recovering them. 
3 
He for his 
part had already decided to send delegates to the Shari'a courts 
in Islamic countries to claim these revenues. If his 
endeavours proved successful, the ground would then be paved 
for the British Government to enforce the court's decisions. 
The British delegates pointed out that it was generally in 
Britain's interest to maintain a policy of non-intervention 
in matters of a religious nature such as these. Nevertheless 
they were prepared to promise that Britain would use her good 
offices whenever possible and to offer a written obligation to 
that effect provided that Ibn Saud did not insist on the 
point being mentioned in the treaty. With this he was satisfied. 
4 
1. The revenues of the Awqaf in Egypt alone as Ibn Saud's 
estimations were £E60,000 a year, and the total accumulated 
amount of the revenues of the Awqaf were estimated as over' 
£E1,000,000, See: Minutes of the 7 Feb. 1927 meeting 
at the C. O., E837/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. For Egyptian 
Awqaf, see: Gabriel Baer, 'Waqf Reform in Egypt', St. 
Antony's Papers, iv (1958) pp. 61-76. 
2. Antoni us explained to the meeting of 7 Feb. 1927 at the 
C. O. that the Awqaf which had been confiscated by the 
Ottoman Govt. before the war, 'had been bequeathed to 
subjects which had since disappeared and the Ottoman 
Govt. had, after consulting the religious authorities, 
decided to devote the revenue to educational services; 
and that in Palestine before the setting up of the Supreme 
Moslem Council, the Administration had collected the revenues 
of the Wagfs and expended them on education, but now handed 
them over entirely to the Council'. E827/119/91, 
F. O. 371/12244. 
3. Jordan and Antoniu s to Chamberlain, 26 January 1927. 
4. Minutes of the 7 Feb. 1927 meeting at the C. O., E827/119/91 
F. O. 371/12244. 
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Regarding his fourth point, Ibn gaud, acting as 
instructed by the 1926 Islamic Conference, had already demanded 
the restoration of the Hejaz Railway, including its portions 
in Palestine, Transjordan and Syria, to the Hejaz. 
The Railway, it had been argued, was the property of the 
Muslim World and the Hejaz Government had been authorised 
to assume sole responsibility for its administration. 
Ibn Saud had also requested that immediate repairs should 
be made to the line and that service throughout its length 
should be reestablished. These two requests had been 
treated separately by London. On the question of the 
restoration of the Railway to the Hejaz, Britain had 
so far refused to be drawn into any serious discussion. On 
the other hand, repairs to the Railway had been authorised 
for those portions lying in the British and French mandated 
areas conditional on Ibn Saud doing the same for the Hejazi 
portion. If he fulfilled his part of the bargain it had 
been affirmed that "the French and British Governments 
will guarantee an adequate train service as far as the 
frontier of the Hejaz to link up with whatever service His 
Majesty Ibn Saud may establish on the section under his 
control". 
1 
The British had also agreed that a meeting 
should be held between the local railway experts to 
work out arrangements for this. 
1. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) 
18 May 1926, E2946/306/91, F. O. 371/11440. 
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Now at Wadi al-Aqiq Ibn Saud repeated both his requests. 
Jordan tried to persuade him not to press the point or at 
least to treat it as a separate matter outside the treaty. 
Although he admitted the religious significance of the 
railway, Jordan stressed his Government's rejection of the 
idea that any foreign Power could administer and control a 
railway in territories under British Mandate, (a position 
also likely to be adopted by the French regarding the Syrian 
portion). In view of this argument and of the involvement 
of different parties responsible for the railway, Ibn Saud 
temporarily conceded, but, without implying acceptance of 
the 1923 Anglo -French delcaration, requested a payment of 
150,000, from the accumulated funds standing to the credit 
of the railway in Syria and Palestine in order to effect 
the repairs of his own section before the coming pilgrimage 
season. In reporting this to London Jordan stressed that 
any move by the British Government to facilitate the matter, 
"would be greatly appreciated by Ibn Saud and would also 
help to fix a de facto frontier between Transjordan and 
the Hejaz. °"1 
With no final conclusion on this point reached the 
Wadi al-Agiq negotiations were suspended on 11 December. 
The two parties were obviously in contention over the 
following issues: 
1. Memo. by Jordan, Ibn Saud's attitude vis ä vis the 
Hejaz Railway, 25 Jan. 1927, E475/475/91, F. O. 
371/12250; also Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe 
(Paris) 1 March 1927, E827/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
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1. The British special position in the mandated territories 
(art. 2. ); 
2. The "national status" clause or the Capitulatory 
rights (art. 5); 
3. Britain's right to exercise consular manumission in 
the Hejaz-Nejd (art. 7); 
4. The definition of the Hejaz-Transjordan frontier (a 
separate protocol); 
5. Slight differences about the wording of articles 3 and 4 
(pilgrims) aid 6 (the trucial states); In addition to 
the following points of in Saud's interest. 
6. Arms and ammunition supply; 
7. The collection of Awqaf al-Haramain; 
8. The restoration and up-keep of the Hejaz Railway. 
Aware of the risk that an interruption in the negotiations 
might prejudice Ibn Saud's future attitude and presently 
friendly disposition, it was nevertheless felt better to 
halt the discussions "than to conclude a treaty on 
disadvantageous conditions". Jordan thought that if a 
treaty was based on Ibn Saud's draft of 4 December the latter 
would obtain concessions which the British Government had 
never intended to grant, and Britain would surrender what was 
believed to be "a valuable position in the strategy of 
negotiations". Jordan estimated that "the task of future 
negotiations would probably have been rendered considerably 
more difficult". Admitting their failure to secure Ibn Saud's 
agreement to the British draft treaty, both Jordan and 
Antoni us recommended that a treaty with Ibn Saud "would be 
of real value if it can be concluded without the sacrifice 
of any vital British interest". From personal impressions of 
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Ibn Saud they felt able to affirm that he was "a ruler 
of undoubted ability and power, whose prestige in the 
Moslem World is visibly growing, and whose empire seems 
to be securely established ... from the Red Sea to the 
Persian Gulf". 
1 
For his part, Ibn Saud regretted the interruption of 
the negotiations but he did not lose hope of reaching an 
agreement possibly as soon as the following spring. 
2 
1. Jordan and Antonius to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. 1927. 
2. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 15 Dec. 1926, Annex 8, E477/119/91, 
F. O. 371/12244. 
The Making of the Treaty of Jeddah, the Second Phase, 
January - May 1927 
Six days after Jordan's verbal report of 13 January 
another meeting was held at the Colonial Office to consider 
the objections raised by Ibn Saud to the British draft 
treaty. The main topic was whether there was any real 
advantage to Britain in concluding a treaty "in the 
truncated form desired by Ibn Saud". Shuckburgh, the 
Chairman, wasmainly concerned about the Middle East 
Department's wish to obtain Ibn Saud's recognition of 
Britain's special position in her mandated territories 
and of the boundary between the Hejaz and Transjordan. 
In that context; Philby's recent activities gave cause 
for anxious speculation. His articles in The Near 
East and India were described by Shuckburgh as "clearly 
propaganda intended to strengthen Ibn Saud's position in 
the negotiations", and the suggestion was made "that Ibn 
Saud was probably in frequent communication with Mr. Philby 
and that the latter was advising him to take up a stiff 
attitude on all points". To yield would be to convince 
Ibn Saud that "Philby was right and that the British 
Government could always be bluffed with impunity". 
l 
There was some justice in Shuckburgh's suspicions 
about Philby's role. It was true that since his departure 
in 1924 from the Indian Civil Service, Philby had devoted 
1. Note of a meeting-held at C. O. on 13 Jan. 1927, 
E479/119/91, F. O. 371/12244. 
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many articles and lectures to defend Ibn Saud's case and 
most recently to support him in opposing Britain over the 
issues of recognising her position in the mandated territories, 
over the Capitulations,, over the Hejaz, Railway and over the 
Hejaz-Transjordan frontier. Philby seemed to be acting more 
as an adviser to Ibn Saud than as an independent critic of 
British Middle East policies. This was partly due to the 
friendly relationship between the two men and partly due to 
Philby's personal interests in the Hejaz. He had recently 
obtained a concession to start a trading company (Sharqieh 
Limited) in Jeddah. 
1 
. And this was only a first step. His 
main ambition was to win a concession for the proposed 
Jeddah-Mecca-Arafat-Mena railway and he had frequently 
discussed this project with Ibn Saud during the years following 
the conquest of Mecca. In the meanwhile Philby's presence in 
Jeddah, with apparently little to-keep him occupied, surely 
must be explained, as the Foreign and Colonial Offices 
suspected,. by the fact that he was unofficially acting as 
Ibn Saud's adviser and responsible for the latter's 
inflexible attitude. 
2 
Miss Monroe considers the Foreign Office 
suspicion of Philby as "almost certainly unfounded". 
3 
But 
Philby himself claims that "Ibn Saud put me on his very-select 
Cabinet Committee for the final vetting of the text of the 
1. See: Monroe, Philby of Arabia (London 1973) pp. 147-8; 
Oriente Modern, vii (1927), 233-4. 
2. J eddah_Report, Nov. 1926, "F. O. 361/11442. 
3. Monroe, Philby of Arabia, p. 194. 
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Jeddah Treaty before singing it; and I think I can claim 
that ... I used the opportunity 
in the interests in the 
Common weal" .1 
However justified Shuckburgh's suspicions may have 
been, Jordan, while not denying Philby's activities, 
advised that they should be ignored, claiming that he 
"... was being used by Ibn Saud as a tool". 
2 
Incidentally 
Jordan's poor opinion of Philby was fully reciprocated since 
Philby described him as "ignorant" of Arab affairs and 
Arabic. 
In an endeavour to avoid further discussion of philby's 
motives and potential role, Antonius concentrated on listing 
the advantages which would be secured by the conclusion of 
the treaty. Ibn Saud, he argued, was destined to become an 
increasing force and his position in the Middle East and in 
the Islamic World was of great importance to Britain. Therefore 
a settlement with him would counter balance both the Italian 
and Russian activities in South West Arabia. Oliphant agreed 
that a treaty with Ibn Saud would "be of increasing value 
in the future". He warned, "if we declined to conclude a 
treaty with him he might possibly turn to other quarters". 
Indeed the Foreign office was also anxious to pave the way 
for the Air ministry "to secure, in course of time, facilities 
1. Philby to Dalton, 14 April 1930 (Philby Papers) 16/1. 
2. Minutes of a meeting held at C. O. on 19 Jan 1927, E479/119/91, 
F. O. 371/12244. As early as 1925 both Jordan and Clayton 
were warned against Philby's activities and criticism of 
Britain's policy in the M. E., an act by an ex-official 
"would be impossible to excuse". F. O. to Jordan, 26 Oct. 
1925 (Clayton Papers) 471/6. 
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from Ibn Saud to enable them to develop the air route 
to Aden along the Arabian Coast of the Red Sea". The 
meeting shared the view that Ibn Saud's friendly relationship 
with Britain should be preserved and should also be paid for. 
Thus, "it was decided to recommend that the amendments 
proposed by Ibn Saud should be accepted as regards the 
preamble and Articles 1,2 and 4. " But, it was also agreed 
that 
"an effort should be made to retain Article 5 in 
the treaty, particu]aly as the wording of this 
Article would involve implicit recognition by Ibn 
Saud of the position of H. M. G. in Iraq, Palestine 
and Transjordan; and that the proposed surrender 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction ... should, if 
it were to be agregd to, be embodied in a 
separate Article. " 
As regards article 6, the India office representative 
preferred to retain the wording of the draft treaty, 
because if it was altered as suggested "might, in. Ibn 
Saud's eyes, imply that the British Government were no 
longer concerned to object to encroachment on his part, 
so long as it could be carried out under covercf friendly 
relations". Article 7 should be retained and Ibn Saud's 
modifications on article 8 should be referred to the legal 
advisers of the Foreign Office. The meeting also agreed 
that Ibn Saud was free to obtain arms supplies from wherever 
he wished and that "he should be made acquainted with the 
provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention". But his 
request to include this in the treaty was "undesirable and 
1. Ibid. 
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unnecessary". With regard to Ibn Saud's claim to 
control of the Hejaz Railway, it was agreed that Britain 
"could not agree to his control of those sections of the 
Railway which lay in Palestine and Transjordan, and it 
was most improbable that the French Government would 
agree as regards the sections in Syria". 
l 
Having finished with these discussions it was agreed 
that the next meeting should be devoted to the preparation 
of the revised draft. In the meanwhile, reports from the 
Middle East helped to confirm policy on the question of 
the Hejaz-Transjordan frontier with particular reference 
to Aqaba. 'Lord Lloyd, the High Commissioner in Cairo, and 
Lord Plumer, his colleague in Jerusalem, expressed their, 
fears that Aqaba might be given to Ibn Saud. Writing to 
2 
Chamberlain on 31 December 1926, Lloyd emphasised the 
importance of Aqaba from the viewpoint of British 
interests in Egypt. Aqaba, he argued, must remain a 
territorial barrier between Egypt and the Hejaz, because 
any direct link between these two countries would be 
dangerous for British interests in Egypt; Ibn Saud's 
ability to. control his subjects was believed to be limited, 
and it was not certain that his tribesmen could be 
restrained by him from encroachments on the Egyptian frontier. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Lord Lloyd (Cairo) to Chamberlain, 31 Dec. 1926, 
8002/33, F. O. 371/12247. 
In any case of differences with the ruler of the Hejaz 
whoever he were, diplomatic pressure "might be less easy 
to apply to a relatively inaccessble and sacred Hejaz". 
Therefore Aqaba must remain in British hands to prevent 
Egypt from being in direct contact with the potential danger 
from the Hejaz, especially since after 1922, the British 
control over Egypt itself had been weakened. Egypt's-security 
in these circumstances "would be removed by the establishment 
of Hejaz authority in the place of mandatory authority". 
Lloyd went further in stressing his point when he referred 
to the good relations which now prevailed between IbnýSaud- 
and the Wafd party contrary to King Fuad's wishes. This 
Wafd-Hejaz friendship was based on "motives of Islamic political 
solidarity", which could lead to a common anti-British policy; 
and "a common frontier would greatly facilitate their co- 
operation against us". Finally, Lloyd urged London not to 
cede to Ibn Saud "territories which he has never held". 
1 
From Jerusalem four weeks later, Lord Plumer warned 
Amery that the exclusion of Aqaba from the British Mandatory 
area "would create a very dangerous situation in the rest of 
Transjordan and be contrary to British Imperial interests". 
2 
With these indicationsof support for the Government's 
policy, the matter was referred to an interdepartmental 
meeting on 4 February 1927 for a final decision. Jordan 
1. Ibid. 
2. Lord Plumer (Jerusalem) to Amery, 27 January 1927, 
979/27, F. O. 371/12247. 
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argued that the maintenance of the status quo -would safeguard 
Aqaba for Britain and that trust could be placed in Ibn 
Saud's offer, even if he could not formally abandon his 
claims, not toýraise them again-in the near-future. The 
Air Ministry favoured this proposal and agreed to let the 
matter lie without'reference: in'the draft treaty resolving 
that "if the negotiations with Ibn Saud were to break-down, 
it was much better that they should break down over-the 
question of manumission than over that of the frontier. "1 
Britain, as'leader in`the anti-slavery campaign, could 
hardly abandon her position by remaining blind to"~the fact 
that Mecca was the"biggest slave market in the world, rand 
that slaves were being displayed in public---like merchandise. 
2 
Although both Jordan and'Antoni us warned against insistence 
on the right'of manumission in the Hejaz, as this "had-never 
been formally recognised", and it was "beyond Ibn Saud's 
power to'recognise it", the meeting insisted that the 
maintenance or omission of this cause-must be the 
responsibility, "of-a higher authority. Accordingly, 'it was 
noted that'Ibn Saud's refusal to agree to manumission if 
that clause was maintained, would'then bei-the only possible' 
reason for a breakdown in negotiations with him. 
3- 
1. Minutes'of a meeting held'at C. O. -;, 4 Feb. 1927. 'F. O. 
371/12244. 
2. Rutter, The Holy Cities of Arabia (London 1928) it pp. 133-6. 
3. Minutes, of a meeting held at C. O., 4 Feb. 1927. 
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On 13 January it had been agreed, according to Jordan's 
advice, to waive the Capitulations in the Hejaz. But on'4 
February, the issue was raised again for further discussion. 
This time it was Antonius, who reminded the meeting that 
Ibn Saud had, on his conquest of the Hejaz, issued a pro- 
clamation that he did not consider himself bound by the 
commitments of his predecessors and that he would tolerate 
no form of external interference, either by Capitulations 
or otherwise; Ibn Saud, consequently, did not ask the 
British Government to renounce the Capitulations, simply 
because he did not recognise their existance. It was 
finally agreed to drop all claim to Capitulatory rights 
but without stating this in the form of an article. That 
left the question'of disputes between British subjects in 
the Hejaz, as contrasted with those to which only one party was 
a British subject, unresolved. It was, however, agreed that the 
British Consular Officers would have latitude to intervene, 
as in the past, to secure an amicable settlement of such cases. 
In spite of remaining difference; the British policy makers 
were unanimous that a : treaty with Ibn Saud was desirable. 
Acccirdingly, two preliminary drafts were drawn up and submitted 
to the 4 February meeting. One had been prepared by the 
Colonial office and the other by Jordan. The meeting 
favoured Jordan's draft as the most useful basis for the 
next round of negotiations. 
On 7 February it was decided that these should be resumed 
with Ibn Saud as soon as possible and with every intention of 
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avoiding another failure. 
1 
With this end in view, and 
since Jordan had been associated with the first abortive 
attempt, it was recommended that Clayton should now try 
his hand at winning over Ibn Saud. Clayton, unlike Jordan, 
was Ibn Saud's personal friend, and had successfully , 
concluded two agreements with him-in. _1925. Accordingly, 
on 41 April, he was formally instructed to proceed on his 
second mission to Arabia. 
2 
Ibn Saud, who had never returned to al-Riyadh since 
the conquest of the Hejaz, decided to do so before resuming 
the next round of negotiations. The situation there was 
critical as opposition to his policy was growing and his 
-absence provided the chance for a possible plot. 
3 While 
pacifying his people, the King seized the opportunity and 
called for a meeting, with his tribal chiefs and 'ulama` 
under his father's presidency to convert the Sultanate of` 
Nejd into a Kingdom. The move aimed at ending the state of 
inferiority between the two main regions of his large country 
by putting them on an equal footing. The resolution was passed 
and accepted. Accordingly, his royal title was to be "King" 
of the Hejaz and Nejd. 
4 This move also solved for him the 
1. Minutes ofa meeting held at C. O., 7 Feb. 1927, 
F. O. 311/12244. 
2. Chamberlain . to. Clayton, 14 April 1927, E1744/119/91, F. O. 
371/12245. Philby claimed that: "it was I who asked the 
British Govt. to send Clayton to the Hejaz". Oriente 
Moderno, vii (1927), pp. 233-4. 
3. Jeddah Reps. Jan., Feb., & March 1927, F. O. 371/12250. 
4. Ibid. April 1927, F. O. 371/12250; Yasin to Mayers (Jeddah) 
4 April 1927, E1884/1328/91, F. O. 371/12251; Yasin to the 
Soviet Consul (Jeddah) 3 April, 1927, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A. 
iii, p. 216; For Arabic text to the resolution see: (Philby 
Papers) 16/4; Umm al-Qura, No. 121,8 April 1927.. Oriente 
Moderno, vii (1927), p. 172. 
problem of his status in the coming negotiations over the 
treaty. In the previous negotiations he had assumed the title 
"King of the Hejaz and Nejd" in his submissions but Jordan had 
refused to accept such a title as it did not exist. The 
King's new title approved on 2 April, was proclaimed in Jeddah 
two days later by Amir Faisal, and was recognised by the 
British Government and by other Great Powers soon after. 
1 
Now established as King in all his dominions, Ibn Saud 
travelled back across the desert to Jeddah to meet Sir Gilbert 
Clayton. 
On 15 April, accompanied by Jordan, Clayton left London. 
Antonious joined the mission at Port-Sudan. One week after 
their arrival in Jeddah, negotiations started, on 10 May, in 
the King's house. 
2 Assuring the King that Arabian affairs 
had been occupying the attention of the British Government, 
Clayton opened the negotiations by giving the King a short 
history of the events which had occured since they first met 
in 1925. In his account, Clayton briefly touched on points 
of interest to Ibn Saud, for instance, the Clayton negotiations 
1. See: Mayers (Jeddah) to Chamberlain 4 April, E1612/1328/91, 
F. O. 371/12251. British authorities in the M. E. were 
immediately instructed to use the Saudi new title see: ' 
C. O. to the High Commissioners for Palestine and Iraq, 
and to the Resident (Bushire), 13 April 1927, E1796/1328/91, 
F. O. 371/12251. 
2. Clayton to Chamberlain (i), 6 June 1927, E2582/119/91, 
F. O. rihehouse house at Kundara, 2 miles away from 
Jeddah, had been placed at the disposal of the mission 
during the negotiations. In the meanwhile, negotiations 
took place in the King's house as well as in the mission's 
house. Jeddah Rep. - May 1927, F. O. 371/12250. 
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at Rome on Anglo-Italian interests in the Red Sea which 
had ended with complete understanding between the two 
Powers to respect each other's interests in the area. The 
Rome discussions, he pointed out could in no way menace 
Hejaz-Nejd interests. Indeed, the two parties agreed to 
abstain from any interference in'Arabian internal affairs. 
' 
After this assurance, Clayton turned to discussion of the 
main points at issue. 
The, Hejaz-Transjordan frontier question proved a real 
obstacle. The two parties maintained their former positions. 
Ibn Saud's opposition to the British proposal on the matter 
stemmed from his fears of hostile Islamic reactions rather 
than personal objections. 
2 To explain this the King 
invited Clayton to a private meeting. There he stressed his 
anxiety to avoid confrontations within Arabia and with the 
Muslim'World outside while he was still engaged in consolidating 
his own position. Then, to Clayton's surprise, he appealed 
to him for advice and also undertook to act upon it. Appreciating 
the King's frankness and understanding his difficulties, 
Clayton had no wish to force his hand. He concluded that it 
would be better to negotiate. "in a spirit of real amity and 
confidence" than to take advantage of the situation in a-manner 
1. Clayton to Chamberlain (ii) 6 June 1927, E2583/119/91, 
F. O. 371/12245. For full details on Clayton's mission 
to Rome see: D. B. F. P. 1919-39, (Ser. 1A, ii, 1968) 
pp. 856-9. Italian influence in the Yemen concerned the 
Saudis' security and was one of the topics discussed 
by Amir Faisal with Chamberlain during the autumn of 
1926. See: Clayton 2 above and; D. B. F. P. 1919-39 
(Ser 1A, ii, 1968), pp. 824-6. 
2. Aqaba was the question at issue. 
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which would leave a bitter taste. 
l 
Clayton therefore advised, and it was agreed, that-the 
frontier protocol should be dropped and replaced by an 
exchange of letters. In fact the British letter was worded 
in exactly the same way as the cancelled protocol. 
2 
In 
his own letter, 
3 
Ibn Saud stated his desire to maintain 
cordial relations with the British Government and his 
acceptance of the status quo in the Aqaba and Maan district. 
As far as Ibn Saud was-concerned he had not renounced the 
claims-which he wished to preserve but had simply promised 
not to press them. - In taking this stance he was, no doubt 
encouraged by Philby who continued, as he had done in the 
past, to proclaim while in Egypt that summer that the Aqaba 
and Maan district "ought to be handed over to the Hejaz". 
4 
But, nevertheless, thanks to Clayton's flexible diplomacy, 
Britain gained the substance of what she had been seeking 
5 
to secure. 
1. Clayton to Chamberlain (i), 6 June 1927. 
2. Clayton to Ibn Saud, 19 May 1927, see Appendix F. (1) 
3. Ibn Saud to Clayton, 21 May 1927, See Appendix F. (2) 
4. J. R. May 1927, F. O. 371/12250. Philby's obctive in 
Egypt that summer aimed at obtaining a contract for 
the lighting of Jeddah from an Anglo-Egyptian Company, 
'Associated British Manufactures'. Also see: Al-Manar, 
xxvi (1925-26), pp. 471-3. 
5. When in 1936 the treaty of Jeddah was revised Ibn Saud 
maintained his claim on Aqaba, see: Cmd. 6380. See also 
letter (2) attached to the treaty of Jeddah, Appendix F. 
- 202 - 
Negotiations now shifted to Britain's insistance on 
maintaining the right of manumission as part of the treaty. 
Ibn Saud offered to cooperate in suppressing slavery 
gradually by cutting off the sources of supply, but explained 
that he could not even make a beginning without obtaining 
a fatwa. from the 'ulama'. Any immediate measures to be 
taken in the anti slavery campaign would entail serious 
social dislocation and economic damage. Appreciating these 
difficulties, Clayton agreed not to include the right of 
manumission in the body of the treaty on condition that an 
exchange of letters over the matter should taker'place. 
l 
Accordingly, the King undertook "to co-operate by all means 
at his disposal ... in the suppression of the slave trade". 
2 
In his letter on the matter, Clayton informed Ibn Saud that 
the British Government "feel it their duty to abstain at 
present from renouncing the right of manumitting slaves, 
whth has long been practised by His Majesty's Consular 
Officers ... "3 Accepting this point Ibn Saud added the 
qualification that 
1. Clayton to Chamberlain (ii), 6 June 1927. 
2. Art. 7, See Appendix F. While this article states 
general obligation, each party made its point clear in 
the exchange of letters. 
3. Clayton to Ibn Saud, 19 May 1927, See Appendix F (3). 
Later in 1936 it was agreed that H. M. G. "renounce the 
right of manumission of slaves". Cmd. 6380. 
"the British agent at Jeddah will always act in 
accordance with the spirit in which our agreement was 
arrived at, and that he will not permit any confusion 
as this might have undesirable effects on the adm n- 
istrative and economic aspects of this question". 
In effect this agreement simply maintained the status quo 
with Britain maintaining her manumission rights and Ibn 
Saud tolerating them without according any formal recognition. 
Privately he, was resolved to reopen the question at a more 
favourable opportunity. 
2 
With the status quo reaffirmed as a means of settling 
the two main problems one,. important question remained in 
suspense; mutual recognition of national status. Ibn 
Saud maintained that le could not agree to an article 
which contained any reference to the Capitulations. For 
religious as well, as political reasons he could not admit 
a privileged British position in his country, nor could he 
sign the treaty unless the jurisdiction of his courts was 
fully recognized in all cases both civil and criminal 
and in regard to foreigners as well as natives. This 
issue remained unresolved until the eve of signing the treaty. 
1. Ibn Saud to Clayton, 21 May 1927, See Appendix F(4). 
2. Philby, 'Britain and Arabia, unpublished article (Philby 
Papers) 18/9. Philby made several attempts to have the 
treaty of Jeddah 1927 revised°in'örder to satisfy Ibn 
Saud's previous observations. In 1936 
*U"-d that Britain should give some 
concessions to Ibn Saud on the questions of pilgrimages, 
manumission of slaves, arms supply and other minor issues. 
Ibn Saud described it as a matter "of life and death". 
Since his unwillingness to sign the treaty depended on this 
singe point, Clayton invited him'to submit a written 
statement to that effect. This Ibn Saud refused to do. 
Instead he eventually accepted a suggestion from a Sub- 
Committee that a supplementary sentence should be added to 
Article 5 declaring that foreigners in Ibn Saud's territories 
would not be subject to local laws and tribunals, but to 
international law. 
1 
This partly satisfied Britain's 
requirements but avoided any need for unequivocal recognition 
of national status and so partly met Ibn Saud's concern. 
It was, in fact, a compromise but on a point that Ibn Saud 
had declared there could be no compromise. 
Although outside the scope of Britain's treaty proposals 
a number of other matters, previously raised by Ibn Saud, 
were discussed, at his request, during the negotiations. 
First was the question of military supplies. Here Ibn Saud 
wished to obtain a guarantee from Britain that no embargo 
would be put on military supplies to his country. Britain 
was not prepared to give guarantees for the future or to 
include any reference to arms supply in the treaty. Instead, 
by means of an exchange of letters, Ibn Saud was informed 
that the old 
1. Clayton to Chamberlain (ii), 6 June 1927; See also 
Appendix F. 
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"embargo on the ecport of war materials to Arabia 
has been removed, and that if your Majesty should 
see fit to place orders for arms, ammunition and 
war material with British manufacturers, in 
accordance with the conditions set forth in the 
Arms Traffic Convention (1925), for the use of 
the Government of the Hejaz and Nejd, His 
Britanic Majesty's Government will not prevent 
the export thereof'or place any obstacle to 1 their importation into your Majesty's territories". 
The other two matters discussed were the Hejaz Railway 
and the Awgaf al-Haramain. Ibn Saud was unable to obtain any 
immediate satisfaction on eitherquestion but he did receive 
a promise of British cooperation in trying to resolve the 
problems. 
Once these discussions were concluded, a final draft 
of the treaty was approved and signed on 20 May 1927. 
Clayton had completed his mission. 
2 This brought to an 
end almost two years of negotiation and discussion. Credit 
was surely due to Clayton, who had first communicated Ibn 
Saud's wish to make a treaty, to the Colonial , Office, for the 
successful completion of. his latest mission. The new treaty 
was ratified on 17 September 1927. According to article 9 
on the date of ratification the treaty of 1915 was abrogated 
and Ibn Saud could. no longer be classed as one of the minor 
rulers of the Gulf. 
For Ibn Saud the signing of the treaty was the culmination 
of a long struggle to establish his authority in Arabia and 
1. Clayton to Ibn Saud, 19, May, See Appendix F-": (5)-*- This 
letter, was., dropped from the treaty in 1936, See Cmd. 6380. 
2. Clayton to Co., . 21 May 1927,, --E228,5'/1,19/91-, IS. O.. 3'71/12245. 
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to get his independence and sovereignty recognised by 
Britain as "complete and absolute" (art. 1). Theoretically 
the treaty had been made between parties equal in national 
status (arts. 2 and 5). For the first time since their 
establishment in the 16th Century the Capitulations ceased 
formally to apply in his dominions and only the Shari'a 
and International Law figured in the terms of the treaty 
(arts. 4 and 5).. Although some issues, of importance to 
Ibn Saud, remained unresolved he could be satisfied that 
Britain's dispositions were friendly and that his 
friendship was valued by Britain. 
For Britain the main advantage of the treaty was 
that it had been desired by Ibn Saud and that without it 
good relations could have been prejudiced. More specifically, 
the treaty guaranteed the saftey of British pilgrims in the 
Hejaz (art 3. ). Ibn Saud also undertook "to maintain 
friendly and peaceful relations" with the Gulf Emirates (art. 
6 ). Of some value, too, was his promise to co-operate 
with Britain in the suppression of the slave trade (art. 7). 
As for Britain's right of manumission it was neither cancelled 
according to Ibn Saud's wishes nor embodied in the treaty as 
the British had wished, but was at least protected by an 
exchange of letters. 
The Treaty thus was regarded as a successful achievement 
by both parties. Each was satisfied that the maximum, if 
any treaty at all was to be signed, had been gained. During 
the long negotiations each side had come to a better appreciation 
of mutual and conflicting interests. Some compromises 
had been made and the way to future compromises had been 
left open. The fact that agreement had been reached was 
particularly "opportune at a time when the internal 
situation in Ibn Saud's dominions was on the point of 
producing fresh outbreak of disturbance", 
' 
along the 
borders of Iraq, Kuwait and Transjordan. For both 
parties the treaty was an insurance against future 
strains which already seemed inevitable. 
1. Toynbee, survey 1928, p. 288. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Anglo-Saudi Dilemmas: The Ikhwan and the Frontier Posts, 
November 1927 - December 1928. 
- The aftermath of the Haddah and Bahrah Agreements, 
November 1925 - November 1927. 
- Anglo-Saudi Relations after the Busaiyah Incident, 
November 1927 - March 1928 
The Jeddah Negotiations, the First Round and its aftermath 
April - July 1928. 
The Jeddah Negotiations, the Second Round and its 
. aftermath, 
July - December 1928. 
The Aftermath of the Haddah and Bahrah Agreements,.. 
November 1925 - November 1927 
Between the conclusion of the Haddah and Bahrah 
Agreements and the conclusion of the Jeddah Treaty the 
situation on the frontier between Nejd and the mandated 
territories seemed quiet. Meanwhile, Ibn Saud, most of 
whose personal ambitions had been gratified by the end of 
the Hejaz war, started serious attempts at modernization 
in his vast dominions., Telephone, telegraph and cars, 
which were intended to afford better control over the 
state, were hated by the Ikhwan who regarded these modern 
machines as sihr (diabolical magic) invented by the 
devil and by the infidels. Appreciating the sudden shock 
caused to his nomadic people, the King forgave their 
hostility hoping that the passage of time could help solve 
this problem. 
Believing in the necessity for modernization, Ibn 
Saud also started to set up a new administrative system 
by recruiting well educated Arabs from Egypt, Iraq and 
Syria. The number of Syrians in particular gradually 
increased and by 1927 so did their influence. 
1 Their 
attempts inspired by Pan-Arabism to revive Ibn Saud's 
1. Chief among the Syrian advisers to'the King were Yousuf 
Yasin and Fuad Hamza. Education, Health and Army affairs 
were in the hands of Syrians. See: Oriente Moderno, 
vii (1927) pp. 375-6. 
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former ambitions to restore direct contact with Syria 
by suppressing the artificial Iraq-Transjordan corridor, 
caused anxiety in British circles even though meeting with 
no response from Ibn Saud. Mayers, the Acting British Consul, 
feared their eventual effect on the King's policy. They 
could "one day try to exert their influence to induce the 
King to support Arab claims in Palestine". 
1 For the time 
being, however, Mayers seemed confident that Ibn Saud's 
good sense and friendliness to Britain would prevail. 
Syrian influence, which troubled the British, was 
also resented by the natives of the Hejaz. They 
complained that their country was ruled by the Syrians 
and the Wahhabis of Nejd, and that they were taxed-,. for 
the benefit of Nejd. Expression of these,:. feelings emerged 
in February 1927, when notes of protest were hung on walls 
in Mecca asking "Why Syrians should rule the Hejaz,. and 
why Hejaz money should be drained by Nejd". 
2 
1. Jeddah"Report, Oct. and Nov. 1927, F. O. 371,12250. 
2-- Jeddah Report, Feb. 1927, F. O. 371/12250. The principle 
'The Hejaz is for the Hejazis' which had been proclaimed 
after the Hejaz war was practically unconsidered before 
Aug. 1927, when some 'ten Syrians holding responsible 
positions have been invited to leave the country'. 
This may have intended to satisfy the Hejazis, but it 
also definitely would have satisfied the French and 
improved relations with Britain. Jeddah Report Aug. 
1927, F. O. 371/12250. Umm al-Ours says it was the 
Syrians themselves who re-opened the question in 1927 
on basis similar to the Monroe Doctrine. Umm al-Qura 
No. 118,18 March 1927. 
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The Ikhwan, who had been deliberately directed to 
return from the Hejaz to Nejd and ordered to maintain peace 
with Iraq and Transjordan, now found themselves with no 
new worlds to conquer. They felt that Ibn Saud had prevented 
them from pursuing the 'eý had against the infidels. Even 
worse, he was himself concluding treaties with those 
mushrikin and sending his sons to tour their countries 
(Britain and Egypt). In their minds, he had allowed 
himself to be corrupted byvestern luxury and ceased to be 
a true Wahhabi. Moreover, he tolerated the presence of 
Muslim pilgrims whom they regarded as infidels and refrained 
from putting pressure on them to adopt the "Wahhabi faith". 
Since the conquest of the Hejaz the King had had to spend 
a considerable time away from Nejd and so had lost close 
contact with his Ikhwan leaders. This of course gave a chance 
for gossip to spread among the Nejd tribes about the King's 
policy. They believed that the British were dictating 
his policy for the benefit of the Western World and that 
he had sold himself and the country to them. ' In order 
to contradict these rumours, he assured them that he was 
acting according to the Shari'a and, he added: 
1. Jeddah Report, Jan., Feb. and March 1927, F. O. 371/ 
12250; see also: Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours 
(London 1956) pp. 285-7,295-6; Glubb, War in the 
Desert, An R. A. F. Frontier Campaign (London 1960) 
pp. 200-1; Iqbal, Flnergerne of Saudi Arabia, P. 170; 
'The Iraq-Nejd Frontier', Journal of the Central 
Asian Society, xvii (1930) pp. 77-92, The Times. 
3 March, 1928. 
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"I have nothing in common with the English. ' 
They are strangers to us and Christians. 
But I need the help of a Great power and ne 
British are better than the other Powers. " 
In fact, Ibn Saud realising that Britain held the key 
to the balance of power in the Middle East, was anxious, 
ever since his first official contact with the British, 
to remain on good terms with them. He was also fully aware 
of the fact that any challenge to the mandatory Power in 
Iraq and Transjordan might involve a fatal risk to his 
own position. The need to preserve British friendship and 
to avoid possible causes of friction was thus essential. 
This willingness to cooperate was reiterated in all his 
contacts with British officials. At the same time he had 
to maintain the solidaritycf his own people and their support 
for him. His attempts to win them over proved to be a vain 
hope; al-Dowaish, Ibn Hamid of 'Utaibah and Ibn Hithlin 
of 'Ujman "swore a defence alliance against Ibn Saud". 
2 
Openly, they organised a series of meetings in Nejd 
summoning in Saud to reconsider his policy. 
3 
1. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 220. See: Toynbee, 'A 
Problem of Arabian Statesmanship', Journal of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, viii (1929) 
pp. 366- 75. 
2. Dobbs, 'Note on situation in Nejd reported from 
Kuwait', 25 Nov. 1928, F. O. 371/12990; see also: 
Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 286; The 
Times, 3 and 6 March 1928. 
3. See: Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam, The Ikhwan 
of Neid and Their r Role in the Creation of the Saudi 
Kingdom, 1910-1930 (Leiden 1978) pp. 105-55. 
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It is significant. to note here that the Ikhwan 
movement now entered a new phase in its relationrwith Ibn 
Saud. Previously their views on the frontier question 
had been the same. But Ibn Saud's position, due to his 
need and desire to be on good terms with Britain, had 
since 1926 clearly changed. And this division appeared 
to be bringing Ibn Saud to the verge of confrontation 
with the Ikhwan. 
In the meanwhile, British authorities on the spot 
were fully aware of the nature of the restless nomadic 
proclivities of the beduin and of their lack of any 
permanent loyalties. This implied a constant watchfulness 
and readiness to cope with any sudden hostilities. 
Immediately after the ratification of the Bahrah Agreement 
a former British officer (J. B. Glubb) was appointed to 
organise a reconnoitering patrol to provide intelligence 
about the movements of the Ikhwan. No warning of this 
was given to Ibn Saud. The first news of British action 
in the area reached him in March 1926, when the Amir of 
Hail reported to him that Ibn al-Suwait of the Dhafir tribe 
(Iraq) accompanied by "Abu Hunik" (J. B. Glubb) had arrived 
"with tents and aeroplanes" within Nejd territory in order 
to persuade the Shammar of Nejd to migrate to Iraq. To 
Ibn Saud this seemed a clear violation of the Bahrah 
agreement. He immediately telegraphed an account of the 
situation to the British Agent, who was on a visit to 
Port-Sudan, protesting about the incursion and warning that 
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the tribes were restless and might get out of hand even 
to the point of attacking those who had entered Nejd 
without authority. 
) 
Early in the month he had stressed 
the danger of any minor incident which might provoke the 
tribes to "take : revenge" and affect "the security of 
the frontiers". 
2 
Ibn Saud's point was now well taken. Urgent messages 
passed-between Port-Sudan, Cairo, London and Baghdad, 
enquiring about the alleged violation of the frontier. No 
evidence seems to have emerged to question the accuracy 
of Ibn Saud's information about the incident. The Foreign 
Office recommended to the Colonial' Office that Dobbs should 
be h structed to "settle the matter peacefully". 
3 Ibn 
Saud, in the meanwhile, felt himself neglected by London. 
He was on bad terms with Dobbs and even, if had known of 
the instructions to Dobbs, he would not have welcomed any 
communication about the incident from that quarter. The 
only message which he does seem to have received was 
from Jordan who simply had been told "to allay the King's 
fears". 
4 
In the meanwhile, however, British operations 
1. ýoýd ýýQyJl4Sairojt 
ios 
ýin9ersýOÖarýýal9Igh 
Sä0Aý448/91, 
account had been passed by Jordan from Port Suudan 
to Cairo and then through Lord Lloyd to London. 
2. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 8 March 1926, E2071/48/91, 
F. O. 371/11434. 
3. F. O. to C. O., 31 March 1926, E2036/48/91, F. O. 371/11434. 
4. Jordan to Ibn Saud, 6 April 1926, E2619/48/91, F. O. 
3,71/11434. 
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near and. across the frontier to guard against any possible 
further Ikhwan raids continued to be pursued. 
Worried by Britain's silence, Ibn Saud frequently 
repeated his protest against frontier violation warning 
that in the circumstances he could not accept responsibility 
for any frontier incident. He emphasised that a general 
recrudescence of border raids might occur 
l. On 3 April, 
he complained to Jordan about receiving no answers either 
to his various communications on the matter or to his 
protest about other violations on the Nej3-Transjordan 
frontier. 2 He warned Jordan: 
"I am writing this letter to you to get rid of 
the responsibility of any incidents that may 
occur in future as the Arabs 03edouind 
do not bear oppression and cannot stand still 
while their properties are being plundered and 
their lives threatened ... They are able to 
take back their properties ... I was willing 
to write direct to ... Londcr to the 
serious state of affairs ." 
Ibn Saud was right to be anxious; he understood his 
people and was aware of their feelings and reactions. 
The King's fears, as well as a report on the 
frontier situation, were communicated to London on 6 April 
1. Jordan to F. O., 6 April 1926, E2247/48/91, F. O. 371/11434; 
Jeddah Report, April 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
2. See: Jordan to Ibn Saud 26 Feb. 1926; Ibn Saud to 
Jordan 3 March 1926; Jordan to Chamberlain, 5 March 
1926, E2067/48/91, F. O. 371/11434. 
3. Ibn Saud to Jordan, 3 April 1926, No. 16, F. O. 371/11434. 
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MAP TO ILLUSTRATE IKHWAN RAIDS 
Nov 1927- Feb 1928 
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The Foreign Office took serious note and became concerned 
that a matter, depending on the Colonial Office, threatened 
to disturb relations with Ibn Saud. Accordingly the 
Colonial Office was urged to issue instructions to the 
High Commissioners in Iraq and Palestine "to do all in 
their power to minimise possible causes of friction., with 
Nejd". 
1 
In the meanwhile Jordan was again instructed to 
reassure the King. The Colonial Office replied one week 
later that not only had measures been taken by the 
Government of Iraq to stop raids on Nejd, but also to 
punish those who were responsible for the previous raids. 
Similar steps were also taken by the Government of Palestine. 
2 
Among the measures which had been taken in Iraq, with 
the approval of London, was the strengthening of the 
Montafiq - Police Force. This force was intended to occupy 
the important water wells in the desert close to the 
border with Nejd "so as to exercise control over the 
movements of the Iraqi tribes and deny the wells to raiding 
parties". 
3 These measures were insufficient to prevent 
the Shammar raiders from launching their attacks on both 
Nejd and Kuwait. 
1. F. O. to C. O., 8 April 1926, E2247/48/91, F. O. 371/11434. 
2. C. O. to F. O., 15 April 1926, C8226/26, F. O. 371/11434. 
Jeddah Report, April 1926, F. O. 371/11442. 
3. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 287. 
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On 17 July 1926, Jordan communicated an early warning 
to Ibn Saud that the Shammar tribes were active, and that 
they were planning to attack Nejd from Syria and informed 
him that the Iraqi Government "declined any responsibility". 
Ibn Saud was not satisfied with this disclaimer and complained 
that the Iraqi Government was shrinking from its obligations. 
He insisted that Iraq "was certainly responsible for the 
acts of the shammar", who could only raid Nejd via Iraqi 
territory. In October, the Iraqi Government promised to "take 
active steps to prevent them crossing the frontier and 
raiding Nejd". 
1 But no details of what was intended were 
communicated to Ibn Saud. In fact, the Iraqi Government, 
in co-operation with the R. A. F., decided "to teach these 
Shammar raiders a severe lesson during their return passage 
through Iraq territory". One of their measures was the 
occupation, on 15 October 1926, of the Busaiyah wells 
near the border with Nejd, by a permanent police force of 
15 camelmen. By the end of the year it wasdecided that 
the post should be fortified to provide accommodation for the 
police detachment. The proposal was sanctioned in February 
1927.2 
By March 1927 according to Glubb, who had originally 
promised the fortification of the Busaiyah wells, 
1. 'Nejd Proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
2. 'Origin of the Busaiyah Post', Dobbs (Baghdad) to 
C. O., 8 May 1928, E2316/1/91, F. O. 371/12993; also: 
Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 191-201. 
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"Active operations were in full swing, The R. A. F. 
had established a forward headquarters at Ur, 
with advanced detachments of armoured cars a 
Busaiya and Salman, each with an R. A. F. 
Special Service Intelligence Officer. Many 
air reconnaifsances were being flown all over 
the desert. " 
A new system of Intelligence had to be established. The 
old method of collecting information about the Ikhwan 
movements ceased to be effective; merchants and travellers 
who used to come from Nejd with information halted their 
journeys for fear of being killed by the Ikhwan. Dependence 
on the R. A. F. intensive air patrolling proved to be a very 
costly way of intelligence and "had never yet succeeded". 
Glubb who had been appointed Administrative Inspector Iraq 
Southern Desert believed in the effectiveness of his 
plan which was "to organise the Iraq tribes to defend 
themselves, using the R. A. F. as a supporting arm rather 
than as a sole defensive weapon". But he met with the 
opposition of, the air staff, who 
"regarded the Iraq tribes as a useless crowd 
of civilians who were apt to obstruct operations. 
Their [air staff] first demand was for all the 
tribes to be swept out of the desert in order to 
give aircraft a clear field for their operations. 
The result had been to destroy the tribal herds for 
lack of grazing. Moreover, the morale of the 
tribes had been underlined by their being always 
ordered to run away". 
Retrospectively Glubb stressed that the chief difficulty 
-- 51 
about the air staff plan rested in the inability of pilots 
1. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 201. 
2. Ibid., pp. 202-3. 
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to distinguish between friendly and hostile tribes. 
l 
It was, as Glubb stated, 
"not easy to expound to air headquarters two 
hundred and fifty miles away over a wireless set 
which sometimes functioned and at other times 
did not. It was still less easy to explain them 
to thousands of suspicious Arabs of many different 
tribes, spread over an area nearly as large as 
England. " 
While Glubb's plan was maturing, news leaked out 
in Nejd about fortifications undertaken by Britain and 
Iraq on its northern frontier. Ibn Saud, as has been 
seen, was already meeting with criticism from his Wahhabi 
supporters which this latest news helped to magnify. 
For the-time being there was no other Ikhwan response and 
Ibn Saud himself was fully occupied in-concluding his 
treaty with Britain. By September, however, and when Iraqi 
workers had started to construct permanent buildings on the 
Busaiyah wells, Ibn Saud became seriously alarmed at 
probable Ikhwan reactions. Consequently he requested Iraq 
to stop all building on water wells "in the vicinity of 
the border". He protested to the High Commissioner 
that the construction of the Busaiyah post was contrary to 
the provisions of article 3 of the'Uqair Protocol of 2 
December 1922,3 which reads as follows: 
1. An interview with Glubb in the T. V. Programme 'Friday 
Night Saturday Morning' on 20 Feb. 1981. 
2. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 203. 
3. `Nejd proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers) 16/3; Dobbs, 
'A Short History... ', E2316/1/91, F. O. 371/12993; The 
Times, 17 Feb. 1928; Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 193-4. 
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"The two Governments Iraq and Nejd] mutually agree 
not to use the watering places and wells situated 
in the vicinity of the border for any military 
purpose, such as buiLl. ng forts on them, ayd not 
to concentrate troops in their vicinity. " 
As Dickson advised, Ibn Saud clearly had a good case. 
2 
While Ibn Saud was waiting for the High Commissioner's 
reply, Ikhwan anger exploded and they attacked the Busaiyah 
post on 5 November. Dobbs' reply, dated 27 October, reached 
Ibn Saud only after the raid had taken place. In his letter 
Dobbs tried to persuade Ibn Saud that his protest was 
groundless. As supporting evidence he enclosed photograph s 
and detailed descriptions of the post. By now, however, 
explanatiom which might have been useful if earlier conveyed 
to Ibn Saud, were irrelevant. The short period of peace 
on the frontier had clearly ended. 
3 
The appetite of the Ikhwan had been whetted and it seemed 
as though they would not be satisfied until they had conquered 
the whole of the Arabian desert and imposed their will on 
all infidels. In pursuit of their goals and in protest against 
the King's association with the infidels they launched the 
raid on Busaiyah as a deliberate challenge both to Britain and 
to Ibn Saud. The raid and its aftermath were to interrupt 
for several years any progress in the development of closer 
Anglo-Saudi relations. 
1. Text from: Documents on International Affairs (1929) p. 261. 
2. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 287. 
3. 'Nejd proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
Anglo-Saudi Relations after the Busaiyah Incident, 
November 1927 - March 1928. 
The Ikhwan raid on the Busaiyah post not only led to 
a state of chaos on the Nejd-Iraq frontier, but also involved 
Britain in military activities in the desert which broke 
with her previous tradition of avoiding clashes with the 
subject tribes of Ibn Saud. He himself was deeply distressed 
by the situation and by the lack of comprehension among the 
Ikhwan of the political significance of his own relationship 
with the British. 
The initial raid by Faisal al-Dowaish and his tribesmen 
was followed, in quick succession, by a number of further 
and serious raids. Strongly worded protests were made by 
the British Government to Ibn Saud. In reply he insisted 
that al-Dowaish and his followers had acted in defiance of 
his own instructions and that he had consequently ordered 
"a boycott of him and his associates". Furthermore, he 
had "decided to meet out severe punishment to him". But 
such a step was to be delayed until he had received an 
assurance from the Iraqi Government, whom he, held in 
part responsible for those developments, that they would 
not offer al-Dowaish a shelter as they had done before 
with other tribal leaders when Ibn. Saud had sought to 
discipline them. l 
1. Ibid; Record of Proceedings, 1st meeting 'Clayton 
Report on his mission to Ibn Saud 1928' (Thereafter:. 
'Clayton Report 1928') F. O. 371/13014; Dickson, 
Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 295; Glubb, War in the 
Desert, pp. 194,197. 
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Dissatisfaction with Ibn Saud's reply was 
evident in British and Iraqi circles. But even before his 
reply was known, London had decided to take action. 
On 14 December 1927, permission was given to the R. A. F. 
. 
in Iraq to attack the Ikhwan raiders across the Nejd border. 
Two days later the refortified post at Busaiyah was ready 
for operation. 
1 
The British decision to attack Nejdi 
subjects in their own land was a'result of numerous reports 
received from Baghdad on the disastrous situation on the 
frontier. It seemed likely that Iraqi tribes would either 
have to throw in their lot with the Ikhwan, or to evacuate 
the area "unless the Royal Air Force have the good fortune 
to get an opportunity to teach them [the Ikhwan] a severe 
lesson. "2 In recommending this course, Dobbs was in fact 
under pressure from the Iraqi Government and Iraqi tribesmen. 
The important tribe of Anizah was most seriously affected by 
the Ikhwan raids. Its Shaikh had requested the High 
Commissioner to take immediate action to protect his tribe's 
watering and grazing rights near the frontier. He suggested 
that Britain should attack the Mutair headquarters, or else 
provide Anizah with armoured cars and aeroplanes otherwise 
his tribe would be compelled to join the Ikhwan or to seek 
1. F. O. to Jakins (Jeddah) 1 Nov. 1928, E5184/3261/91, 
F. O. 371/13018; Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 194-7. 
2. Dobbs (Baghdad) to C. O., 2 Jan. 1928, E54/1/91, F. O. 371/ 
12988. See also: Joint Memo. by the Secretaries of 
State for Colonies and Air (undated) CP70/28, F. O. 
371/12990; C. O. to Clayton, 17 April 1928, F. O. 371/13014. 
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refuge in Syria with the French authorities. Confronted 
by these two possibilities, Dobbs confirmed that "all 
opinion now favours air attacks on Mutair". 
l 
Limited British military action so far had not proved 
conclusive. It was impossible for the R. A. F. to catch the 
raiders within Iraqi territory, or even to pursue them 
directly into Nejd, particularly if operations were confined, 
as presently laid down. As Dobbs pointed out: 
"our respect for frontier and treaties is not understood, 
our reason for not retaliating and punishing the Mutair 
(tribe] by dropping bombs up2n them or their villages is 
that we cannot or dare not. " 
Dobbs' proposal for retaliation, made on 2 January, crossed, 
similar instructions of the same date from London. Dobbs was 
now authorised "to take steps ... at an early date to make 
raiders understand that frontier aggression on their part 
will not be tolerated". 
3 London took the decision. 
"Whatever may be Ibn Saud's personal attitude" he was 
simply to be notified of it, and reminded of Britain's 
repsonsibility to defend her Mandates. Accordingly, in 
Iraq two advanced bases along the frontier with Nejd were 
established immediately. By 8 January they were garrisoned 
with two squadrons of aeroplanes and four armoured car sections. 
1. Dobbs to C. O., 2 Jan. 1928, E54/1/91, F. O. 371/12988. 
Although Dobbs favoured the destruction of the Mutair 
tribe, the Resident in the Gulf seemed to be interested 
only in Ibn Saud's reaction not in the tribes. See: 
Dobbs to C. O. 17 Feb. 1928, The Resident to C. O. 18 
Feb. 1928, Air 5/460. 
2. Dobbs to C. O., 2 Jan. 1928, E54/1/91, F. O. 371/12988. 
See also F. O. to Jakins (Jeddah) 1 Nov. 1928, 
E5184/3261/91, F. O. 371/13018. 
3. C. O. to Dobbs, 2 Jan. 1928, E66/1/91, F. O. 371/12988. 
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These two bases as well as the Busaiyah one were ready for 
operations with at least 18 aircraft. All Iraqi tribes were 
warned to withdraw behind the line of Busaiyah-Salman. 
On the 11th January warning leaflets were dropped in Nejd 
1 
. The establishment of 
further bases in Kuwait territory 
was also proposed as they would provide close access to the 
heart of Nejd. Dobbs was instructed to inform Ibn Saud of 
the British plan andtas asked to ensure that 
"every care should be exercised that no action is 
taken against any place which has been occupied by 
Ibn Saud's regular forces or where2His Majesty 
has re-established his authority. " 
The British plan was discussed with the Iraqi Government 
and with King Faisal who offered on 12 January to place 
Iraqi troops in the Neutral Zone from which they could 
operate as a striking force. This offer was refused by Dobbs 
for political and technical reasons. On political grounds, 
"it was perhaps unwise as it would most likely bring about 
a situation practically amounting to a state of war with Nejd". 
3 
It was agreed to operate according to the British plan which 
seemed adequate to restore the confidence of the Iraqi tribes. 
1. Dobbs to C. O., 14 Jan 1928, Air 5/460; 'Short History of 
the Ikhwan raids into Iraq', 25 Feb. 1928, F. O. 371/12989; 
Joint Memo. by Colonial Office and Air Ministry, CP70/28, 
F. O. 371/12990; Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 197-8; 
The Times, 3,6,14 and 25 Jan. 1928. Retrospectively 
Glubb in the T. V. programme 'Friday Night Saturday 
M r. ning', 20 Feb. 1981, pointed out that British authorities 
later recognized that Bedouins neither read nor write and 
that the leafiets were useless. See map p. 271A. 
2. C. O. to Dobbs, 2 Jan. 1928, E66/1/91, F. O. 371/12988; 
also: F. O. to Air Ministry 10 Jan. 1928, Air 5/460. 
3. Report on the meeting of 12 Jan. 1928, Air 5/460. 
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Once the R. A. F. started operations inside Nejd territory, a 
large number of the moderate Ikhwan joined al-Dowaish in 
protest against the British action and their own King's policy. 
Their anger was expressed by raiding Kuwait on 27 January. 
There they suffered severe losses due to a counter attack 
launched by the R. A. F. in co-operation with Kuwaiti forces. 
Aeroplanes were henceforth kept on the alert. 
1 
At this juncture, Ibn Saud bitterly protested against the 
incursions of British forces which was in contravention of 
article 6 of the Bahrah Agreement. But more serious and 
dangerous for him than the violation of the frontier was his 
fear that his tribes in accordance with their habit of riding 
with the stronger party, might turn towards the British. Then 
he would lose their allegiance and in effect their territory. 
Glubb was fully aware of Ibn Saud's cause for concern. Ibn 
Saud's prestige had depended on retaining the loyalty of his 
own tribes and on his apparent ability to "continue to steal 
ours". This prestige he could only maintain if the British 
Government "continue to appear weak". 
2 
Now, he argued, was 
the moment to take more severe punitive action against the 
raiders. In the interest of achieving security for Iraq, 
Glubb seems to have relished the prospect of clipping Ibn Saud's 
1. See: Memo (ii) by Eastern Dept., 6 March 1928, E1211/1/91 
F. O. 371/12990; 'Short history of the Ikhwan raids into 
Iraq', 25 Feb. 1928, F. O. 371/12989. For operations from 
Iraq see: R. A. F. to Air Ministry, 18,19,20,22 and 28 
Jan. 1928, Air 5/460. For operations from Kuwait see: 
R. A. F. to Air Ministry 30 Jan., 4 Feb. 1928; Dobbs to 
C. O. 31 Jan. 1928, Air 5/460. 
2. Glubb, 'Memo. on British policy', No v. 1928, E5302/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12996. 
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wings. 
Ibn Saud's private worries at Britah's show of 
strength coincided with anxiety about the angry and agitated 
state of opinion in Nejd. He felt constrained to abandon 
the measures which he had already set in motion to control 
the Ikhwan. It seemed that "his work of pacification 
had been destroyed and he could no longer control the 
feelings of his people". 
1 Britain's friendship, which he 
valued so highly, "could now apparently be preserved only 
at the cost of seriously antagonising his own people. Their 
reactions, therefore, assumed an important significance. 
No direct sources are available for a study of the 
attitudes and opinions of a tribal society like Nejd. In 
trying to assess them much therefore must depend on the 
recorded observations and public pronouncements of Ibn Saud. 
Useful information is sometimes also contained in the reports 
of British officials. At this juncture a report from 
Stonehewer-Bird, the British Agent at Jeddah, probably 
provides the best analysis of the various groups and points 
of view among the Nejdis. He suggested that public opinion 
could be divided into the following three groups: 
1. Pro-Ibn Saud elements. These formed the majority 
of Nejd and believed that the raiders acted in direct 
opposition to the King's wishes and instructions. 
2. A small anti-Ibn Saud group who believed that the 
raiders had operated unofficially at the King's 
instigation in order that he might take credit for 
the result or to disclaim responsibility as it 
suited him. 
1. C. O. to Clayton, 17 April 1928, F. O. 371/13014. 
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3. Another small anti-British group which believed that the 
frontier events were engineered by the British Government 
in thdr own interest. They argued that the British had 
expected that difficulties would arise in their future 
discussions with the Iraqi Government over a treaty by 
which military control of Iraq should remain in British 
hands. Britain, therefore, this group believed, required 
proof that the security of Iraq depended on the presence 
of British forces. Hence Britain built the Busaiyah 
post because she was sure that this would provoke an 1 
attack which could only be repulsed by British arms. 
It appears from this report that the majority of the Nejdis, 
contrary to prevailing rumours, were still loyal to Ibn Saud. 
In fact the source of these rumours seems to have been the 
Iraqi and British press, and the Iraqi press was accused of 
seeking "to sow dissension between Ibn Saud and his people". 
2 
As has been seen Stonehewer-Bird, in attempting to 
describe Nejdi attitudes, divided them into three groups. 
Their assumptions about Ibn Saud's own conduct clearly differed 
and it is worth considering which group came closest to a 
reality. 
The first group, admittedly in the majority and influenced 
by Ibn Saud's determination to preserve good relations with 
Britain and also by the Umm al-Oar 's leading articles, was 
misled into supposing that the raiders had indeed acted in 
total defiance of Ibn Saud's instructions. At least outwardly 
they continued to proclaim their loyalty to the King. What 
the majority of Ibn Saud's supporters failed to appreciate 
w äs that a rift between Ibn Saud and Faisal al-Dowaish and 
his Ikhwan followers had been gradually developing. It 
1. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1928, F. O. 371/13010. 
2. Jeddah Report, Feb. 1928, F. O. 371/13010; The Times, 
17,18,19,22,24,25 and 29 Nov., and 1,6,7 and 15 
Dec. 1927. 
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was their strict religious fanaticism which divided them 
from their ruler. Ibn Saud was a politician rather than a 
religious leader, and he ceased to call himself "Wahhabi" 
since Wahhabism began towconflict with his political 
objectives. 
The second group came closer to an understanding of 
Ibn Saud's ambivalent attitude towards the raiders. 
Ibn Saud was himself neither happy nor satisfied with the 
agreements he had concluded with the British regarding 
Iraqi boundaries in 1922 and in 1925. There also remained 
his suspicions and hatred of the Hashemites ruling in Iraq 
and Transjordan with whom, as he once said, there can be 
"no future of calm and peace". Referring to the British 
as an obstacle in the way of his ambitions, he added: 
"... if the matter was between ourselves and them 
[the Hashemites] only, it would be easy, and we 
should ... put an end to it prudently. But between 
us and them there are the British Government .. " 
It seems probable, therefore, that Ibn Saud during that 
period tacitly approved the raiding activities into Iraq 
and Transjordan, believ ing that he could nevertheless 
continue to avoid any direct clash with the British. As 
far as the particular incident of Busaiyah was concerned,. 
it seems that the Ikhwan action took Ibn Saud by surprise. 
Yet, when he learned of it he neither protestedagainst it 
nor tried to prevent subsequent raids; presumably hoping, 
1. Ibn gaud to Lord Lloyd (Cairo) 6 Dec. 1927, 
(Clayton Papers) 472/2. 
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if the enterprises were successful, that he could reap the 
benefits; if they failed, he could deny responsibility. 
In either case he could avoid being blamed by the British. 
The third group appears the furthest away from the 
truth because Britain's interests and future plans depended 
on the preservation of peace in the area. This gas important 
for the continued security of air communications, for the 
Baghdad-Haifa railway and road project, and for the building 
of a proposed oil pipeline in the desert corridor between 
Iraq and the Mediterranean. In reaching their false con- 
clusion, that Britain deliberately wanted to stir up trouble 
in order to persuade the Iraqis to sign a defensive treaty, 
this group may have been influenced by the fact that the 
building of the frontier posts was mistakenly associated, 
for instance, in an article of 20 December in The Times, 
with the making of the treaty. Actually this was a 
simple coincidence. Thus although the first part of this 
group's argument proved correct, there is no such 
evidence for the second. 
Whatever the differences in attitudes and interpretation 
between the above three groups, they were all oppsoed to 
the establishment of posts in the vicinity of thdr borders 
with Iraq, and were united in determination to take forcible 
action if the posts were not demolished. 
It wasagainst this background of angry local opinion 
that Ibn Saud endeavoured, without losing too much face, 
to moderate the temper of his own people and to avoid 
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envenoming relations with Britain. For instance, Shaikh 
Yousuf Yasin', the founder and editor of Umm al-Aura, and 
one of Ibn Saud's closest advisers, adopted a conciliatory 
tone about the posts dispute in his paper. Although he 
accused the Iraqi press "of making capital out of discontent 
of certain border tribes", he pointed out that the majority 
of the'ikhwan had remained peaceful throughout the troubles. 
He also maintained that, although.. the building of the posts 
was a_definite breach of the'Uqair protocol, Ibn Saud 
had consistently opposed their demolition by force. Yasin 
continued to follow this line in his editorials; stressing 
on 24 Feburary that al-Dowaish had acted unlawfully, and 
noting that a proclamation to that effect had been issued by 
the'Ulama of Nejd. 
1 
This conciliatory tone also emerged at official levels. 
Dr. ' Abd-Allah al-Damluji, the then director for Foreign Affairs, 
had been interviewed by Stonehexýwer-Bird '- and accepted that the 
question of the posts was "debatable". He also defended the 
position of Ibn Saud insisting that he, had-done all in his 
power to counter al-Dowaish's unlawful activities. Damluji 
was quoted as saying: "no one could seriously suspect Ibn 
Saud of having tacitly permitted the raids to take place much 
1. See: Umm al-Aura, No. 157,16 Dec., No. 138,23 Dec. 1927 
and No. 161,13 Jan., No. 163,27 Jan. No. 167,24 Feb. 
1928; Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah) to F. O. 30 Dec. 1927, 
E256/1/91, F. O. 371/12988; Jeddah Report, Dec. 1927, 
Jan and Feb. 1928, F. O. 371/13010. 
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less of having instigated them. " He added that: 
"if the authorities in Iraq had thought'fit to 
inform the King of their intention to establish 
the posts, he would have been able to allay 
the suspicions of the tribes, whereas he oily 
received information of the fait accompli. 
This endeavour to enlighten the British about Ibn Saud's 
role and the problems posed for him met with some success 
in improving their understanding. But they remained confused' 
about the complexities of Nejd politics. 
At this juncture Ibn Saud sought Britain's assistance 
in patching up his relations with Iraq and conveyed his 
own hopes that his friendly relationship with Britain would 
not be impaired by these frontier incidents. A settlement 
could be arrived at, he argued, using Damluji's proposal. 
This was that Britain should appoint a delegate to examine 
the situation, add that a conference to include Nejd, 
Iraq and Kuwait should follow. This conciliatory proposal 
was not communicated by the British Consul at Jeddah to 
London until 10 January. 
2 
London, unaware of Ibn Saud's 
gesture, had decided to act militarily against the Ikhwan 
by pursuing them into the heart of Nejd, and the operations 
were already in progress. Nevertheless, Stonehewer-Bird's 
telegram, on arrival, created hopes for a peaceful settlement 
particularly in the Foreign office where there was anxiety 
1. Jeddah Repot, Dec. 1927, F. O. 371/13010. 
2. Stonehewer-Bird to F. O., 10 Jan. 1928, E164/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12988; 'Nejd Proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers) 
16/3. 
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about the unfortunate consequences for relations with Ibn 
Saud which must result from bombing his subjects and 
territories. The Foreign office therefore at once repeated 
an earlier invitation to Ibn Saud to meet the Resident in 
the Gulf (Haworth) to discuss a peace plan, while reminding 
Ibn Saud of Britain's "very definite responsibility in 
respect of [the defence of] Iraq". Because of this 
obligation, the Foreign office pointed out, punitive action 
against the Ikhwan raiders was "justified and inevitable". 
' 
Ibn Saud who had asked for the appointment of a special 
delegate and who mistrusted the Resident, rejected this 
offer "owing to various obstacles including the violation 
of the frontier .. "2 
In the meanwhile, the London authorities had become 
increasingly aware of Ibn Saud's "extraordinarily difficult" 
position. The majority of the Ikhwan seemed to be in open 
revolt. This, it was argued, could justify Britain's 
punitive actions and might even assist Ibn Saud. 
3 In 
fact there was no clear picture of how far Ibn Saud should 
be held responsible for Ikhwan actions and about his own 
present relationship with their leaders. Confusion was 
magnified by rumours and counter rumours that the Ikhwan 
were in revolt against their King. Dobbs admitted that the 
4 
1. F. O. to Stonehewer-Bird, 13 Jan. 1928, E164/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12988. 
2. 'Nejd Proposed Green Book`(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
3. C. O. to F. O., 4 Feb. 1928, E573/1/91, F. O. 371/12988. 
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construction of posts had caused this state of chaos. " 
Haworth doubted Ibn Saud's ability to'impose control 
on the Ikhwan who had formed the original basis of his 
own power'and suggested that Ibn Saud was being forced 
to reflect tribal opinions against his own will. 
' These 
conclusions'were not shared by the Shaikh of Bahrain 
who believed that Ibn Saud could re-establish control over 
all his tribes if and when he liked. The Shaikh argued that: 
"Ibn Saud was in a position to control all the 
Ikhwan Chiefs owing to his possession of stores 
and money, arms and-amunition, and that his 
inactivity could only mean that he was behind 
them. " 
This point of view was also, rather naturally, the 
prevalent one in Iraq. According to Dickson, the general 
opinion among those bedouin best able to judge was that: 
"Ibn-Saud would soon re-establish his ascendancy 
in the desert, but that he would do it by peaceful 
means, as it would be unwise to punish the Mutair .. "3 
This was correct. Ibn Saud was concerned to avoid a 
civil war and anxious to preserve both the unity of 
his country and the confidence of Britain. The difficulties 
into which this had led him coinciding with British violation 
1. Haworth (Bushire) to C. O., 2 Jan. 1928, E77/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12988. 
2. Memo. (ii) by Eastern Dept., 6 March 1928, 
E1211/1/91, F. O. 371/12990. 
3. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 289. 
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of the frontiers, made him angry. He was rendered even 
more bitter by his presumed failure to restrain or punish 
the rebels. 
1 
Having consulted other departments, the Colonial 
Office decided to give Ibn-Saud another chance to regain 
control of the situation. That decision was communicated 
by Amery to the British authorities in the Middle East 
in the following telegram: - 
"... on the political grounds, I am strongly averse 
from establishment of air base in Nejd territory 
or indeed to any extension of present punitive 
operations ... permission to extend operations over 
Nejd territory was given because it ... -was 
necessary in order to restore confidence among 
wavering Iraq border tribes. It appears ... that 
this object has now been achieved, and I consider 
that time has now come to hold our hand in order 
to give Ibn Saud. an opportunity to re-establish 
control himself ... Ibn Saud should not be driven 
into the position where he has to choose between 
permanently antagonising his own people or coming 
out into the open as enemy of Great Britain. Nor 
is it in our interest that he should suffer any 
severe diminution of his authority in Nejd. " 
" We must not overlook the possibility of Faisal 
attempting to manoeuvre us into the position in which 
our aeroplanes become the in2trument of his personal 
hostility towards Ibn Saud. " 
In conclusion Amery instructed the Resident in the Gulf 
to inform Ibn Saud that the British Government 
1. Memo. (ii) by Eastern Dept., 6 March 1928 E1211/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12990; Glubb, 'Memo. on British Policy', 
Nov. 1928, E5302/1/91, F. O. 371/12996. 
2. Amery to High Commissioner (Iraq) and to the Resident 
(Bushire) 22 Feb. 1928, F. O. 371/12989. For Britain's 
reservation not to establish permanent bases in Kuwait, 
see: C. O. to the Resident (Bushire) 21 Feb. 1928, 
Air 5/460. For Dobbs' anxiety to take major steps 
against Ikhwan incursions, see: Dobbs to c. o., 
22 Feb. _1922, Air 5/460. 
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"have no desire to take any action which would 
make it more difficult for him to punish the Mutair ... 
but ... so long as these tribesmen were admittedly out 
of control, His Majesty's Government clearly could 
not remain passive ... " 
He repeated the old invitation to Ibn Saud-to meet the 
Resident in the Gulf because with such a meeting "all 
difficulties might speedily be removed". 
This moderate attitude was taken after careful con- 
sideration of various questions. Among these was, of 
course, Ibn Saud's appeal for a peaceful settlement,. 
and the fear that too much pressure might ultimately drive 
him into the camp of the Ikhwan. But most important . 
for Britainfs Imperial policy was the Islamic reaction 
outside Arabia itself. As the Viceroy telegraphed the 
India office on 21 February : 
"Apart from danger of alienating Ibn Saud, we 
are perturbed by probable reactions on Muslim 
feeling of any extension of bombing into 
Jazirat-al-Arab. " 
The Government of India, unlike the British authorities 
in the Middle East, recognised the grave consequences 
of pursuing the policy of bombing Nejd territory. This 
is obvious in the Resident's letter of 18 February to 
the Colonial Office: 
"The only matter to be considered is Ibn Saud 
and not the local tribes. In my opinion the 
tribes are a side issue and even then they 2 
only affect local rather than Imperial Policy. " 
1. Viceroy to I. O:, 21 Feb. 1928, Air 5/460. See also: 
The Times, 22,23 and 28 Feb. 1928. 
2. The Resident. (Bushire) to C. O., 18 Feb. 1928, 
Air 5/460. 
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A short'period of calm, full of intense diplomatic 
activity, followed as a result of London's conciliatory 
decision. But Londonfpolicy was'-not without its critics. 
In Glubb's view, London had'decided wrongly. He thought that 
his own task had been made harder and that, instead of 
ensuring peace of even preventing raids further troubles 
would be created. He blamed his government for this truce 
which the Ikhwan could exploit. Glubb's point of view, 
based on a purely military appraisal, was a narrow one. 
He took no account of the wider political implications 
which were involved. London, on the other hand, had come 
fully to appreciate the importance of Ibn Saud's role in 
Middle Eastern affairs. The preservation of good Anglo- 
Saudi relations and the protection of Ibn Saud were the 
main objectives. Therefore, Britain feared. the possibility 
of pushing the tribes so hard that they would turn against 
Ibn Saud himself. As minuted by the Foreign office "... it 
is quite definitely not in our interests that Ibn Saud 
should fall and Central Arabia and the Hejaz relapse into 
chaos". 
' 
Pursuing the policy now agreed the Foreign Office yet 
again proposed that Ibn Saud should meet Haworth. 
This he still rejected but instead suggested that he should 
send Hafez Wahba to Kuwait for discussion with Dobbs. 
2 
1. F. O. minutes, 12 Nov. 1928. See also: Glub, 'Memou 
on British Policy', Nov. 1928, F. O. 371/12996. 
2. Stonehewer-Bird to Chamberlain, 10 Feb. 1928, E995/12989. 
See Hafez Wabba's comments in Cairo after his return from Kuwait, Oriente Moderno, viii (1928) p. 64. 
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Soon afterwards that meeting took place but no agreement 
was reached. Wahba reported to the King that Dobbs had 
insisted that it was impossible to dismantle the posts 
and that Dobbs' understanding of-the terms of the 'Ugair 
protocol was completely different to theirs. Leaving 
aside differences-of interpretation about the protocol, 
Dobbs suggested British arbitration on the issue. A similar 
proposal had previously been rejected by Ibn Saud and he 
maintained his objection. In a letter to Stonehewer-Bird 
he appealed to Britain to remove the main obstacle in 
the way ofýgood understanding, namely the posts, and 
explained that otherwise he must be faced with two equally 
dangerous alternatives; 
if the situation-: remains the same, we shall have 
either to rise up and fight against all the people 
of Nejd to silence them ... or to fall into a great 
dispute with the British Government. " 
He then expounded at length his fears that Iraq might harbour 
the raiders if or when they asked for refuge. Ibn Saud's 
purpose in raising this issue seems to have been simply to 
impress Britain with the difficulties which he might encounter 
if he attempted any punitive measures at this stage against 
al-Dowaish. In reality he was determined to avoid any 
such action until the posts were demolished. 
Somewhat unkindly Dobbs offered the following 
explanation for Ibn Saud's loss of authority 
1. Ibn Saud to Stonehewer-Bird (undated) E995/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12989. 
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"As soon as [he] had to pause and consolidate 
and forbid raids, his power waned, because it hid 
been nourished only on fanaticism and plunder. " 
Dobbs, in the circumstances, doubted Ibn Saud's capacity 
to fulfil promises and, obviously anxious to avoid further 
confrontation between the Ikhwan and the Iraqi forces, 
suggested a new balance of forces in the desert struggle. 
According to Dobbs' plan,. Ibn Saud should be advised to 
turn to Harb, one of his loyal tribes., to join him against 
his opponents from Mutair, 'Ujman-and'Utaibah. The 
proposal simply meant a civil war. Dobbs admitted that if 
Ibn Saud rejected such-a course or even worse, if he was 
forced to link with the Ikhwan in a Holy War, Britain would 
have to undertake further military-measures to defend Iraq. 
An army of thirty or forty thousand would be required. 
Furthermore, a new base in Kuwait would be essential. 
This latest proposal was expected to be endorsed by the 
Shaikh of Kuwait who had expressed gratitude for the former 
punitive actions against the Ikhwan seeking to take refuge 
in his territories. The Shaikh had indicated that he would 
appreciate and welcome the R. A. F. operations from Kuwait. 
2 
There is no sign that the Colonial Office gave any 
encouragement to Dobbs' notion of promoting a civil war in Nejd, 
but the R. A. F. was authorised on 17 February to operate from 
1. Dobbs, 'Note on the situation in Nejd reported from 
Kuwait', 25 Feb. 1928, F. O. ' 371/12990. 
2. See: The Resident (Bushire) to C. O., 9 Feb.; C. O. to 
the Resident, 10 Feb.; Dobbs to C. O. 25 Feb. 1928, 
Air 5/460. 
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Kuwait territory, and defensive-measures were taken around 
the-town of Kuwait. H. M. S. Emerald was directed to 
Kuwait Bay soon afterwards. Similarly, preparations to 
meet all possibilities continued in Iraq.. An armoured 
train was stationed on the route between the hinterland 
and the advanced bases. 
1 Even these steps seemed inadequate 
to Dobbs to meet the Ikhwan; threat. He began-to think in 
terms of destroying their power altogether and proposed 
blockade-tactics as used by Mohammad_Ali a century before 
against the early-Wahhabis. 
"... Central Arabia, he wrote, "cannot. feed-itself, 
and if the Ikhwan tribes starve within a ring fence 
and cannot. burst out, they will in the end be forced 
to fight among themselves for the food remaining 
inside. Then . comes the opportunity for Ibn Saud 
or some other sane person to recover control. " 
Dobbs plan to starve the Ikhwan alarmed London and was 
totally rejected. 
3 Clearly it would have entailed abandonment 
of the policy of refraining from provocation of the Ikhwan 
in the interest of consolidating Ibn Saud's position. 
1. See: F. O. to Air Ministry 10 Jan. C. O. to the 
Resident (Bushire) 10 Feb. 1928, Air 5/460. The Resident's 
worries about having Kuwait involved in the troubles remained. 
The Resident to C. O. 13 Feb. 1928, Air 5/460; C. O. 
to the High Commissioner (Jerusalem), 9 March 1928, 
E1328/1/91, F. O. 371/12990; Glubb, War in the Desert, 
p. 198, The Times, 18,21 and 28 Feb., and 3,5 and 
13 March 1928. 
2. Dobbs, 'Note on the situation in Nejd reported from 
Kuwait`, 25 Feb. 1928, F. O. 371/12990. 
3. C. O. to Clayton 17 April 1928, F. O. 371/13014. 
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The Resident in the Gulf thought of solving the 
problem differently by-sending to Ibn Saud an`informal 
emissary to request a clarification of his position;, then 
"We shall know at any rate what Ibn Saud has to say". 
l 
This plan coincided with Ibn Saud's second initiative for 
peace. 
At the beginning of March, London received a telegram 
from Lord Lloyd containing a new hope for peaceful 
negotiations. He reported that Shaikh'Hafez Wahba had 
contacted him in Cairo and had suggested that if Iraq 
agreed to destroy the posts negotiations would start between 
Nejd and-Iraq immediately afterwards. Wahba stressed that 
only in these circumstances would Ibn Saud be able to control 
his people. 
2 The Foreign Office welcomed Wahba's 
initiative and suggested to the Colonial office, on 2 March, 
that the concurrence of both_. the High Commissioner and the 
Government of Iraq should-be obtained. Asýregards the posts, 
however, the, Foreign office maintained Britain's traditional 
attitude that the posts were not fortifications, but "only 
an intelligence centre" established-to: meet Ibn Saud's 
complaints of raids against his country. 
3 
While efforts continued to find a solution, rumours 
also continued further to complicate the situation. On 6 
1. The Resident (Bushire)"to C. O., 1 March 1928, Air 5/460. 
2. Lord Lloyd-,, (Cairo) 29 Feb 1928, E1079/1/91, F. O. 371/12989. 
3. F. O. Minutes, 29 Feb. 1928, E1079/1/91, F. O. 371/12989. 
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March The Times published an article describing the 
critical situätion'in Arabia. Ibn Saud, it was said: 
"has been forced to abandon his efforts to run with the 
hare and hunt with the hounds ... [. He] called [fora 
a meeting at'Ja]]= Riyadh ... of the chief leaders 
of his realm including ... Faisal al-Dowaish .. 
[At the meeting] he had-come to accept their point 
of view, seeing that all grounds, except the sword, 
were useless with the Mushrekin, or infidels of 
Iraq, Kuwait and Transjordan ... [He] assured the 
chiefs that they could depend on-receiving his support, 
and as having given the rifles, ammunition, provisions, 
and tents, with the 'go forth, Allah will be with you'. "1 
The article caused renewed confusion in-British Government 
circles. It was followed by another rumour that Ibn Saud, 
powerless to prevent the iehad movement, had been forced 
to associate himself'with it. '' All these were in fact no 
more than rumours, and The Times later recognised this fact 
when it described the situation as obscure and asked its 
readers to treat cautiously the news about Ibn Saud's 
relations with Britain. 
2. In the meantime, Dobbs described 
Ibn Saud's joining the movement as a "fairy tale". 
3 The 
fact was that Ibn Saud was genuinely seeking peace and he 
was trying to win over the tribes to prevent them from 
joining al-Dowaish. 
4 This was confirmed when Hafez Wahba 
again approached Lord Lloyd in Cairo in March. Wahba tried 
1. The Times, 6 March 1928. 
2. The Times, 7 and 12 March 1928. 
3. The Times, 13 March 1928. 
4. Umm al-Aura, No. 174,13 April 1928. 
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once more to gain Lloyds support for the concessions 
required by Ibn Saud on the posts question. In return, 
Ibn Saud offered a promise of a strict control over his 
people. Wahba seems to have convinced Lloyd who reported: 
"Any general Arab cortrontation against us is 
going to embarrass us seriously in Egypt and 
elsewhere throughout the Middle East. It would 
therefore appear justifiable that such concession 
would obviate such situation, but actual implementation 
of these assurances could of course only be made 
after Ibn Saud had fulfilled his part of bargain. " 
At these March meetings in Cairo Wahba proposed that 
a communige should be issued to Ibn Saud via Bahrain 
formally inviting negotiations. If Ibn Saud could produce 
this evidence of Britain's good will he would feel in a 
strong enough position to order the tribes to suspend 
their raids pending the outcome of the negotiations. Wahba 
then suggested that-the communige should be drafted as follows: 
"His Majesty's Government have taken into 
sympathetic consideration your Majesty's various 
complaints and suggestions about recent 
difficulties in connection with Iraq and 
Transjordania. His Majesty's Government think 
these questions cannot be satisfactorily discussed 
by letter and they, therefore, suggest that your 
Majesty should receive as soon as possible at 
Jeddah Sir G. Clayton who will be delegated by 
His Majesty's Government to examine with your Majesty 
in friendliest spirit all matters in dispute and to 
make every effort to arrive at2a settlement 
satisfactory to your Majesty. " 
1. Lord Lloyd (Cairo) to F. O., 8 March 1928, Air 5/460. 
2. Lord Lloyd (Cairo) to P. O., 12 March 1928, E1320/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12990. 
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Wahba's approach met with a favourable response 
in London. Consequently King Faisal's proposal for 
launching counter-attacks by larger Iraqi tribes 
against Nejd was rejected. On 15 March Ibn Saud 
was advised that H. M. G.: 
"are"prepared to despatch immediately Sir 
Gilbert Clayton to discuss al} outstanding 
questions with your Majesty. " 
By the end of March Glubb reported that'he had the 
situation in hand and that the frontier tribes were 
under control. The propsect of successful-negotiations 
was thereby improved. 
2 I 
-, -I 
1. F. O. to Stonehewer-Bird, 15 March 1928, Air 5/460. 
2. CAB 16(28), 23/57,28 March 1928. 
The Jeddah Negotiations, The First Round and its aftermath, 
April - July 1928 
Clayton was instructed formally on 17 April 1928 to 
start immediately on a new mission to Ibn Saud aimed 
at ending the critical situation on the Nejd northern 
borders and at restoring peace with his neighbours.: Fully 
authorised--- by London and Baghdad to negotiate with Ibn 
Saud, Clayton was provided with all the essential documents 
and assisted by a number of British Middle East officials. 
These included K. Cornwallis, the adviser to the Iraqi 
Ministry of Interior, who was chosen partly for. his wide 
knowledge of Iraqi internal affairs but mainly to establish 
future liaison with Ibn Saud. There was also J. B. Glubb, 
the Administrative Inspector of the Iraq's Southern desert 
and the mastermind of the Police Posts policy in the vicinity 
of Iraq's border with Nejd. This choice was made because 
of his familiarity with every aspect of the desert and of 
tribal customs. George Antonius , both as an interpreter 
and as an expert in Arab politics, was also, as a matter 
of course, included. As an adviser on technical questions 
Flight-Lieutenant G. M. Moore, who was familiar with the 
local tribal situation, also joined the mission. ' 
1. C. O. to Dobbs, 14 April 1928, E2046/1/91, F. O. 371/12993; 
Abd al-Muhsin al-Sadun (Iraqi Prime Minister) to Dobbs, 
21 April 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/3, also: E2632/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13013; C. O. to F. O. 3 May 1928, E2321/2068/91, 
C. O. to F. O. 16 May 1928, E2614/2068, F. O. 371/13013; 
Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 209. 
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On the eve of Clayton's departure from London stone-hewer- 
Bird was authorised to inform Ibn Saud that the negotiations 
would be conducted by the British on behalf of 'Iraq and 
that, therefore, -there would be-no Iraqi representation. 
' 
Having made earnest attempts at al-Riyadh to reconcile 
the Ikhwan leaders pending his negotiations with the British, 
Ibn Saud crossed the desert to the Hejaz. He arrived-at 
al-Madinah on 2 May. On the same day the British mission 
arrived at Jeddah. The mission was received by Ibn Saud's 
advisers, none of whom were either Nejdis or Hejazis. 
2 
According to Glubb "the atmosphere-of Jidda was cosmopolitan 
with flavour of Egypt, and there was a considerable colony 
of Europeans. There was certainly nothing to suggest Nejd 
or bedouins". On 7 May, Ibn Saud welcomed the mission 
3 
and it was decided to start negotiations on the following day. 
The attitudes of the parties concerned at the start 
of the negotiations maybe defined as follows. Ibn Saud, 
for his part approached the negotiations in an inflexible 
frame of mind. While prepared to accept responsibility for 
protecting Iraq's frontiers from his own tribesmen, he 
had decided to lay down the following conditions: - 
l. F. O. to Stonehewer-Bird, -18 April 1928, --E2019/l/91, 
F. O. 371/12993; C. O. to. Dobbs, 14 April 1928, E2046/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12993; C. O. to F. O., 3 May 1928, E2321/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13013. 
2. Stonehewer-Bird to P. O., 2 May 1928, E2306/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13013; -Jeddah Report, May 1928, F. O., 371/13010. 
3. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 209. 
- 246 - 
1. The'Ugair protocol should be honoured and the 
Busaiyah post-should be demolished, no other 
being built in the vicinity of the borders. 
2. A mutual undertaking by Iraq and Nejd to give no 
shelter to any criminals should be established. 
3. No British official should interfere in border 
tribal affairs. 
r 
4. Those who were responsible for the latest troubles 
on the frontier should be punished. 
Ibn Saud was mainly concerned with the first two points 
upon which his political-career depended. 
The Iraqi council of Ministers also held a fixed 
attitude about which Clayton was fully aware. The 
Busaiyah post, it was argued, was not built to control 
Nejd but to, protect it from the Shammar raids, and 
could not therefore be demolished. On the other hand, the 
right should be reserved to Iraq to take whatever steps 
might be necessary` within the limits of International 
conventions. Furthermore, any prospective settlement to 
the frontier dispute had to contain Ibn Saud'. s agreement 
to renounce his former claims and to punish those who took 
part either in the raid on Busaiyah or in its aftermath. 
As a possible solution, the Iraqi Government suggested that 
a joint post should be established by Iraq and Nejd in the 
1. These conditions had been suggested by him in March 
and now repeated. Thus between March and May no change 
had occured in Ibn Saud's attitude. See: Ibn Saud 
to the Political Resident. (Bushire) 8 March 1928, 
E2089/1/91, F. O. 371/12993; 'Nejd proposed Green Book', 
(Philby Papers) 16/3; Dickson, Kuwait and Her 
Neighbours, p. 294; Glubb, War in the Desert. p. 213. 
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neutral zone. Finally, --Iraq emphasised the importance 
of article 4 of the Bahrah agreement by which both Iraq 
and Nejd undertook "to stand in the way" of emigration of 
any tribe from one side to the other, and to abstain from 
offering- asylum to any refugee. 
1 
The British, too, had their own interests to protect. 
According to Colonial Office instructions to Clayton, 
"His Majesty's Government are not prepared to admit 
that the 'Iraq Government, in constructing these 
posts, acted otherwise than in full accord with their 
treaty obligations; nor are they prepared to agree 
to the demolition of any of these posts. It should 
be realised that the interest of His Majesty's Government 
in the maintenance of these. posts does not arise solely 
out of their responsibility for the defence of 'Iraq. 
It is of the utmost importance for His Majesty's 
Government to ensure the preservation of the authority 
of the 'Iraq Government in the corridor connecting 
'Iraq and Trans-Jordan. If Akhwan influence were 
allowed to penetrate into this area, the projects 
of a pipe line and a railway from Haifa to Baghdad, 
to which His Majesty's Government attach considerable 
importance, would become impracticable. The only 
apparent means of securing the maintenance of 'Iraq 
authority in this area is by a chain of posts such 
as those which have been established by the 'Iraq 
Government, and to which King Ibn Saud takes such 
a strong exception. You will see, therefore, that 
Imperial as well as local issues are involved. 
Consequently, a solution on the lines proposed by 
King Ibn Saud is unacceptable, and it remains to 
consider what other measures can be taken in order 
to provide a satisfactory settlement of the matters 
in dispute, and one which will offer good prospects 
of the cessation of further raiding and the establishment 
of settled conditions on the 'Iraq-Nejd frontier. " 
1. Ministry of Interior (Iraq) to the Iraqi Council of 
Ministers, 17 April 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/3; 
See also: Oriente Moderno, viii (1928) p. 414. 
2. C. O. to Clayton, 17 April 1928, No. C. 59092/28, Appendix 
to Clayton Report on his mission to Ibn Saud, April - June 1928, F. O. 371/13014. (Thereafter contract to: 
'Clayton Report, April-June 1928'). 
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Thus while the British and the Iraqis agreed that the posts 
were legal and should not be demolished, -Ibn Saud thought 
otherwise. 
When negotiations started, Ibn Saud laid all his cards 
on the table in-a private audience with Clayton. In the 
first place, Britain's friendship was essential for him 
and he would be loth to lose it. But the security of his 
land, his people and his regime were, of equal importance. 
Posts established by a hostile regime in the vicinity of 
the frontiers could not be agreed upon because their 
existence had-agitated his followers who now needed calming. 
While taking the-responsibility to maintain harmony between 
home and foreign affairs on his own shoulders, British 
authorities in Baghdad and Jerusalem, he thought, were 
"too prone to believe inaccurate reports spread with- 
mischievous intent by self-interested persons", 
l 
and were 
supporting his enemy`s views. 
The question of the posts proved a stumbling block 
on the way to an agreement. The King, relying on his own 
understanding of article 3 of the 'Uqair Protocol (which 
prevented Nejd and Iraq from fortifying any wells in the 
"vicinity" of the border), rejected the establishment of 
posts on the Iraqi side. He maintained that the article 
in question was originally designed to help him accept the 
1. Record of proceedings, 1st meeting, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928., F. O. 371/13014; 'Nejd Proposed Green 
Book'(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
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"artificial frontier" which had been drawn up by the 
Mohammarah -convention. 
) By stipulating that every 
water-point on either side of the frontier should--, always 
be left free of access, it had been-intended to meet his 
own objection about strict delimitation of frontiers in 
a desert country. Therefore, it was impossible for either 
him or his people "to consent; to the erection of posts in 
the desert". 
2 Holding thus, to his position he then 
repeated conditions previously defined for any settlement. 
3 
Answering the King's argument, Clayton explained that 
the measures taken on the Iraqi side had been approved 
of and in some cases initiated by-London; and "consequently, 
the responsibility for [taking] these measures was fully 
shouldered by His Majesty's Government". 
4 Clayton's 
reply left no room for Ibn Saud to manoeuvre. He had 
either to change his position or to risk breaking his 
friendly relationship with Britain. Faced with no acceptable 
-1- 
1. With his refusal to ratify the Mohammarah Convention, 
Ibn Saud found himself facing the most difficult choice, 
either to break with Britain or to consent to a frontier 
which violated the established nomadic customs of his 
country. See Chapter 1 above pp. 70 ff; also: Clayton 
(Jeddah)- to Plumer (Jerusalem) 18 May 1928 (Clayton 
Papers) 472/5; Documents on International Affairs (1929) 
pp. 260-3. 
2. Record of Proceedings, 1st meeting, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014;, Cox (Baghdad) 
to Chackbourgh (C. O. ) 25 July 1928, C. O. 372/33. 
3. See pp. 245-46 above. 
4. Record of Proceedings, 2nd meeting, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014" 
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alternative, Ibn Saud concentrated on the meaning of the 
Arabic expression "ala atraf al-hudud", (in the vicinity 
of the border), according to the Arabic text of article 3 
of the 'Uqair Protocol. Clayton felt that Ibn Saud was 
reading into these words far more than had originally 
been intended. Although the post in question was about 
75'miles from the frontier, Ibn Saud maintained that the 
object of article 3 was "to prevent the erection of 
fortified posts at any of the wells situated in the open 
desert on either side of the frontier and at any distance". 
This interpretation the British tried without success to 
erase from his mind by making a clear explanation of the 
meaning of the words in dispute. Attempting to. remove any 
element of ambiguity Clayton suggested that a distance of 
25 miles should be the basis for discussion, or otherwise 
certain wells on each side should be designated as ones 
at which no post might be established. 
l Ibn Saud rejected 
both these attempts to define the original wording. As he 
later stated: "we take the'treaties in their obvious 
meaning namely that all the territory in which there are 
wells and pastures belong to the frontier and therefore 
forts should not be built therein either by us or by Iraq". 
2 
1. C. O. to Clayton, 17 April 1928, Appendix 'Clayton 
Report, April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014; "F. O. to 
Jakins (Jeddah)- 1 Nov. 1928, E5184/3261/91, F. O. 
371/13018. Philby while supporting Ibn Saud's 
understanding to the article in question criticized 
Britain's attitude when he wrote to The Near East and 
India, "Today the British Government proposes a zone, 
where buildings shall be prohibited, of 25 miles. Does 
this not represent a restriction of Iraq to administer 
itS own desert in its own way? ". Oriente Moderno, viii (1928) p. 480. 
2. 'Nejd Proposed Green Book`(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
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Clayton, who could find no evidence in British 
records to counter Ibn Saud's argument that the article 
in question was made as a concession to obtain his sanction 
to the Mchammarah treaty (to which the 'Uqair protocol was 
appended), found himself at a disadvantage and privately 
confessed that it was very difficult for him to question 
Ibn Saud's case. ' As he wrote to the Colonial Office 
"On one point, however, Ibn Saud appears to have 
some justification for his somewhat sweeping inter- 
pretation of the phrase 'in the vicinity of the 
frontier'. In the Arabic text the corresponding phrase 
is 'äla atraf al-hudud', and I am informed on reliable 
authority that this Arabic expression is capable of a 
wider application than its English counterpart. Ala 
atraf means literally 'on the sides of',, or 'at the 
extremities of'; and I am creditably informed that, 
to the Arab reader who has no English, the phrase 
might and probably would convey a wider connotation 
than can reasonably be read into the English phrase. 
It should be noted, moreover, that no provision is 
made in the Muhammarah Convention or in either of 
the two protocols for priority to be given to the 
English text, in case of Divergence between the English 
and the Arabic versions". 
Ibn Saud's understanding of article 3 remained unshakable. 
Glubb quoted him as dramatically saying: 
"At 'Uqair I understand from Cökus [Cox] that the 
protocol meant no forts in. the desert. Now you say 
that the wording of the agreement d2es not mean that. 
How do I know? I am a bedouin ... " 
Cox, who had represented both Britian and Iraq in 
those discussions, was contacted. Replying on 25 July, 
1. Clayton to C. O. 10 July 1928, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014; Clayton to Plumer, 
18 May 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/5. 
2. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 214. 
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he stated that he had no private record or diary regarding 
what passed at 'Uqair and-that the words in dispute had not 
been intended to bear. any strained or exceptional construction 
or to convey any-meaning other than that which would 
ordinarily be assigned to them. The words "in the vicinity 
I 
of", Cox stated, "signified to my mind, and I am sure to 
that of Ibn Saud at the time,, 'within rifle shot of'- or 
'within sight of' tribes using the-water-holes at a given 
point". He suggested a distance of 10 or 15 miles to which 
the expression should apply and warned against Ibn Saud's 
ambitions to-control the area up to the Euphrates. 
1 
Later, in 1929, B. H. Bourdillon (the High Commissioner's 
representative at Muhammarah).. stated that "the root 
of the trouble lies in Ibn Saud's profound ... desire to 
avoid any extension of ordered administration into the 
2 desert". This was at least partly correct since a tribal 
society was involvedlin-which subjects "were accustomed to 
roam freely within limits defined only by the respective 
strength of themselves and their neighbours". Ibn Saud 
was bound to be influenced by the realities of local and 
tribal customs and behaviour as well as by considerations 
of International Law. Thus a wide gulf remained between 
Ibn Saud's point of view and the position which Clayton, 
whatever his personal reservations, had been instructed to 
1. Cox to Shuckburgh, 25 July 1928, C. O. 732/33. 
2. Documents on International Affairs (1929) pp. 260-3. 
- 253 - 
defend. In his-official report Clayton summed up the 
King's conclusion as follows: . fr - 
"If the Iraq Government persisted in establishing and 
maintaining those posts, then all hope of a settlement 
would be lost and he would be faced with a very serious 
situation, in which he would have to choose one of 
three courses; either to let his people do their worst 
while he declined all responsibility for the consequences, 
or to join forces with his people in an attack upon Iraq, 
or to wage war upon his people. Each of these courses 
was equally intolerable". 
Clayton could not let the question pass in Ibn Saud's 
favour. He still endeavoured to counter Ibn Saud's argument 
by pointing out that the posts were also'important to Ibn 
Saud's own security. He was fully aware of the extradition 
question which had been conceeded by Ibn Saud as a matter 
of importance and which had been partly solved by a suggestion 
included in article ten of the Bahrah'agreement2 which the 
two parties had'failed to bring into'effect. Clayton cleverly 
took advantage of this situation to support the idea 
of the need for the existence of the posts when he 
emphasised the close relationship between them and the 
extradition of criminals. The existance of the posts would 
prevent criminals from crossing the border. Annoyed at 
being confronted with this argument, and by Clayton's 
refusal of "a clause relating to the surrender of tribes 
or individuals who commit a crime, in the territory of the 
other party", and of a proposal "that crimes of whatever 
nature committed by tribes should not be considered political 
1. Record of Proceedings, 4th meeting, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014. 
2. See Appendix C. 
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crimes", 
1 Ibn Saud felt that Britain and the Hashemites 
were intriguing against him. Exploding with anger, the 
King was quoted as saying 
"My people may be-angry and'suspicious of the desert 
posts in Iraq. You may say that they are fanatical, 
but I tell you that I2am sixty thousand times more 
fanatical than they. " 
The negotiations seemed to have reached deadlock on 12 
May. Ibn Saud could not and perhaps would not give way on the 
posts question. Faced with this, Clayton adopted a more 
threatening tone and emphasized to Ibn Saud the value of 
Britain's co-operation and friendship. The King hardly 
needed reminding of this, but equally he could not afford 
to antagonise his own people. 3 Worried at the possible 
suspension of negotiations, Clayton urged the King to 
reconsider his attitude. Ibn Saud, therefore, slightly 
modified his position when he abandoned insistance on the 
demolition of all the posts as a prelude to any settlement, 
asking instead for their permanent dismantling. Clayton 
unsuccessfully tried to encourage the King to show further 
flexibility and stressed that the British Government 
"not only maintained their traditional policy of 
friendship with him, but had definitely instructed me 
to use my best endeavours to arrive at a settlement 
of such nature as to help to. 
"cýnsolidate 
his 
position with nis own people--. 
ý 
1. 'Nejd Proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
2. Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 214-5. 
3. Record of Proceedings, 5th meeting, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014; See also: Dickson 
Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 294. 
4. Record of Proceedings, 5th meeting, 'Clayton Report 
April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014. 
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He also tried to bring to the King's notice that there was 
a difference between the current negotiations andithe 
former ones. 
"On former occasions", he said, "it had been a 
question of negotiating treaties or agreements between 
two parties who were naturally contending with each 
other in order to secure the best possible results 
for the interest which they represented. Now my 
mission was one primarily of co-operation ... to 
discover, by a frank and friendly interchange of views, 
some solution of the difficulties with which he was 
faced". 
He endeavoured to convince Ibn Saud that he would be the 
principal loser if no agreement was reached. This was not 
in fact the case; British and Iraqi interests had been 
threatened by the Ikhwan raids and that was in fact why it 
was impossible for Clayton to subscribe to any arrangement 
which might preclude the erection of posts or any other 
buildings which might be found necessary in the future. 
In another manoeuvre to pressurise Ibn Saud, Clayton 
requested him to compensate Iraq for the loss of life 
and properties. 
2 ý His ultimate target was to leave the 
King with only one option, the British one. At this 
juncture negotiations were diverted to less urgent questions. 
3 
Even so, it was difficult for the two parties to avoid 
mention of and consequent clashes over the question of the 
posts, since this was indeed the key point at issue. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 6th meeting. 
3. Among these questions there were Nejd-Transjordan frontier 
dispute and Italian policy in South West Arabia and the 
Red Sea, See: Record of Proceedings meetings 7-10. 
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In the meantime, a sub-committee had been formed 
(with Cornwallis, Glubb and Moore on the one side and Damluji, 
Yasin, Wahba and Hamza on the other) to draft an extradition 
treaty. Ibn Saud set much store on the work of this committee 
but unfortunately for him the committee ran into trouble 
from the very beginning. While Britain demanded the insertion 
in the treaty of a clause excluding political offenders, 
Ibn Saud insisted that these should be included. He had a 
personal interest; fearing that Faisal al-Dowaish might 
be offered asylum in Iraq. The British were prepared to 
give a separate pledge, applying only to the case of al- 
Dowaish should he be punished. The committee held seven 
meetings between 12 and 20 May, during which "we", Glubb 
wrote, "spent endless futile days arguing in our 
sub-committee over political offenders". The reason behind 
this was that "the two Kings [Ibn Saud and Faisal] 
did not trust one another". 
1 
Hoping for "a permanent peace 
which cannot be disturbed", Ibn Saud's representatives 
suggested that a treaty of Bon voisinage should be 
concluded. This was rejected because it would involve 
the British negotiators in difficult questions such as 
recognition and diplomatic representations between the two 
rival rulers of Iraq and Nejd. 
1. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 213-4; see also: Memo. on 
the matters discussed in committee between Iraq and Nejd, 
22 May 1928; Minutes of meetings of Iraq-Nejd sub- 
committee; Ist and 2nd drafts of the proposed extradition 
agreement presented by Nejd; Amendments by Iraq, 
'Clayton Report, April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014. 
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The Nejd-Transjordan differences were also left 
unsolved. Two meetings, between Clayton and Ibn Saud on 
12 and 17 May concerning these, proved fruitless, so a 
sub-committee with Antonius, and Ibn Saud's advisers was 
formed to re-examine the following matters: 
1- The appointment of a British arbitrator to adjudicate 
on post raids; 
2- The appointment of a permanent Raids officer to supervise 
future raids; 
3- The conclusion of Extradition and Bon Voisinage 
agreements. 
Eight meetings between 18 and 24 May, revealed that it 
was impossible to arrive at any final agreement. 
1 
In the absence of any achievement Clayton made no attempt 
to approach Ibn Saud over such Imperial interests as an 
air route along the Hasa coast. Ibn Saud, for his part and 
in order to avoid complications which might prejudice the 
frontier settlement, maintained a tactful silence on the 
following issues he knew to be delicate: the Bolshevik 
activities in the Hejaz; the Hejaz Railway; the abolition 
of the Capitulations in the Hejaz; and Awqaf al-Haramain. 
Clayton privately wrote to Lord Plumer on 18 May, 
"The whole business is very unfortunate, especially 
at a time when our relations with Ibn Saud seemed to 
be getting on to a solid basis of friendship, and I 
am afraid that is going to mean much wo5k and anxiety 
before a confidence is re-established. " 
1. See: Record of Proceedings, 7th and 8th meetings; 
Memo. by Antoni,. us on the proposed arbitration between 
Nejd and Transjordan; Clayton to C. O. 10 July 1928, 
'Clayton Report, April-June 1928', F. O. 371/13014. 
2. Clayton to Plumer, 18 May 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/5. 
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Having become more fully aware of the situation and in 
particular of Ibn Saud's position, Clayton, although deploying 
all his diplomatic skills, never pressed the King as hard 
as he had been instructed. In particular he refrained from 
threatening to blockade the Gulf ports. 
1 
In the circumstances Clayton and Ibn Saud concurred that 
there was no better option than to suspend negotiations until 
a later date. This conclusion was facilitated by the approach 
of the pilgrimage season, by the personally friendly relations 
which had been established between the two men, and by 
London's desire to avoid any complete collapse of the 
negotiations. 
2 To London Clayton complained on 19 May that 
he was "unable to hold out the hope that His Majesty's 
Government would find it possible to meet ... [Ibn Saud's] 
views to any great extent". 
3 
In order to avoid any adverse 
impression and also to prevent the occurence of untoward 
incidents during the interval, the two parties showed 
similar eagerness to minimize the extent of the setback. 
As Clayton wrote to Lord Plumer 
1. See: C. O. to Clayton, 17 April 1928 'Clayton Report 
April-June 1928', C. O. 371/13014. 
2. Ibid; 'Nejd Proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
3. Record of Proceedings, 10th meeting, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928'. 
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"I was practically anxious that the break in 
conversations should not take the form of a 
definite rupture. I therefore intend, ... to 
treat it merely as a postponement ... In this 
way I hope to secure a period of quiet expectation 
in which both parties will be able to give the 
question further consideration ... " 
To London he concluded that "it was essential to confine 
ourselves to a general statement ... to general assurances 
of a sincere endeavour to preserve the peace and avoid hampering 
our future conversations ... " He emphasised the "necessity 
of maintaining and promoting an atmosphere of confidence 
and tranquillity". Ibn Saud agreed and promised to take 
every step to ensure the maintenance of peace. No date 
for the resumption of negotiations was fixed, but Ibn Saud 
wished it to be not later than August. The King indeed 
urged speedy resumption "in order to avoid having to 
return to Nejd and to face his tribesmen without having 
brought matters to a favourable conclusion". 
2 
On 23 May, The Times published the following statement 
issued by the Colonial office: 
"... Satisfactory progress was made in several of the 
questions under discussions. But owing to the approach 
of the pilgrimage season, it became necessary to suspend 
negotiations, and the British Mission is taking advantage 
of this opportunity to return to London to report progress 
to his Majesty's Government, subsequently returning to 
Jeddah at the earliest opportunity to resume 
negotiations 
... 
" 
Similar statements were also published in Umm al-Qura 
1. Clayton to Plumer, 18 May 1928 (Clayton Papers) 
47 2/5 . 
2. Record of Proceedings, 12th meeting 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928'. 
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and in the Baghdad Times on 25 May. 
1 
The verbal agreement for preserving peace was yet 
to be confirmed by an exchange of letters on 23 and 24 
May. .. At this hopeful 
juncture things again went wrong. 
On the eve of his departure for London, Clayton received 
from Ibn Saud an indignant letter dated 22 May, in which 
the King summarised a detailed and circumstantial report 
which he had received from his Governor at Hail. The gist 
of the report was that: soon after Ibn Saud's agreeing 
to negotiate with Clayton and even after the departure 
of Clayton from London, eight cars crossed the border into 
Nejd to persuade the Nejdi tribes to migrate to Iraq. 
2 
A few days later aeroplanes circled over the neighbourhood 
of Lina and bombed the village. Ibn Saud condemned these 
acts of aggression and protested against the interference 
of British officials with his own tribes. He asked for 
an enquiry into these incidents which came as "fresh proof 
of bad faith and refusal to be bound by treaties ... it 
was abundantly clear that there were interested parties who 
desired the failure of the negotiations to reach a satisfactory 
solution ... "3 
1. Umm al-Qura, No. 180,25 May 1928; Sadiq al-Sudani, al-ilagat 
, g1'ýir4giyah.: 
a. l=. saudiyah (Baghdad 1976) p. 293, note 45. 
2. Similar activities took place in 1926 and led to the 
present disturbances, see the beginning of this 
chapter pp . 
213 ff. 
3. Ibn Saud to Clayton, 22 May 1928 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928', Annex 7, F. O. 371/13014. See also: 
'Nejd Proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers) 16/3; 
Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 291-93. 
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This was a new and unexpected blow for Clayton. 
He feared that unless Ibn Saud received a satisfactory 
reply he might refuse to sign the conditions for the 
suspension of negotiations and this could lead to a definite 
rupture. Therefore he replied on the same day agreeing 
that these incidents were contrary to the spirit of the 
negotiations, and promising to report the matter with a 
view to obtaining an explanation. 
1 
At the same time he 
telegraphed Dobbs at Baghdad, giving him an account of the 
matter and asking for an immediate reply to-enable him to 
cope with this new obstacle. He admitted that he had been 
placed "in a most unfortunate position" on the eve of his 
departure. 
2 
Dobbs immediate reply confirmed that the 
frontier had been crossed on the occasions mentioned, but 
the most significant revelation was that: 
"His Majesty's Government were ... aware that 
occasional air reconnaissances over Nejd territory 
were to continue until it was certain that [a] meeting 
with Ibn Saud would take place. " 
The British Government had perhaps designed these air 
raids to pressurise Ibn Saud in anticipation of his 
negotiations with Clayton, while the latter was on 
his way to meet the King. But once their meeting had 
begun, transfrontier operations were as Dobbs explained 
1. Clayton to Ibn Saud, 22 May 1928, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928', Annex 7, F. O. 371/13014, also 
C. O. 732/34. 
2. Clayton to Dobbs 22 May 1928, repeated to F. O., 
'Clayton Report, April-June 1928', 
3. Dobbs to Clayton, 23 May 1928, repeated to C. O., 
'Clayton Report, April-June 1928'. 
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"cut down to a minimum". 
l This made it difficult for 
Clayton to tell the King the truth, because "the explanation 
given does not enable me to reply satisfactorily", 
2 
and because, had he done so, a rupture would have been 
inevitable. He only sent the King a letter, on 25 May, 
expressing his best wishes and confirming the statements 
contained in his letter of 22 May. 
3 Ibn Saud felt ill-used 
and expressed much regret that his protest had, without 
explanation, gone unanswered. 
4 
Dobbs tried to defend his attitude by stressing the 
necessity of the air actions to stop raids from either party. 
As he telepraphed to the Colonial Office, 
"The incident regarding the tribesmen was in fact 
splendidly successful operation by the Air Force 
which in the nick of time prevented Iraq tribesmen 
from raiding Nejd. If we had not stopped them Ibn 
Saud'would have been most indignant and would probably 
have broken off negotiations. " 
Dobbs and the Air officer were of the opinion that, until they 
had ascertained that Ibn Saud "could control his tribes, it 
would be unsafe to tie our hands". Their reason was (as 
had been communicated to the Air Ministry) that "occasional 
reconnaissances across the frontier [should bed continued 
1. Ibid. 
2. Clayton to Dobbs (undated) repeated to F. O., 'Clayton 
Report, April-June 1928'. 
3. Clayton to Ibn Saud, 25 May 1928, 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928'. 
4. 'Nejd proposed Green Book`(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
5. Dobbs to C. O., 26 May 1928, E2814/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
See also: C. O. to F. O., E2982/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
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until we learnt that Ibn Saud had reached Medina". 
l 
In fact, Ibn Saud's arrival in the Hejaz had been delayed 
by difficulties with his own tribes, who had rushed towards 
the frontier to defend their relatives and their lands against 
the air "raids. He was anxious to settle the matter 
peacefully and ordered one of his leaders to'contact them and 
convince them to', ait until he had negotiated with the British. 
Later he sent one of his brothers to make sure that his 
wishes were obeyed. However, some of the Nejdis had reached 
the frontier before the arrival of the King's peace messengers. 
2 
It was this latest action which delayed the King's departure 
for Jeddah to meet Clayton. Dobbs argued that, "we should 
have risked disaster had we entirely stopped reconnaissances". 
insisting that Britain was at liberty to continue the flights 
over Nejd territory and to pursue the former policy of pushing 
the Mutair tribes back into Nejd, he concluded: "I do not 
believe that it would prejudice Sir Gilbert Clayton's 
mission". 
3 Dobbs was angry at Clayton's failure to deny 
Ibn Saud's reports about the incident before leaving Jeddah. 
4 
1. Ibid. ; -See p. -245 above " 
2. Umm al-Qura, No. 174,13 April 1928; also: Clayton 
to Plumer 18 May 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/5. 
3. Dobbs to C. O. 26 May 1928; F. O. Minutes 14 June 1928, 
E2982/1/91, F. O. 371/12994; Air Minictry to P. O., 
2 June 1928, E2867/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
4. C. O. to F. O., 9 June 1928, F. O. 371/12994. 
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The Air Ministry, too, had to defend its attitude 
regarding bombing Nejd after Ibn Saud had agreed to meet 
Clayton. In reply to the Foreign Office, the Air ministry 
detailed the reasons which had necessitated the crossing of 
the frontier into Nejd. They emphasised the importance of 
continued air action to defend British interests "against 
any renewal of raiding by the Ikhwan while conditions were 
still uncertain, and in addition to prevent counter raids 
by Iraqis ... " They 
justified their action by Ibn Saud's 
admission that "the tribes were to some extend beyond his 
control". They believed that the indication of Ibn Saud's 
willingness to-meet Clayton in no way provided the assurance 
required by the British Government that he had been taking 
effective measures to prevent further raids. The situation 
was wide open to doubts when the political agent at Kuwait 
reported the deadlock in Ibn Saud's discussion with the Ikhwan 
leaders; after all it was not until 7 May that news of an 
agreement to cease raiding was made known. Furthermore, the 
available forces for immediate defence of the Iraq-Nejd 
frontier (over 600 miles) were barely sufficient for the 
purpose. "If the Ikhwan had been allowed to get close to 
the frontier in any strength", they argued, "there would have 
been serious risk". 
l Finally, they asserted that they had 
only taken the minimum action and had refused to implement 
1. Air Ministry to F. O., 2 June 1928, E2867/1/91. 
F. O. 371/12994. 
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other suggestions by Dobbs and Glubb to destroy certain 
Nejdi wells neighbouring the border. 
The local authorities were, in fact, partly misled 
by the spread of rumours about the reality of the situation 
in the desert. This caused anxiety in the Foreign Office which 
was anxious to distinguish the facts from the rumours. 
Oliphant (Under Secretary of State) although appreciating 
the local authorities' fears, warned against the spread of 
rumours in official circles: 
"Rumours", he wrote, "might well be put about fora speci- 
fic. evi-l purpose , and I had felt ever since the beginning of the troubles with Ibn Saud six months 
ago that locally there was far too great an 
inclination tQ believe any rumour to the detriment 
of Ibn Saud. " 
Oliphant stressed his disquiet at some length and referred 
back to the original proposals of the Foreign office which, 
he claimed, would have stopped the rumours and prevented 
raids. The first was to get Clayton started on his 
mission at least one month earlier, but this met with the 
disspproval of the Colonial Office. The second was to arm 
him with "power to abandon one if not more posts in case of 
need". Although Clayton was a "man of experience", he had 
been given no free hand to negotiate within a minimum limit 
regarding the frontier posts. Finally and highly important 
for a successful negotiation was that Clayton should have 
been allowed to inform Ibn Saud that he (Clayton) was 
to replace Sir H. Dobbs. 
1. Memo. by Oliphant, 30 May 1928, E2914/1/91, F. O. 
371/12994. 
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The replacement of Dobbs by Clayton was in fact 
Chamberlain's ideal which he had proposed on 19 May to 
Amery. It showed an unusual interest in the development 
of Arabian affairs and in particular in the negotiations 
with Ibn Saud, in which the risk of complete breakdown should 
be avoided. Chamberlain's proposal, if adopted, might 
have made Ibn Saud less adamant, and he would have been far 
less suspicious about the future. Chamberlain had not 
intended Dobbs replacement by Clayton to take effect 
immediately but had wished the decision to be made known 
to Ibn Saud. It seems obxdous that the inflexible stance 
of the Colonial Office. was a handicap to Clayton during 
the negotiations. .- 
Oliphant added another reason for their, failure: 
"When he [Clayton] started . 
[his mission], no 
definite decision had been come to between the 
Colonial Office and Air Ministry regarding even 
one police post, nor had he been able to ease 
Ibn Saud's Bind about the position at Baghdad in 
the autumn. 
Glubb, a member of Clayton's mission has advanced 
other reasons in his War in the Desert. The gist of his 
analysis is that Clayton's failure was due to more than 
bad luck and the constraints imposed by London. Ibn Saud, 
like all bedouin was "frank and outspoken". Clayton ought 
to have appreciated this frankness. 
1. Chamberlain to Amery, 19 May 1928; CAB 30(28), 
23/57,23 May 1928. 
2. Memo. by Oliphant, 30 May 1928, E2914/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
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"I was familiar" Glubb argued, "with the bedouin 
faculty for openly putting all the cards on the 
table, and in the King's speeches I recognised the 
authentic bedouin frankness which I knew so well. 
Clayton could not be expected to appreciate these 
differences, and seemed to believe that oriental 
diplomacy required flowery complijents and a 
circuitous and courtly approach". 
Clayton had not made a good impression. As evidence of 
this, Glubb quoted Ibn Saud's words on 17 May: 
"When the English came first to Iraq, I congratulated 
my people. They were surprised and asked me why. I 
had always abused the Turks as unbelievers,. they said, 
yet here were people who were even worse, because they 
were not Muslims at all. I told them that the English 
wereIDnest, and were my friends. Now I must admit that 
we have despaired of the English and of their hair- 
splitting ... " 
Glubb concluded that Clayton's best approach would have 
been to "tackle Ibn Saud man to man with perfect frankness 
in a tete ä tete". Glubb was perhaps right in thinking 
that Clayton might have made more of his mission if he had 
been less determined to be diplomatic. 
Whatever the causes of failure, all the parties 
concerned feared its consequences. In the absence 
of Clayton's personal contact with Ibn Saud and if the 
latter was pressed by his tribesmen, Britain's position was 
at risk. Glubb stated in his diary: 
1. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 215. 
2. Ibid., p. 214. 
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"I am afraid that, if no settlement is reached before 
next autumn, we shall have a state of war rather than 
one of spasmodic raiding. A war would give rise to 
considerable bloodshed and expense and would result 
a- either in the British Government losing its 
nerve when serious fighting began and giving way, 
would expose Iraq to unending incursions by the 
Ikhwan, until the nettle was finally grasped, or 
b- in the ultimate fall of jbn Saud and the 
relapse of Nejd into chaos. " 
In order to avoid this disaster, Glubb,. the architect of 
Busaiyah, was now in favour of agreeing to Ibn Saud's 
demand for the destruction of the post and of suggesting 
other defensive means. But 
"My proposal to find a compromise by abandoning 
Busaiya was, however rejected by both the 
British and the Iraq Governments, a2 constituting 
a weak surrender to the Ikhwan ... " 
Glubb's attitude had clearly changed since before his own 
he 
encounter with Ibn Saud and/now became anxious to make a 
concession to the King to enable him to tell the Ikhwan: 
"You tried to get rid of this post by raiding, even 
though I advised against such a course. As you saw, 
your raids did not produce that result. Now I have 
talked to the English and thS Iraqis and they have 
agreed to demolish Busaiya". -. 
There is no evidence, apart from his own diary, that Glubb 
put forward any detailed proposal. However he may 
have conveyed his views,, they met with no response. He 
himself returned to Baghdad in a despondent mood and 
resigned to preparing for any sudden Ikhwan attacks. 
1. Ibid., p. 217. 
2. Ibid., p. 217. 
3. Ibid., p. 218. 
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"Neji", he wrote, "was obviously in complete confusion 
and there was every indication that the 1928-9 grazing 
season would see an extensive outbreak ?f Ikhwan 
raiding, if not of open war with Nejd. " 
In London, the Cabinet met on 23 May and approved the 
recommendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence in which 
it was pointed out that: 
a) Busaiyah and other posts were "essential for the 
effective defence of Iraq ... " Therefore it was 
"impossible to give way to Ibn Saud ... " 
b) It was most important that Clayton "should be put in a 
position to make an offer which will convince Ibn Saud 
that we are doing our best to meet him in this matter". 
This, however , required re-examining the whole question 
of the posts in order to determine whether any might be 
demolished. 
c) Ibn Saud should be informed by Clayton that Clayton 
himself was to succeed Dobbs as High Commissioner for Iraq. 
d) Notwithstanding the risk involved, the embargo on military 
supplies to Ibn Saud was to be lifted. This was regarded 
as a political concession for which the Cabinet unanimously 
accepted responsibility despite possible military 
consequences. These decisions were to be communicated 
through the Foreign Office to Clayton, Lord Lloyd (in 
Cairo) and the Air Ministry in orde5 that arrangements 
for necessary action could be made. 
It was recognised by now that some concessions were 
essential to avoid troubles on the frontier, but what might 
be conceded had not yet been clarified. As far as the 
posts were concerned, the British authorities in Iraq now 
succeeded in winning London's approval of their plans. 
Having been informed of the Cabinet's decisions the High 
1. Ibid., p. 225. 
2. CAB 30(28), 23/57,23 May 1928; Report of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, 22 May 1928, C. O. 
732/34; see also Oriente Moderno, viii (1928) 
p. 414. 
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Commissioner pointed out that the administration and defence 
of Iraq could be served by a number of frontier posts namely: 
Rutbah, Shabichah, Salman and Busaiyah. 
1 
The Shabichah 
post, yet to be established, was only 33 miles from the 
frontier and its construction was in itself enough to increase 
tension. Although the Government was nervous about taking 
further irritating steps, the Air officer in command insisted 
on the establishment of the new post because it would provide 
a water supply and landing area and it would enable Iraq 
to defend its own tribes living by the border, particularly, 
the Dahamishah. 
2 
Air 
The Nice-Marshal in Baghdad reported in detail about 
his plans for the future defence of Iraq against Ikhwan 
raids. Indicating the difficulties of his task, he stressed 
that unless the Iraqi tribes were protected from raids, they 
would gradually "make their own terms with Nejd and throw in 
their lot with Ibn Saud. The practical result of this would be 
to push back the Iraq frontier to the Euphrates Valley". 
He suggested an early warning system which depends on daily 
armed air patrols over the whole desert. He was aware 
that his suggestion was beyond the capacity of the R. A. F. in 
Iraq. Alternatively he favoured that the establishment of 
1. C. O. to Dobbs, 25 May 1928, E2815/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
2. Dobbs to C. O. 28 May 1928, E2815/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
see map p. 269A. 
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"a line of posts 75 to 150 miles from the nearest 
telegraph office in the settled area enables 
information to be received 48 hours to 4 days 
earlier than it would otherwise have been received 
and the chances of catcýing the raiders are 
increased accordingly". 
Agents could report quickly to these posts on the situation 
in the interior of Nejd. In this case "the greater the 
number of posts ... the shorter time it will take for an agent 
to reach a place from which he can report ... " Therefore certain 
water wells must he fortified, and these could be on the line 
Jarishan-Busaiyah-Salman-Shabichah-Lussuf-Muhaiwir-Rutbah. 
In front of this line a number of secret service agents 
could be placed among the tribes. He again emphasised that 
if this plan were not adopted "all the desert tribes will becom 
potentially hostile ... " He went further to suggest that 
all stations along the railway between Samawah and 
Basra would have to be fortified. According to his estimation 
this plan was "the most economical way" of defence. 
2 
Acceptance of his proposals obviously would have destroyed 
all Ibn Saud's hopes of reconciliation. Ibn Saud was quite 
unaware of the Air Vice-Marshal 's plans, but he was alarmed 
by the Iraqi Defence minister's declaration to the assembly 
of deputies that "negotiations will have no result and that 
the situation would become serious". 
3 
1. /4 e-Marshal , Air Headquarters (Baghdad) to Air Ministry (London) 2 June 1928, E3159/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
2. Ibid.; -see maps pp. 271A & 271B. 
3. 'Nejd Proposed Green Book, (Philby Papers) 16/3. See: 
comments on Nuri al-Said fdeclaration in Ummal-Qura No. 184, 
29 June 1928, and in The Near East and India 16 Aug. 1928, 
quoted in Oriente Moderno, viii (1928) p. 414. 
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on 8 June, the Air Ministry circulated to the Cabinet 
a proposal to reduce the number of frontier posts from 8 to 
6 on the assumption that Ibn Saud would in future take more 
effective steps to restrain his tribes. It was also suggested 
that he should be informed that if there was a recurrence 
of raids the British might erect more posts. 
l The latest 
defence plan had already been presented in May by Dobbs and 
the Air officer commanding? and this was in fact a revival 
of a scheme put forward in March with the omission of the 
posts at Jarishan and Lussuf. The remaining six-can be 
divided into two groups. The first three posts (Rutbah, 
Muhaiwir, and Ain Wiza) might have been tolerated by Ibn Saud. 
But the other three (Shabichah , Salman, and Busaiyah) 
seemed bound to antagonise. A Foreign office minute of 13 
June deplored the necessity of establishing a post at 
Shab ichah which was likely to prove an even more sentitive 
issue than Busaiyah. 3 
The Cabinet considered, the plan on 20 June and 
discussed two memoranda, -one from the Air Ministry4 and the 
other from the Colonial Office. The Colonial office opposed 
any further concession to Ibn Saud. The Cabinet took no decision 
1. Air Ministry to F. O., 8 June 1928, E2983/1/91, F. O. 
371/12994. 
2. Dobbs to C. O., 28 May 1928, E2815/1/91, E2815/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12994. See above pp. 269-71. 
3. F. O. Minutes, 13 June 1928, E2983/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
4. Air Ministry to F. O., 8 June 1928, E2983/1/91, F. O. 
3 71/12994. 
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but referred the matter to the Committee of Imperial Defence 
for examination and report. 
On 27 June, the Cabinet met again to discuss a memorandum 
presented by the Secretary of State for Air concerning both 
the memorandum by the Air Vice-Marshal in Baghdad on the 
use of the R. A. F. in Arabia and the conclusions and 
recommendations in the Air staff paper signed by the Marshal 
of the R. A. F., Sir Hugh Trenchard. These were as follows: 
a-... it is essential that the local political authority 
and the Air Officer Commanding should act together in 
the closest co-operation ... 
b-... Reorganisation of the intelligence services 
in Transjordan, Iraq and Aden appears necessary, and 
additional European personnel capable of speaking the 
local languages are required in those countries both 
in the Air Force and in the political Departments. 
c- Local political-authorities should be given wider 
discretionary powers, so that they can make decisions 
without constant reference to the Departments of 
the state at home. 
d- The responsibilities of the Colonial Office 
should be extended to include Kuwait, the Trucial 
Chiefs, and all political questions concerning the 
countries contiguous with Arabia. 
e- [It was recommended to create] one department of 
the Government ... responsible for political and 
administrative action in Arabia ... . 
[and it was 
advisable if I. O. as well as the Govt, of India] will 
consider relieving themselves of their direct 
political and administrative responsibilities 
connected with Arabia .. 
The Air , `Secretary-strongly supported the proposals, but 
the Foreign Secretary insisted that the Foreign office continue 
1. CAB 33(28), 23/58,20 June 1928. 
2. CAB 35(28), 23/58,27 June 1928 
to be fully consulted. The Cabinet agreed that these 
matters should be-transferred to the sub-committee of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, which had been appointed 
to consider British Policy in the Gulf area. 
l 
At this juncture, Clayton's advice was essential. He had 
not formally reported about his mission, but had sent some 
views in various telegrams. The real difficulty, he maintained, 
lay over the Iraq frontier posts. " He admitted that this 
matter needed to be discussed with the Foreign Office and 
Air Ministry. 
2 He was convinced that the British Government 
should make concessions and that the posts question should be 
settled within a "comprehensive adjustment of the whole 
situation between Nejd and Iraq". As he had intimated to 
Lord Plumer, he would try to persuade the British Government 
"to consider the future very carefully and adopt a definite 
policy". 
3 
Clayton believed that the bombing of the Ikhwan 
would hinder rather than help finding a solution. With this 
the Foreign Office agreed, noting. that 
"from the technical point of view, it may be true that 
an aeroplane reconnaissance over someone else's territory 
is not 'offensive action', but from the ordinary inter- 
national point of view such measures an hardly be 
regarded as other than offensive ... " 
1. Ibid. 
2. Clayton to C. O., 12 June 1928, E3040/2068/91, F. ß. '371/13014 
3. Clayton to Plumer, 18 May 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/5. 
4. F. O. Minutes, 14 June 1928, E2982/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
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In support of this contention, the Foreign Office reminded 
the Colonial Office of Lord Plumer's opposition to the 
Air Ministry's suggestion of 9 March that they make 
reconnaissance flights into Nejd from Transjordan. 
1 
Plumer then considered the ]procedure "most ill-advised". 
The Foreign Office concluded in mid June that "it is going 
ratter far to express complete approval of a policy which ... 
has turned out to be a complete failure from every point of 
view" .2 
Clayton went further when he wrote, on 22 June 1928, a long 
secret and personal letter'to the Air Chief Marshal to the 
effect that the actions of the R. A. F. on the Nejd-Iraq 
frontiers had disturbed his mission and the Air Staff policy 
was wrong. 
"I believe that Ibn Saud might have come to an agreement, 
and in any event he would have had a poor case ... 
if 
aeroplane action had not been pushed across the frontier, 
or even if it had been confined to the pursuit of 
actual raiders across the borders. " 
These actions provided Ibn Saud with good cause to hold 
to his own position in the negotiations. He said that the 
mere crossing of the frontier had been a breach of sovereignty 
as recognised in the treaty of Jeddah and a violation of 
Article 6 of Bahrah agreement. 
4 Consequently this pushed him 
l. C. O. to Plumer (Jerusalem) 9 March 1928, E1328/1/91, 
F. O. 371/12990. 
2. F. O. Minutes, 14 June 1928, E2982/1/91, F. O. 371/12994. 
3. Clayton to Air Chief Marshal , 22 June 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/6. 
4. See Appendix C and F. 
to demand a writeen assurance from the British Government 
that article 6 of Bahrah agreement should apply to the 
British as well as the Iraqi forces. 
1 
Clayton thought 
that the punishment of raiders inside Iraq was enough, 
and reminded the Chief Marshal of the 1923 big raid on 
Transjordan which had been forcibly countered without any 
protest from Ibn Saud. "Quite apart from Ibn Saud's 
likes or dislikes", he added, "I do not much care for the 
idea of fortified posts throughout ... the desert". 
2 
He suggested instead, that forces should be stationed at some 
distance from the frontier ready, not only to mount a 
counter-attack against any raiders, but also to pursue them 
only as far as the border. This was of course far more 
economical and had the advantage of being open to no 
criticism from Ibn Saud. Clayton urged a clear definition 
between a state of peace and one of war. The present state 
of uncertainty only impeded a settlement. Sympathising with 
Ibn Saud's predicament, he argued that it was necessary 
to distinguish between the Nejd tribesmen and the Nejd 
Government "which we have definitely and openly recognised 
by treaty as independent, and which is fully conversant with 
latest principles of Geneva and of international usage". 
3 
1. See: Clayton to C. O., 10 July 1928 'Clayton Report, 
April-June 1928` F. O. 371/13014. 
2. Clayton to Air Chief Marshal , 22 June 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/6. This view, he later expressed to the Colonial 
Office: "I am not convinced that the permanent security 
of ... Iraq can best be ensured by a'chain of far-flung 
posts in the open desert ... " Clayton to C. O., 10 July 1928, 'Clayton Report, April-June 1928'. 
3. Clayton to Air Chief Marshal , 22 June 1928 (Clayton Papers) 472/6. 
Despite his rejection of the idea that constructing 
posts was the only way to defend Iraq, Clayton recognised 
the Sovereign right of Iraq to decide for itself the best 
means of defence. He argued: 
"It would be neither fair nor expedient to ignore 
altogether the arguments put forward by Ibn Saud 
or to underrate the difficulties of his position. 
His account of Article 3 of the protocol of 'Uqair 
.... seems to me to bear the mark of genuineness ... Just as we have a duty towards Iraq in maintaining 
the prestige and the interests of the Ruler and 
Government of that country, so we owe to Ibn Saud, 
who has hiter to displayed a scrupulous respect 
for treaties and a remarkable determination to keep 
his pledged word, to go as far towards easing the 
difficult situation he is in as is compatible with the 
maintenance of a fixed principle ... we should 
offer him some concession, not on the principle of 
the right to construct posts, but on the actual 
programme of their location and construction ... "1 
Such an attitude would help Ibn Saud to continue his efforts 
for peace. He recommended making concessions to Ibn Saud 
on the question of sovereignty, extradition, and the 
definition of article 6, of the Bahrah agreement. 
In return, Ibn Saud was to give assurances similar to those 
he had demanded from Iraq. 
Meanwhile British policy came under attack in a 
number of rr ess articles from Philby. He complained 
against the ill-treatment of Ibn Saud and assumed that 
Ibn Saud could not be wrong and Iraq could not be right. 
Anxious to "correct any impression which Mr. Philby's 
communique will produce ... ", 
2 
Amery was reluctant to answer 
questions in Parliament about the fate of negotiations with 
1. Clayton to C. O., 10 July 1928 'Clayton Report, April- 
June 1928'. 
2. Stonehewer-Bird to F. O., 16 May 1928, E2588/2068/911 
F. O. 371/13013. see Philbyl point in: Oriente Moderno, 
viii (1928) pp. 479-80 
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Ibn Saud until the situation was clarified. 
1 
On 10 July Clayton's full and complete report was 
made available. For the first time all the departments 
concerned were in possession of the, latest information on 
which policy could be properly co-ordinated. On 11 July 
the Cabinet discussed the report of the sub-committee of 
the committee of Imperial Defence on the Ikhwan. The 
report, prepared after consultation with Clayton and the 
Air Vice Marshal , reached the following conclusions: 
a-"... the maintenance of a certä. n number of 
desert posts is essential, not only for 
purposes of defence, but also in order to restrain 
the tribes on the Iraq side of the border. 
Accordingly, we should make no concession of 
principle on this question. 
b-"... we regard the right of Iraq to administer its 
own territory and to construct posts within it as 
essentially a British interebt. 
c- "[With regard to]. ... the number of posts, their 
distance from the frontier etc., we should take 
as conciliatory a line as possible ... with 
insistance on the general principle [mentioned 
above]. As regards the number of posts, these 
should be limited in the first instance to the 
following: Rutbah, Muhaiwir, Ain Wiza, Shabicha, 
Salman, Busaiyah. [ the first three are required 
in connection with the Air Route and pipeline and 
are beyond the range of controvers]A 2 
d- "we should give Ibn Saud an assurance that we 
intend to observe Article 6 of the Bahrah Agreement, 
and that our forces will not cross the common 
frontier in pursuit of offenders .... _[but 
in 
case Ibn Saud proved] himself unable or unwilling 
to deal [with serious Ikhwan raids] ... we must 
reserve to ourselves the right to make such 
action as we think fit. 
1. Parliamentary question, 13 June 1928, E3041/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13014. 
2. See map p. 271A. 
e "The Secretary of State for colonies should make every 
effort to effect an Extradition Agreement between 
the-Governments of Iraq and Nejd. 
f-.... 
g-.. 
h- "Sir Gilbert Clayton should himself return to resume 
conversations with Ibn Saud, both as an act of courtesy 
and on account of ... Clayton's friendly relations with 
him. 
i "It might simplify ... Clayton's task if Ibn Saud were 
to be given a present preferably a personal gift from 
the King,. [George V] ... Clayton should be asked to 
submit his suggestion in regard to this recommendation. 
These conclusions were presented by Stanley Baldwin (the 
Prime Minister) and approved, without discussion, by the Cabinet. 
It was also agreed that Clayton should be authorised to spend up 
to £500 on presents for Ibn Saud from the British Government and 
not from King George as had been suggested. 
2 
At this stage the main point established was the decision 
that a resumption of negotiations offered the only route towards 
a compromise on the vexed question of posts and Ikhwan raids. 
Accordingly, Clayton was formally notified of the Cabinet's 
decision on 19 July and authorised to return quickly to Ibn Saud. 
The Government's attitude was defined in detail, but he was 
informed that there was 
"... no desire on the part of ... [HMG] to interfere with 
your discretion in regard to the precise form of manner 
in which the various decisýons reached should be 
communicated to Ibn Saud. " 
Accompanied by Antonius on 20 July, Clayton left London for Jeddah. 
1. CAB 37(28), 23/58,11 July 1928; See also; Committee of the 
Imperial Defence to F. O., 10 July 1928, E3472/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13014, also C. O. 732/34. 
2. CAB 37(28), 23/58,11 July 1928, - 'The Cabinet Office 
to F. O. 11th July 1928, 
E3473/2068/911, ' F. O. 371/13014. '-' 
3. C. O., to Clayton, 19 July 1928, E3710/2068/91, F. O. 371/13014;, 
also (Clayton Papers) 472/7. 
The Jeddah Negotiations, the Second Round and its 
aftermath, July - December 1928. 
Armed with fresh instructions to carry out his mission 
to its desired end, Clayton arrived in Jeddah on 30 July 
1928. An Iraqi delegation was also present but not empowered 
to negotiate directly. Ibn Saud, who had been waiting at 
Taif while negotiations were suspended, arrived in Jeddah on 
1 August. During the following two days three meetings 
were held in quick succession after which Clayton was 
attacked by a sharp fever which incapacitated him for the 
next four days. A final meeting, however, was held on 8 
Avgxst after which he returned to London1 having accomplished 
nothing. From beginning to end the mission proved a dismal 
failure. 
All the old ground was covered and there was an 
atmosphere of boredom and lassitude over the proceedings. 
Neither side was prepared to shift on main principles. 
Britain, however, had been prepared to offer minor con- 
cessions. At their first meeting Clayton assured Ibn Saud 
that a complete report on the previous round of discussions 
had been faithfully placed before H. M. G. and had received 
careful consideration in the highest quarters. While 
Britain's position with regard to the main points at issue 
(the posts and article 3 of the 'Uqair protocol) remained 
1. Jeddah Report, July 1828, F. O. 371/13010; Clayton 
to Amery, 3 Sept. 1928, E4337/2068/91, F. O. 371/13015. 
Taif was 'suggested as a venue for this round of 
discussions but again Jeddah was preferred. 
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unchanged, Clayton nevertheless hoped that agreement 
could be reached before the Iraqi delegation was allowed 
to enter the discussions. He admitted that the wording 
of article 3 of the 'Uqair protocol, both in English and 
in Arabic, was imprecise. Nevertheless, neither Britain nor 
Iraq had at any time envisaged that it could be interpreted 
along the lines put forward by the King and could not do so 
now. Thereupon Clayton tactfully turned to other minor 
points upon which he was prepared to offer concessions. Among 
these where was article 6 of the Bahrah agreement. He 
had been authorized to give Ibn Saud written assurances that 
this article would apply to British as well as Iraqi forces. 
But he reserved to his country the right to intervene when 
they thought fit. This reservation was intended to cover 
future crises. He also was prepared to offer a concession on 
the proposed Extradition and Bon Voisinage agreements 
between Iraq and Nejd. Moreover, he offered to facilitate 
recognition by both Iraq and Transjordan of the Kingdom of 
the Hejaz and Nejd, but reminded the King that everything 
"depended on a satisfactory solution of the main question 
of the posts". Finally, he dramatically announced that the 
British Government had decided to appoint him for the job 
of High Commissioner in Iraq as successor to Sir Henry 
Dobbs, hoping thus to make Ibn Saud "confident that his 
interests and those of his country would always be regarded 
by me with sympathy and a measure of understanding". 
1 
At this meeting Clayton presented Ibn Saud with all the 
concessions he could offer, but none of them was what Ibn 
Saud now wanted. 
At their second meeting, Clayton repeated his 
readiness to give assurances for the safety of Nejd 
insisting that the posts had never been intended for use 
against Nejd. As a token of good will Britain would accept 
a distance of 25 miles on either side of the frontier as 
defining'. the meaning of the words " in the vicinity of the 
border". Again Clayton turned around the main point without 
satisfying Ibn Saud who was prepared under no circumstances 
to give up his interpretation of article 3 or his principal 
demand: the demolition of the posts. "By a very calm and 
friendly, but quite unequivocal statement", he replied 
that he could not reconsider his attitude. With some 
bitterness, he remarked that "this was the first occasion on 
which he felt that he could legitimately say that the 
confidence which he had always placed in His Majesty's 
Government had been disappointed". Clayton saw no room for 
manoeuvre. Ibn Saud then commented that the Iraqis 
(in fact he meant the British) should have devised a less 
provocative intelligence system. This suggests that he might 
1. Record of Proceedings, 1st meeting, E4337/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13015. See also: Amery to Clayton 19 
July 1928, E3710/2068/91, F. O. 371/13014; 
'Nejd Proposed Green Book`(Philby Papers) 16/3. 
have been prepared to accept any other system of 
intelligence provided that its operation had remained 
unknown to the Ikhwan. The two parties were in fact 
arguing over a vital question in different ways. Clayton, 
in an endeavour to avoid another fatal failure, begged 
the king to avoid coming to a hasty conclusion. Ibn Saud 
strongly replied that he had given to this matter "all 
his time and his thoughts for the last eight months ... 
[and J wa. s sufficiently aware of his rights and of the 
realities of the situation to express his conclusions 
without hesitation". 
1 
Ibn Saud saw Clayton as a good bargainer, however, 
"the question was not one of bargaining but rather of 
recognition of rights and actual treaties". 
2 
He indicated that there were'only two options open to 
him: either to declare his failure to reach peaceful 
agreement with the British, leaving them to solve matters 
in their own way, which of course meant war, or otherwise 
to clear out of his country and to take refuge elsewhere. 
Whatever option he might choose, he emphasized that "it was 
absolutely impossible for himself or his people to accept 
the conclusions that ... [HMG] had arrived at". He 
complained (and this was the first time that he had been so 
direct) that the British Government "had placed themselves in 
1. Record of Proceedings, 2nd meeting, E4337/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13015. 
2. 'Nejd proposed Green Book' (Philby Papers) 16/3. 
the position of a party to this quarrel and that they 
were issuing a verdict in a dispute in which they themselves 
were involved". At this juncture there seemed no prospect 
of any accord. Clayton could only note the fact and warn 
the King of its consequences. He was, as he later wrote, 
"convinced that Ibn Saud was sincere in this expression of 
his views". 
1 
The focal point behind Ibn Saud's stand emerged at the 
third and decisive meeting, when Clayton asked the King a 
direct and definite question about "what exactly were the 
concrete objections of his people to the existence of the 
posts". The King's reply, reflecting his own fears as 
well as those of the Ikhwan, can be summed up as follows: 
Firstly: the posts, built in a country whose ruler was 
a member of a hostile family, could be used against the 
lawful movements of Nejd tribes. The Nejdis feared 
encirclement, and this fear was stirred up in the press 
of both countries. While he had done his best to pacify 
opinion, the desert posts frustrated all his efforts. 
Secondly: he, of course, shared the feelings of his 
people, and no longer had confidence in any British assurance 
that the posts would not be used against him. He insisted 
that the Bahrah and Haddah agreements as well as the treaty 
of Jeddah had been violated. New agreements and treaties 
might meet a similar fate. What now was required was practical 
1. Record of Proceedings, 2nd meeting, E4337/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13015. 
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evidence of good faith and this could only be supplied- 
by the destruction of the posts. The King continued: 
"I find it impossible to go to my people at the 
present critical juncture and say to them that 
as a result of my negotiations .I had obtained 
yet another written assurance. "1" 
His simple-minded people would surely regard this as another 
trick. According to Clayton's final report which accurately 
conveyed Ibn Saud's attitude, the King was 
"now pledged to his people, who would never be content 
with mere assurances in a matter which they held to be 
one of life and death to them and in which he shared 
their views to the full. He was still inspired 
by unalterable feelings of friendship towards Great 
Britain and a determination to respect existing 
agreements; and he was convinced that a policy of 
co-operation with ... [ HMG] was in the best of interests; but in this particular question he was 
powerless to subscribe2to the decision which .... [HMG 
had seen fit to take. " 
After only two meetings Clayton was convinced that 
nothing could shift the King from his attitude except the 
destruction of the posts. At the third meeting this 
opinion was simply confirmed. Clayton appreciated that, 
in the circumstances, retention of the posts could only 
magnify Ikhwan suspicions and mistrust. Since his own 
hands were tied he decided that there was no option but 
to leave matters as they were in the hope that time would 
1. Record of Proceedings, 3rd meeting, E4337/2068/91, F. O. 
371/13015. In fact Ibn Saud noted, early in March, that 
all the agreements and treaties he had concluded with 
Britain, had been violated. As Umm al-Qura stated 
art. 1 of the Mohammarah Convention, art. 3 of the 'Uqair 
protocol, Art. 1,4,5 and 6 of the Bahrah agreement 
had not been respected, See Umm al-Aura, No. 169,9 
March 1928; also, Oriente Moderns, viii (1928) 
p. 178; 'Nejd Proposed Green Book'(Philby Papers)16/3. 
2. Clayton to Amery, 3 Sept. 1928, E4337/2068/91, F. O. 
371/13015. 
prove to the Ikhwan that their suspicions had been unfounded. 
Angry at his failure and tired of futile discussions, Clayton 
withdrew without even arranging any further meetings. For 
the next four days he was ill with a fever. 
During Clayton's indisposition, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi 
met the King and discussed with his advisers the main 
obstacles, but without changing the King's attitude. 
l 
A similar attempt was made by Antoni us- on 7 August but that 
also ended in failure. At that meeting the King described 
his difficulties to Antonius., who was well qualified to 
appreciate and understand them. Meanwhile he admitted that 
even if his people were "ignorant and obstinate", they "have 
confidence in me for one thing, if for no other, they know 
that I am a man of my word, they know-that Abdul-Aziz 
has never made a promise in vain". Ibn Saud's anxiety 
,, as caused by the knowledge that feeling against the posts 
was confined not only to the tribesmen butlad also spread 
among all the population of Nejd.,. Faisal al-Dowaish, was 
for him "nothing", sooner or later he would be muzzled,, 
but what could he do with people "who are of us and were 
always with us"., Ibn Saud was really under the threat 
of a general revolt by his-supporters as well as by his 
opponents. If he agreed to the British retention of the 
posts, he stated, "there will not be a single man, woman 
or child on my side". At this awkward point in thdr 
1. Ibid. 
talk, Antoniiis " presented the King on Clayton's behalf 
with a telescope and a sporting rifle to express Britain's 
goodwill. 
1 
Clayton, having recovered from his fever, held a 
final meeting with Ibn Saud on 8 August at which they 
agreed to suspend the ngotiations but still to leave 
the door open for future compromise. The conditions laid 
down in the notes exchanged between them on 23 and 24 May 
1928 would, in the meanwhile, remain valid. Finally, 
Clayton assured the King that, from his new position in 
Iraq, he would cooperate with him as well as with the 
Iraqi Government "in the task of fostering peaceful 
. and 
friendly relations between the two Arab states". .2 
Although authorized to discuss some other minor 
matters, Clayton did not raise them because their 
settlement was conditional on resolution of the posts 
questions. Thus no reference was made to the extradition 
and Bon Voisinage agreements. Recognition of Ibn Saud 
by Iraq-and Transjordan and the establishment of diplomatic 
representation were not pursued beyond the general 
intimation previously given to Ibn Saud. The question 
of compensation for the destruction of life and property 
at Busaiyah was not mentioned at all. 
1. Minute by Antonius on his meeting with Ibn Saud, 
7 Aug. 1928, E4337/2068/91, F. O. 371/13015. 
2. Record of Proceedings, 4th meeting, E4337/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13015. 
The question of the Nejd-Transjordan dispute was left 
to a sub-committee consisting of Antonius and the King's 
principal advisers (Hafez Wahba, Yousuf Yasin , and Fuad 
Hamza). This sub-committee started its work on 31 July 
before the main negotiations began and ended on 8 August. 
During this period six meetings were held to discuss the 
1 
following points: 
1. The measures taken by the Government of Transjordan 
with regard to the latest raids, and the raid 
committed by the Riwala in February 1928. 
2. The proposed appointment of an arbitrator to 
adjudicate on claims in respect of post raids. 
3. The proposed appointment of Nejd representatives for 
Palestine and Transjordan. 
These points, having been discussed by the sub-committee, 
were taken up by Ibn Saud and Clayton at their final meeting 
on 8th August. However, the question of arbitration remained 
at issue, because Clayton rejected the Saudi condition 
that the arbitrator wasto adjudicate upon past raids. 
At the end of the whole proceedings Clayton raised the 
question of means of communication for future, official 
correspondence. Ibn Saud stressed his wish to receive all 
communications from the mandated territories via the British 
Agent at Jeddah. Clayton agreed and the talks ended. 
2 
1. Memo. by Antonius on the proceedings of the sub- 
committee meeting`(undated), E4337/2068/91, F. O. 371/ 
13015. 
2. Clayton to C. O., 3 Sept . 1928, E4337/2068/91, 
F. O. 371/13015. 
On Clayton's arrival in London The Times published 
an article on Britain's obligation to defend Iraq against 
the Wahhabi incursions, and justified the measures 
adopted for that purpose. 
l A moderate communique 
expressing Ibn Saud's goodwill and his promise to deal with 
his neighbours "in a spirit of concord and in accordance 
with text of treaties concluded", was published in Umm 
al-Qura. 
2 
In a letter to the Near East and India, Philby wrote: 
theefailure of tiee 
negotiations oE jeaaan ed 
it was known from the beginning that the demolition 
of the forts was a sine qua non condition of to 
agreement from the point of view of Ibn Saud. " 
Philby then accused Britain of not respecting agreements 
signed by her and concluded: 
"Ibn Saud although he had every intention to 
keep up his long friendship with her [Britain] 
may be excused if he did not seek new negotiations ... 
If we have rendered his task more difficult that is 
not something which does us honour and our attitude 
will only serve to raise against us in all the 
peninsula a solid barriar of hostility. Is the 
game worth the candle? " 
Philby's criticism of British policy, from what followed, 
no doubt made some impact in London. There the official 
1. The Times, 15 Aug. 1928. 
2. Umm al-Qura, No. 190,10 Aug. 1928. 
3. Near East and India, 27 Sept . 1928, quoted in Oriente Modern o, viii (1928) pp. 479-80. 
4. Ibid. 
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announcement of Clayton's appointment as High Commissioner 
for Iraq, upon which such high hopes had been grounded, 
was published in September. Clayton in the meanwhile, 
remained on in London, 
1 
and no doubt influenced the decision 
not to close the door on negotiations. Arbitration on 
the vexed question of the interpretation of; article 3 of 
the 'Uqair protocol was again2 proposed in the following 
note sent to Ibn Saud via Jeddah: 
[H. M. G. ] have given the most careful and 
sympathetic consideration to the views and 
arguments put forward by your Majesty, and 
they are particularly anxious to ... .. 
assist your Majesty in your manifest efforts 
to maintain peaceful conditions on the 
frontier .... in earnest of their desire to arrive at a fair and peaceful settlement 
of the qm stion at issue ... [both Britain 
and Iraq] are prepared, should, your Majesty 
so desire, to submit the points in dispute to 
an arbitrator to be settled in consultation with 
your Majesty and in agree ent between the 
Governments concerned ... 
Ibn Saud agreed to the proposal stressing that the arbitrator 
should be an Arab, neutral and an expert in Arabian affairs. 
Communications on this proposal continued during December 
1928 and January 1929.4 Glubb strongly protested against 
1. Clayton did not leave for his new post before March 
1929. See: The Times, 12 Dec. 1928,6 March 1929. 
2. Shackburgh (C. O. ) to Monteagle (F. O. ) 29 Sept. 1928, 
C. O. 732/36. 
3. F. O. to Jakins (Jeddah), 1 Nov. 1928, E5184/3261/91, 
F. O. 371/13018; also (Clayton Papers) 472/9. 
4. Jeddah Report, Dec. 1928 and January 1929., F. O. 
371/13728. 
arbitration because, in his opinion, if the British case 
was lost only anarchy would ensue and the banks of the 
Euphrates would be within Ikhwan reach. "The British 
Government" he wrote, "seemed to have failed to 
appreciate that the nature of the struggle had changed. 
We were witnessing a contest for power between Ibn Saud and 
the Ikhwan". Glubb, from his local desert knowledge, was 
correct in his opinion that the situation had by January 
1929 completely changed. The roots of these changes went 
back to the consequences of the Jeddah negotiations, when 
Ibn Saud's position was reported as "extremely insecure". 
l 
A1-Domaish was still leading the Ikhwan rebels, but even 
more threatening to Ibn Saud's political future was the 
attitude of those other tribal leaders who were now divided 
between customary loyalty to their King and growing 
fears for their land and faith. 
The King promptly sent invitations to the leaders of 
all the Nejd tribes (including the rebel leaders) as well 
as to the 'ulama'in order to inform them, as he had promised, 
about his latest round of discussions with the British. 
2 
1. G1ubb, - War in the Desert, pp. 232-33. 
2. Jeddah Report, Oct. 1928, F. O. 371/13010; Dickson, 
Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 296. 
His obvious fear was that if he remained silent the 
moderate Ikhwan might join al-Dowaish, leaving him destitute 
of supporters. The rebel leaders, who had agreedýto the 
partitition of Ibn Saud's dominions among themselves, 
ignored this invitation. By the end of October 1928 the 
Nejdi leaders started to arrive in al-Riyadh to attend 
what was later known as The al-Riyadh Conference. 
1 
A mass meeting of 25,000 formed a general assembly in 
December. Only 800 were chosen to meet the King. A special 
issue of Umm al-Qura is the main source available about 
what took place. 
2 Its account is more of a literary 
exercise by the editor than an accurate report. The King 
is depicted-as dominating the whole occasion. He had not, 
he is quoted as saying, invited them out of fear of any 
of them but out of fear of Allah. He had summoned them 
to discuss the future of their country in the light of 
his negotiations with the British. In order to do this as 
one of them-he offered his abdication. The immediate and 
1. If the Ikhwan'rebel succeeded, Faisal al-Dowaish was 
to rule Nejd, Ibn Hithlain was to rule al-Hasa, and 
Ibn Hamid was to govern the Hejaz. The three leaders 
believed that their success in the partition of Ibn 
Saud's dominions depended upon the uncertain position 
of the other tribes whom they could win over if only 
'eý had was proclaimed. Ibn Saud was aware of their 
motives and invited all the tribes to al-Riyadh in 
order to secure their adherence to him against the 
rebels. See: Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 232; 
Al-Manar, xxx (1929-30), pp. 228-29; Umm al=Ours. 
No. 200,26 Oct. 1928. 
2. Umm al-Qura, No. 208,18 Dec. 1928; also: Report on 
the conference of al-Riyadh, Fuad Hamza to Philby 
(Philby Papers) 16/4; Al-Manar, xxix (1928-29) 
pp. 696-711. 
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expected answer of the 'ulama' was that they would 
accept "no ruler but him". He bowed to their decision, 
which was in fact a new bay'a. By this dramatic mode of 
abdication and re-election, Ibn Saud succeeded in 
consolidating his shaken position. Having secured this end, 
he began to discuss with them certain demands, including 
the abolition of the additional taxes that he had imposed 
on them and the modern inventions, but most importantly 
the destruction of the frontier posts. Their first two 
demands seemed very much easier for Ibn Saud to concede 
than the last one, which "worried" them and "grieved 
their hearts". 
"Our enemies" they argued, "built it [sic] in 
territories belonging to us ... you know that all 
the desert is ours ... Does your religion allow you 
to make such frontiers for them in our country ... 
we cannot be satisfied to keep patient on such 
a matter ... we look at1them only as an enemy 
entering our house 
They concluded: "we dis-associate ourselves from the 
activities of Al-Dowaish" on two conditions. First, the 
destruction of the posts and secondly no British intervention 
in Nejd affairs. Ibn Saud declaring himself ready to 
answer for all his actions in public, nevertheless 
insisted that questions relating to the posts and to the 
British must be reserved for more private discussions. 
Maintaining a bold front he proposed a meeting limited 
to fifty. 
2 No record of the meeting seems to have survived 
1. Jakins (Jeddah) to F. O., received 22 Jan. 1929, 
E387/3/91, F. O. 371/13713. 
2. Ibid; Jakins to F. O., 20 Dec. 1928, E139/3/91, F. O. 
371/13713. 
and this silence suggests that Ibn Saud was once again able 
to evade discussion of the matters in question and to 
concentrate on ways and means of cooperating against 
Faisal al-Dowaish and the Ikhwan rebels. 
Umm al-Qura confidently reported that the general 
meeting, as well as the private one, had ended in complete 
szccess for Ibn Saud's policy. It had been decided to 
"uphold the Nejd attitude with regard to the frontier posts 
and to maintain peaceful relations with Iraq and Transjordan". 
At the meeting the sovereign rights of the King to control 
policy were also "confirmed", and some tribal reorganization 
was completed. 
1 
. As the King himself later admitted Umm 
al-Qura had no doubt-exaggerated what had been achieved. 
But clearly Ibn Saud did obtain the backing of Nejd against 
the rebels. It was, however, left to him to find a solution 
to the posts question either peacefully or by force. 
The conference was an occasion for lavish entertainment 
and the distribution of presents to the people of Nejd. Accord- 
ing to Umm al-Aura "all the 25,000 men returned home with 
money and clothes". This display of calculated generosity 
no doubt helped Ibn Saud to win over the tribes. 
Now that the crowds had dispersed, Ibn Saud was left 
personally responsible for finding a compromise solution, 
as he had promised, to the problem. For this purpose, he 
felt it necessary to remain at al-Riyadh. While he was 
1. Umm al-Aura, No. 208,18 Dec. 1928; Jeddah Report, 
Dec. 1928, F. O. 371/13728 
deliberating, doubts among his supporters re-emerged 
and his own future again seemdd at risk. It was further 
threatened by renewed Ikhwan activities in December against 
Iraq and by R. A. F. retaliations. In reply to an official 
British protest he denied that the Ikhwan action could 
be regarded as raiding and described it simply as the 
exercise of customary grazing rights. These exchanges 
followed a familiar pattern, but more alarming from Ibn 
S? ud's point of view was a visit from King Faisal to the 
Busaiyah post, coinciding with rumours of revolt in 
the Hejaz spread by ex-King Ali and with news of raids 
coming from Transjordan. All this suggested to Ibn Saud 
that the Hashemites were still actively endeavouring 
to oust him. His anxieties were even further increased 
when news leaked about military exercises which Glubb 
was conducting in the desert. 
l 
As 1928 drew to a close, Ibn Saud found himself a very 
worried man. In the following year, which was to prove 
crucial for him, for Nejd and indeed for the whole of Arabia, 
he was to face even more formidable dangers than he had 
anticipated. Out of them was to emerge a new era of 
Anglo-Saudi co-operation. 
1. Jeddah Report, Dec. 1928 and Jan. 1929, F. O. 371/13728; 
Umm al-Aura No. 209,28 Dec. 1928, 'No. 210,4 Jan., 
No. 211,11 Jan., No. 217,22 Feb., No. 219,8 March, 
No. 220,11 March 1929. See also: Glubb: War in the 
Desert, Chapters 11,12 and 13. 
CHAPTER -. FIVE 
Anglo-Saudi Co-operation over the Liquidation 
of the Ikhwan Rebellion, January 1929 - January 1930 
- Ibn Saud Consolidates his Position with Britain's 
Help, January - June 1929 
Britain's Attitude. towards. 2khwan Attempts to Seek 
Asylum in Kuwait and its Effect on the 'Awazim, 
July - December 1929 
- Anglo-Saudi Co-operation over the Ikhwan. Rebellion, 
October 1929 - January 1930 
Ibn Saud Consolidates his Position with Britain's Help, 
January to June 1929 
Ibn Saud's frequent promises toýthe Ikhwan that he 
would solve the dispute over the frontier posts by 
diplomatic means rather than by military actions carried 
diminishing credence. His latest attempt at al-Riyadh, to,. 
calm the situation inside Nejd-in order to win time for- 
perhaps a last diplomatic attempt and for consolidating-his 
own position, was only temporarily effective. The Ikhwan, 
who had rejected the idea of obtaining any more written 
agreements from the British or the Iraqis, were now unwilling 
to accept further vain promises from their Imam. Thus they- 
rejected the decisions of al-Riyadh insisting instead on 
the immediate destruction of the posts. In fact this was 
the same attitude as Ibn Saud's-with only one difference that 
he was prepared to negotiate while they were not. While the 
problem remained unsolved the grievances of the Ikhw an 
multiplied and-separated them from their King. Unless Ibn 
Saud changed his mind-and joined them in the struggle, he 
seemed to them no better than an infidel: Despairing of 
any such change on his part they prepared for open rebellion 
against him. In that mood their leaders sought external 
support from their traditional enemies --the Iraqis, the 
Kuwaitis and even the British. This radically altered the 
whole situation. Now apart from the British, Ibn Saud was 
threatened from all sides. The Hashemites and the Ikhwan, were 
making secret contact to secure his downfall. - 
Aware of these developments, Ibn Saud decided temporarily 
to shelve his differences with Britain and to concentrate 
on the immediate internal threat. His first and limited 
attempts to put pressure on the rebels to bring them back 
to his fold failed and on the contrary helped to widen, 
the gulf between him and the rebel leaders. Consequently' 
he decided that he must liquidate the rebel movement before 
it destroyed him. On the other hand he lacked sufficient 
military resources to-guarantee-victory and, even if 
victorious, he realised that the rebels could seek asylum 
in neighbouring countries-thus still posing a threat. 
He therefore concluded that Britain's help-was necessary 
both to provide military equipment and to influence the 
neighbouring states not to admit'the rebels. Since Britain 
had frequently urged him to take action against the IkIwan 
he felt that, in this cause, he could rely upon their 
assistance. 
The decision to seek aid from Britain was not an easy one 
for Ibn Saud and the circumstances leading to that conclusion 
will be examined in detail: - He was faced with one obvious 
dilemma. If, as he desired, he was to retain the loyalty 
of the Ikhw. an he must act-as"their leader in opposing Britain. 
This obviously he could not do without sacrificing the good 
relations with Britain which he valued. In'that situation 
he first tried'to temporize. But, by the beginning of 1929 
the situation began seriously to deteriorate. The Ikl an, 
challenging internal authority and external Powers, launched 
attacks againstIraq; Kuwait and Transjordan in January. 
King Faisal's visit to the border area soon after was 
considered by Ibn Saud as a hostile act"directed against 
him, especially when it'coincided with"ex-King Ali's "injudicious 
remark" that the Hejazis would revolt against Ibn Saud in the 
near'future. l In the meanwhile, Transjordan tribes raided 
Nejdi tribes and'took as hostage the son of the-Shaikh of 
Bani Sakhr. " Also in'the same month, the American millionaire 
C. Crane and an American missionary were attacked by the 
Ikhwan inside Kuwait. While the former managed to escape, 
the latter was killed. This train of events, -in addition 
to Glubb's military activities on the vicinity of the border, 
created a dangerous ` situätionjust ' when the King was preparing 
to leave for the'Hejaz to spend the month of Ramadan according 
to custom. The'-situation became even more critical when in 
February the Ikliwan launched a big-raid on Iraq. This raid 
caused the British to'blame Ibn Saud and to shoulder him 
with the responsibility. 
2 
Umm al-Aura defended the King and blamed the British 
Government and its representatives on the spot-for originally 
causing the troubles by building the "forts", and also for 
having blocked Arab unity. " `The paper` urged the Iraqis 
1. See: Umm'al-Qura, No. ' 211,11'Jan 1929; Oriente Moderno 
_ix 
(1929) pp. 90,189. Also C. O. file no. 69040 about Ali's 
remarks, C. O. 732/39. 
2. Jeddah Report, Jan. and Feb. 1929, F. O. 371/13728; 
Umm al-Aura, No. 209,28 Dec. 1928, No. 210,4 Jan., 
No. 219,8 March, No. 220,11 March 1929; The Times, 
4,24,29 Jan. 1929; American Consul (Baghdad) to the 
Sec. of State (Washington) 14 Feb. 1929, al-Rashid, 
D. H. S. A., iii, p. 16; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 
p. 300. 
to throw off the Western yoke and to preserve the 
brotherhood between the peoples of the two countries. 
) 
Presumably, the paper intended to show that even moderate 
of 
elements in the Hejaz. and Nejd, disapproved, British attitude 
to the frontier disputes and at the same time aimed to turn 
the attention of Ibn Saud's internal critics to what 
it believed to be the main cause of, the. dispute. 
To the British the King indicated that he would now be 
prepared to give consideration to their previous arbitration 
proposal. At the sane time, anxious to display both to 
the British and to the Iraqis that he was master in his 
own house, he began to build up a strong punitive force 
to tackle the rebels. This led H. Jakins to report in 
March that the King was going to take "the most momentous 
decision in recent Arabian history".. "He seems" Jakins 
continued, "to have broken definitely with his former 
lieutenants". 2 Indeed, the King, realising the failure of 
the Riyadh Conference. and anxious to end the state of chaos 
which threatened his domestic position and his external 
relations, wanted. to make a limited show of force against 
the rebels which, he. hoped, would be sufficient to restore 
their allegiance. He was encouraged by the arrival of Clayton 
in Baghdad as High Commissioner in March. With a friend-in 
Baghdad for the first. time, the King believed that the rebels 
would not be given asylum should he punish them. 
3 
1. Umm al-Aura, No. 217,22 Feb. 1929; Jeddah Report, 
Feb. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
2. Jeddah Report, March 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
3. The Times, 6 &'9 March 1929. 
Closing upon the rebel forces, the King sent one 
of the'ulama'to persuade the Ikhwan leaders to submit 
to arbitration based on the Shari'a . This mission failed, 
but later al-Dowaish went to Ibn Saud's tent for discussions. 
A temporary agreement was reached but Ibn Saud, who did not 
believe that the other Ikhwan would endorse it, launched a 
sudden attack on the following day aimed at winning a quick 
victory to prove to the British that he was truly the master 
of the situation and capable of crushing-any unlawful behaviour 
by his subjects. In fact Ibn Saud only won an indecisive 
victory at this battle which became known as the battle of 
al-Siblah. Reports about the actual fighting are very 
confusing, but it is clear that the approach of the 
l 
pilgrimage season was one of the reasons which prevented 
the King from following up his partial success. He was 
obliged to hurry to the Hejaz where his presence was by 
now indispensible. Before his departure'he addressed 
the 'ulama'stressing that the Quran and the Sunnah must 
form the bases of any decision on`religious matters that the 
ummah must-obey him as their Imam; that meetings to 
discuss religious matters or otherwise were prohibited, and 
that the Ikhwan must respect other Muslims. 
2 
Ibn Saud's speech was significant. He sought to remove 
fanaticism from the minds of'the Ikhwan by sticking to the 
1. . See: Oriente Moderno, ix (1929), pp. 189-90,226-27. Dickson describes the battle of al-Siblah as 'a rather 
mysterious', see: Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 302-4. 
2. Umm al-Oura, No. 224, ` 12 April 1929; Jeddah Report, 
April 1929, F. O. 371/13728; Habib, Ibn Saud's warriers of 
Islam, pp. 136-42; Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 284-89. 
Sunnah rather than to individual interpretation of the 
Quran. He also wanted to make it clear that his claim 
to authority was according to the Shari'a . 
l, 
This was 
in fact a final attempt on the King's part to leave the 
door open for reconciliation. and to consolidate his 
position by gaining as much support from the 'ulama'as 
possible for any future campaign. The timing of the battle 
supports the idea that Ibn Saud was not prepared to break 
definitively with his former lieutenants. Thus Jakins 
report about a break between the King and the Ikhuan was 
premature. 
Leaving Nejd in a state of uncertainty, the King 
arrived in the Hejaz on 7 May. While there for religious 
duties, Ibn Saud found himself fully occupied by internal 
and external political affairs. Ibn Hithlin, the leader 
of the 'Ujman, had been murdered after being given 
not 
aman (full safe conduct) for/having joined al-Dowaish at 
a l-Siblah. According to Dickson: 
"The news of this shameful murder. spread like 
wild fire and caused a deep stir throughout 
north-eastern Arabia and local sentiment 
veered strongly round against Ibn Saud from 
this date". 
Hearing the news of the murder, Ibn Saud anticipated 
fresh troubles. This involved him in a flurry of 
diplomatic activity. One immediate problem was that his 
regular forces in Nejd urgently required a strong force 
1. '.... ati'o Allah wa rasoulaho wa oli al-amr menkom', 
(... obey Allah and his messenger and those in 
authority among you), Quran, 4/59. 
2. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 205. 
from the Hejaz to meet the anticipated troubles. Transport 
proved a major problem. The land route from the Hejaz to 
al-Hasa ran through hostile land. The only alternative 
was the sea route. To overcome this he asked Britain not 
only for transport facilities, but also for arms and 
ammunition. 
) These requests were sympathetically considered. 
"We are under some sort of obligation to assist 
him [Ibn Saud] to meet the consequences of his 
action [against the rebels]. Moreover, as it is 
the settled policy of H. M. G. so far as possible to 
maintain the authority of Ibn Saud in the Hejaz 
and Nejd any assistance, that we could properly 
give to prevent the collapse of his dominion, is 
desirable. " 
London', s readiness to offer a ship to the worried 
King posed a problem over unloading it. The coast 
of al-Hasa lacked any suitable port for the purpose. The 
only alternative was to make use of the port of Bahrain, but 
this would infringe Bahrain's neutrality in the struggle. 
Meanwhile, Ibn Saud's Government approached Gellatly, Hankey 
and Company with the same object. The company, who had to 
obtain Foreign office endorsement, met with the same 
difficulty over lack of port facilities, and the Foreign 
Office was not prepared to approve the use of Bahrain. 
The Government of India was prepared to sell Ibn Saud the 
required ammunition if he made a formal request. This 
last offer was not useful because of the already mentioned 
shipping difficulty, which forced the King to cancel the 
1. Jakins to F. O. 7 May 1929, E2322/2322/91, F. O. 371/13716; 
Jakins to F. O. 15 May 1929,69124, C. O. 732/41; Oriente 
Moderno, ix (1929) p. 482. 
2. Minute by Mr. Hall (F. O. ) 9 May 1929,69124, C. O. 732/41. 
whole project) In spite of his failure to solve the 
arms supply problem and of his previous inability to 
follow his victory at al-Siblah, the King's resolve to 
deal with the Ikhwan rebellion remained unshaken, particularly 
since he now knew that Britain was behind him. 
The King's experience in the Hejaz was "the worst of 
his campaigning days". According to Jakins, he "had 
to wash his own shirt and had only dates to eat". In 
addition to official diplomatic contacts, he was busily 
occupied in. trying_to lighten the gloom of the depressing 
political atmosphere at Mecca. There he, met a number 
of Indian agitators, all violently opposed to British 
Imperialism. To those. and to others, he made a number of 
speeches clearly reflecting his political position in both 
internal and foreign affairs. He. was reported as having 
said that it was hopeless for him or for his people to 
challenge the European powers by force, and indeed there 
was no need to do so since he did not fear the foreigners 
as much as he did the Muslims. The foreigners, he argued, 
could not achieve their aims in; Muslim countries without 
the help of treacherous and mercenary Muslims. In that 
connection, he stressed that the unity. of Islam was the 
only way to overcome all dangers whether from foreigners 
or from internal dissidents who called themselves Wahhabis and 
who had separated themselves from other Muslims. Wahhabism 
1. C. O. to'F. O., 13 May 1929, E2426/2322/91, F. O. 371/13716; 
F. O. to Jakins, 15 May 1929,69124, C. O. 732/41; F. O. 
Minutes 14 May 1929, E2433/2322/91; F. O. Minutes 15 
May 1929, E2494/2322/91, F. O. 371/13736; 
Jakins to F. O., 30 May 1929,69124, C. O. 732/41. 
appeared to Ibn Saud to threaten his own position and 
authority in Arabia, and to jeopardise the unity of Islam. 
He argued that, since Mohammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did-not 
create a new faith, it was a great mistake to 'call the 
movement Wahhabi. This was, in fact, a call for his people 
to moderate their fanaticism and to concentrate upon 
political realities. To this purpose they must avoid 
becoming separated fiom the main stream of Islam and they 
must learn to accept the fact of modern civilization and 
adapt themselves to its consequences. This, in his mind, 
need not clash with religious beliefs. The King went on to 
say that people of the present day, whether they wished it 
or not, were bound to accept Western civilization. He 
rejected the Ikhwän policy of banning any relationship 
with the British, but it must be remembered that on this 
occasion the King was speaking to non-Ikhwan elements and 
also to non-Arabs and attempting to find support for his 
l 
own political stance. His views had already found some 
support among Arabs. Amir Shakib Arslan an Arab nationalist 
from Lebanon, for example, had while on his way to Mecca in 
May, declared in an interview at Port-Said: ' 
"Arabia is now the only region that still has 
true independence ... The Arabs lack only, the 
modern arts and the material means. When they 
have these means together with the2faith and the 
national idea, they lack nothing. " 
1. See: Jeddah Report, May 1929, F. O. 371/13728; Umm al-Qura, 
No. 229,16 May, No.. 238,, 19 July, No. 240,26 July, 
No. 241,3 Aug. 1929. Hafez Wahba in his lecture at 
the Central Asian Society about 'Wahhabism Past and 
Present', stressed Ibn Saud's point of view on the 
Wahhabi sect of Islam. 
2. Oriente-Moderne, ix (1929) pp. 225-26. 
When Ibn Saud had completed his religious duties 
for the pilgrimage, he remained in the Hejaz, notwith- 
standing alarming reports of a deteriorating situation in 
Nejd. This was perhaps because he felt that he could better 
serve his political future by his presence in the Hejaz 
than on the battlefield. By the end of May, not only the 
Mutair and the 'Ugman, 
1 but also 'Utaibah were all, in open 
rebellion. Alarmed at this he thought that it would be politic 
to make some placatory gesture towards the Ikhwan and hence 
decided to release Ibn Bujad, one of, the 'Utaibah leaders 
whom he held in captivity. 
2 But, with rebellion still 
spreading, this failed to have the desired effect. Some of 
the leading rebels now began to secure promises of asylum 
, 
both in Iraq, and Kuwait. News of this caused Ibn Saud to 
raise the question of extradition. He urged the British 
Government to prevent the rebels "from making use of 
neighbouring countries ... and to refuse asylum to those 
who flee from justice into Iraq and Kuwait territories". 
The king argued that he could not-inflict punishment on 
the raiders if the British Government were unwilling to take 
equally strong action and if, Kuwaitand Iraq did not cease 
assisting and encouraging the rebels. He further complained 
of Glubb's policy in southern Iraq and asked the British 
Government to ensure that sanctuary would be refused to all 
Nejdis without discrimination. Then he made four specific 
1. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 306. 
2. Jeddah Report, May 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
requests to the British Government: 
1. to undertake the necessary military measures against 
the rebels; 
2. to expel the Ikhwan from Kuwait; 
3. to establish a blockade between Kuwait and Nejd; 
4. to allow Nejd forces to cross into Kuwait in pursuit 
of the offenders and to eject them. 
These proposals were discussed, before being sent to London, 
at a joint meeting at Jeddah between Fuad Hamza and Jakins. 
Accordingly, -Shaikh Ahmad of Kuwait was immediately 
instructed to allow no supplies to the rebels. 
1 
In mid June, Fuad Hamza pressed for a reply to his 
various requests and to those of the King. He argued that 
"a great change has taken place in the situation, 
necessitating the hastening of the request that a definite 
decision should be made on the subject". Ibn Saud 
and his government were worried about the possibility of 
al-Dowaish joining Ibn Mashhour and the 'Ujman in operating 
from Kuwait. Hamza tried to explain that Ibn Saud's purpose 
in seeking to punish the rebels was solely because they had 
attacked Kuwait and Iraq. If the British Government did not 
take effective action, the people of Nejd, as Hamza put it, 
"will be filled with misgivings". In order to avoid creating 
such an unfortunate impression, Ibn Saud's Government 
1. Ibn Saud to Jakins, 29 May 1929, No. 31/3/183; Jakins 
to F. O., 9 June 1929, E3375/2322/91, F. O. 371/13736; 
Jeddah Report, May and June 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
"see no objection to agreeing to British aeroplanes 
going and beating the criminals, even in the case 
of their being found within the frontiers of Najd, 
providid that this should take place on this occasion 
only. " 
Hamza concluded that his Government 
"earnestly hope that the British Government will 
take the most speedy measure in reply to the request 
of H. M. the King, and will thus furnish a real and 
satisfactory proof of týe cooperation expected from 
a_friendly Government. " 
Hamza's arguments'clearly reflected Ibn Saud's intention 
to persist in his new policy of liquidating the Ikhwan 
rebellion. 
In further pressing the case, Hamza frequently condemned 
Kuwait for providing help to the; rebels. He presented 
as-proof of his allegations a letter from al-Dowaish to 
Amir Saud (the eldest-son of the-king).. in which al-Dowaish 
statedLamongst other things that the Shaikh of-Kuwait 
"has given Ibn'Mashur arms, amunition and money 
and has communicated with the Ajman and told them 
that whatever"they. want is obtainable from him, 
and has promised to grant their requests ... [also] his territories are free-for them to enter, 
and ... he will speak to týe Christians [the 
British] on-their behalf. " 
Al-Dowaish offered, a conditional-reconciliation in the same 
letter as follows: 
4 
r 
1. Fuad Hamza to Bond (Jeddah) 16 May 1929, No. 31/2/4, 
F. O. 371/13736. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Faisal al-Dowaish to Amir Saud (undated) Annex to Hamza's 
letter of 16 May 1929, Ibid. 
"If'you want us as your subjects, you should 
look into our case ... we wish your father to 
promise us [the following]: 
firstly: to wipe out the past, 
secondly, to release your prisoners and each of 
us for his part will guarantee to do the same, and 
thirdly, to be allowed to fight the infidels 
with one of you, sons of Abd el Aziz accompanying 
us ... 
If we are killed it does not matter, and if we 
succeed it will be for'your benefit, just as our 
brethern took the Hejaz and it became yours in your 
name. " 
Al-Dowaish dramatically'concluded: 
"Saud, 'my brother, do not give up your friend for 
your enemy, please send the reply quickly ... the 
enemy of'your religion does not help. " 
Notwithstanding this emotional, appeal the king, 'as 
indicated by Hamza, remained determined to force the Ikhwan 
leaders to acknowledge his authority, in his-conviction 
that Britain's friendship was worth the risk of definite 
break'with'the Ikhwan. His political reasoning was 
communicated to London on 19 June. 
2 
The King's complaints had, meanwhile, been investigated 
by Colonel Dickson who-had just taken up his new job as 
Political ' Agent in Kuwait. Dickson confirmed the smuggling 
of food-and arms from Kuwait, but judged it impossible to 
mounta complete blockade of"the Kuwait-Nejd"frontier 
because of the migrating customs of the tribes in the area. 
Furthermore, the tribes of Mutair, 'Awazim and 'Ujman 
had regular contact with relatives in Kuwait through whom 
1. Ibid. 
2'.. Bond (Jeddah) to F. O., 19 June 1929, E3146/2322/91, F. O. 
371/13716. 
they could easily obtain supplies, with the connivance 
of the Shaikh and despite his faithful promise to Britain 
to the contrary. In fact, the Shaikh's sympathies were 
entirely with the Ikhwan rebels whatever his official- 
attitude. This was partly because of his, long standing 
differences with-Ibn Saudand-of his secret-hope that Ibn 
Saud might be toppled from his throne., On the-other hand 
he wasýtoo weak to act openly against British'policy. The 
people of Kuwait, according to Dickson, 'were "entirely with 
the'Ajman-today". The tribe had always been considered as 
Kuwaiti and its rights to. enter-Kuwait had always been 
recognised. 'Dickson obviously-felt sympathy for the Kuwaitis 
who had suffered the consequences of economic blockade. He 
concluded, "today it is the case of 'go as you please', 
and one cannot blame the peoplelof Kuwait from taking full 
advantage of the-state of affairs". 
1' 
- 
The Nejd situation was discussed at an interdepartmental 
conference at the Colonial-Office on 21 June. With regard 
to the question of bombing the Ikhwan as requested by Ibn 
Saud, the conference found it "impossible" blindly to obey 
Ibn Saud's request '. 'without first making sure that the 
implications involved were fully understood". Even then 
2 
an extension*to the operations from Kuwait was doubtful. 
1. Political Agent (Kuwait) to the Resident (Bushire) 
17 June 1929, E4058/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. Also 
Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 306. 
2. Memo. by Rendel (F. O. ) 21 June 1929, E2322/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13736; also I. O. to F. O., 26 June 1929, 
E2372/2322/91, F. O. 371/13716. 
Theydefended the recent policy of bombing because of its 
conditional and limited nature and because it did. not go 
far. beyond the policy which had already been approved by 
the last. Labour Government in 1924. That policy, it was 
decided, should remain the guide line. Two days later, 
Dickson warned the Colonial office against risking the fall 
of Ibn Saud. . Dickson predicted that if Ibn Saud 
disappeared from the Arabian theatre, as the Shaikh of 
Kuwait desired, "Arabia might-be reduced to anarchist 
tribe [sic], but in, that event's he added, "the tribes 
would leave their civilised neighbours unmolested". 
1 
This ambiguous conclusion suggested a need for a reconsideration 
of.. the-whole-matter. 
In reply to the. King's. requests above mentioned, the 
British Government promised to prevent the "improper use 
of. Kuwait territory by any. refugees from Nejd". 
2 This of 
course applied also to-Iraq territory. It was made clear 
to Ibn Saud that Britain could. not agree 'to aeroplanes 
crossing, the frontier merely, to search for rebels or to 
initiate operations, in Nejd, nor. could they allow his forces 
to operate from Kuwait. Ibn_Saud, had anticipated a 
warmer response, wrongly believing. in Britain's full readiness 
to,. be committed as far. as. he might-wish. In fact, Britain 
did not want to risk. burning her fingers. Britain's reluctance 
1. Political Agent (Kuwait) to C. O., 22 June 1929, E2322/2322/91 
F. O. 371/13736. The differences between Kuwait and Nejd 
were mainly-caused by, the blockade imposed by Ibn Saud on 
Kuwaiti trade, see Qasem, al-khalif al-arabia 1914-1945, 
Chapters 1-3. 
2. Jeddah Report, June 1929, F. O. _371/13728. 
to, go"beyond the policy they had already' determined, left 
the Ikhwan free to operate. Theycontinued to maintain 
contacts in Kuwait and, Iraq and persisted-in aggression 
against the Transjordan tribes, challenging Britain's 
influence there and Ibn Saud's authority in Nejd. W. L. 
Bond--reported that, according to an eye witness account, 
Ibn-, Saud's authority had-been shaken and'his limited 
achievement-following the Conference of al-Riyadh, October 
1928, had been destroyed. "The tribesmen" he continued, 
"openly declared their disapproval of Ibn Saud's title of 
King of the Hejaz and Nejd". 
1 
Determined to overcome 
these provocations by theýuse of modern-weapons, Ibn Saud 
appealed to Britain for help in providing planes to create 
a new Air Force. The King's wishes were put directly 
before the British Air mission which visited the Hejaz in 
June 1929 in connection with an earlier request for help 
in repairing his old planes. Negotiations continued 
throughout June and into. July when the British Government 
agreed to provide the King with new aeroplanes and personnel,. 
2 
Ibn Saud, having tried to build up his resources militarily 
and diplomatically in the Hejaz, now started a long and 
slow journey to Nejd in order to deal with the troubled 
situation there. Security measures were taken with the help 
of the British Agency and a strong force accompanied the King 
1. Ibid. 
2. Jeddah Report, July 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
"during his-"advance into unpacified country". 1, On 9 July 
he summoned the loyal 'Utaibah chiefs to meet him at al-Dowadami 
(150 miles from al-Riyadh). On meeting, he upbraided them for 
the disloyalty of their fellows--and reminded them of his own 
early and glorious days in an endeavour to gain their support 
for his next move against-the 'Ujman rebels. He also 
reminded them, of his superior power-and issued a warning 
against those who might fail him. 
2 (This was an echo of 
a declaration which he had made before setting out. ) He then 
talked to the assembled chiefs about plans to subdue the 
rebels. In supporting him they would be guided to the 
"right path". The King went on to say ... "if some 
persist in their sinning and it appears that the general 
interest is threatened, the one in charge will be obliged 
to inflict punishment and to shed blood". 
3 In his opinion, 
a politician like a physician may be "obliged to amputate 
one of the limbs in order to save the whole body". He then 
swore to fight for the maintenance of his country. The 
al-Dowadami meeting was only a partial success for Ibn Saud. 
1. Ibid. See also: Umm al-Qura, No. 239,21 July 1929; 
Oriente Modern o, ix (1929) p. 378. 
2. For al-Dowadami meeting see: Jeddah Report, July 1929, 
F. O. 371/13728; Bond (Jeddah) to F. O. 30 July 1929, 
E4139/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737; Wahba to Bond, 24 Sept. 1929, 
E5416/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738; Umm al-Qura, No. 239, 
21 July, No. 240,26 July 1929; Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriers 
of Islam, pp. 144-45. 
3. Bond to F. O. 15 July 1929, E3941/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
See also: Communique issued on the meeting of al-Dowadami, 
Annex to Umm al-Qura, No. 248,20 Sept. 1929. 
Further meetings to gain support against the rebels from 
the local tribes followed and the summer witnessed extensive 
efforts to tighten the ring around the rebels. The story 
of Ibn Saud's successful campaign has been fully recorded. 
Its main consequence, where Anglo-Saudi relations were 
concerned, was the impact of Ikhwan endeavours to evade Ibn 
Scud's wrath by seeking asylum and support from outside. 
Britain's Attitude towards Ikhwan Attempts to Seek Asylum 
in Kuwait and its Effect on the 'Aiiazim, July - Dec. 1929 
The Ikhwan appeal for refuge in Kuwait fell on deaf 
`1,. 
ears both in Kuwait and in London. The Ikhwan then conveyed 
to Dickson their desire to conclude a treaty of friendship 
with Britain. This was in fact a fundamental change in 
their attitude caused by food and other supply shortages. 
They preferred to deal with the mushrikein rather than to 
yield to Ibn Saud. In choosing to turn towards the infidels 
they were themselves adopting the same attitude that they had 
so much criticised in Ibn Saud and which indeed had 
precipitated their quarrel with him. In return for the 
proposed treaty, the Ikhwan. offered the British Government 
guarantees not to raid or loot. In spite of the fact 
that the Btitish Government was-reluctant to take up the 
Ikhwan's proposals, Dickson wished to keep in touch with them 
in order to try and understand their motives. At each 
meeting, he was careful to stress that Britain could not 
deal with men in rebellion against a friendly ruler, that 
they could not have supplies from Kuwait and that, if they 
crossed the borders, they would at once be bombed. The 
Ikhwan for their part denied any responsibility for the past 
raids, claiming that they were only soldiers obeying orders 
from their leader, that they had "accepted no orders except 
from Ibn Saud's own mouth" and that he had frequently 
1. Bond to F. O., 5 July 1929, E3817/2322/91, C. O. to F. O. 
13 July 1929, E3850/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
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ordered them "to continue their raiding and took the 'khumus'. 
1. 
of all the loot they got". ' They had'been content to carry 
out his orders but, when he "deceived" them and-broke 
the oath of God and when he became deeply involved with'the 
British all this had "stirred up" the whole of the"Ikhwan, 
even the moderates. The inevitable result was their revolt. 
Dickson concluded that "all. had. sworn to throw off his 
. 
1Ibn Saud's] yoke". 
2 
The Ikhwan explained that the revolt sought to guarantee 
security for their faith and lives. They believed that this, 
could be achieved either by. establishing for themselves 
"a small nation" should Britain agree to their proposed 
treaty, or by coming under Kuwaiti jurisdiction since 
they "looked. upon themselves as Kuwait tribes and wished 
only to return to their own". These two options were 
contradictory. The small nation they hoped to create was 
supposed to be on Nejdi land. For such an option no, British- 
help could, be expected since it contravened Britain's 
obligations to; IbnSaud. The other option, whereby they 
would be recognised as Kuwaitis, raised equal problems for 
Britain. If the Ikhwan established a foothold in Kuwait, 
this might lead to a whole host of new claims, possibly on the 
1. Islamic law gives Muslim warriors-one fifth of the 
ghana'im they got from the enemy. 
2. Dickson (Kuwait) to the Resident (Bushire), visit of the 
Ikhwan-leaders to Kuwait in July 1929, E2322/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13737; Jeddah Report, July 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
i' 
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part of Ibn Saud himself. Such confusion-about loyalties 
and nationality puzzled the British authorities and made 
them suspicious of Ikhwan motives and arguments. What had 
become obvious by now was that. their religious discontent 
had developed a political aspect. This, Dickson tried to 
discourage.. He pressed them "to make peace with Ibn Saud 
before it. was too late". In reply they, calmly and 
peacefully, assured him of their goodwill and requested 
him only to communicate to his government that the British 
need have nothing. to fear from them. either in regard to Iraq 
or Kuwait. Aware of the reasons behind the Ikhwan initiative, 
Dickson reported to London that the Ikhwan "were beginning 
to feel-the pinch. of hunger". Sympathising with their 
cause he agreed that the British. had the right to stop 
the smuggling of ammunition and rifles, but emphasised that 
"we had no right to stop food from their women and-children of .l 
Dickson wanted to distinguish between humanitarian principles 
and politics, or at any rate to justify a softer line than 
his instructions warranted. During this period doubts increased 
about the Ikhwan position. London, on 25 July, instructed 
the Resident in the Gulf to confirm that the attitude of the 
Shaikh of Kuwait had not changed, and to promise the Shaikh 
that "if he will co-operate loyally at the present juncture 
H. M. G. will endeavour to secure honourable settlement of his 
dispute with Ibn Saud". 
2 
1. Dickson to the Resident (Bushire), Visit of the Ikhwan 
leaders to Kuwait in July 1929, E2322/2322/91. Also: C. O. to 
F. O., 22 July 1929, E3678/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
2. C. O. to the Resident (Bushire) 25 July 1929, E3836/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13737. 
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Soon after they had made' their first appeal to Dickson, 
the Ikhwan, through Farhan Ibn Mashhour, again tried to talk 
to Dickson on 24 July. Meanwhile, 'Faisal'al-Dowaish pushed 
women, children and old men across the border into Kuwait. 
One of the reasons for this action was the "shortage of food 
and water inside Nejd; another may have been an attempt 
to force the Shaikh of Kuwait or the'British Government 
to help to'solve his problems. On 30 July, äl-Döwaish 
himself entered Kuwait and was interviewed by Dickson. 
' 
Soon afterwards the two Ikhwan leaders were ordered to 
leave Kuwait territory. 
Dickson's meetings with both Ibn Mashhour and al-Dowaish 
were highly important. Ibn Mashhour went to see him "on 
behalf of all the Ikhwan" in order to secure a political 
agreement. The Ikhwan frequently tried to reach a compromise 
at that time because they were unable to continue fighting, 
and because as Ibn Mashhour falsely boasted; 
"we are victorious today and as such we consider it 
a suitable time to reiterate our promises of 
friendship with the English and to reassure H. M. G. 
that we Ikhwan will not again attack the Iraq 
or Kuwait tribes". 
The-Ikhwan, unwilling to abandon the idea of a peace 
treaty, threatened through Ibn Mashhour that if the British 
did not give them asylum in Kuwait or Iraq, they 
would then turn to the French. For his part al-Dowaish proposed 
1. Jeddah Report, Aug. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
2. Dickson to the Resident (Bushire) 26 Aug. 1929, 
E4939/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
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to Shaikh Ahmad that he should be the Imam of the, Ikhwan, 
and mediate between them and the British Government. 
1 
While their. appeäls-fell on deaf ears, their position was 
becoming increasingly critical. As "Reuter" telegraphed 
at the end of August, "Hejaz troops have completely 
isolated. and surrounded Faisal al-Dowaish and his 
supporters". 
2 
The critical position of the Ikhwan. had been 
revealed by, al-Dowaish himself during-his meeting with Dickson 
and with Shaikh-of Ahmad, who sympathised with their cause, 
but was anxious not to get involved in Nejd affairs. He 
expressed surprise to learn that large numbers of Ikhwan 
women and children had already entered his territories. 
In spite of the difficulties which this was bound to cause, 
the Shaikh urged that at all costs we must save these 
[people] from being bombed". He turned to Dickson saying: 
"Both for you English, and [for] my sakes [sic]. if there 
should be a wholesale killing of women the results will be 
deplorable". Al-Dowaish, however, seemed heedless of the 
risk of bombing, because this "will serve to show us one 
more enemy ... if'our women are killed, then we shall move 
north ... and proceed via the Euphrates, to Syria in spite 
. He threatened, as had Ibn Mashhour, to of the English" 
3 
turn aginst the British and ally with the French. al-Dowaish's 
1. C. O. to F. O., 29 Aug. 1929, E4330/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13737. 
2. The Resident (Bushire) to Dickson, 30 Aug. 1929, 
E5009/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
3. Dickson to the Resident (Bushire) 31 Aug. 1929, ibid. 
attempts to win Dickson's support for the Ikhwan cause 
were vain. Dickson's negative attitude, and Shaikh 
Ahmad's inability to offer any help forced the Ikhwan, 
who were under the threat of hunger, to turn against other 
Nejdi-tribes, who had hitherto refused to join the rebels. 
As al-Dowaish threatened, he would turn the whole of Nejd 
against Ibn Saud. Al-Dowaish, however, was anxious to 
conciliate the British and to convince them that they were 
under an"obligation to him. He even drew up a list of 
favours performed: 
"we have cleared northern Nejd of Ibn Saud's 
forces, and we have done the British army a 
good turn by sending back to Iraq, some of her 
recalcitrant tribes like Shammar and Dhafir. 
We must now deal with Awazim... lwe wish to detach them from Bin Saud ... " 
Speaking to Shaikh Ahmad, al-Dowaish insisted that Kuwait 
was the 
"ancestral home of the Mutair... the Mutair and 
Ajman are your fighting tribes, and have been 
since the world began ... we certainly have been 
enticed away under the name of religion by Bin 
Saud, but we have no further use for him ... we now 
wish to return to our old homes and be under our 
old rulers ... our words are those of true Mussalmin [peaceful people] and we do not lie... we require 
nothing but water and grazing ... " 
While assuring their old enemies of their peaceful 
intentions the Ikhwan declared that they were going to fight 
their old friends. Al-Dowaish's plan was "to leave our camels 
and women here [in Kuwait] and issue forth into Nejd once 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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more to parry on our fight ... "1 Dickson reminded him 
that Britain had committed itself to'friendly relations 
with Ibn Saud and therefore could not break with him. He 
insisted that the Ikhwan must leave Kuwait at once. Putting 
all their cards on the table, the Ikhwan leaders had indeed 
left themselves with nothing left for bargaining. Conseqently 
al-Dowaish promised to leave Kuwait overnight, saying that 
he would go to the"Awazim's grazing area and affirming that 
his words were kalam sharaf (word of honour). He insisted, 
however, that he would not surrender to Ibn Saud. 
The British made good use of the outcome of these 
two meetings. They had become satisfied that there could 
be no peaceful relationship with the Ikhwan, who insisted 
on fighting and who seemed completely unstable. It was 
decided, therefore, to continue supporting Ibn Saud and to 
use every effort to put down the Ikhwan revolt. For that 
purpose, aeroplanes and personnel were to be sent to Ibn 
Saud by August. Because of his financial problems, London 
promised to defray the cost and all other"incidental 
expenses, "representing a free gift of about one fifth of 
the total cost". This was intended to provide "concrete 
evidence of their goodwill towards Ibn Saud and their desire 
to assist him". 
2 
1. Ibid.; see also, Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 
311-13. 
2. Jeddah Report, Aug. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
- 322 - 
Leaving Kuwait empty handed, al-Dowaish fulfilled his 
kalam sharaf to Dickson and the evacuation of the Ikhwan 
from Kuwait was completed by 5 September. The main body 
of the Ikhwan moved to al-Hasa in the'Awazim grazing 
area, while others were busy raiding the north of Nejd. 
These developments took place at a time when Ibn Saud's 
forces were fully occupied by the 'Utaibah rebellion in 
southern Nejd and by other problems in the Hejaz. 
l 
- 
The Ikhwan raids on Nejdi tribes worsened the 
situation, and by September rebellion had broken out again 
in many parts of Nejd. Ibn Saud criticised Dickson's 
soft dealings with their leaders in Kuwait and condemned 
his decision to allow them to depart without having been 
arrested or sentenced for their previous crimes. Hamza 
also pointed out that the failure to punish them would 
result in rumours as to a possible change in Britain's 
attitude and would be considered as a breach of the under- 
taking already given by the British Government to Ibn Saud on 
21 June. 2 On 22 September a note was addressed to 
Hamza giving full details about the alleged use of Kuwait 
as a base for the Ikhwan. It was stressed that Britain 
had only undertaken to prevent the improper use of Kuwait 
territory by Nejd rebels. Dickson interpreted British 
obligations as defined by the British authorities in London 
1. Ibid, Sept. 1929; Bond to Ham a, 5 Sept. 1929, E5409/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13738. 
2. Fuad Hamza to Bond, 3 Sept. 1929, E 5013/2322/91, Bond to 
F. O. 9 Sept. 1929, E 5015/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
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but Hamza pointed out that the note contained a promise that 
al-Dowaish was "to be attacked at once'in the event of his 
entering Kuwait territory". 
l While the British were 
anxious to preserve the neutrality of Kuwait and to 
prevent her getting involved'in the Nejd troubles, Hamza 
suspected their motives. He believed that the British were 
only talking about-the neutrality of Kuwait to hide their 
secret deal with'the Ikhwan. 'In order'to'avoid'any future 
misunderstanding London sent a formal reply to Hamza, dated 
28 September, emphasising their viewpoint and assuring him 
that the phrase in question was drawn up only to enable the 
British authorities in the field "to take drastic action 
against him [al-Dowaish] if and when necessary without 
2 
reference to higher authority". The British were 
being very cautious. They tried to appear to the outside 
world as neutral in the struggle between Ibn Saud and his 
people. They feared a strong reaction by Muslims elsewhere, 
especially after the warnings they had received from India. 
Finding difficulty in co-ordinating policy at a distance and 
in the interest of saving time, London decided to instruct 
its representatives in Baghdad Kuwait and Bushire to communicate 
directly with one another and to take whatever decisions 
seemed necessary to help tighten the ring around the rebels. 
3 
1. Jeddah Report, Sept. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
2. Bond to Hamza, 28 Sept. 1929, No. 2042/1464/38, F. O. 
371/13738. 
3. The Resident (Bushire) to the High Commissioner (Iraq) 7 
Sept. 1929, E 5010/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. Ibn Saud seized 
this opportunity and proposed to send a delegate to Baghdad 
to serve as a channel of communication, but this was rejected by London, presumably because it might be understood as a 
premature recognition by King Faisal of Ibn Saud's regime in 
the Hejaz. Jeddah Report, Oct. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
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Britain's objective, however cautiously approached, 
was to deny to al-Dowaish any chance of overthrowing Ibn 
Saud. This clearly emerged in a report drawn-up at the 
beginning of October by the American Vice Consul at Baghdad, 
based on information which he had received from an R. A. F. 
Officer. The report stated that al-Dowaish's activities 
were considered as:. 
"a cause for apprehension on the part of the British, 
and a source of real danger to Ibn Saud; that Dowaish 
,, 
is gathering his forces for a. test of strength with 
Ibn Saud, and, that should be successful, it is 
feared he will-attemyt to champion the cause of the 
Arabs in Palestine. " 
The ramifications of the situation were so complex 
that a reconsideration of British policy in general in the 
Middle East now seemed necessary. Rendel drew up a minute 
on 1 October which reflected all the difficulties that 
confronted both Ibn Saud and Britain. Ibn Saud appeared 
reluctant to take action against the Ikhwan without being 
assured of British support. In this context, Rendel pointed 
out that "our position, however, is one of considerable 
difficulty". He rejected Ibn Saud's proposal to pursue 
the rebelsrinto-Iraq or Kuwait, adding 
"I do not think we can give., an unconditional undertaking 
to attack fugitive rebels at sight should they be found in 
Iraqi,. or Kuwiti territory ... we could hardly hand them 
over to Ibn Saud who would ... inflict barbarous 
punishments on them ... it would be extremely difficult to intern large bodies of Ikhwan in Iraq for indefinite 
period ... Ibn Saud's fears on this question are therefore 
... well grounded; but we are already committed to 
giving himýall possible assistance, and it2is therefore 
desirable to do all we can to allay them. " 
1. American Vice Consul (Baghdad) to the Sec. of State 
(Washington) 5 Oct. 1929, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., iii, pp. 39-41. 
2. Minute by Rendel, 1 Oct. 1929 E 5002/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
For Ibn Saud's attitude see: Ibn Saud to H. M. G. 26 Sept. 
1929, E 5418/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738. 
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Rendel suggested that it was advisable to strengthen the 
British forces in Iraq and in Kuwait'but he again admitted 
that the question was "full of difficulty". He proposed 
its discussion of an interdepartmental meeting. It was 
agreed that the questions raised by Ibn Saud were awkward 
and required careful handling. 
1 
Preliminary discussions took place soon afterwards 
to consider the fears expressed by Ibn Saud that the 
Ikhwan would eventually launch a new attack should they 
succeed'in gaining asylum in Kuwait, Iraq or Syria'. It 
was agreed that air'action would be inappropriate'if the 
raiders were accompanied by their women and children. 
It was impossible therefore to give Ibn Saud the undertaking 
which he desired. The meeting, however, found it possible 
to meet some of Ibn`Saud's' desiderata by 
"agreeing to his proposal to post forces near the 
frontier, and by suggesting arrangements for 
closer liason between his loyal chiefs and the 2 local frontier authorities in Iraq and Kuwait". 
But'if it happened that-women and children entered either 
area, the Btitish position would become "most difficult". 
Ibn Saud, it was suggested, should also be informed of this 
difficulty since this would stop the British being accused of 
bad faith. It was agreed later that he should designate 
1. Minute by Monteagle, 1 Oct. 1929, Minute by Oliphant 
2 Oct 1929, E 5002/2322/91, F. O. 371/13737. 
2. Minute by Rendel, 3 Oct. 1929, op. cit. 
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emissaries to the local frontier authorities-to inform them 
of the movements of his troops, -but the crossing of the 
l 
fontier by his forces was now-totally rejected. 
Nevertheless, London continued to feel anxious about 
Ibn Saud's position. They hoped he would be able to deal 
with the rebels without getting the. British involved., 
His situation was also discussed locally by the moderates 
and by the loyal tribes, who showed the same anxiety as the 
British. ' There was, in fact, a-consensus that he had been 
facing a critical challenge-to his authority ever since 
the Ikhwan had thrown off the veil of their doubtful 
allegiance and--had'declared themselves openly in rebellion. 
According to Bond the Hejazis whether sympathetic or hostile, 
believed that 
"the fate of, the Hejaz and of Arabia in general 
may at any time within the next few months be 
staked upon the-issue of a deci2ive battle between 
Ibn Saud and the rebel forces. " 
Doubts also were expressed as to the King's ability to control 
the situation. He had not only lost his warriors but they 
themselves had now become his main opponents. His endeavours 
to replace them by regular forces3 had been hampered by 
fZ 
social and financial problems. Even when he later succeeded 
1. Jeddah Report, Oct. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
2. Bond to Henderson, 22 Sept. 1929, E 5410/2322/91, F. O. 
. 371/13738. Hostile elements in the Hejaz believed, as the Hashemites did: Ibn Saud would survive for one month 
only. See: Al-Manar, xxx (1929-30) p. 397. 
3. For Ibn Saud's regular army see: Ummal-Aura, No. 287, 
6 June, No. 289,20 June, No. 291,4 July, No. 292,11 July, 
No. 293,18 July 1929. 
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in doing so, the new army-lacked-the enthusiasm of the 
Ikhwan when they had carried him to power. This 
enthusiasm and their religious zeal were their main 
assets. Dickson likened them to Cromwell's "Ironsides" 
or to the German "storm troops". Even if the regular 
army now appeared the stronger force, it had some weaknesses 
due to inferior morale. The defection of the Ikhwan had 
to a large extent discredited Ibn Saud among the more 
fanatical and influential elements of his own following. 
Reflecting on Ibn Saud's decline in prestige and popularity 
in the Hejaz Bond concluded: 
"it is generally believed that, except in Nejd ..., 
the majority of the tribes would rise at once if thyre 
were any reasonable hope of throwing off his yoke". 
Ibn Saud suffered further humiliation when he 
found himself powerless to protect his own supporters. 'Awazim. 
They were defeated in October by the combined forces of 
the Mutair and the 'Ujman under Faisal. al-Dowaish. Finding 
themselves unprotected in their own homes, the'Awazim appealed 
to the Shaikh of Kuwait for permanent protection, which he 
and the Political Agent were willing to offer, as the only 
alternative left to the'Awazim was to throw in their lot with 
the Ikhwan and to start fighting Ibn Saud. London approved 
the admission of the'Awazim into Kuwait claiming that it 
was in no way inconsistent with the attitude hitherto adopted 
by H. M. G. on the ground that there was a cause for believing 
1. Bond to Henderson, 22 Sept. 1929, E 5410/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13738. 
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that the 'Awazim originally to have. been a Kuwaiti tribe. 1 
With their inclusion in his forces, it was argued, the Shaikh 
of Kuwait "might be able to protect Kuwait against Akhwan 
raiders". But Ibn Saud, the-Foreign Office believed, 
would not "voluntarily cede a tribe to another state", 
2 
because this would reduce the number of his fighting men, 
and might also reduce his territories by adding the 'Awazim 
grazing area to Kuwait territory. The Shaikh of Kuwait 
could be persuaded to grasp such an opportunity, and then to 
use the 'Awazim as a bargining card in any settlement 
of differences with Ibn Saud. The defeat of the 'Awazim 
and their migration to the Kuwaiti border area was in fact 
of considerable benefit to al-Dowaish. The immediate 
advantage was that the rebels enjoyed grazing in a large 
area of al-Hasa. On 30 October the 'Awazim were given 
assurance of Kuwaiti protection and on 16 November the Shaikh 
addressed their leaders offering them a certain part of his 
country for grazing. 
3 This produced a strong, protest from 
1. See: Bond to F. O. 15 Oct. 1929, E 5308/2322/91; C. O. to 
F. O. 18 Oct. 1929, E 5376/2322/91; C. O. to F. O. 21 Oct. 
1929, E 5434/2322/91; 1.0. to F. O. 28 Oct. 
-, 
1929, - 
E 5556/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738; Oriente Moderno, ix 
(1929) p. 481. About the'Awazim, their origins and 
society seer A. A. al-'Ubaid, Quabilat al-'Awazim, 
derasah 'an asleha wa moitama'ha wa diareha, 
(Beirut 1971). 
2. F. O. Minutes, 17 Oct. 1929, E 5127/4032/91, F. O. 
371/13740. 
3. Jeddah Report, Nov. 1929, F. O. 371/13728; The Resident 
, (Bushire) to C. O., 31 Oct. and 1 Nov. 1929, E 5651/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13738 
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Ibn Saud, who requested both the British and Shaikh Ahmad 
to expel the tribe .l Ibn Saud pointed out that the alleged 
defeat of the 'Awazim was "a trick of Dowaish in order to 
place friends of his inside Kuwait territory whom he 
can use for his own purposes". 
2 He also condemned 
Shaikh Ahmad for taking advantage of Nejd troubles. 
Ibn Saud received no reply to his complaints before 
5 December. Britain defended her decision to endorse 
Shaikh Ahmad's acceptance to admit the 'Awazim into his 
territories. It was argued that the 'Awazim -having 
surrendered to Faisal al-Dowaish could no longer be 
regarded as part of the King's forces, but they equally 
could not be regarded as insurgents". Britain's attitude 
was therefore not "inconsistent either with their decision 
not to allow Ibn Saud's forces to cross the frontier-of 
with their undertaking not to allow the rebels to find- 
refuge in Kuwait". Indeed the 'Awazim had a very limited 
choice - that is "to throw in their lot with the rebels 
and to fight against the King", 
3, 
a course which Britain had 
wished to avoid. In the circumstances it had been entirely 
in the King's interest that the 'Awazim should be definitely 
neutralised by entering Kuwait, and indeed Britain favoured 
this course. 
1. Bond to F. O., 24 Nov. 1929, E 6069/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738. 
2. Jeddah Report, Nov. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
3. Jeddah Report, Dec. 1929, F. O. 371/14460. See also: F. O. to Bond, 4 Dec. 1929, E 5651/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738. 
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In fact, the'Awazim did not enter Kuwait. They 
remained in the neutral zone. This displeased Shaikh Ahmad 
who asked them on 8 December to choose between entering 
Kuwait within ten days or being refused access to his 
territories and denied supplies. The Shaikh intended to 
add the tribe to his own and if he was successful he then 
needed to remove them from the vicinity of the troubled 
area. The'Awazim, whose loyalty was wavering, argued that 
they had been forced to stay midway because their camels were 
then im poor condition and that their temporary position 
offered them the protection they needed. Their, argument 
was unacceptable to. the Shaikh and later it was reported that 
they were treated "as being part of the contending forces 
and were denied supplies from Kuwait". Consequently the 
tribe raided Kuwait three times and this convinced 
their 
the British that no faith could be put in/protestations. 
Britain's policy had indeed placed the'Awazim in 
"an indeterminate position" which, as Rendel put it, "may 
well justify Ibn Saud's worst fears". 
2 
However, the 
expulsion of the'Awazim was an equally difficult decision and 
in any case Britain's pledges to Ibn Saud did not oblige her 
to take such severe measures as Ibn Saud suggested. 
1. Jeddah Report, Dec. 1929, F. O. 371/14460. 
2. Minute by Rendel, 6 Dec. 1929, E 6374/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13739. 
Anglo-Saudi Co-operation over the Ikhwan Rebellion, 
October 1929 - January 1930 
Not only Kuwait but also the Hashemite King of Iraq 
took. advantage of the Ikhwan rebellion. There is evidence 
that Faisal, while keeping the British in the dark, had 
morally and materially supported the rebels. In doing so- 
he might benefit and had nothing to lose. Ibn Saud was 
fully aware of the potential danger. He had always been 
suspicious of Iraqi designs. Early in September 1929 he 
furnished Clayton with evidence for his suspicions. The 
letter was received by R. 
_ 
Sturges, Acting High Commissioner, 
in October immediately after Clayton's sudden death. 
Sturges drew the attention of the Iraqi Prime Minister to 
Ibn Saud''s complaints that Iraqis 
"have been attempting to encourage the rebel 
tribes with promises of assistance both from 
Iraq and from [H. M. G. ] ... and that on more 
than one occasion they have conveyed money and 
horses to the rebels ... via Kuwait territory". 
He then advised that: - 
"in any case, it is obviously impossible on grounds 
either of political expediency or of good faith 
for the Iraq Government to countenance in any way 
surreptitious relations with the rebel Ikhwan tribes 
who have so recently been guilty of murderous attacks 
on Iraqi subjects for which the Iraq Government have 
demanded their punishment at the hands of King Ibn 
Saud. The British Government will appreciate therefore 
the importance of taking, immediate steps to remove 
the misapprehension that has }been caused by the 
activities of those persons". 
1. R. Sturges (Baghdad) to the Iraqi Prime Minister, 
6 Oct. 1929, E5574/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738. 
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In fact this. precaution had been advised by Clayton three 
months earlier, but "it seems unfortunate that his advice 
was not adopted".. , 
By the end. of October suspicions had grown about 
Faisal's involvement in the-affair. 
1 At the Foreign 
Office Stonehewer-Bird minuted: 
"King Faisal has been actively intriguing 
with the rebels and on a much larger scale 
and with more. fýr reaching objects than had 
been supposed. " 
Butler agreed, with Stonehewer-Bird'. s minute and added: 
"... the position is a shabby one ... Ibn 
Saud ... has driven. the guilty tribes ... into 
rebellion and is now fighting for his life against 
them. King Faisal ... has seized this opportunity 
to work off his family's feud against Ibn Saud 
by intriguing with the rebels. " 
London was worried about the consequences of Faisal's 
intrigue which could make Ibn Saud's position "far from 
good". Thus. Faisal's attitude was. regarded as a breach 
of his obligations to the. British Government. According to 
article 4 of the 1922. -treaty, Faisal was to be guided by 
Britain's advice on all important matters affecting 
her international obligations and her friendly treaty 
relations with Ibn Saud. It-was agreed that Faisal must 
1. See: Al-Manar, xxx (1929-30) pp. 396-98; Helms, The 
Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, Evolution of Political 
Identity, (bondon 1981) pp. 238-42. 
2. Minute by Stonehewer-Bird, 23 Oct. 1929, E5422/2322, 
F. O. 371/13738. 
3. Minute by Butler,. 24 Oct. 1929, . cit. 
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be pressurised to respect his obligations. Accordingly 
he now agreed-"to maintain a scrupulously correct attitude 
in conformity with H. M. G. policy in regard to Ibn Saud". 
But London remained alarmed by the threat of the Iraqi 
backed Shammar. The danger which they continued to pose 
to Ibn Saud's regime was harmful to Britain's prestige 
in the area. As Butler minuted on 24 October: 
"It is difficult to forsee how the fall of Ibn 
Saud would react on Arab feeling towards the British. 
But suspicion that we have treacherously connived 
at it would be likely to prejudice our own positign, 
and perhaps ultimately that of King Faisal also. " 
Britain's fears stemmed from intelligence reports 
about a "most secret" plot against Ibn Saud engineered 
by the rebels in co-operation with other elements from 
Shammar and Taala with the help of Baghdad. The plot 
was leaked to Dickson by a reliable Mutair leader, whose 
source was al-Dowaish himself. 
2 
Faisal was once again 
caught in the act of disobeying British instructions. 
Shaikh Ahmad's attitude, it was'argued, was "better" than 
Faisal's3 
1. Ibid. The C. O. put pressure on King Faisal by 
refusing permission for his father to leave Cyprus. 
Thus Faisal was forced to work harmoniously with 
British policy.. 
2. Dickson to the Resident (Bushire), (undated), op. cit.; 
American Vice Consul (Baghdad) to the Sec. of State 
(Washington) 31 Oct. 1929, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., iii, 
p. 54. 
3. Minute by Butler, 1 Nov. 1929, E5127/4032/91, 
F. O. 371/13740.. Butler repeated that "we may 
agree to do our best for him" (Shaikh Ahmad) 
in securing "an honourable settlement" in his 
dispute with Ibn Saud over Zakat and other 
commercial matters. 
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Britain's success in isolating the rebels, by denying 
them any aid or support, forced al-Dowaish to make another 
appeal to Shaikh Ahmad. At the end of October he travelled 
directly to Kuwait to confront the Shaikh. Refusing to 
meet him,, Shaikh Ahmad sent his brother'Abd - Allah 
to make contact and to obtain from him as much information 
aspossible, without giving any promise for further 
meetings. 'Abd -Allah followed his instructions and 
accordingly al-Dowaish agreed to leave atdawn on 1 November. 
At that meeting al-Dowaish'made three specific requests 
for transmission to the British Government: 
1. that the families of the Ikhwan were to be given 
assurances that they would not be molested while in 
Nejd territory, 
2. that if those families were attacked by Ibn Saud, 
would they be given permission to. enter Kuwait? 
3. Knowledge of British reaction if his forces were to 
destroy or capture any of Ibn Saud's aeroplanes. 
These requests were immediately communicated to London 
through Bushire on 2 November. 
2 
London took al-Dowaish seriously. His requests were 
added to, the agenda of an Interdepartmental meeting which 
was being held on 4 November. The meeting reached the 
1. Jeddah Report, Nov. 1929, F. O. 370/13728. 
2. C. O. to F. O., 3 Nov. 1929, E5655/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738; 
Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 316. 
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following conclusions: 
"They [H. M. G. ] do not feel 'called upon to indicate 
[the]. attitude which they would adopt in circumstances 
referred to by him [al-Dowaish], but as regards his 
point 2_ assurances given to Ibn Saud preclude grant 
of refuge to Dowaish's women in Kuwait or Iraq. 
As regards his point 3 they would take a very 
serious view of failure on his part to treat with 
full consideration anY British personnel that might 
fall into his hands. " 
In communicating the above statement to al-Dowaish, London 
expressed to Shaikh Ahmad the desire that: 
"It would be made clear that they [H. M. G. ] were 
not-prepared to enter into any further discussions 
with him [al-Dowaish] , he should be warned that if 
he himself or any of his emissaries crossed the 
Kuwait frontier again they would be liable to 
arrest, or any other action that might be 
considered necessary. " 
At the same time Ibn Saud was asked to "take effective 
measures to prevent the crossing of the Iraq or Kuwait 
frontiers by the rebels or their women and children. ,3 
This gesture of good faith was appreciated by Ibn Saud, 
but it is not clear how Ibn Saud could- prevent the rebels 
from crossing the frontier while maintaining his own 
pressure upon them. Nevertheless Britain's attitude, 
as Dickson concluded, "marked the collapse of the rebellion" .4 
1. C. O. telegrame to the Resident (Bushire) 6 Nov. 1929, 
E5655/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738. See also: Minute 
by Rendel, 6 Nov. op. cit. 
2. Jeddah Report, Nov. 1929, F. O. 371/13728 
3. Ibid. 
4. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 316. 
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Ibn Saud, having recovered from his-October campaign 
against 'Utaibah in Southern Nejd was now, in midýNovember, 
: busily preparing for a similar campaign against 'Ujman 
and Mutair. On 29 November this Communique was issued: 
"After the brilliant success achieved in the 
punitive expeditions against the rebels ... the 
King has given orders to all the forces to proceed 
to the frontier regions where the remnant of the 
rebels have sought shelter, so that decisive 
measures may be taken against them ... within 
a few days the punitive operations1will have [been] 
brought to a successful issue,... " 
In order to prepare the political ground for his 
campaign Ibn, Saud had sent Hafez Wahba to Kuwait, without 
previous notification, to discuss the situation with 
Shaikh Ahmad and., to keep a close watch on its development. 
2 
Meanwhile, IbnýSaud's plan was made known to the British 
Agent At Kuwait.. The Baghdad Times reported that Wahba 
went to Kuwait to discuss a-blockade of al-Dowaish 
and-that Ibn Saud would personally lead his forces in 
the battle, -while British aeroplanes which had already 
been sent to-Ibn Saud would be used in the offensive and 
would be piloted by four British Officers. 
3 In fact 
Wahba's presence in Kuwait complicated the situation. 
1. Jeddah Report, Nov. 1929, F. O. 371/13728; also: 
Dec. 1929, F. O. 371/14460; Umm al-Qura, No. 258, 
29 Nov. 1929. 
2. Bond to F. O. 8 Nov. 1929, E5783/2322/91, F. O. 371/ 
13738. See also: Dickson Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 
p. 317. 
3. See: American Consul (Baghdad) to the Sec. of State 
(Washington) 10 Jan. 1930, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., iii, 
p. 58. For purchase by Ibn Saud of aeroplanes see: 
American Vice Consul (Aden) to the Sec. of State 
(Washington) 27 Feb. 1930, Ibid ., p. 69. 
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rather than helped to solve it. The Shaikh` was suspicious 
about his sudden appearance. Although London appreciated 
the Shaikh's misgivings, it was difficult to deport Wahba 
from Kuwait or even to protest against such a petty 
matter officially. 
1. 
The`strong pressure' put on' al-Dowaish led to 
rumours that he 
"had decided to submit to Ibn Saud, 'partly as a 
result of the collapse of the Ataibah but chiefly 
because of H. M. G. uncompromising reply to his 
questions 
He "had given up all hope of receiving 
support from Kuwait or Iraq, and had, therfore 
decided to open negotiations with Ibn Saud while 
still strong and undefeated, especially as the 2 
Mutair were pressing him to adopt this course. " 
In fact, Ibn Saud, who was still favoured a , peaceful 
solution, took the initiative and sent al-Dowaish an offer 
of reconciliation conditional upon his return to the fold. 
Taking advantage of this suitable opportunity al-Dowaish 
enquired about Ibn Saud's terms. But before receiving any 
reply al-Dowaish put his own conditions for surrender; 
that he could purchase. necessary supplies from wherever he 
liked, that he would not be asked to meet Ibn Saud, and that 
his people would be allowed to lead a nomadic life in the future. 
3 
1. See: The Resident (Bushire) 15 Dec.; C. O. to F. O. 17 Dec. 
1929, E 5695/2322/91; 'C. O. to F. O. 27 Dec. 1929; F. O. to 
C. O., 7 Jan. 1930, E 6762/2322/91, F. O. 371/13739. 
2. Jeddah Report, Nov. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
3. Ibid. 
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Ibn Saud, whose reply was sent to al-Dowaish through 
the British Agent at Jeddah on 23 November, gave a vague 
answer referring the matter to the Shari'a and'threatening 
that he would attack in force not only the rebels but also 
Kuwait. 1 This threat alarmed the British, whose concern 
about the security of Kuwait was well known to Ibn Saud. 
It was based upon formal recognition by Ibn Saud of Britain's 
special p(osition in Kuwait under article 6 of the Treaty 
of Jeddah concluded only a year ago. 
Ibn Saud's threat to Kuwait was mainly caused by his 
anger at Shaikh Ahmad's sympathetic treatment of the Ikhwan, 
Equally he was, as he wrote Dickson on 17 November, angry 
at Dickson's failure to force the Shaikh to obey British 
instructions and at the leaking of the secret information 
with which he had furnished the Agent. Moreover he claimed 
that he had evidence that the rebels had been guided 
by high authorities in Iraq and Kuwait. He pointed out 
that he had made a conciliatory gesture to the Ikhwan 
although admittedly at the same time setting his forces in 
motion. He requested Britain to approve either of the 
following alternatives: 
"a) That Kuwait subjects should be 
ordered to collect in a given place, 
far removed from any likely zone'of 
hostilities, and that they should be 
informed of the place selected. The 
Kuwait Government should then man the 
1. Bond to F. O. 24 Nov. 1929, E6109/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738. 
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frontier with a sufficient force to repel 
the rebels and to drive them back as far as 
they can, even pursuing them in Nejd territory 
itself. If any rebel succeeds in crossing the 
frontier he should be siezed and handed over. 
If this alternative were adopted it would then 
be unnecessary for him to cross into Kuwait 
territory himself. Liaison officers should 
be attached to the two forces engaged in dealing 
with the rebels. " 
"b) If this is not agreed to he proposed that the 
-subjects of Kuwait should be ordered to 
concentrate in only locality as above and that 
he should be at liberty to pursue the rebels 
anywhere. He would then take upon himself to 
protect the subjects of neighbouring countries 
from aggression, and he would undertake to 
withdraw every single soldier as soonlas the 
pursuit of the rebels was at an end. " 
Ibn Saud warned that if neither alternative was acceptable, 
he would give up his punitive measures and would take no 
responsibility for any Ikhwan aggressive action. 
2 
On 28 and 29 November two interdepartmental meetings 
were held at the Foreign office to consider the line of action 
which should be recommended. The India office, supported 
by the Foreign office, recommended that the reply should be 
"as conciliatory as possible", but the Colonial Office 
preferred it to be "more stiffly" worded. The India and 
Foreign Offices appreciated Ibn Saud's legitimate grievance 
which had been expressed not only by himself but also in an 
Air Ministry study of the situation. The meeting agreed that 
1. Jeddah Report, Nov. 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
2. Bond to F. O. (undated) E6169/2322/91, F. O. 371/13738. 
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"there is no doubt that the British authorities in Kuwait 
have gone somewhat too far in negotiating with Ibn Saud's 
rebels". It was also agreed that Britain "should not allow 
Ibn, Saud'sýimplications that they had shown bad faith to 
pass unchallenged", and in order to avoid the repetition of 
such'allegations, it was decided to send a warning to Ibn 
Saud "against the acceptance of reports from interested and 
unreliable sources". 
l Accordingly, a long telegram was 
sent to Ibn Saud in which London stressed their good faith 
in handling his problems, and reminded him of the military 
help they had provided and of their refusal, as agreed not 
to give any guarantees that the rebels' women and children 
might remain in the neighbouring states. In reply to Ibn 
Saud's specific requests of 17 November, he was informed that 
in addition to the stringent measures already pursued, 
further steps had been taken to meet his wishes and to 
express Britain' s' readiness "to co-operate wholeheartedly" 
with him in the establishment of peace and order in his 
dominions. He was also informed that instructions had been 
given to secure the removal of all Kuwaiti tribes and 
the'Awasim refugees from the disturbed neighbouring areas and 
to secure the concurrence and co-operation of the Shaikh of 
1. Quotes from: Memo. by Rendel, 30 Nov. 1929 E6205/2322/91, 
F. O. 371/13739. The reference here is to Philby who 
became'a definite enemy of H. M. G. in the public press'. 
His position as an anti-British confidential adviser 
to Ibn Saud was difficult to deal with. See minute 
by Rendel, 29 Nov. 1929; see also Daily News 2 Dec. 
and Daily Herald 4 Dec. 1929, for Philby's articles. 
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Kuwait and the Government of Iraq and Transjordan in military 
efforts to prevent the Ikhwan from entering their territories. 
It was finally emphasised that London could under no 
circumstances allow Ibn Saud's forces to cross the frontier 
into neighbouring countries. Any such attempt might result 
in conflict with British forces. 
1 
Sufficiently reassured by this British reaction, Ibn 
Saud launched his assault against the rebels. Al-Dowaish, 
who had been evicted from Kuwait with his followers by 
British forces, had been preparing but without any success for 
a counter attack. His followers suffered a partial defeat. 
Now at the beginning of December, he and other Ikhwan leaders 
found themselves in a hopeless situation. Resistance seemed 
impossible and he could only look for peace. According to 
Glubb three courses appeared to be open to him. The first was 
to surrender to Ibn Saud unconditionally and to seek his 
mercy. As Ibn Saud had already declared, he would then refer 
the matter to the Shari'a. "A second possible course was to 
attempt to break through to Transjordan or Syria", where he 
might be able to gain sympathy. A third and preferable 
course was to obtain asylum in Iraq. This course, if agreed 
upon, would offer the Ikhwan safety either on a permanent 
basis or pending return to their homeland once peace was, made 
1. F. O. to Bond, 30 Nov. 1929, E6205/2322/91, F. O. 371/13739. 
By mid Dec., the Resident in the Gulf reported: the Neutral 
Zone was gradually evacuated andlbn Saud was assured. 
Jeddah Report, Dec. 1929, F. O. 371/14460. 
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with Ibn Saud. In the event al-Dowaish, followed by some 
of the other leaders, first turned towards the Iraqi 
frontiers. Then on 13 December he sent a deputation to 
negotiate with the British and the Iraqis seeking 
friendship and protection. In his letter, addressed to 
Glubb, al-Dowaish threatened that, if his offer was not 
accepted, he would find sanctuary in Transjordan. Glubb 
understood that al-Dowaish's deputation "had been sent as 
much to ascertain our strength as to negotiate for terms". 
Glubb gave no immediate reply, but he seemed in favour of 
reaching an agreement. As he later stated: "never indeed, 
during the previous eight years of terror, had we dreamed 
of so dramatic a turning of the tables". 
1 
The British and the Iraqis were now convinced that 
intensive work must'be done to resist any Ikhwan adventure 
into Iraq. Accordingly a senior police officer was appointed 
to organise Iraqi police in the frontier area. He was 
instructed by Baghdad to dismiss the Ikhwan deputation and 
to halt any further intercourse with the rebels. "Thus the 
rebels' hopes of obtaining asylum in Iraq had been destroyed 
at a blow and there seemed to be a possibility that they 
would now adopt the alternative course of breaking through 
to the West". Apparently, "the Ikhwan were unable to make 
1. Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 311-15; See also: F. O. to 
C. O., 31 Dec. 1929, E6687/2322/91, F. O. 371/13739 . 
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up their minds on any united course of action", 
' but later 
it was reported that al-Dowaish had tried to win a positive 
reply from the French to a similar appeal - but to no avail. 
2 
The rapidly deteriorating conditions of the Ikhwan caused 
some fear among the Baghdad authorities that the rebels 
might, under stress of shortage of food and water, attack 
Iraqi tribes and cause chaos in the southern desert. 
Therefore it was decided that "the rebels must be allowed 
to use the wells in the Neutral Area". In the meanwhile 
British and Iraqi forces were redeployed to frustrate any 
sudden offensive. 
3 
Permission to the rebels to enter the 
neutral zone could be interpreted on humanitarian grounds 
rather than as a breach of promise to Ibn Saud. 
Only Ibn Mashhour crossed the Iraqi borders and refused 
to move. He and his followers were disarmed and surrendered on 
24 December. As an R. A. F. Officer reported, he was "our 
Christmas present to Iraq". 
4 By 29 December al-Dowaish and 
his followers had been routed by the forces of Ibn Saud's 
loyal Harb tribe assisted by Iraqi tribes. In the meanwhile 
the R. A. F., Iraqi forces and Kuwaiti forces were rounding up 
1. Ibid., pp. 317-18. 
2. American Consul (Baghdad) to the Sec. of State (Washington) 
10 Jan. 1930, al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., iii, p. 59; The Times, 
7,10 January 1929. 
3. Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 318-20. 
4. See: R. A. F. (Iraq) to the Air Ministry (London) 24 Dec. 
1929, E6761/2322/91, F. O. 371/13739; High Commissioner 
(Iraq) to C. O., 30 Dec. 1929, El/1/91, F. O. 371/14449. 
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the Mutair fugitives on the borders. 
' By the end of the 
month most of the remaining rebels, by now in total disarray, 
escaped across Iraqi borders and refused to leave as Ibn 
Mashhur had done earlier. Glubb wrote: 
"The British and Iraq Goverroxnts, which had pledged 
themselves to Ibn Saud not to give asylum to the rebels, 
were finding the task less simple than they thought. " 
The R. A. F. Commodore, on Glubb's advice, proposed 
as follows to the authorities in Baghdad: 
"The principal leaders were to surrender themselves 
and be interned. They would not subsequently 
be handed back to Ibn Saud, unless he agreed to 
spare their lives. Should he refuse to do so, they 
would be made to reside at a distance from the Iraq-Nejd 
frontier, both the British and the Iraq Governments 
guaranteeing that they would not e allowed to return 
to Nejd on the frontier area ... " 
Baghdad agreed to the former suggestion but insisted that 
the leaders "would not, in any event, be handed back to Ibn 
Saud". Indeed, Baghdad's policies were confusing. Earlier 
they had rejected al-Dowaish's appeal to negotiate; his 
deputation had been dismissed and the frontier authorities 
had been banned from making any future contact. But later 
the rebels had been permitted to enter the neutral zone. Now 
when frontier authorities had suggested obtaining assurances 
from Ibn Saud to spare their lives, Baghdad appeared unwilling 
to let them go. Glubb wrote: 
1. Jeddah Report, Dec. 1929, F. O. 371/14460; The Resident 
(Bushire) to C. O., 23 Dec. 1929; C. O. to F. O., 27 Dec. 
1929, E6763/2322/91, F. O. 371/13739. 
2. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 324. 
3. Ibid., pp. 324-5. 
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"It seemed as though conflicting policies were 
giving rise to these vacillation. King Faisal doubtless 
wished to make matters easy for the rebels, because 
they were the enemies of Ibn Saud ... e British 
and to a lesser extent, the Iraq ministers, were 
anxious only for peace and reconciliation, and desired 
to appease Ibn Saud. Neither King Faisal, nor the 
Iraqi or the British authorities seemed to me to 
give enough thought to the Iraq tribes, which had 
suffered so any losses and massacres at the hands of 
the Ikhwan. " 
Al-Dowaish was contacted at the beginning of the new 
year about the British and Iraqi intentions and was given 
time to think about them. When he made no reply by 3 January 
1930, he was notified that he was understood to have rejected 
the Anglo-Iraqi offer and that he and his followers "must 
consequently evacuate Iraq and Kuwait territory by dawn on 
5 January". On that day the rebels fled into Kuwait in absolute 
chaos and misery not for fear of being bombed by the R. A. F. 
but because, of the presence of Ibn Saud's army in the vicinity. 
Glubb later described his feelings as follows: 
"As a man, I found something pahful and humiliating 
in seeing other human beings reduced to such a state of 
abject fear. The ... dislike which we instinctively feel at striking a man who is already beaten made 
me apprehensive of the possibility that we might be 
ordered to fire on this panic-stricken horde, or that 
we should hand them over to Ibn Saud to be butchered 
before our eyes. Yet at the same time I could not but 
remember how often I had seen our own Iraq tribes in just 
such terror-stricken flight, intent on escaping from 
massacre by these same pitiless Ikhwan whom we now saw 
before us. This was poetic justice indeed - být far 
from feeling satisfaction, I felt distressed. " 
1. Ibid., p. 225. 
2. Ibid., pp. 229-30. 
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However, Glubb was ordered to round up the fleeing rebels 
in Kuwait with the help of the R. A. F. On the same day 
Yousuf Yasin presented Glubb with a letter from Ibn Saud 
in which he asked about the measures which the British 
Government would take "to fulfill their pledge not to allow 
the rebels to enter Kuwait". Glubb was not concerned about 
what hadlappened in Kuwait, but he privately assured Yasin 
that the British Government "were determined to take every 
step to fulfill their pledges". Pressing his point, Yasin 
wrote out two wireless messages to the High Commissioner in 
Baghdad and to the Resident in the Gulf. In both he 
requested "that the rebels be evicted from Kuwait or that 
Ibn Saud be given permission to enter Kuwait to attack them". 
If any of these requests was not accepted, he continued, Britain 
would be shouldered with responsibility for the consequences. 
1 
On 6 January, the Resident was instructed to ecplain to Ibn 
Saud that the only reason for the delay in implementing 
this undertaking was that the Ikhwan forces were accompanied 
by their women and children, but Britain would take the 
necessary steps to overcome the difficulties. 
2 
In Kuwait, Dickson tried on 7 January to persuade 
al-Dowaish 
1. Ibid., pp. 231-32. 
2. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
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"to surrender to the R. A. F. and not attempt to 
break through, as he intended doing, and risk 
confrontation. with Ibn Saud's forces lying in 
wait for him on the sout fern frontier of Kuwait. 
I left him unpersuaded. " 
The following telegram describes the situation before the 
actual surrender of al-Dowaish: 
Dowaish and Ibn Lami with followers located by 
Political Agent in Kuwait in vicinity [of] Jahra. The 
Chief Staff officer is taking concerted action with 
Political Agent Kuwait to effect their arrest tomorrow. 
7 January Ibn Saud with a force reported 8000 strong 
arrived Kha5jah. At Ubaid Glubb is camped with 
police ... " 
Indeed, there was nowhere for al-Dowaish to go. The other 
Ikhwan leaders had already surrendered and now, powerless to 
take any action, he yet again appealed in final desperation 
to the Resident for mercy. On 9 January, the day of his 
surrender, he wrote a message to, the effect that: "if only 
a ray of hope [were] given that he would not be handed over 
by H. M. G. to Ibn Saud and to his death, he would surrender 
to me at once". The Resident noted the sympathy which 
Shaikh Ahmad felt when he stated his readiness to "offer 
Ibn Saud all Kuwait camels for the life of al-Dowaish". 
3 
By the end of the day al-Dowaish surrendered to the R. A. F., 
unconditionally. Before being taken to a British ship, 
pending a final decision, he emotionally appealed to Dickson 
1. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 319-. 20. 
2. R. A. F. (Iraq) to the Air Ministry (London) 7 Jan. 1930. 
E135/1/91; The Resident (Bushire) to C. O., 9 Jan. 1929, 
E164/1/91, F. O. 371/14449. See also: Glubb, War ine 
Desert, pp. 331-37; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 
p. 319. 
3. The Resident (Bushire) to C. O. 9 January 1930, 
E149/1/91, F. O. 371/14449. 
saying "I hand my ladies to your personal charge, 0 Dickson, 
and from my protective honour to your protective honour"-1 
Thus, the 9th of January witnessed the extinction of the final 
spark of the Ikhwan revolt when the main portion of the 'Ujman 
and Mutair also surrendered to the R. A. F. 
2 
The surrender of the Ikhwan while ending the rebellion, 
led to controversy over the interpretation of previous British 
undertakingrto hand the rebels back to Ibn Saud. Ibn Mashhour'f 
case was long debated. He and his followers were of the Rwalah 
tribe whom the British and Iraqi Governments reckoned to be 
Syrian subjects. Therefore, they were not deemed to be 
covered by the pledge given to Ibn Saud. 
3 
" Ibn Saud regarded 
this as a deliberate attempt by Iraq based on fabricated 
evidence to strengthen its bargining position vie -a 
vis Nejd, 
Inevitably the British became involved. Ibn Saud insisted 
as he did before, that the failure to bomb the rebels 
while in'Iragi territory, or to hand them back soon after 
indicated the existence of a plot against him. By refusing 
to allow him to cross the borders Britain in effect had 
protected the rebels. 
4 
A protracted debate now began over 
the conditions on which the Ikhwan should be handed back to 
1. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 320. 
2. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1930, F. O. 371/14460; Al-Manar, 
xxx (1929-30), pp. 634-35. 
3. See:. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 321. 
4. See: Bond to F. O., 12 January 1930, E221; 13 January 
1930, E234/1/91, F. 0. ' 371/14449. 
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Ibn Saud. The British were increasingly alarmed that 
Ibn Saud would kill them immediately should they be returned. 
The British consequently sought to retain them in Kuwait 
until satisfactory guarantees were obtained. 
1 
Personal 
contact with him seemed to be more fruitful than any other 
method of communication. - Ibn Said agreed to receive a 
British delegation, meanwhile, his Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, unaware of this latest step, continued to condemn 
the British for breach of faith until eventually his 
attention was drawn to Dickson's proposed mission. Clearly 
Britain preferred not to reply Ibn Saud's earlier allegations 
or to those of Hamza until after the planned meeting. 
2 
Dickson suggested that Shaikh Ahmad should accompany 
him on his mission in order to "enable the Shaikh to recover 
prestige lost owing to recent actions of H. M. G. " 
in Kuwait. 
3 
Since such a settlement should also include 
Iraq, the High Commissioner advised that negotiations over 
the return of the rebels to Ibn Saud should be protracted 
"until H. M. G. have settled [with Ibn Saud] conditions which 
should include reparation for losses caused to Iraq and Kuwait". 
4 
1. The Resident (Bushire) to C. O., 3 Jan. 1930; 
C. O. to F. O. 3 January 1930, E49; C. O. to F. O., 
9 January 1930, E157/1/91, F. O. 371/14449. 
2. Bond to F. O., 11 Jan. 1930, E201/1/91, F. O. 371/14449; 
Jeddah Report, Jan. 1930, F. O. 371/14460; The Times, 
11 Jan. 1930. 
3. C. O. to F. O., 10 Jan. 1930, E169/1/91, F. O. 371/14449. 
4. High Commissioner (Iraq) to C. O., 10 Jan. 1930; C. O. to 
F. O., 11 Jan. 1930, E197/1/91, F. O. 371/14449. 
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The matter was so "delicate" that immediate discussions at 
the highest levels followed in London. There it was decided 
-that the mission to Ibn Saud should be led by Sir Hugh 
Biscoe, Political Resident at Bushire, who was instructed 
on 16 January to. 
"assume personal charge of the mission to Ibn Saud, 
and should take with him H. M. Political Agent at Kuwait, 
and, subject to the consent of the High Commi$ioner in 
Iraq, Air Commodore Burnett, to whose presence as a 
military advisor H. M. G. attached great importance ... Having regard to the fact that the assitance and co- 
operation of the British Military forces had been 
the determining factor in the suppression of the revolt, 
they could not but take exception to the tone of 
recent communications from Ibn Saud and from the 
Hejaz Government. In the circumstances they were of 
opinion that a dignified and stiff remonstrance was 
called for. They considered it to be preferable, 
however, that this should be conveyed iy word of mouth 
rather than'by written communication. " 
Biscoe was also instructed to inform Ibn Saud that the British 
Government had never agreed to hand over the rebels who might 
surrender, and that the single reason which had prevented the 
British Government from expelling the rebels'prior to their 
surrender, as he (Ibn Saud) had suggested, was the fact that 
they were accompanied by their women and children against whom 
military action could not be taken. Most importantly Biscoe 
was also told that London laid great stress on the necessity 
of obtaining from Ibn Saud "written and binding" guarantees 
that, if the Ikhwan leaders were handed over, their lives 
and those of their relatives would be spared, that any 
1. C. O. to the Resident (Bushire), 16 Jan. 1930, 
79006, C. O. 732/42. 
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punishment inflicted would not be excessive or such as 
to outrage Arab sentiment or run counter to British 
tradition and that effective measures would be taken to 
eliminate the possibility of Iraq or Kuwait suffering 
further at their hands. The-alternative was the deportation 
of the Ikhwan leaders and their immediate entourage,,, 
a course which was objectionable on various grounds. 
Britain aimed at a general compromise based on humanitarian 
considerations. The question of Ibn Mashhour was regarded 
by Britain as a separate issue, Biscoe was instructed not 
to mention this particular topic until Ibn Saud did. 
only then was Ibn Saud to be told that Ibn Mashhour was, 
for the time being, "in the custody of the Iraq Government, 
and that the question of his ultimate disposal could better 
be handled at subsequent meetings with King Faisal". 
l 
This last hint was the first direct indication of the need 
for a meeting between the two Kings since the crisis began 
in 1927. 
Soon after, Biscoe met Ibn Saud and discussed with him 
the principal British desiderata upon which the King 
agreed on 26 January. 
2 Accordingly letters embodying 
these conclusions were exchanged. The gist of Ibn Saud's 
letter was summarised by Bond as follows: 
1. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
2. Report by Biscoe, 21 Jan. 1930, E1081/1/91, F. O. 371/14451; 
Biscoe to C. O., 22 Jan. 1930,79006, C. O. 732/42; Umm al- Qura, No. 269,31 Jan. 1930; Dickson, Kuwait and Her 
Neighbours, pp. 323-24 
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"Although the rebel leaders and their followers 
deserve punishment for their offences, in 
deference to the wishes of His Majesty's 
Government he undertakes to spare their lives. 
While it is his prerogative to punish them, any 
punishment awarded will be ''saturated with the 
spirit of kindness and mercy'', but he reserves 
the right to recover from them any plunder that 
they may have taken. 
He promises categorically to prevent any raids in 
the future. by Mutair. Ajman or any other Nejd 
tribes into Iraq or Koweit territory. Should 
any such raids occur, he agrees to effect a 
settlement without delay under machinery provided 
for in the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq and 
to restore immediately anything plundered from 
Koweit in accordance with customs current 
between Koweit and Nejd. He is ready to 
negotiate an agreement with Koweit similar to 
the Bahra Agreement should the sheikh desire it 
He agrees to settle all past claims by a tribunal 
provided for in the Bahra Agreement in the case of 
Iraq, and in accardance with current practice in 
the case of Koweit, provided that all the Mutair 
and Ajman and their followers and property at 
present in the hands of British military authorities 
are returned to Nejd territory. In view of the 
friendship existing between him and His 
Majesty's Government, he agrees to pay 110,000 through 
Jedda on the 5th Shawal (March 3), as compensation to 
tribesmen in Koweit and Iraq in anticipation of the 
final settlement of the account. Finally, he 
agrees to appoint a representative to the Bahra 
Agreement tribunal at any time one month after the 
receipt of a request to do soi the month of Haj 
(pilgrimage) being excluded. " 
The mission returned to Kuwait on 27 January, and 
on the following day the rebel leaders were flown back 
1. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
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to Ibn Saud under Dickson's personal charge. 
1 The King 
was pleased and immediately wrote to Biscoe conveying his 
gratitude. As Bond reported: 
"He expressed himself as being deeply grateful 
to His Majesty's Government for fulfilling their 
pledges so faithfully, and as being confident that 
the future relations between ... [H. M. G. ] and Nejd 
would be strengthened and established more firmly 
than ever ... the act of H. M. G. would assist him in carrying out his engagements and in preserving 
peace on his boundaries ... " 
Britain indeed was as eager for peace as Ibn Saud. 
Now, with no more Ikhwan rebels to interrupt the 
development of friendly Anglo-Saudi relations, the first 
step towards a comprehensive peace in the region had been 
taken. 
1. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 324. 
2. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Peace-Making between Ibn Saud and the'Hashemites, 
1930=1932 
- The Meeting of the Kings, 22/23 February 1930 
- MacDonnell's Investigations into Raids and Counter - 
Raids between the'Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan, March - 
December 1930 
- Glubb - Ibn Zeid Meetings 1931 
- The Peace-Making between'Abd-Allah and Ibn Saud, 1932 
The Meeting of the Kings 22/23 February 1930. 
The surrender of the Ikhwan rebels had resolved 
one of the major problems affecting Anglo-Saudi relations. 
The other major problem yet to be solved was accommodation 
between the Saudis and the Hashemites. In fact, several 
attempts made since 1922, had failed.. -But the appointment 
of Clayton in 1925 as a special envoy to Ibn Saud had 
enabled him to appreciate the depth of the bitter feud 
which had grown between the then Sultan of Nejd and the 
Hashemites. After his early mission in 1925, over matters 
in which the Hashemites were directly involved, he had 
again negotiated with Ibn Saud in 1927 and in 1928. 
Unlike any other British official he managed to get to 
the heart of the problems facing Ibn Saud, who was 
surrounded by enemies, sponsored by Britain, in Iraq, 
in Transjordan and in Kuwait. This obviously impeded 
friendly relationships with British authorities there. 
When in 1929 Clayton took up the post of the High 
Commissioner in Iraq, this was intended to persuade Ibn 
Saud that he had a friend at Baghdad. Previously he 
had always regarded British officials there as enemies. 
Now he felt more secure and decided to punish the unlawful 
movements inside his territories for the benefit of the 
stability of his regime and indirectly for the benefit of 
British interests in the mandates. Consequently, bridges 
for better relations began to be built, not only between 
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between Britain and Ibn Saud but also between him and the 
Hashemite rulers in the mandated territories. Clayton, 
however, died two months before the collapse of the Ikhwan 
rebellion and it was left to Sir Francis Humphr. ys, the 
new High Commissioner, to bring Faisal and Ibn Saud together. 
George Antonius who had helped Clayton's diplomacy wrote in 
1930, immediately after the meeting between Ibn Saud and 
Faisal, that, 
"the era of better understanding which this 
Conference heralds must for ever be associated 
with the memory of the late Sir Gilbert Clayton ... the project of bringing thout a meeting and 
reconciliation between the two monarchs was 
conceived by him as long ago as the autumn of 
1925, on the conclusion of his first visit as 1 
British plenipotentiary to the ruler of Nejd. " 
There is no doubt that Britain had always been anxious 
to achieve peace and understanding between Iraq and Nejd. 
Now, in the absence of the Ikhwan factor, the atmosphere 
was more favourable. Indeed, all the1arties concerned 
desired a relief from the state of chaos and confusion 
which had begun with the advent of Hashemite rulers to 
Iraq and Transjordan, with the arrival of the Ikhwan 
in the vicinity of these newly established states, and 
with the establishment of British Mandates over them. 
Britain's interest in promoting pacification seemed clear. 
As The Times of 18 January 1930 commented: 
1. The Times, 28, Feb. 1930. 
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"Our special relations with Iraq, the natural interest 
of our Moslem fellow subjects in India and Africa in 
the prosperity of the Kingdom of the Hejaz, the 
Holy Land of Islam, explain the hopeful interest which 
the meeting of the Kings arouses among the many 
English speaking men whom War, Commerce or travel have 
brought into contact with the Arabs since 1914. " 
In fact, the initiative for such a meeting was taken 
by the Iraqis on 28 December 1929. Ibn Saud was then in 
pursuit of the Ikhwan rebels in the vicinity of the Iraqi 
frontier. Urgently and confidentially Naji al-Suwaidi, 
the Iraqi Prime Minister wrote, at Faisal's instructions, 
to the High Commissioner that: 
"it is necessary at present to settle the outstanding 
questions between Iraq and Nejd ... Ibn Saud is now 
engaged with the rebels near the Iraq borders, this 
is a good opportunity to meet him. " 
Humphr-ys later reported that Faisal was: 
"so impressed with the necessity for siezing this 
opportunity of making friendly overtures to a 
neighbouring King on is borders that he was ready 
to meet Ibn Saud ... " 
Britain was requested to convey an invitation to Ibn Saud. 
Al-Suwaidi explained that Faisal was "very anxious to try 
and dissipate the existing atmosphere of distrust between the 
Iraq and Nejd, Governments by a personal meeting with Ibn 
Saud and suggested that Sir F. Humphr Ys should also. be-present". v 
1. The Times, 18 Feb. 1930. 
2. Iraqi Prime Minister to the High Commissioner, 28 Dec. 1929, 
E621/111/91. F. O. 371/14462. 
3. High Commissioner (Baghdad) to C. O., 7 Jan. 1930, 
E111/111/91, F. O. 371/14462. 
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The Iraqis sought to have the frontier question settled 
Thus they suggested seven points for discussions. These 
were: the disposal of the rebel refugees, the return of 
the loot, the breaches of article 4 of the Bahrah agreement, 
the extradition treaty, the treaty of Bon Voisinage, 
the mutual recognition question and finally the desert 
posts. 
1 
Not surprisingly, the British Government gave prompt 
support for the meeting. As Humphr, ys argued: "even if 
the Conference-failed to solve any outstanding questions, 
the way might be prepared by personal contact for. a better 
mutual understanding". 
2 Only one point, the refugee question, 
seemed to be urgent. 
3 London aimed at securing some 
progress here in order to encourage the old enemies to pursue 
the more difficult-questions later and to persuade them 
that success was eventually possible. Accordingly the 
refugee question was raised at a preliminary meeting of 
Iraq and Nejd representatives in Kuwait. Although no 
decisions were reached at the meeting, it did at least 
clarify the issues involved. 
4 More significantly the. 
1. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
2. High Commissioner (Baghdad) to C. O., 29 Jan. 1930, 
E535/111/91, F. O. 371/14462. 
3. C. O. to F. O., 8 Jan. 1930, E133/1/91, F. O. 371/14449. 
4. See: Jeddah Report, Jan-and Feb. 1930, F. O. 371/14460; 
High Commissioner (Baghdad) to C. O. 29 Jan. 1930, 
E535/111/91, F. O. 371/14462. 
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peace initiative had clearly been welcomed by Ibn Saud, 
1 
and this opened the way for its active sponsorship on the 
part of the British authorities in the Middle East and in 
London. .A 
flurry of communications, dealing with policy 
and practical arrangements followed between the Foreign 
Office, the Colonial office, the. India Office and the 
Admiralty. 
The venue of the meeting was carefully considered, 
and it was finally suggested that a British ship would 
offer the most neutral ground. The Admiralty. accordingly 
arranged to provide naval transport and a ship for the 
meeting. The High Commissioner for his part agreed to buy 
presents for the Kings from the Secret Sevice funds. 
2 
The preparations for the meeting were quickly and smoothly 
accomplished. This seemd to confirm that it was Britain 
who had persuaded Faisal to issue the invitation. 
3 
The 
scale of the preparations did not mean that Britain 
expected full agreement on every question at issue. 
The Times optimistically commented: 
"their personal distinction and charm ... make it 
certain that each will depart with a warm appreciation 
of the qualities of his rival .. ý if only this is 
gained ... much will be gained. " 
1, C. O. to F. O., 15 Feb. 1930, E854/111/91, F. O. 371/14462. 
2. Humphr.. ys (Baghdad) to C. O., 6 Feb. 1930, C. O. to F. 0 
7 Feb. 1930, E704/91, F. O. 371/14462; C. O. to Humphry's 
12 Feb. 1930, C. O. to F. O. 14 Feb. 1930, E893/111/91, 
F. O. 371/14473. 
3. Al Manar, xxx (1929-30) p. 636. 
4. The Times, 18 Jan. 1930. 
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The Times also praised King Faisal for the gesture that 
he had made: 
"whatever the issue of their conversations, King 
Faisal's decision - no easy one for an Arab ruler - 
to sacrifice a long-standing and romantic family 
feud to the wider interests of his Kingdom, will 
, 
be 
gratefully remembered by the friends of peace. " 
Humphreys had already reached similar conclusions when he 
reported that whatever they could agree upon "would not 
be prejudicial" to British interests. 
2 
In Baghdad it had been settled that King Faisal 
would be accompanied by the following team of advisers: 
Naji al-Suwaidi, the Prime Minister; Sir F. Humphreys, the 
to 
High Commissioner; Cornwallis, the advisor/the Ministry 
of Interior; Halt, the oriental secretary, and Glubb, 
the Administrative Inspector for the Southern Desert. 
3 
The following guidelines were laid down: 
1. The Iraqi Government was ready to accept arbitration 
on the question of posts. 
2. King Faisal was to persuade Ibn Saud to accept 
the idea of a tribunal to adjudicate over matters 
in dispute between the frontier tribes. 
3. He was also prepared to recognise Ibn Saud as King of 
the Hejaz. 
4 
1. Ibid. 
2. Humphreys (Baghdad) to C. O., 16 Feb. 1930, E894/111/91, 
F. O. 371/14462. 
3. The Times, 14 Feb. 1930. 
4. Humphr_ys to C. O., 20 Feb. 1930, E966/111/91, F. O. 371/14462. 
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The meeting took place in the Gulf on board H. M. S. 
'Lupin', 15 miles out to sea beyond the mouth of Shatt al-Arab 
on 22 and 23 February 1930. Arrangements had been made 
for the steam ship 'Patrick Stewart' to pick up King Ibn 
Saud at Ras-Tanura. An Iraqi ship brought King Faisal to 
the meeting. Ibn Saud brought with him a retinue of 
one hundred and eighteen, while Faisal was accompanied only 
by twelve. The first to come aboard H. M. S. 'Lupin' was 
Ibn Saud accompanied by his two principal Ministers, Hafez 
Wahba and'Fuad Hamza and his private secretary, Yousuf Yasin, 
and three others. Faisal followed with a suite of the same 
number including his Prime Minister, Naji al-Suwaidi. When 
Humphr.. ys brought the two Kings together, "they seemed to 
eye one another with a mixture of curiosity and suspicion, 
but embraced in Arab fashion with every outward appearance 
of cordiality". 
1 
Humphr.; ys, on behalf of the British 
Government welcomed the Kings and opened the proceedings. 
In reply the two Kings expressed their appreciation of the 
endeavours of the British Government to further the cause 
of friendship between the two Arab countries. 
Contrary to plan, Faisal made a lengthy statement on 
the relations between Iraq and Nejd which led to the crisis. 
Ibn Saud gave this speech "a patient and impassive hearing". 
He was reported as saying: "it was not his wish that the 
1. Humphrýys to Passfield (C. O. ) 15 March 1930, 
E2171/111/91, F. O. 371/14463. 
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friendliness of the meeting should be marred by the 
intrusion of controversial discussions". He commented that 
he had accepted the invitation to the meeeting on the 
grounds that there would be no formal discussions. The 
meeting's purpose was to give each of them an 
opportunity of making the other's acquaintance. Humphreys, 
who was an astute. diplomat, took Ibn Saud's comment to mean 
that the King had no intention of negotiating details in the 
presence of the delegates. He arranged for the delegates to 
withdraw leaving the two Kings alone with him and his 
oriental Secretary. The two Kings "opened their hearts to 
each other and confined themselves to questions of principle", 
while representatives from the two sides formed a committee 
to discuss the details of all the outstanding questions. 
) 
On the following day, the Conference was resumed. 
The two Kings and Humphr. ys began by discussing the question 
of the posts. Ibn Saud rejected a suggestion that Britain 
should act as arbitrator. He correctly explained that since 
the British Government had already 
-"declared their views on the question of the 
-interpretation of article 3 of the 'Uqair Protocol ... 
any arbitrator nominated by them would share their 
view and would be unable to appr9ach the question 
with an open and unbiased mind. " 
1. Ibid; The Times, 25 Feb. 1930. 
2. Humphr.. ys to Passfield, 15 March 1930, . op-cit. 
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Instead, he suggested that the presiding arbitrator should 
, 
be an Arab. Faisal in his turn rejected this proposal and 
withdrew leaving Humphr, _ys alone with Ibn Saud. This 
private meeting resulted in a compromise'suggested by Ibn 
Saud himself who agreed that the presiding arbitrator should 
be nominated by Britain, but on condition that "the parties 
should try once more during the next six months to find 
a solution which would be acceptable to both sides". 
1 
This was accepted and accordingly an exchange of letters 
between the Kings was undertaken. Bond reported that: 
"... they would endeavour during the next six 
months to come to an agreement ... if they failed to agree, each King would appoint two representatives 
as arbitrators, and if an agreement were not then 
reached they undertook to accept as president any 
person designated by His Majesty's Government. " 
Ibn Saud's rejection of the original arbitration 
proposal had been expected in London. Rendel had 
minuted, on 21 February 1930 only the day before the meeting, 
that Ibn Saud had always been ambitious, and that he "has 
never formally withdrawn his request that the arbitration should 
not only deal with the legality of the frontier posts, but 
should also consider a possible revision of the frontier ". 
Should the King maintain this stance, Rendel had argued, 
"we might find ourselves obliged to support the Iraq point 
1. Ibid. 
2. Jeddah Report, Feb. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. See also: 
Humphreys to C. O. 23 Feb. 1930, E1076/111/91. F. O. 371/14463; 
Humphreys to C. O. 24 Feb. 1930,79006, C. O. 732/42. 
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of view". 
1 Ibn Saud now assured Humphr. ýys in private that 
"nothing should be done to interfere with the proper 
protection of the transdesert oil pipeline". He admitted 
that the posts "were quite harmless" to Nejd, but he 
maintained his opposition to them because he had pledged to 
his people that he would never accept the existence of the 
posts, and he "could not go back on his word". 
2 
The matter, 
as had been agreed, would hopefully be settled within six 
months. 
The disposal of Ibn Mashhour, the last of the rebel 
leaders remaining in Iraq, was the next item on the agenda. 
The discussion was opened by Humphreys himself. Earlier 
at Baghdad, Faisal had told Humphreys that he needed no help 
from the High Commissioner in this matter because the question 
was one of Arab traditions and he felt confident of winning 
over Ibn Saud to his point of view. At the meeting, however, 
instead of arguing the case, Faisal declared that responsibility 
lay with the Mandatory Power. It was left to Humphreys to 
reiterate that the surrender of Ibn Mashhcjr had never been 
promised by a representative of His Majesty's Government, 
and that the question was one for settlement between . .. 1 
Ibn Saud and King Faisal . To try and break the deadlock 
Humphreys brought the two kings together to discuss the question 
once again. Eventually, Ibn Saud agreed to pardon Ibn Mashhour 
1. Minute by Rendel 21 Feb. 1930, E966/111/91, F. O. 371/14463. 
2. Humphreys to passfield, 15 March 1930, 'op. cit. 
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while Faisal would insist that he should leave Iraq territory". 
' 
In the event, Ibn Mashhour was deported to Syria and subsequently 
pardoned by Ibn Saud; he returned to Nejd in 1931.2 
The last important matter discussed by the Kings related 
to the claims that both had Praised against each other as a 
result of the past raids, 
3 
starting from-the Busaiyah raid of 
1927. After hesitations on Ibn Saud's part it was agreed that 
a British representative "should preside over the tribunal 
which is to beset up under article 2 of the Bahrah Agreement ... 
the tribunal is to meet, in Kuwait in June next". 
4 Although Ibn 
Saud had already stated on 27 January 1930 that he was prepared 
to settle the claims arising out of the past raids, he now 
privately informed Humphr-ys that 
"he had no confidence whatever that the tribunal would 
be able to arrive at a settlement satisfactory to both 
parties; and he asked me to persuade King Faisal to name 
some reasonable sum which he would be prepared to pay in 
final settlement of all claims. " 
Humphr.. ys promised to consider this proposal on his return to 
Baghdad, as such a'step would. avoid "much acrimonious and 
indeterminate wrangling". .. 
1. Quotes from: Ibid. See also; Humphr-ys to C. O., 
23 Feb. -1930 E1076/111/91-, F. O. 371/14463. 
2. 'Al-Sudani, al-ilagat, al-iragiyah al-saudiyah, 1920-31, 
p. 340. 
3. It had earlier been agreed that neither side should put 
claims for raids prior to the big raid on Busaiyah in 
Nov. 1927. The raids under discussion here are those 
from 1927 onwards. 
4. Jeddah Report, Feb. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
S. Humphreys to Passfield, 15 March 1930, op. cit. 
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In the meanwhile, the committee of the Ministers had 
managed to prepare a draft agreement (the Bon-Voisinage) 
to which the Kings agreed in principle. This draft 
recognised Ibn Saud as King of "the Hejaz aid Nejd" and 
Faisal as "King of Iraq". Moreover, diplomatic missions 
were to be exchanged. This draft was accepted only as the 
basis for a formal agreement which was to be concluded in 
three months time. 
l The draft caused some stormy discussions 
which nearly culminated in a violent explosion. Faisal, 
although he had agreed in principle to the recognition of 
Ibn Saud, was not prepared to use the title "King of the' 
Hejaz" as an immediate mode of address. 
"Faisal was furious with his Prime Minister for 
conceding ... the principle of recognition, which 
was meant to be embodied for the first time in the 
treaty of Bon Voisinage, and flatly refused to 
sign the letter". " 
Humphr, ys mediation led to Faisal signing the letter in 
question but omitting the title. Instead he addressed 
Ibn Saud as "my dear-brother". 
The meeting of the Kings, although it only lasted for 
two days, in fact succeeded in tackling all the outstanding 
questions. Preliminary agreements were reached on many 
matters but no single issue was completely solved. The two 
Kings ended their conference with promises to achieve their 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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various goals within the next six months. 
1 
Ibn Saud 
regarded the conference as a victory. On his way back, 
he wrote to Humphr., ys, through the Political Agent at 
Bahrain, expressing his gratitude to him personally and 
to the British Government and asked for the fulfillment of 
the agreements made on board 'Lupin' especially those 
concerned with recognition. 
2 In reply, Humphr.. ys 
expressed the-hope that the meeting would "pave the way to 
permanent friendly relations between the two Kings and a 
satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions. "3 
The conference was a major triumph for Hwnphr-ys and 
a notable success for British policy. It ended an era 
of feud and hatred and opened a new era of friendship. It 
was a landmark in-the history of Arbbia. As Faisal said 
when he shook hands with Ibn Saud for the first time, "I 
am not now Faisal Ibn al-Husain talking to Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Saud, but I , am the King of Iraq and you are the King of 
4 
the Hejaz and Nejd ... " Indeed Faisal was deliberately 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibn Saud to Humphreys, 26 Feb. 1930, E2171/111/91, F. O. 
371/14463. 
3. Humphreys to Ibn Saud, 27 Feb. 1930, op. cit. Humphreys 
wrote a similar letter to King Faisal on 28 Feb. 1930, 
E1778/111/91, F. O. 371/14463. 
4. Quoted in: al-Saudani, al-ilagat al-iragiyah al-Saudiyah, 
1920-31, p. 336. Later in Aug. 1932, and after the Ibn 
Rifada Plot against Ibn Saud, King Faisal told Humphreys 
that as Faisal Ibn al-Husain, Ibn Saud must always be his 
enemy, but as Faisal King of Iraq, he would always put 
his country's interests before those of his House 
(Humphreys to Sir P. CunliffzLister, 2 Aug. 1932). 
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trying. -to obliviate memories of the past feud between the 
two families. Not surprisingly he was congratulated 
by the British Government for his foresight and flexibility. 
Humphr. ys, too, received a message of thanks for securing 
a successful end to the conference. 
' The British Government 
had indeed cause to be grateful for this almost unbelievable 
achievement. 
The conference, however, did not pass without criticism. 
Some of those who had witnessed the long feud between the 
Saudis and the Hashemites belittled the results of the 
conference which, as they argued, would be ephemeral. And 
indeed, although the conference was characterised by much 
-outward show of cordiality, Ibn Saud in private conversations 
with Humphreys continued to express his distrust of Faisal. 
2 
Humphr-ys was fully aware that the Kings still regarded 
each other with the deepest suspicion, but he remained 
confident that even if nothing spectacular had been 
achieved "each King will be more ready in future to move 
more distance towards meeting the point of view of the other". 
3 
In this diagnosis he proved correct. 
Among those best qualified by knowledge and experience 
to comment, George Antonius expressed his appreciation in a 
1. C. O. to Humphr.. ys, 27 Feb. 1930,79006, C. O. 732/42. 
2. Jeddah Report, Feb. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
3. Humphreys to Passfield, 15 March 1930, E2171/111/91, 
F. O. 371/14463 
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letter to The Times on 26 February. 
"All students and friends of Arabia", he wrote, 
"will be grateful for the admirable survey of the 
recent conference on board H. M. S. Lupin which 
. appeared 
in today's issue of The Times. The importance 
of that conference could scarcely be over-estimated. 
Its significance is not only in its paper results ... but also, and perhaps still more, in its future 
promise - that is to say, in the establishment of 
direct and friendly contact between the King of Iraq 
and his Wahhabi neighbour ... " 
Although the British and Iraqi press prominently featured 
news of the conference, Umm al-Qura did not comment until 
more than seven months later. In October, the paper admitted 
that the Iraqis had shown themselves very friendly towards 
Nejd. This had been demonstrated by congratulations sent to 
Ibn Saud on his victory and by the invitation to the Kings' 
conference. 
2 
The long silence of Umm al-Qura had been 
interpreted by Bond as 
"disappointing and would tend to give rise to doubts 
as to the sincerity of the motives which actuated 
Ibn Saud in attending the meeting, or it might be 
interpreted as a desire to forget aj episode of 
little moment in Arabian Politics. " 
Bond's pessimism was not justified. Relations, after the 
conference, steadily improved. The first concrete evidence 
came on 9 March when the Nejdi-Iraqi delegates met at 
Baghdad to draw up and to initial a Bon Voisinage agreement 
1. The Times, 28 Feb. 1930. 
2. Umm al-Qura, No. 308,31 Oct. 1930. 
3. Jeddah Report, March, 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
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between the two countries which was signed at Mecca on 
7 April 1931. Further evidence later came in May when the 
two countries started negotiations over an extradition., 
l 
treaty, which was signed on 8 April 1931 at Mecca. 
This was indeed a tremendous achievement. Britain played 
no direct part in these proceedings but, having paved 
the way, was content to let events take their course on 
the lines designed. Britain's main concern was to settle 
differences between 'Abd-Allah and Ibn Saud. 
1. Ibid. For details on the process of making of the 
agreements see: F. O. 371/14477; C. O. 732/44. 
MacDonnell's Investigations into Raids and Counter-Raids- 
between Hejaz-Nejd and Transiordan, March - December 1930- 
Britain's main attention had been concentrated since 
1927, as has been seen, on the Ikhwan main bases sited in 
the vicinity of Kuwait and Iraq. Nevertheless the 
British Officials in Transjordan could hardly resign 
themselves to contemplating an indefinite Bedouin 
indulgence in the bloody sport of raiding. The raids, 
consequently, produced protests and counter-protests, 
and every little detail of controversy had to be channelled 
through the British authorities in the area and to be 
reported to London for advice and instructions. This was 
partly due to the lack of direct contact between Ibn Saud 
and his hostile neighbours. The British authorities both 
in London and on the spot had become weary of the thousands 
of telegrams and letters which the situation occasioned. 
To remedy this, new policies were required. The recent 
reconciliation between Ibn Saud and Faisal had proved 
useful. A similar improvement in the Ibn Saud-'Abd-Allah 
relationship, which was in fact moving from bad to worse, 
seemed indicated. 'Abd-Allah had missed no opportunity 
to cause trouble for Ibn Saud and appeared disposed to 
continue in that attitude. Britain's endeavours to 
resolve this feud need now to be considered. 
The latest Transjordanian raid on Nejd (autumn 1929) 
produced a strong Nejdi protest. Fuad Hamza reminded the 
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British Agent of the British assurances made to the Hejaz- 
Nejd Government two months earlier. These concerned 
measures to be taken by Britain to prevent Transjordanian 
raids into Nejd. London replied that they were considering 
and would shortly put into effect "far reaching measures 
which they confidently believed would improve the existing 
situation on the Transjordan frontier". 
' 
On the same 
day of Hamza's note (23 November 1929) the King sent a letter 
to the British Government warning that if the trouble 
continued on his frontier with Transjordan, his people 
"will be compelled to take action themselves". This kind 
of threatvas customary and its repetition irritated the 
British. In a more conciliatory vein Ibn Saud offered 
the following alternatives to Britain: 
a) Britain "should act as a sole arbitrator and be 
responsible for execution of the tribal decisions so 
far as Transjordan is concerned ... and he himself 
would accept responsibility for his own tribes, or 
b) to leave the tribes to settle their differences themselves 
without intervention, or 
c) He himself "should be left free to arrange matters 
amicably with the Transjordan tribes", something which 
he could "accomplish without difficulty". . 
London replied on 21-December that they "could not contemplate 
1. Jeddah Report, Nov 1929, F. O. 371/13728. 
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either the second or the third alternative". As to the 
first, they pointed out that their newly decided measures 
were now about to be adopted and were identical with his 
first suggestion. They finally promised to watch the 
l 
situation closely. 
Apparently, the British measures proved ineffective. 
During the preparation for the meeting of the Kings-"the 
situation on the Transjordan frontier has taken a turn for 
the worse". Nejdi tribes frequently raided the Transjordan 
tibes and, as reported, further raids were being planned. 
Again the British found themselves in the midst of an 
explosive situation. A strong protest was made to Ibn Saud 
together with a demand for the restitution of looted 
property, for compensation and for the withdrawal of his force 
from the vicinity of the frontier. He was also reminded that 
the force in question was living on supplies obtained from 
Syria via Transjordan under special British protection. 
Britain's role in the circumstances', it was feared, would 
arouse "acute-feeling" of resentment among Transjordan 
tribes. Britain therefore decided to withdraw her 
protection from the Saudi caravans passing through Transjordan 
and to use the force in question "both to protect Transjordan 
tribes from further raids and to check any attempt on their 
1. Jeddah Report, Dec. 1929, F. O. 371/14460. 
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part to make counter raids". Ibn Saud was also informed 
that "it would be beyond their [H. M. G] power to continue 
to afford the special protection ... "1 It is true that 
Nejdlad always been heavily dependent on supplies from Syria. 
The regular route had been via territory now included in 
the Transjordan Emirate and, in order to reassure Ibn Saud 
who had expressed many misgivings, Britain had at the 
outset offered him conditional facilities through the 
Emirate. 
Worried about the consequences of Britain's decision 
to withdraw those facilities, Ibn Saud and Hamza expressed 
their deep regret for the incident and their disapproval 
of the raid, which had been launched without sanction. 
The King then referred to the incursions previously' committed 
against Nejd by Transjordan tribes, which had incited his 
people to take revenge. He finally pressed for a speedy 
settlement of the problem. 
2 On 14 March he complained that 
"the situation has changed and the raids have now taken the 
form of a regular military offensive". Providing evidence 
for his claim, he expressed anxiety that the past raids had 
been engineered to cause friction between himself and the 
British Government and to make him appear powerless to defend 
his subjects. He therefore again urged Britain to take more 
1. Jeddah Report, Feb. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. (For the 
original idea behind the establishment of this force 
see: Chapter 2 above p. 95, and article 13 of 
the Haddah agreement, appendix B. ) 
2. Ibid. 
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decisive measures to prevent hostile action and to 
settle the-looting issue. For his part, Ibn Saud 
would welcome an enquiry into the last Nejdi raid 
on Transjordan. While he and Britain were still 
looking for a settlement, news of a fresh Hejazi raid 
on Transjordan became known. This, inevitably, 
complicated the situation. 
1 
The British Government felt that the best possible 
action they could take was to send a special envoy, 
to the area to investigate the claims made by the two 
sides and to make recommendations in the light of - 
his findings. For this task, of a kind so often undertaken 
in the past by Clayton, M. S. MacDonnell was selected. 
He had served with Clayton in the Sudan and Egypt and also 
had experience of working for the League of Nations in 
Danzig. His qualifications favourably impressed both 
sides. Although the idea of sending out MacDonnell had 
been approved in January 1930,2 it was not until the end 
of March that he was formally instructed to start his mission 
by visiting Ibn Saud in May in order to make contact and to 
gain his support for the enquiry. This was to be followed 
by a similar visit to 'Abd-Allah. 
3 
MacDonnell's mission coincided with the appointment 
of Sir Andrew Ryan to, the post of British Minister at Jeddah. 
1. Jeddah Report, March 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
2. F. O. Memo., 11 Jan. 1930, E223/223/91, F. O. 371/14464. 
3. Jeddah Report, March, 1930, op. cit. 
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. Ryan was due to arrive at Jeddah about the same time 
as MacDonnell. He had been instructed to give top 
priority to the question of improving relations between 
Ibn Saud and 'Abd-Allah, and to co-operate with MacDonnell 
to that end. He was to try to convince Ibn Saud that the 
best way to solve his problems with Transjordan would be 
through direct discussion with Britain's representatives 
rather than by further written communications. 
) 
The object 
was to get away from the atmosphere of protest and counter- 
protest which had grown round the question. It was hoped 
that Ibn Saud would realise that MacDonnell's appointment 
represented an effort "to liquidate the past". As to the 
present and the future, Britain's position was that article 
3 of the Haddah agreement must be respected, and that Ibn 
Saud must fulfil his obligation to control his tribes. 
Britain for her part would strengthen the Transjordan 
Tribal Control Board and the local police. On his arrival, 
Ryan first met Fuad Hamza with whom the ground was prepared. 
2 
MacDonnell was instructed on 13 May to start his mission 
as soon as possible. Accordingly he arrived in Jeddah on 
3 June. 3 The King gave him a formal audience on 7 June 
and discussions started on the same day in the presence of 
1. Jeddah Report, April 1930, op. cit. 
2. Jeddah Report, May 1930, op. cit. 
3. C. O. to MacDonnell, 13 May 1930, E3228/223/91, Ryan 
to F. O. 4 June 1930, E2933/223/91, F. O. 371/14465. 
- 377 - 
the King's advisers with Yousuf Yasin taking the leading 
part. MacDonnell presented to the King a memorandum, 
which outlined the reasons for the mission. The object, he 
explained, was to "examine all claims arising out of raids 
committed between the conclusion of the Hadda 'agreement 
of the 2nd November, 1925 and the date of the beginning 
of my mission". He stressed that the co-operation of both 
in Saud and 'Abd-Allah was obviously essential. He asked 
the Hejaz Government to ensure that "any persons concerned 
as parties or witnesses, whose attendance is required by me, 
should be immediately forthcoming when summoned". Ibn 
Saud was also "to attach an official with similar powers 
to ... 
[mine ]and to inform me of the tenor of the orders 
given to this official". MacDonnell suggested that 
accommodation and communication facilities were to be 
offered by the Hejaz and Transjordan. He finally set out 
alternative formats for the investigation as follows "A 
Bedouin tribunal with myself as President to hear each case", 
or "the submission of the cases by a competent person nominated 
by each Government to sustain claims of its nationals falling 
within the scope of my instructions". Both methods of 
proceeding had their own disadvantages. The first method 
might involve considerable delay, and the second might get 
bogged down on minor points due to the direct involvement of 
the two governments. He pointed out, in conclusion, that the 
British Government attached importance to speedy termination 
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of the mission. 
1 
MacDonnell's suggestions appeared impracticable to 
Ibn Saud. He dismissed as "chimerical" the notion that 
a Bedouin tribunal could represent the "scattered tribesmen", 
and suggested that MacDonnell should study the Hejaz-Nejd 
files before taking any steps. He did, however, accept 
MacDonnell's second proposal and gave a general commitment 
which was to be subject to detailed discussions with the 
King's advisers. 
2 
Accordingly, three "most wearisome" 
meetings, were held on 8 and 9 June during which the 
Saudis introduced counter proposals as a reply to 
MacDonnell's memorandum. These analysed every minor 
detail connected with the methodology of the investigation 
. and reflected. Ibn Saud's strong doubts about 'Abd-Allah 
even though the British were acting as intermediaries. 
The Saudis, however, did agree "to attach to the mission 
a competent official authorised to summon Hejaz-Nejd 
nationals or witnesses whose evidence the arbitrator may, 
find it necessary to take". But they expected little 
chance of success for the mission unless a number of 
persons were chosen from every tribe "whether raiders 
or raided to present the interest of the tribes concerned 
and to, give information on their behalf". 
3 The proposal 
1. Memo. by MacDonnell for submission to the King of the 
Hejaz and Nejd, 6 June 1930, E3598/223/91, F. O. 371/14465 
2. Ryan to Henderson, 12 June 1930, E9598/223/91, F. O. 
371/14465. 
3. Memo. in reply to MacDonnell's Memo-of 6 June 1930, 
E3598/223/91, F. O. 371/14465. 
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seemed reasonable to MacDonnell but he could not commit 
himself to accept before discussing it with 'Abd-Allah. 
Abd al-Aziz Ibn Zeid, "a walking encyclopeadia of 
information relative to raids", was nominated by Ibn Saud 
to be the Hejaz-Nejd Agent who would serve as a channel of 
communication with his government on matters not requiring 
the intervention of the British Minister at Jeddah. He 
would also act as interpreter when necessary to question 
Nejd-Hejaz subjects with a view to elucidating details. 
He would finally submit claims put forward by Hejaz-Nejd subjects. 
Attention was then drawn to the difficulty of obtaining 
evidence other than that already recorded. Recognizing the 
sbwness and hazards of communications, MacDonnell agreed 
to consider the earlier suggestion that the frontier tribesmen 
should be represented by nominated spokesmen. It was also 
necessary to define a deadline for the notification of the 
claims. The Saudis suggested that "a reasonable time" 
(unspecified) should be allowed. MacDonnell pointed out that 
he was under instruction to finish the job "as soon as 
possible". Both propositions were vague and the matter was 
allowed to rest without any firm conclusion. Finally when 
attention was drawn to the question of access to and 
facilities in the Hejaz the King and his advisers preferred 
to express no views. 
1 It was unlikely that Nejd could 
1. Record of the points agreed on discussion between the 
Saudis and MacDonnell on 7,8 and 9 June 1930, Ryan to 
Henderson, 10 June 1930, E3598/223/91, F. O. 371/14465. 
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provide any facilities. Even the entry of MacDonnell 
into the Hejaz-Nejd would be "undesirable and unnecessary" 
at any stage of his investigation. 
1 
A British protest 
was later made against this attitude. The Saudi Government 
sent an immediate explanatory note which never reached 
the British Legation at Jeddah. When Hamza's 
attention was drawn to this apparent failure to respond, 
a duplicate of the note was sent in July. This pointed 
out that the insecurity caused in Nejd by. the Transjordan 
raiders was a good and sufficient reason not to let 
MacDonnell pursue his investigations in Nejdi territory. 
2 
It-was thought that Ilan Saud's real motive was a desire 
to avoid paying the cost of MacDonnell's travel and 
accommodation. Ryan, therefore replied that "their 
3 
investigation would be free". One may add as another 
reason that Ibn Saud had always complained about 
British officials intriguing with his tribes and now 
could not be expected to agree to MacDonnell's request 
to be in direct contact with the tribesmen. This 
explains the motive behind the Saudi suggestion for 
the nnation of tribal spokesmen. Before his departure 
for Amman, on 10 June, for similar talks with 'Abd-Allah, 
MacDonnell wasg,. ven a farewell audience by the King who 
1. Jeddah Report, June 1930, F. O. 371/14460; MacDonnell 
Report, E490/3/25, F. O. 371/15285. 
2. Jeddah Report, July and Aug. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
3. Jeddah Report, June, 1930, op. cit. 
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excused himselfýas Ryan reported, "for having seemed 
stiff and ungracious during-the negotiations". 
l 
Now it was Ryan's turn to meet the King and to 
inform him 'of the instructions which he had received 
from London' regarding the situation on the frontier with 
Transjordan and the measures which were being made on 
the Transjordanian side to control'"the tribes" movements. 
Thus, two British officials were now fully engaged in the 
matter. Ibn Saud belittling the importance of the measures 
taken in Transjordan, stated that he had issued "stringent 
orders for the punishment of the raiders on his side and the 
return of the loot". But due to mistrust on the part of 
his own tribesmen he admitted that he had done nothing to 
carry out article 3 of the Haddah agreement, which bound 
him to place his local authorities in direct touch with 
those of Transjordan. 
2 
Ibn Said of course had learned 
his lesson from the Ikhwan rebellion and did not want to 
risk any repetition. The MacDonnell-mission, however, 
offered Ibn Saud a new chance to show his desire to 
co-operate. Accordingly, in response to MacDonnell's 
enquiry, he prepared lists of his claims against Transjordan 
tribes since-November-1929. In the meanwhile he addressed 
a personal letter to Ryan on 23 July expressing "the 
1. Ryan to Henderson, 12 June 1930, E3598/223/9 
F. O. 371/14465. 
2. Ibid. 
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anxiety and discontent of his subjects caused by the 
failure of measures taken by Transjordanauthorities to 
produce the desired results". He stressed that the raids 
had not ceased but had become more like organised expeditions. 
The King's letter was followed, on 28 July, by a long 
official note from Hamza covering much the same ground but 
also accusing the Transjordan authorities of "culpable 
negligence", and expressing pessimism as to the outcome 
of MacDonnell's mission. The note definitely disclaimed 
any responsibility for future developments. Both the King's 
letter and the Hamza's note, while stressing the Hejaz-Nejd 
grievances, were intended to establish the Saudi case against 
Transjordan. In reply Ryan gave the Kinga personal 
interpretation of the situation. He stated, on 1 August, 
that it was too soon. to assume. that the Transjordanian 
measures had been ineffective. Hennas quick to turn the 
King's argument against him reminding him of his own 
unwillingness to commit himself to any co-operative move 
against raids. Indeed the echo of the King's account at 
their first meeting on 11 June was still fresh in Ryan's mind. 
He finally warned the King that "raids provoke raids". 
1 
In London an interdepartmental meeting was held on 26 
. 
August at the Colonial office to prepare a reply to Ibn Saud's 
1. Jeddah Report., July and Aug. 1930, op. cit. 
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letter of 23 July. The meeting produced a number of draft 
recommendations and submitted them for treasury sanction on 
12 September. The main points were: 
1. The Bedouin Control Board to be retained in Transjordan. 
2. A Secret Service-Fund of 12000 per annum to be placed 
at the disposal of the officer to be appointed to the Arab 
Legion;, 
3. A British intelligence Officer to be appointed to the 
Arab Legion; 
4. The mobile reserve to be mechanised; and 
5. Three small intelligence posts to be established on the 
frontier at Mudawwara, Azrak and Inshash. 
1 These measures 
were similar to those which had been adopted on the Iraqi 
frontier since 1927.2 
Meanwhile 'Abd-Allah had accepted Ibn Saud's suggestion 
that spokesmen be named by the tribes involved, ''MacDonnell 
spent a fortnight at Amman preparing for the investigation. 
On 14 July he informed the two sides that the lst of August 
had been fixed as the last date on which claims for 
compensation and evidence about the raids would be received. 
This date was to be highly significant in the forthcoming 
negotiations. Accordingly, Transjordan appointed their own 
agent at once, while Ibn Saud's agent left Jeddah for Amman 
as late as 13 August, with instructions to collect the tribal 
1. Jeddah Report, Sept., O ct and Nov. 1930, F. O. 371/15289. 
2. _ See chapter 
4 above. 
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representatives on his way. 
1 
They reached Amman on the 
1st of September, one month later than MacDonnell had 
suggested. Between, 3 and 13 September, he had been 
examining the-Saudi claims. Obviously, Ibn Saud's 
desire to fulfill pledges of assistance to the mission was 
now open to question. His procrastination hindered 
MacDonnell and prevented him from sticking to his timetable. 
Moreover, he produced only vague accounts of his claims, 
and gave limited authority to his agent. 
By 14 September, however, there was sufficient material 
for MacDonnell to'start the enquiry. At the opening meeting 
with representatives from both sides he pointed out that he was 
"there merely to investigate, that the final word 
was with His Majesty's Government and that functions 
of the government [sic] agents and tribal representatives 
was [sic ]to assist me to arrive at the facts rather 2 
than to fight their case before a judicial tribunal". 
Although MacDonnell made it plain that he was only investigating 
the claims, this did not prevent acrimony. At the first 
meeting on 15 September the Saudi attita. * soon produced trouble 
and discord. On 19 September, the Saudi agent pushed non- 
co-operation to the extent of refusing to. answer enquiries. 
The Saudi tribunal representatives alleged in justification 
that they were not there to defend themselves against 
accusations made by Transjordanians but only to detail their 
own long history of grievances. Due to deep differences 
1. MacDonnell Report, E490/3/25, F. O. 371/15285. 
2. MacDonnell to Passfield, Oct. 1930, E5591/223/91, 
F. O. 371/14467. 
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between the two parties, MacDonnell had to suspend the 
negotiations between 30 September and 5 October. 
1 
The immediate cause was that the Saudi delegation was 
reluctant to accept "the use of oath" in the proceedings 
claiming that "such use would entail the loss of the 
established rights of the subjects of the Hejaz-Nejd. " 
This claim related to an earlier refusal to testify on 
oath. As Hamza explained: "having successfully resisted 
the imposition, of the oath at the abortive Maan and 
Jericho tribunals, the Hejaz Government could not accept the 
2 
use of oath at Amman". To-the British, it seemed that 
Ibn Saud was trying to interfere with free conduct of the 
enq y. Hope-Gill, the Charge d'Affairs at the Jeddah 
legation, was therefore instructed to represent-to Ibn 
Saud the seriousness with which Londcn viewed the situation. 
"Should his representations fail of [sici decisive effect 
within forty-eight hours", Hope-Gill was authorized "to 
convey [to] Ibn Saud himself a strongly worded message". 
Once Hamza-discovered London's attitude, he suspended his 
interviews with Hope-Gill and left for Taif to see the King. 
Th r meeting was decisive with regard to the Amman investigations. 
The King modified his position and now'shö^ed flexibility. 
Immediately instruct 
,, 
ions were sent to the Hejaz-Nejd 
agent at Amman to conform to MacDonnell's wishes in the matter 
1. MacDonnell Report, E490/3/25, F. O. 371/15285; Jeddah 
Report, Sept., Oct. and Nov. 1930, F. O. 371/14460. 
2. Jeddah Report, Sept., Oct., and Nov., 1930, F. O. 371/15289 
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of the oaths and to answer all Transjordan accusations 
except those relating to Ibn Mashhour. These instructions 
allowed the investigation to proceed and accordingly a 
meeting was held on 6 October. 
1 
Before that, however, and in fact on 4 October, Hamza 
informed the British Legation that his King had just 
received news of an insult directed by the Transjordanian 
agent against his own agent and Government. He stated 
that the King would be making official representations to 
the British Government. Hope-Gill was neither able to 
answer Hamza nor to satisfy the King as he had received 
no information about the incident. On 5 October, the Saudi 
Government officially demanded a written apology from the 
Transjordan Government and insisted that this should be 
read out publicly in a session at Amman. ' This affair 
led to the withdrawal of the Saudi agent from the meetings 
of 6 October and to the renewed suspensionýof the negotiations. 
The situation was rapidly getting out of hand, and on 13 
October tope was finally abandoned of getting the two parties 
together again, for on that date "a coffee party quarrel ... 
ended in a promise by the Transjordan Howaitat to kill the 
Shararat and Billi of Nejd if and when the investigations reopened: 2 
While in Jerusalem during the suspension of the 
investigations, MacDonnell reported to Lord Passfield, the 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., see maps pp. 704 and 269A 
i 
ý 
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Colonial Secretary, blaming his difficulties mainly on 
the Saudi-attitude. 
"On the whole, " he concluded, "theýNejd cases 
are badly got up and the agent himself appears 
not to have even gone to the pains of studying 
the material provided [byJ his own Government... 
The Transjordan Government-agent is equally 
inefficient ... Feeling is very bitter, the 
Najdis not concealing their view that the 
Transjordan Arabs are practically infidels, while 
-the other side looks on them as emissaries of 
King Ibn Saud rather than as spokesmen for their 
tribes ... In the light of my experience'so far I 
am far from feeling that ... very satisfactory 
results could ever have been expected. " 
The rest of October was spent in endeavours to lower 
the temperature between the Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan. 
Amir 'Abd-Allah would not comply with the demand for a 
written apology but-he conveyed his regrets verbally and 
induced the two agents to shake hands on the grounds that 
guests-of his country should be treated with courtesy. - 
Meanwhile Ibn Saud agreed, at the request of the British 
Government, to regard the incident as separate from the 
investigation proper. Although. he accordingly instructed 
his agent to continue to afford MacDonnell every assistance, 
Ibn Saud insisted that he'could not overlook the insult as 
the matter had become one of prestige; therefore, his 
people could not possibly-attend joint sittings until a 
written apology was received. This was a more intransigent 
attitude than that adopted by the Hejaz-Nejd representatives 
1. MacDonnell to Passfield, 'Oct. 1930, E5591/223/91, 
F. O. 371/14467. 
- 388 - 
on the spot. - Eventually, however, the King did receive 
an apology from Amir . 'Abd-Allah together with a message 
from the British Government to the effect that "this 
action was such as any government might accept as 
affording honorable satisfaction and. that the time had 
now come to close the door upon the past". To this 
Ibn Saud agreed on 30 October and accordingly MacDonnell 
resumed his investigations on 2 November, "with joint 
sittings and oaths". His work was completed by 16 November 
During the two months of negotiations (14 Sept. to 16 Nov. ) 
only 23 days were occupied by oath takings and joint 
sittings. It was, as Ryan reported, "a wearying period 
for all concerned, it is well over". 
1 
There is no doubt that Ibn Saud's eventual flexibility 
helped towards the conclusion of MacDonnell's mission. 
But the mission's success could not have been achieved 
I 
without the pressure put by London on Ibn Saud. On 2 
October, a "comprehensive and up to date" memorandum had 
been issued in reply to the King's letters of 23 July and 
13 August as well as to Hamza's note of 28 July. Britain 
strongly urged Ibn Saud to co-operate for the making of 
peace, and reminded him that Ryan and MacDonnell had been 
engaged trying to resolve matters in dispute with Transjordan, 
that measures had already been taken to control the situation 
Jeddah Report, Sept. Oct., and Nov. 1930, 
F. O. ' 371/15289. 
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from the Transjordan side and that more measures were 
now under consideration, These included: 
"'(1) The Bedouin Control Board; 
(2) The mechanisation of one company of the 
Transjordan Frontier Force; 
(3) The closing to Bedouin of an area lying 
between the eastern and southern frontiers 
of Transjordan and Bair, Jaffar and Tell Shahem; 
(4) The stationing of armouý, ed--car detachments and 
aircraft at the few water-points in the southern 
desert of Transjordan and intensive. reconnaissance 
work by aircraft; 
(5) A declaration by the Amir Abdullah as to the 
punishment of tribes who raided or instigated 
raiding or withheld information about raids; 
(6) Powers of arrest given to British detachments 
patrolling the frontier area and stationed at 
the water-points; 
(7) The appointment of a British intelligence officer 
on the establishment of the Arab Legion with 
powers to ensure respect for the decisions of 
the Bedouin Control Board, of which he would be 
a member; and 
(8) The establishment of two advance intelligence 
posts at Azrak and Imshash (Bir Nam)., the 
stationing of an intelligence detachment in 
the old Turkish fort near Mudawwarj, and their 
provision with wireless apparatus! 
While Britain was committing herself to the task 'Abd -Allah 
was doing his best to display his obedience to the British 
instructions. On 14 July he had issued a warning to his 
own tribes not to raid or to instigate others to raid or 
withhold information about raiding. 
"Whoever is found in the closed area" 'Abd-Allah 
warned, "shall be fired upon, and previous orders issued 
by the Bedwin Control Board must be respected. " He 
also declared that he "has granted powers of arrest 
to British detachments patrolling the frontier area 
and those now stationed at the only water points in 
the desert of Southern Transjordan". 
1. Ibid. 
2. Memo. by P. O., sent to Hope-Gill (Jeddah) on 2 Oct. 1930, 
E5256/89/91, F. O. 371/14460. 
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These measures illustrated that neither Britain nor 
'Abd-Allah were to be blamed for the deteriorating 
situation. Indeed, the memorandum pointed out, it was 
Ibn Saud's own responsibility to help remedy the situation, 
and his Government should 
"lend their wholehearted co-operation by making 
every effort to control the tribes of the Hejaz 
and Nejd, by giving instructions for fulfilment 
of their undertakings under article 3 of the 
Hedda Agreement. " 
Before Ibn Saud was'able to respond as Britian 
requested, ` his tribes raided Transjordan in October, 
2 
and it had become urgent that a solution to the endemic 
frontier problem must be found. In the meanwhile the latest 
raid coinciding with the October suspension of the 
investigation, caused gloom at the Foreign Office. An 
urgent interdepartmental meeting was held on' 22 October 
and expressed great anxiety about the international 
aspect "of the question and decided that urgent telegrams 
should be sent to the High Commissioner in Transjordan and 
to MacDonnell, who appeared "far-from appreciating the 
importance of--remedying the situation and the 
International difficulties which may result if ... [his] 
enquiry is allowed to breakdown". Reaching an early 
settlement was important to give Ibn Saud a greater 
measure of satisfaction. Another telegram was to urge 
1. Ibid. 
2. For the October Raid, -see': E5656/E5669/E5686/E5687/223/91, 
F. O. 371/14467 
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the High Commissioner that "provisional measures'should 
be taken at once in order to reduce the risk of further 
raids from either side to a minimum. "1 London's 
alarm was unnecessary because by then Ibn Saud's new eagerness 
to reach a speedy conclusion had enabled MacDonnell success- 
fully to conclude his mission. After that all parties 
agreed that immediate steps should be taken'to consider the 
present raids and that for this purpose the local 
authorities should meet regularly. 
MacDonnell reported his findings on return to London 
in December. While these were being considered Hafez 
Wahba, now officially appointed as Saudi Minister in 
London, did his best to press the Saudi case on questions 
at issue. He seems to have had little influence and it 
was not until 12 August 1931 that the British Government, 
refusing to enter into any debates, communicated its 
negative and blunt conclusions to Ibn Saud: 
"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
have considered the report submitted to them 
by Mr. MacDonnell on the results of his 
investigation into the claims arising from raids 
from the Hejaz-Nejd, which took place before the 
1st August, 1930. Owing to the insufficient and 
often contradictory nature of the information and 
evidence furnished to Mr. MacDonnell; to the 
. 
length of time which has elapsed since the dates 
of many of the raids involved; and owing, moreover, 
to the fact that the conditions under which Mr. 
MacDonnell was obliged to carry out his investigation 
did not permit of his conducting his enquiries on 
the actual sites of raids, or of his having the 
opportunity of examining all available witnesses, 
1. Memo. by Rendel, 22 Oct. 1930, on Transjordan-Hejez- 
Nejd raids, arbitration and frontier situation, E5656/ 
223/91, F. O. 371/14467. 
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the information is-not such as to enable His 
Majesty's Government to make an exact award 
on each claim submitted. For this reason His 
Majesty's Government are not in a position to 
make a detailed estimate as to the amount of 
loot taken from the nationals of either 
Government by nationals of the other. 
"The information-furnished to His Majesty's 
Government is, however, sufficient to enable 
them to-judge that it would be fair and 
reasonable that all claims referred to them 
by both Governments concerned should be held 
to cancel each other out. His Majesty's 
Government. conclude, therefore, that all 
claims arising from raids beteen the two 
countries which took place before the-lst 
August, 1930, should, on the basis of 
such cancellation, be held to 11e settled, 
and conclusively disposed of. " 
1. Jeddah Report, July-and Aug. 1931, F. O. 371/15289. 
Glubb - Ibn Zeid Meetings, 1931. 
While London was debating MacDonnell's report the`-' 
local situation was changing. Glubb had'been appointed 
the Desert Control Officer in Transjördan in autumn 1930, 
as his duties had no longer been necessary on the Iraqi 
front after the meeting of the Kings. Indeed Glubb's 
success in the Iraqi desert had encouraged the authorities 
in Transjordan to ask for his services. His main task 
was to reorganise and pacify the Bedouin so that they 
would eventually abandon the custom of raiding. 
1 
Having moved to Transjordan, Glubb reported to London 
the Nejdi raid of. October 1930 on the Howaitat the 
powerful tribe of Transjordan. This report produced a 
storm of indignation in Downing Street. Formerly the tribe 
had challenged both the British forces in Transjordan and 
the Ikhwan, but on this occasion they were the victims 
and had been left virtually starving. Glubb held Ibn 
Saud responsible for the raid, stating that the King had been 
1. Glubb has explained his policy in detail in The Story 
of the Arab Legion (London 1948). It has been well 
summarised in an article clearly written by an admirer 
of his methods: 
"Glubb's policies involved no pitched battles and 
succeeded at negligible cost. But they-'could never 
have been accomplished without the mutual trust and 
affection which developed between the Bedouin and 
himself ... he decided that the root of the trouble lay in the Bedouin's distrust of any form of regular 
government, and particularly of Transjordan, which 
they believed to be in league with Saudi-Arabia. 
Glubb was convinced that if pacification was to be 
permanent, the tribesmen must be shown that the Government 
had their welfare at heart. He also believed that the 
Bedouin must be taught, to pacify themselves. He.. - -explained to the sullen and hostile Arabs [Bedouin] that they must 
inevitably destroy themselves in they continued to raid. " 
J. L., 'Abu Henaik', Blackwoods Magazine, CCLXXIX (1956) 
pp. 419-29. 
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"pursuing a deliberate policy of seducing the Howaitat 
into-his own allegiance, a-plan which, if successful, 
would be disastrous to British prestige". Glubb's views 
were endorsed by-the High Commissioner,, who expressed 
"an even more serious view of the consequences 
of a secession of Transjordan Beduins 
to Ibn Saud, in view of the difficult situation it 1 
would create in the event of trouble in Palestine. " 
Before a decision had been taken by London and 
probably unaware of Glubb's report, Yousuf Yasin (deputising 
for Hamza who had been taken ill) openly manifested his 
Government's hostility towards the appearance of Glubb in 
the frontier area with Transjordan. Glubb's former 
activities in Iraq and its consequences were still fresh 
in the minds of the Saudi authorities. Yasin in particular 
had, through his editorials of Umm al-Aura, launched numerous 
criticisms and attacks on Glubb. These now continued in 
his official role and through the paper. 
2 On 3 February 
1931, he discussed the situation with Ryan and complained 
that the British Government "were really responsible for 
Transjordan and that their interposition between the 
parties served as a protection to. Transjordanian raiders. "3 
He also explained that his Government was anxious to bring 
1. Jeddah Report, Jan. and Feb. 1931, F. O. 371/15289. 
See also, Glubb, The story of the Arab Legion, 
--pp. 71-77. 
2. See for example: Umm al-Aura, No. 293,18 July 1930, 
No., 358,23 Oct. 1931. 
3. Jeddah Report, Jan. and Feb. 1931. F. O. 371/15289. 
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article 3 of the Haddah agreement into operation and was 
now-taking further measures to control the frontier 
situation, among these was the appointment of Ibn Zeid, 
the . Saudiagentat. 
MacDonnell's investigation, as 
Inspector of the Desert. 
Ryan's report on the Saudi complaints and measures 
that they were taking crossed Foreign Office instructions 
dated 6 February 1931 "to make the strongest possible 
representation" to Ibn Saud against the latter's 
underground endeavours to persuade or to force the 
Transjordan tribes to come under his authority. 
) 
In the 
meanwhile Glubb's efforts to organise the tribes and to 
prohibit them from raiding Nejd led them to suspect that 
there was a secret agreement between Britain and Ibn Saud 
against them. 
2 Ryan, who had been closely in touch with 
the situation, thought it advisable to tone down London's 
protest. The Foreign Office concurred and advised on the 
line to be pursued recommending a definite reply within 
four days. Accordingly on 28 February Ryan communicated a 
slightly modified memorandum to the Saudi Government, 
accompanied by a request for an early meeting with the King. 
A separate but earlier note was also sent on the same 
day to the Hejazi Government. in reply to the aspersions 
1. Ibid. 
2. Glubb has given many examples to this in his The 
Story of the Arab Legion, chapters 4 and 5. 
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which had been cast on Glubb.: In Britain's memorandum of 
28 February, the British Government propounded the following 
points: 
"(1) 'Noting Ibn Saud's expressed readiness to bring 
article 3 of the Hadda Agreement into operation 
and having in view the proved necessity for 
immediate co-operation between the authorities 
on both sides of the frontier, they proposed, 
in pursuance of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's request 
for suggestions as to the method of initiating 
such co-operation, that Captain Glubb and Ibn 
Zeid should meet (a) to examine all representatives 
and claims regarding raids since the 1st August; 
(b) to arrange for immediate restoration of loot 
on both sides; and (c)"to arrange for the 
intercommunication of information and mutual 
restoration of loot in future. 
(2) They asked that Ibn Zeid should be invested 
with full executive powers, and that he and 
Captain Glubb should have power to call upon 
the representative-sheikhs to put forward claims, -&c. 
(3) Having explained the inability of the Transjordan 
authorities to maintain the recent improvement 
of the situation unless immediate steps should 
be taken to return the loot captured from their 
tribes since the 1st August; His Majesty's 
Government dwelt on various flagrant features 
of those raids, including the proved culpability 
of En Neshmi and his public statement that 
Ibn Saud permitted raiding into Transjordan, 
a statement widely believed and not effectively 
disproved. They. said they 'must'insist that 
if this has not already been done, the strongest 
measures should be taken to counteract the effect 
of En Neshmi's action in giving countenance 
to raiding and to make it publicly known that 
His Majesty King Abdul Aziz expressly disavows 
and condemns it. ' They expressed hope that 
a recent report of En Neshmi's appointment to 
the command of tribal forces would prove to be 
unfounded. 
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(4) They asked the Hejazi Government to inform 
them. as soon as possible that they agreed to 
the proposed meeting and that Ibn Zeid would 
receive full powers to deal with the matters 
proposed, including the immediate restitution 
of camels: and other loot captured from Trans- 
jordan tribes since the lst August. They 
added-that Captain Glubb would be authorized 
to arrange for the restitution of any loot 
identified as having been taken from the 
Hejazi or Nejdi tribes. 
(5) Finally, His Majesty's Government, having 
regard to the urgent necessity for restoring 
the camels looted from Transjordan, offered 
. British co-operation 
in the Wadi Sirhan, if 
the Hejazi Government should find themselves 
confronted with. any practical difficulty in 
returning them immediately`! 
The discussions arising out of the British memorandum 
overshadowed all other questions between the Saudi 
Government and the British Legation. Ryan at his own request 
met the King on 2 and 4 March. On 5 and 6 March he completed 
2 his discussion with Yousuf Yasin. The meeting of 2 March 
was devoted to the affairs of the frontier with 
Transjordan. The King was "impressed but maintained a bold 
front" as Ryan came to see him personally in connection with 
the 28 February communications. Ryan pointed out that 
since his arrival in the Hejaz in May 1930, he had been 
devoting much of his energy to get the situation on the 
frontier with Transjordan placed on a satisfactory basis, but 
his attempts had proved a failure. The whole matter was 
now left to London and he was working only according to 
1. . Jeddah Report, Jan. and Feb. 1931, F. O. 371/15289. 
2. Ryan to Henderson, 7 March 1931, E1605/387/25, 
F. O. 371/15294. 
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their instructions. Ryan deliberately presented the 
case in that-way., He aimed to confirm Britain's 
objection to-the±Saudi. allegations, against Glubb (as 
indicated in the second. note of-28 February) and to make 
clear to Ibn Saud that -those accusations did not impair 
London's confidence in Glubb. Furthermore, Ryan wanted 
to present the following observations' on the final British 
position: 
=1.,: to- impress on-the King the extreme gravity of the 
situation. ý"I was to do this with all the force of which 
I was capable". 
2. to obtain a definite answer as soon. as possible before 
4 March. 
3. 
- 
to let the King know that it was universally believed 
that the large scale raids from Nejd to Transjordan were 
carried out under the King's authority. The British 
allegations about Ibn Saud's responsibility of the October 
1930 raid were built on an-intelligence. report that Ibn 
Saud had issued the orders to. start the raid. The -- 
frontier authorities in Transjordan, -on"hearing of this, - 
warned Amman, but it was too late because of communication 
delays. l 
For his-part, the King denied these allegations 
and defended his Government's-attitud towards Glubb, but 
drew Ryan's attention to: the discrimination in Britian's 
1. Record of, Ryan's audience-with Ibn Saud on 2 March 1931, 
E1605/387/25, F. O. 371/15294. 
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policy towards his country and Transjordan. He expected 
the British Government "to deal equitably with both sides" and 
emphasized this as a principle to help solve-the frontier, 
problem., If the 
, 
British. Government sought to bully or 
humiliate him, it was-not the treatment he expected of 
that 
"old-, friends". He stressed/his authority over his subjects 
was strong,, and he held, their support "as, completely as 
the ring on the finger". He was ready to take severe 
measures aginst the criminals on his side if offenders 
in, Transjordan were also punished. He was. prepared to 
reply to the memorandum of 28 February only "if he and 
Transjordan were treated equally". He-wanted to preserve 
the best relations with H. M. G. but-would never accept 
inequitable treatment of his subjects since. he had full 
authority over them. 
1 Ryan noted that the King's reply 
was "largely evasive". 
2 
The King, although reaffirming his intention to bring 
article 3 of the Haddah agreement into operation, hesitated 
about accepting the proposed Glubb - Ibn Zeid meetings. The 
King's fears of Britain's involvement in tribal affairs made 
him reluctant to agree to any proposal which might 
frustrate his efforts to maintain the loyalty of his tribes. 
It was that very reason which made him reject MacDonnell's 
proposal to visit the frontier. area. In order to avoid a 
1. Ibid. 
2. Jeddah Report, March and April 1931, F. O. 371/15289 
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direct rejection of Britain's request, the King suggested that 
agreement should be reached first on two points. One 
was the method of-dealing with the raids since the beginning 
the 
of MacDonnell investigations. Regarding this, he claimed 
the return by Transjordan of the loot he had listed earlier. 
The other point concerned the terms of reference for the 
proposed meeting between Glubb and Ibn Zeid. This was 
indeed the most important point. The King suggested that 
Glubb and Ibn Zeid should meet to exchange information in 
the event of large-scale raids, but any decisions they 
might take were to be ad referendum. The King undertook 
to instruct Ibn Zeid to meet Glubb soon after receiving 
the British reply to his previous two proposals, but he 
refused to return any loot to Transjordan until some loot 
taken was restored. It was almost the same tone that 
had been adopted earlier by Hamza when he said that blame 
could not be accepted for raids from Nejd until those from 
Transjordan had entirely ceased. The British offer to 
help Ibn Saud maintain order in Wadi Sirhan was cautiously 
received and finally rejected. Ibn. Saud, claimed that "he 
had power over all his subjects"., If Britain was anxious 
to help him, he argued, she could extradite. criminals 
fleeing into Transjordan. 
l 
Ibn Saud's views were carefully considered in London. 
The policy of trying to solve local problems by local 
1. Ibid. 
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negotiation. was still proving difficult to. implement: 
Ibn Saud's reply 
"whilesin many; ways. evasive. and unsatisfactory, 
did not exclude the achievement of their essential 
purpose, namely, that of bringing about an immediate 
meeting of the frontier authorities and the 
settlement of he questions at issue on a local and 
tribal basis". 
Failure to bring Glubb and Ibn Zeid together would 
inevitably lead to deadlock as long as the Saudis 
maintained the policy that they could not return loot or 
admit blame for raids from Nejd until the other side had 
taken the initiative. The immediate result would be 
continuation of raids and counter-raids,. which would inevitably 
be followed by an unwelcome flurry of despatches between 
Jeddah, London and Amman. Comfort, however, was taken from 
the impression that the proposed Glubb-Ibn Zeid meeting had not 
been totally rejected by the Saudis. Hence Britain should 
continue to press fora preliminary meeting limited to the 
exchange of information and views. For his part Ibn Saud, 
who had been so dubious about the principle of British 
involvement in tribal affairs, now agreed that 
"such a meeting should take place but only after the 
King, had, scouted the idea that there need, be any 
discussion of measures of police and. stressed his view 
the preliminary meeting should only be for the purpose 
of exchanging. information. " 
Ibn Saud maintained his suspicions about. Glubb's actual role 
in the meeting and insisted that full details should be made 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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available to him at once as he was no longer prepared to 
turn a blind eye to the situation on the frontier. 
As a token of good will, Ibn Saud replaced one of 
his frontier off icials, regarded as undesirable by the 
British, by two others carefully selected from among his own 
relatives. In consequence Ahmad al-Sudairi and his 
brother Turki now administered the frontier region. 
l 
Later, in May, the King issued a warning to his own tribes 
to denounce the raiding. Transjordan followed suit. The 
ground was now prepared for the Glubb-Ibn Zeid meeting 
which took place on 3 June in Transjordan. 
2 
Although it 
was later reported that the meeting had been friendly, Ibn 
Zeid would not commit himself to any decision without 
reference to Ibn Saud. The discussion dealt with the need 
for close co-operation; the immediate restitution of loot 
and the method by which victims could substantiate their 
claims and obtain compensation for loss of life. 
3 
Ibn Saud's recent flexibility was probably the result 
of fresh assurances from London a fortnight prior to the 
1, 
Glubb-Ibn Zeid preliminary meeting that 
"Hejazi or Nejdi nationals, who have taken part in 
raids in Transjordan territory and. have returned to 
Hejaz-Nejd, and who attempt to escape from 
penalties imposed on them for raiding by fleeing 
into Transjordan, will, if possible, be prevented, 
upon direct notification of their names and other 
available particulars by the Hejaz-Nejd frontier 
1. Ibid. 
2. Jbddah Report, May and June 1931, F. O. 371/15289. 
3. Jeddah Report, July and Aug. 1931, F. O. 371/15289. 
authorities to the corresponding Transjordan 
authorities, from crossing the frontier into Trans- 
jordan. If they enter Transjordan, the Transjordan 
authorities will, on receiving the necessary information 
from the Hejaz-Nejd authorities, use their best 
endeavours to prevent them from remaining in 
Transjordan jnd, if possible, to expel them into 
Hejaz-Nejd. " 
It was understood that the Saudi authorities would 
deal in the same manner with criminals from Transjordan 
and that the Governemnts of Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan 
had the right to terminate this undertaking. Ibn Saud, 
who had always been anxious for an extradition treaty, 
found hope in this undertaking and promised to co-operate. 
On 15 August Glubb and Ibn Zeid met again. This 
was their first major meeting. There were two points 
at issue: the return of the loot taken since 1 
August 1930 (the beginning of MacDonnellts. investigation 
mission), and the settlement of future procedure. 
Although Ibn Zeid attended the meetings, as before, 
With no authority to negotiate or decide on any of the 
questions, Glubb managed to secure his endorsement for 
the restitution of some of the loot. Having had 
experience in negotiating with the Saudis, Glubb was 
able to understand their motives. He concluded that if 
the British Government decided "to stand aside and 
urge Ibn Saud and Transjordan to arrange matters between 
them[selves], there was not the-least chance of Ibn Saud 
returning a single animal". Whatever the obstacles might 
1. Jeddah Report, May and June 1931, loc. cit. 
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be, the Glubb-Ibn Zeid meetings were, the first fruit 
of Britain's representations of 28 February 1931.1 
, For their part, the British began to appreciate 
Ibn Saud's desperate need for an extradition agreement. 
They offered to develop the undertaking previously 
mentioned into an agreement between Hejaz-Nejd and 
Transjordan to be drawn on the lines of the. Bahrah agree- 
ment. The proposal, though welcomed by Ibn Saud, was 
rejected by 'Abd-Allah, who insisted that such an 
agreement. was the concern. of Britain as the Mandatory 
Power. The British Government. did not feel disposed 
2 
at the time to put pressure on 'Abd-Allah to reconsider 
his attitude nor were they inclined to conclude the 
agreement: by themselves because they realised that it 
would be unworkable. in the present atmosphere of hostility. 
It was therefore decided to rely on the existing policy 
of frontier representatives co-operation. This was 
3 
a disappointment for Ibn Saud,. who now understood that 
Britain had been, trying, to help him.. Thus-when he was 
informed in August 1931 of. the British conclusions, to the 
MacDonnell investigation, 
4 he accepted the situation though 
1. Jeddah Report, July and Aug. 1931, loc. cit. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Jeddah Report, Sept. and. Oct. 1931, F. O. 371/15289. 
4. See above, pp. 391-92. 
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remaining "unable to refrain going over old ground". 
In fact he remained eager to achieve agreements similar 
to those he had recently signed with Iraq. 
' 
After its success in "liquidating the past" between 
the Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan, the, British Government 
again urged Ibn Saud to co-operate in producing a 
similar agreement to settle the present differences. This, 
they believed, could only be achieved by the continuation 
of the Glubb-Ibn Zeid meetings. However Britain failed 
to erase the King's suspicions about Glubb's . real role 
in the frontier region. He indicated that "liquidating 
the present" could be gained by the "removal of those 
causes of friction on the Transjordan frontier which 
were causes of friction on the Iraq frontier". Ibn Saud, 
no doubt, intended to make an oblique reference to the 
presence of Glubb. Britain's reaction was to confirm 
confidence in Glubb and to complain that Ibn Saud had sent 
Ibn Zeid "hopelessly unprepared". Ibn Saud then 
became alarmed that he might be accused and held 
responsible for the failure of the frontier meetings. In 
order to put further pressure on him, the British Government 
asked him to pay his share of the cost of the MacDonnell 
mission (£1,726). 
2 Ibn Saud felt that payment was a 
question open to, bargaining and on. 28 November'the Saudi 
1. See above, : pp. 366-70 . 
2. Jeddah Report, Sept. and Oct. 1931, loc. cit. 
Government expressed. their, surprise 
"that they should be requested to pay half the 
expenses of the arbitration, when they have 
experienced 'heavy loss as a result of the 1 
reduction of the claims of their subjects. " 
When this matter was re-opened later in January 1932 Ibn 
Saud thought it was advisable not to risk complicating 
relations with Britain for such a trifling sum. 
2 
Between 15 August 1931 and 7 January 1932, there 
were no meetings between Glubb and Ibn Zeid. Even when 
they met after five months, their meeting, though friendly, 
proved fruitless. 
3 
Thus the MacDonnell's investigation 
had succeded in liquidating the past, but the Glubb-Ibn 
Zeid meetings had failed to make any progress. The 
situation took a different turn when Ryan decided to visit 
Amman and Jerusalem to try his hand at achieving a final 
settlement. This latest initiative coincided with the 
Transjordanian-backed Ibn Rifada plot against Ibn Saud. 
1. Jeddah Report, Nov. . and Dec. 1931, F. O. 371/16024. 
2. See: Jeddah Report, Jan. Feb. and March 1932, F. O. 
371/16024; Memo. by Ryan, 25 Feb. 1932, E1241/1241/25, 
--F. O. 371/16024. This had happened inspite of 
Ryan's promise to Ibn Saud, that the. investigation would be free. There is no evidence for why Britain did 
request Ibn Saud to pay his share in the investigation's 
cost. 
3. Jeddah Report, Jan, Feb. and March 1932, op. cit. 
The Peace-Making between Ibn Saud and 'Abd-Allah 1932. 
The Saudi procrastination as evidenced in the Glubb 
Ibn Zeid meetings, and the potential danger in the situation 
during the autumn of 1931 demanded a change in British 
policy. Before the end of the year it had been decided 
that personal contact should be established between 
the British Minister in Jeddah and the authorities in 
Amman and Jerusalem to solve the problems blocking 
improvement in the Hejaz-Nejd relations with Transjordan 
and threatening British Imperial interests. Accordingly 
Ryan began a tour to Amman where he spent 12 and 13 
February 1932 discussing, the definition of the nationality 
of the boundary tribes, such as Howaitat and Bani Atiyah, 
the establishment of posts. byTransjordan and the counter 
military preparations of. Ibn Saud. He also discussed the 
need to create direct and, friendly relations between 
'Abd-Allah and Ibn Saud. This of course would require 
the establishment of. closer and more direct 
collaboration between Jerusalem and Jeddah. 
I 
In, spite of many differences,, the Amman discussions 
were useful and enabled Ryan to clear. up a number of 
points. However, their divergencies were, as Ryan 
explained, due not to his unwillingness to support Trans- 
Jordan in dealing with its frontier troubles, 
1. Jeddah Reports, Nov and Dec. 1931, Jan. Feb. and 
March, 1932, F. O. 371/16024. 
"but to the frequent difficulty of accommodating 
action as regards Transjordan questions with the" 
broad policy of keeping Ibn Saud sweet and giving 
him moral sypport for reasons of Imperial 
interests. " 
On his last day at Amman Ryan met 'Abd-Allah who 
was then "most affable" and spoke about Ibn Saud in 
surprizingly moderate terms as "the King of Nejd". He did 
not exclude the possibility of recognizing his full 
titles if this was Britain's desire. For the time being, 
however, he could not favour this course of action. 
In fact he was carefully observing Ibn Saud's internal 
troubles, and he felt that he could benefit from them. 
If his judgment of Ibn Saud's difficulties was correct, 
as indeed it was, why should he hurry to recognize the 
Saudi regime in the Hejaz? 
2 
Ryan reviewed the matters 
he had discussed in Amman with the High Commissioner 
at Jerusalem, By 16. February his mission was completed 
and he left"to consult with London. 
There, he reported on two main topics; the situation 
in the Hejaz-Nejd, and the Hejaz-Nejd frontier question 
with Transjordan. Ryan was convinced that the troubled 
situation would "envenom all our relations with Ibn Saud 
and might again produce a dangerous situation". He 
advised the pursuit of a new policy. 
1. Memo. by Ryan, 25 Feb. 1932, E1241/1241/25, 
F. O. 371/16024. 
2. Ibid. 
"we must suffer the nuisance", he wrote, "unless 
we are prepared for drastic remedies, like driving 
the Amir Abdullah and Ibn Saud into direct relations 
and letting them settle their tribal differences 
between them; and/or attempting a readjustment of 
frontiers so as to give the Wadi Sirhan to Trans- 
jordan (or perhaps neutralize it) and clear uplonce 
[and] for all the question of Akaba and Maan. " 
Ryan suggested that this policy could be successful if 
Britain was able to maintain the Aqaba-Maan question in 
abeyance. He was fully aware that Ibn Saud still had 
I 
great ambitions and that he might be tempted to begin 
dangerous enterprises. He concluded that Ibn Saud 
had just "reached the limit of what he can achieve 
without embroiling himself with H. M. G. " Finally, 
Ryan drew attention to the present position of Ibn Saud, 
who was under the pressure of internal and external problems, 
and whose regime was unstable. He proposed that one of 
the following policies should be adopted: 
-(i) 'to give positive support to Ibn Saud, on the 
ground that he is,. in spite of everything, 
an element of stability"; 
(ii)"to let the present situation evolve its own 
lines, maintaining a, -generally friendly attitude towards Ibn Saud without really helping him"; 
(iii) `to stiffen our attitude all along the line, 
. at the--. risk of definitely antagonising Ibn Saud, and perhaps, promoting his downfall2or 
perhaps driving him into mad adventures. " 
Ryan favoured the second option because 
J., --Memo. by Ryan, -on 
the situation in the Hejaz-Nejd 
as it affects H. M. G., 23 Feb. 1932, E1010/640/25, 
F. O. 371/16022. 
2. .- Ibid. 
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"it-matters very little whether he [Ibn Saud] 
survives or collapses; but in this alternative 
we must be prepared to tolerate the Transjordanian 
nuisance and to go easy with every thing else 
'including týe question of Kuwait and the Arabian 
air route'. 
With regard to the first option Ryan explained that "we 
cannot help Ibn Saud in the only way that would be 
really useful to him ... and ... we cannot help him 
against other Arab rulers". Finally he pointed out 
that the third option would not be dangerous because 
Ibn Saud "is weak and our'grievances against him are 
solid. ' We could make out a case for rigidity good 
enough to appeal even to many Moslems". 
There is no doubt that Ryan's judgment had'been 
affected by his personal differences with Ibn Saud. 
Good relations between them were, however, soon restored 
and Ryan became anxious to sponsor agreement between 
'Abd-Allah and Ibn Saud. Apparently it was he who 
had intimated to London in autumn'1931 
that they should pursue a policy similar to that which 
had successfully led to the meeting of the Kings. 
London hesitated over this because the 'Abd-Allah-Ibn Saud 
grievances were so deeply rooted. The Glübb-Ibn Zeid 
meetings had been suggested instead to pave the way for 
such an encounter. Unfortunately for'the British policy- 
makers, Glubb and Ibn Zeid had failed to meet regularly and 
the purpose of. their meetings had not been fulfilled. But 
1. Ibid. 
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Ryan, still believing that he had a-role to-play, was 
confident--that, if -given'. time, he could achieve a 
settlement. ' 
While Ryan remained in London waiting for a decision 
on the matter Ibn Saud's son, Amir Faisal, arrived there 
in May-. -, The visit was designed: to improve Anglo-Saudi 
relations and to revive'the'momentum towards a settlement. 
Among-various'matters presented by Fuad-Hamza on 9th May 
for discussion: ýwas of --course the present situation on the 
frontier with Transjordan. Hamza expressed Ibn Saud's 
readiness'to make similar arrangements with Transjordan 
to those recently made with Iraq. Oliphant, who had 
been receiving the Saudi mission-at the Foreign office, 
declared"that this was "a very good sign", but he-cautiously 
added-that the matter was not "quite plain sailing". 
He promised to have the question examined. 
1 On 13 May 
he 'added that since Transjordan was a mandated territory 
some problems. would arise and these might widen the gap 
between the two countries'. 
2' 
'The Saudi mission gave 
'Ryan's initiative a new impetus. It was now agreed that 
he should actively pursue the quest for accommodation. 
1. Record of second meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd delegation 
at F. O., on 9 May 1932, E2403/1494/25, F. O. 371/16026. 
2. Record of third meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd delegation 
at F. O., on 13 May 1932, E2404/1494/25", F. O. 371/16026. 
Other issues like 'Aqaba and the Hejez Railway were 
also discussed. For Faisal's visit to London and 
Europe, see; ' Umm al-Qura, No. 402,26 Aug. 1932. 
- 412 - 
Amir Faisal completed his European tour and in 
July visited Baghdad where he met King Faisal. At their 
meeting the King expressed his readiness to mediate 
between 'Abd-Allah. and Ibn Saud. This offer seems to 
have been directly inspired by Britain. No decision had 
been taken on the proposals made either by Ryan or 
by Hamza. Oliphant's reactions to them seemed, in 
Ryan's opinion, to give no, hope of, effective British 
intervention in, such a complex, situation. Ryan accordingly 
had suggested that "Faisal could play a very useful 
role, as he could approach the Amir Abdullah in quite, a 
different way from H. M. G., as a brother and not as a 
. directing authority". 
1 Ryan's suggestion may, therefore, 
have prompted a British appeal to Faisal. Confirmation 
of_Ryan's role in the matter is provided by the fact 
that he was informed of Faisal's offer before it became 
known to Ibn Saud. 
Yousuf Yasin wlecomed Faisal's mediation and confirmed 
that Ibn Saud himself "had been delighted-with the idea 
of Arab Kings helping each other".. Ibn Saud, however,: 
refused to give an immediate reply until he had seen 
Amir Faisal with whom he wished to consult and had had 
1. Ryan to Simon, 2 Aug. 1932, E4189/1241/25, 
F. O. 371/16024. (For Faisal's visit to Baghdad, 
see-: al-Rashid, D. H. S. A., iii. pp. 125-29). 
London welcomed King Faisal's mediatory role, 
C. O. to F. O. 18 July 1932, E3601/76/25, 
F. O. 371/16015; E3803/78/25, F. O. 371/16016. 
9 
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an opportunity to "exchange views on certain undefined pre- 
liminary points with H. M. G. " Ryan did not like this attitude 
feeling that it would. "merely complicate the matter". 
' He 
wanted to avoid attempting a comprehensive solution to the 
Hejaz-Nejd problems with Transjordan believing that this could 
be achieved : 
later. For the present he preferred to concentrate 
on getting 'Abd-Allah and Ibn Saud to recognize each other. 
These efforts were temporarily frustrated by, the 
Transjordanian-backed Ibn Rifada plot against Ibn Saud in 
summer 1932. Ibn Rifada's objective was no less than the 
conquest of the Hejaz. With some support from Egypt and with 
cooperation from Transjordan he managed to cross the frontier 
from Sinai to Aqaba and then to engage, the Saudi forces. The 
British, unaware of this plot, could nevertheless have been held 
responsible by Ibn Saud for permitting the passage of a hostile 
force, through British. mandated territory. Conscious of this 
I 
Britain, offered immediate assistance to Ibn Saud against Ibn Rifadä, 
1. Ryan,. to Simon, 2 Aug. 1932, E4189/1241/25,, F. O. 371/16024. 
2. For Hamed Ibn Rifada al-A'war and his anti-Wahhabi campaign 
and the help he secured from Egypt and Transjordan, see: The 
Times, 22,24 June,, 14,15 July, 29 Aug. 1932. The story 
is also contained in 5 vols. in the P. R. O., F. O. 371/13013- 
13017. See summary in Jeddah Reports, July-Oct. 1932, F. O. 
371/16024. Ibn Rifada declared before leaving Egypt that 
he had met 'Abd-Allah at Amman and chosen him to lead the 
forces to conquer the Hejaz. 'Abd-Allah also promised 
-salaries for all the fighting forces and arms and ammunition 
would be available at Aqaba. Ryan concluded in a report on 
the affair that "it appears to me a strong presumption that 
he, [. 'Abd-Allah] was behind the actual organizers of the plot 
of which Ibn Rifada affair was only one episode". See: 
Memo. by Ryan on the possible connection of Amir 'Abd-Allah 
with recent attempts to undermine Ibn Saud, Sept. 1932, 
E4737/76/25, F. O. 371/16016. On 12 Oct. the F. O. agreed 
on Ryan's findings and held 'Abd-Allah responsible. F. O. 
Minutes, 12 Oct. 1932, E4747/76/25. F. O. 371/16016. 
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'Abd-Allah's link with Ibn Rifada undoubtedly 
increased tension and provided Ibn Saud with new evidence 
that reconciliation with him was unattainable. Ryan 
however, thought differently. He believed that the Ibn 
Rifada affair would compel London to play a more active 
part in the proceedings. The only disadvantage was 
that it would take Ryan sometime to clarify the 
situation and to ease the tension. Faced-with the Saudi, 
insistence on the question of reponsibility, Ryan was 
anxious to treat the affair separately from the general 
settlement. He thought he could influence Yasin, who was 
"completely in the King's confidence" to win over the King. 
1 
. Yasin went 
to see the King at Taif on 1 August. 
Having discussed the whole matter in all its aspects 
in, the presence. of Hamza, Yasin returned to Jeddah and 
presented, a secret and private letter2 and a memorandum3 
to Ryan. The memorandum was in fact a historical record 
of the discord between Ibn Saud and 'Abd-Allah since 1925. 
Significantly, it did not blame 'Abd-Allah as much as it 
did-the British, because 'Abd-Allah was 
"our enemy and there is no agreement or covenant 
between us. The agreements and covenants are between 
.. us and the British Government for whose sake we have 
refrained much and overlooked more of that we feel 
in our heart against him ['Abd-Allah]. 
1. Ryan to Simon, 2 Aug. 1932, E4189/1241/25, F. O. 371/16024. 
2. --Yasin to Ryan, 5 Aug. 1932, E4394/1241/25, F. O. 371/16024. 
3. Memo. by Yasin, 6 Aug. 1932, E4394/1241/25, F. O. 371/16024. 
4. Ibid. 
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The memorandum tackled the heart of the problem when 
it specified-Ibn Saud's wish for-the removal of 'Abd-Allah' 
from-Transjordan. 
if the British Government'desire complete 
rest such as will ensure the. maintenance of their 
interests in Transjordan without costing them 
anything and without disturbance or trouble from 
us ..: and such as will ensure our being in 
agreement with Transjordan, they will not be able 
to find true means-for this so1long as the Sharif 
'Abdulläh: is in Transjordan. " 
The memorandum promised Ibn Saüd's co-operation with Britain 
for peace if 'Abd-Allah were removed and replaced by 
any, other Arab or British ruler. In fact Ibn Saud was 
asking for more than Britain was willing even to consider. 
Later, on 30 August, the King pressed his point to Ryan 
and concluded that "no gentleman, however reasonable, 
could feel safe with a person like the Amir 'Abd-Allah 
over his border". The King, however, assured Ryan of his 
close friendship with Britain and of his desire to 
receive and to be guided by her advice, "subject only 
to the qualifications that she must safeguard his 
honour and his interests". This attitude can not be 
interpreted in simple anti-Hashemite terms-as Ibn Saud 
had by now established. good relations with Faisal, who 
was, as he declared, "a most commendable monarch" and 
with whom he remained on the best of terms. 
2 Ibn Saud was 
probably influenced by his recent settlement with Iraq and 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ryan to Simon, 30 Aug. 1932, E4821/1241/25, 
F. O. 371/16024. 
by Faisal's declarations, whatever his personal attitude, 
that. Arabia could not. survive, without Ibn Saud. According 
to Humphreys, Faisal's impression was that Arabia would 
lapse into "complete anarchy and his frontier would be 
exposed to serious raiding by the Nejdi tribes". 
l 
Notwithstanding mutual professions of friendship between 
Ibn Saud and Faisal, Ryan doubted whether Ibn Saud, 
in his present angry frame of mind against 'Abd-Allah, 
would accept Faisal's proposed mediation unless strongly 
pressed by Britain in that direction. Hoping for 
authority from London to exercise such pressure Ryan, 
in the meanwhile,. confided to Hamza on 6 August; 
"it was, a great pity to-destroy all that had been 
done, on the lines previously agreeable to the 
Hejazi Government, to promote a general settlement 
between Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan. " 
Hamza defended his King's position on the ground that 
he had never personally endorsed unconditional settlement 
with Transjordan. Ryan admitted this but pointed out 
that he was' 'really alarmed by "the King's assertion of 
invincible enmity and mistrust towards Amir 'Abd-Allah 
and his insistance that nothing would satisfy him 
except formal quarantees by H. M. G. " From this conversation 
with Hamza, Ryan emerged depressed and pessimistic. 
1. Humphreys to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, 2 Aug. 1932, 
E4215/1241/25, F. O. 371/16024. 
2. Ryan to Simon, 6 Aug. 1932, E4394/1241/25, F. O. 371/16024. 
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Ibn Saud's reply to Faisal's offer of mediation was 
included in the last paragraph of Yasin's memorandum. 
He stated: 
"we look upon it as gracious act -w.., [but] 
the mediation of His Majesty [King Faisal] however, 
cannot ensure to us our desiderata as he cannot be 
a guarantee for his brother, neither do we accept 
such guarantee... " 
Nevertheless Ibn Saud left the door open to the British 
Government to decide remarking 
"if they see that the interest lies in any 
couse let them take that course, and if they see, 
that their interest requires the acceptance of 
the mediation of His Majesty King Faisal týey 
know better than we [do] in this respect. " 
Although disappointing to Ryan, this reply strengthened 
his belief that initiatives must come from London. 
In the meanwhile, Amir Shaker, a cousin of 'Abd-Allah 
and his main adviser, visited Baghdad late in July at 
Faisal's invitation to secure his support for the 
mediation proposal. In fact, Shaker's influence over 
'Abd-Allah was believed to be extensive. Humphreys met 
Shaker during the visit and found him flexible. He quoted 
Shaker as saying: 
1 
"while it could not be expected that the Hashemites 
could ever in their hearts become the real friends 
of Ibn Saud, they were willing, when necessary, to 
set aside personal and family feelings in the 
common interests of the Arab peoples. The Amir 
'AbdilIdh - was, he explained, hot-headed and somewhat 
embittered, but he was confident that he would yield 
to the wishes of his broýher and to the advice of 
the British Government. " 
1. Memo. by Yasin, 6 Aug. 1932,, E4394/1241/25, F. O. 371/16024. 
2. Humphreys to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, 2 Aug. 1932, E4215/1241/; 
25, F. O. 371/16024. 
This reaction was encouraging. 
Another attempt conducted by A. G. Wauchope, the 
High Commissioner, was made at his meeting with Amir 
'Abd-Allah on 1 September. Wauchope pressed 'Abd-Allah 
to accept reconciliation with Ibn Saud, as this was 
Britain's desire. He also reminded the Amir that he 
was obliged, according to article 5 of the 1928 agreement 
... to be guided by the advice of his Britanic 
Majesty, tendered through the High Commissioner for 
Trans-Jordan, in all matters concerning foreign 
relations of Transjordan, as well as in all 
important matters affecting the international and 
financial obligations and interests of1His Britannic 
Majesty in respect of Trans-Jordan... " 
Early in July, Wauchope had pressed 'Abd-Allah not only 
to act loyally, but also to convince others not to 
give support to H. M. G. enemies. In fact this was a 
criticism of 'Abd-Allah's role in the Ibn Rifada affair. 
Wauchope argued that "as Ibn Rifada's object had been to 
destroy Ibn Saud, -and as'Ibn Saud had a treaty with H. M. G., 
I looked on. Ibn Rifada and all who helped him as people 
who worked against H. M. G. " 'Abd-Allah then promised to 
obey British instructions and to "take measures to 
convince every one that he was not instigating rebellion 
against Ibn Saud". 'Abd-Allah had not kept to this 
bargain and, now, in September "must ... give me a clear 
promise to recognise Ibn Saud as soon as H. M. G. called 
upon him to do so". In order to avoid any delay, Wauchope 
1. Art. 5 of the 1928 Agreement between Britain and Trans- 
jordan, Documents on International Affairs 1928, 
p. 215. See Toynbee's study to the treaty in his: 
Survey 1928, pp. 321-28. 
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made it clear that the question of recognition and 
that of a treaty of friendship should be treated 
separately. The recognition could go ahead easily 
and quickly, while it should later be possible to overcome 
gradually the difficulties in the way of making a treaty. 
1 
'Abd-Allah declined to give his sanction to Wauchope's 
requests until he had obtained a counter concession from 
Ibn'Saud namely his own-recognition as Amir of Transjordan. 
Wauchope refused to give any pledge about the possibility 
of concluding a treaty of friendship between the two rivals. 
Eventually 'Abd-Allah agreed unconditionally to recognise 
Ibn Saud since this was H. M. G. 's desire. He again 
made it clear that he was still hoping that the following 
points would be included in the proposed treaty of 
friendship. 
1. "That Ibn Saud should recognise the de facto 
Southern frontier 
2. That Ibn Saud should put in order the section 
of the Hejez Railway lying in his territory. 
3. That the pilgrimage be opened to the Amir and 
his family 
4. That the heirs'of King Husain should have 
the right to appoint an agent ... to look after their properties in the Hejaz. 
5. That H. M. G. should guarantee the due performance 
of these conditions. " 
Wauchope refused'to comment but promised. to convey 'Abd-Allah's 
1. Wauchope to C. O., 3 Sept. 1932, E4703/1241/25, 
, 
F. O. 371/16024. 
2. Ibid. 
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wishes to London. 'Abd-Allah then assured Wauchope 
that he should be counted "innocent of any connection with 
further troubles which may take place in the Hejaz". Wauchope 
concluded that 'Abd-Allah "was much perturbed and that it 
had been a great wrench for him to promise to recognize 
Ibn Saud, the enemy of his family". 
1 The signs for 
an eventual agreement were becoming more hopeful particularly 
since 'Abd-Allah was expecting his brother Faisal to visit 
Amman in September. 
Baghdad, Amman and Jeddah had reported their points 
of view and on 21 September at an interdepartmental meeting 
held at the Foreign office to decide policy. Ryan was 
present. The removal of 'Abd-Allah as requested by Ibn- 
Saud in his memorandum of 6 August 
"could in no circumstances be acceded to. 
Whatever action H. M. G. might eventually ... be 
obliged to consider taking against the Amir, 
there could be no question of taking drastic 
measures against him aý Ibn Saud's request or 
at the present stage. " 
Regarding Ibn Saud's alternative request that 
Britain should guarantee 'Abd-Allah's non intervention in 
the Hejaz-Nejd affairs Ryan 
"thought"it, very undesirable that His Majesty's 
Government should give to King Ibn Saud a formal 
guarantee of such a nature as to make them jointly 
responsible with the Amir for any misdemeanour of 
his affecting King Ibn Saud. The latter would not 
fail to avail himself of it at every opportunity 
and to hold His Majesty's Government directly 
_responsible, even very probably 
to the extent of 
claiming financial compesation direct from His 
1. Ibid. 
2. Provisional record of interdepartmental meeting held 
at the F. O., 21 Sept. 1932, E4873/1241/25, F. O. 371/16025. 
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Majesty's Government for damage resulting frgm 
any Transjordan raid on the Hejaz and Nejd. " 
Ryan's argument was accepted, but a Colonial Office 
representative suggested that the British Government could 
"satisfy King Ibn Saud's desire for a guarantee 
by securing from the Amir Abdullah an. undertaking 
to His Majesty's Government to observe the 
obligations involved in the proposed settlement, 
and notifying King Ibn Saud formally that such an 
undertaking ýad been given to His Majesty's 
Government. " 
This suggestion might be acceptable to Ibn Saud, but he 
was unlikely to drop his request. A more potent 
incentive was to secure Abd-Allah's recognition of Ibn Saud 
as King of the Hejaz and Nejd. This recognition would be 
of great advantage to Ibn Saud. He could then tell the 
'ulama'and the Ikhwan that he had handled Saudi external 
affairs successfully, especially after the Ibn Rifada 
incursion. This view was stressed by Ryan, who urged 
at the meeting that a. final decision regarding this 
issue should be taken by mid-October to enable Ibn Saud 
to pacify, his agitated Ikhwan and '. ulama'.. He reminded the 
meeting that no guarantees should be made to Ibn Saud, 
though he could be informed 
"that the Amir Abdullah was prepared to recognise 
him at once and thereafter to undertake negotiations 
for a treaty settlement of the questions at issue 
between them, and that His Majesty's Government would 
do all they could to bring aýout a settlement 
satisfactory to both sides. " 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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With regard to 'Abd-Allah's wish that Britain 
should guarantee the observance by Ibn Saud of obligations 
to be undertaken by him in any future treaty of mutual 
recognition, Rendel found it difficult for Britain to 
escape her mandatory responsibilities. It was agreed 
that Britain might participate in a tripartite treaty 
which would place 'Abd-Allah and Ibn Saud under 
obligations to the British Government. This resolution 
"would cover the Amir's request for a guarantee 
from His Majesty's Government as well as that of 
Ibn Saud, and would probably to some extent meet 
the objection inherent in a direct guarantee by 
His Majesty's Government of the Amir Abdu}lah's 
correct behaviour towards King Ibn Saud. " 
The meeting then directed its attention to the 
question of mutual recognition. It was agreed that the 
simplest and safest solution was to make such recognition 
separate from any treaty. As Ryan argued, the treaty 
would inevitably raise many questions which should be 
avoided at such an early stage. These matters could be 
less controversial if discussed after the recognition. 
In these circumstances the meeting recommended that the 
British Government 
"should aim at arranging for recognition by letters 
to be addressed to His Majesty's Government, (i) in 
the case of the Amir through the High Commissioner 
for Transjordan, and (ii) in the case of Ibn Saud 
through Sir A. Ryan. In this way, no question 
would arise as to which of the two rulers should 
write first. o the other, and much complication would 
be avoided. " 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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'One more difficulty needed to be solved; that 
was the form of words which Ibn Saud be asked to accept 
regarding 'Abd-Allah's position as Amir under the 
Mandate when he had never acknowledge its existence and 
when he persisted in his view that 'Abd-Allah was simply 
a local governor. Eventually, 
"it was agreed to recommend that the formula 
'recognizes His Highness the Amir Abdullah as 
Ruler of the State of Transjordan'-would be in 
accordance with the terms of the Agreement between 
the United Kingdom and Transjordan of 1928, and 
would at the same time sufficiently provide for 
recognition by Ibn Saudlof the-Amir's more or 
less sovereign status. " 
Ryan drew the conference's attention-to Ibn Saud's 
special interest in the matter of extraditing tribal 
offenders, which must be included in any agreement that 
Ibn Saud might be persuaded to sign. Rendel agreed that 
this was indeed an essential point. The British authorities, 
whether in London or in Transjordan, were puzzled by the 
complexity of the situation. There were wide differences 
in the interpretation of extraditable crimes. For his part 
Ibn Saud was likely to consider raids on Government forces 
and insurrection as extrad itabl. e, , whereas 
the authorities 
in Transjordan found it impossible to agree to this. 
London also found it contrary to Britain's policy to agree 
to the extradition of political offenders. This difficulty 
was to be given further examinat,, ion, but for the moment, 
1. Ibid. 
I 
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Ibn Saud. was merely informed of Britain's readiness to 
make,, arrangements similar to those embodied in his agreements 
with King Faisal. 
1 
The meeting decided to back 'Abd-Allah's request for 
recognition by-Ibn Saud of the de facto Southern frontier 
of Transjordan but against his request that Ibn Saud should 
undertake to put the Hejazi section of the Hejaz.. Railway 
in order. This matter, ,. it was felt, . would best be left in 
abeyance. 
2 
While the British-policy-makers were thus busy, Ibn 
Saud, was also now planning a major decision for the future 
of; his country. - On-22 September the Hejaz and, Nejd were 
formally unified under the name of "The Kingdom of Saudi- 
Arabia". 3 Although this unification did, not cause any 
fundamental change in the actual status of the Hejaz-and 
Nejd, -. it=was asymbolic union intended as a warning to 
potential enemies of either separate state. Significantly 
the, step-was taken less than two, months after Ibn Rifada 
affair. 
In-October King Faisal visited his brother.. 'Abd-Allah 
and persuaded him to recognise Ibn Saud. The latter, 
1. Ibid. -(See art. 3 of the extradition treaty between 
Iraq and the Hejaz-Nejd, F. O. 371/14477; C. O. 732/44). 
Ibid. 
3. "See: Hope-Gill to G. O. 22 Septe. 1932; Wahba to Simon 
22 Sept. 1932, E4845/1484/25, F. O. 371/16025; Fuad 
Hamza, al-belad al-arabiyah al-Saudiyah, pp. 92-95; 
Umm al-Aura, No. 405,16 Sept., No. 406,23 Sept. 
No. 407,30 Sept. 1932, Oriente Moderno, xii (1932), p. 405. 
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having received London's decision. regarding questions 
raised in thesmemorandum of16, August, declared on 13 
October his readiness to recognize 'Abd-Allah and to 
enter into treaty negotiations with him along the, -lines 
of the Saudi-Iraqi settlement. 
' However no immediate 
step was taken in that direction. On-the contrary, 
trouble started in Asir. soon afterwards and it was later 
known that at-least 'Abd-Allah and his brother, Ali were 
involved in backing a plot against Ibn Saud, known, as 
the al-Dabbagh conspiracy. Hamza presented a lengthy 
memorandum dated 15 November to Hope-Gill, protesting 
against 'Abd-Allah's aid to al-Dabbagh and urged, 
the British Government to prevent territories : under their 
control, being used as bases for anti-Saudi activity. - 
Ibn 
Saud had evidence for his claim about the link between-Ibn 
Rifada, al-Dabbagh and 'Abd-Allah. His intelligence network 
captured'a-letter from 'Abd-Allah to al-Dabbagh about the 
co-operation between the northern forces (Ibn Rifada)- 
and the southern-forces (al-Dabbagh) to capture the Hejaz. 
The case was reported to London later in November. London 
decided-not to reply before consulting Aden-and Jerusalem. 
Aden confirmed the uprising by al-Dabbagh. Jerusalem 
replied that although there were no indications of any 
association between the north and south collusion was not 
1. Hamza to Hope-Gill, 13 Oct. 1932, E6080/1241/25, 
F. O. 371116025; Jeddah Report, Sept. and Oct. 1932, 
F. O. 371/16024. 
- 426 - 
impossible. Ibn Saud then decided to concentrate his forces 
near the Transjordanian border in-preparation for a direct 
attack intended to oust 'Abd-Allah from his Emirate. 
1 
On 27 November, the Saudi Government presented another 
memorandum to the British Legation providing more evidence 
of 'Abd-Allah's anti Saudi activities. It was alleged 
that, earlier in the month and after winning over the 
leader of the Bani 'Ataiyah tribe, 'Abd-Allah had undertaken 
a-tour to seek more support from other tribal leaders and 
in particular Nuri al-Sha'lan of the Rwalah. Ibn Saud 
claimed that these border tribes owed allegiance to him 
and that 'Abd-Allah's designs upon them were clear evidence 
of, hostile intentions. In. fact there is no evidence that 
'Abd-Allah even saw Nouri and there is evidence that 
while supposed to be touring, he was engaged on a shooting 
party at Azraq. After that he is known to have visited 
his sick brother 'Ali in Baghdad. 
2 
The presence of the Saudi forces in the vicinity 
of the borders raised fears that a similar situation to 
1. See: Ryan to F. O., 4 Aug. 1932, E3918/76/25; 8 Aug. 
1932, E4026/76/25, F. O. 371/16016; Hope-Gill to P. O., 
25 Nov. 1932, E6212/5839/25, F. O. 371/16028; Jeddah 
Report, Nov. and Dec. 1932, F. O. 371/16875. See art. 
2 of the Treaty of Jeddah, Appendix-F. The original 
plan for the association between the north and the 
south was that the south should start the uprising 
which would be followed by the north. Apparently things 
went wrong. See text of message from al-Dabbagh to 
Amir Shaker in, Attar, sagr al-iazirah, pp. 1090-94. 
2. Jeddah Report, Nov. and Dec. 1932, F. O. 371/16875. 
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that which had occured on the-Iraqi border might arise. 
Hope-Gill advised that London should take radical 
action'against some of : Abd-Allah's leading advisers even 
if for policy reasons 'Abd-Allah himself could not be 
punished with dismissal. Hope-Gill concluded that in 
the long run Britain "must choose between the Amir 
Abdullah and Ibn Saud ... " London found it difficult 
"to deny the accusation of hostile activities made by 
Ibn Saud against Amir 'Abdullah_. and his associates". 
Jerusalem was informed on 3 December of this "embarrassing 
and ignominious" position, and was urged to take drastic 
steps as soon as possible to remedy this position - not 
only to safeguard Anglo-Saudi relations but also British 
interests throughout the Middle East. 1 
Wauchope carried out London's instructions. He 
interviewed-'Abd-Allah on 7 December and extracted a 
reiteration of his promise of non-aggression and peaceful 
intent. - 'Abd-Allah said that he had already dismissed 
some of his advisers and had taken action to curb the 
activities of anti-Saudi elements operating from within 
Transjordan. ` Notwithstanding these professions Wauchope 
noted that Amir Shaker, believed to be the leader of the 
anti-Saudi campaign, remained in office. 
2 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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London declined to give any formal reply to 
the two Saudi memoranda of 15 and 27 November until a 
clarification of the situation in Transjordan had been 
achieved. In fact' no reply was made as " it was hoped 
that Ryan, onhis return to Jeddah on 28 December, would 
manage verbally to sooth Saudi anger and to take charge of 
the peace negotiation. He was to try to avoid the topic of 
recrimination and to concentrate on the matters of mutual 
recognition. 
1 
Accordingly, in January 1933 Ryan conveyed to the 
Saudi Government London's definite-proposals regarding the 
procedure for mutual recognition between 'Abd-Allah 
and Ibn Saud and for subsequent negotiation of a bilateral 
treaty for the execution of which Britain would be directly 
responsible. The Saudi Government satisfactorily replied 
on 22 January assuring Ryan that the Ikhwan forces rich 
had been concentrated near the borders had been withdrawn 
and that they were prepared to exchange assurances of non- 
aggression. 
2 
Having ascertained the Saudi" attitude, Ryan visited 
Jerusalem on 15 February to pave the way, in consultation 
with Wauchope, for further discussions with the Saudi 
Government. After these preliminary discussions, Ryan 
proceeded to Amman'the following day. He and Colonel Cox 
1. Ibid. 
2. Jeddah Report, Jan. 1933, F. O. 371/16875 
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lunched with Amir 'Abd-Allah, who "reaffirmed his 
willingness to comply in every respect with the wishes 
of H. M. G.. regardingrthe relations with Ibn Saud". On 
26 February Ryan returned to Jeddah. Now, a, year after he 
had visited Jerusalem and Amman in-February 1932, Ryan's 
initiative seemed-tobe working despite the severe damage 
caused by Ibn Rifada'fincursion-and by the al-Dabbagh 
plot. This visit had produced three major results: 
a) "Drafts-in English and Arabic ..., were 
prepared of the communication to be addressed 
by-the Amir's chief Minister-to the High 
Commissioner regarding mutual recognition, 
and of a telegram to be sent by the Amir to 
Ibn Saud after the completion of the recognition. 
The Amir accepted the drafts ... ' 
b) "Similar agreements to, those which had been 
concluded between the Hejaz-Nejd and Iraq 
in 1931. would be. negotiated in'two stages, 
the first at Jeddah in April and the second 
in Jerusalem in June. _ 
c) "Tentative drafts of the proposed treaties 
were prepared, at Inman, for submission to 
higher authority. " 
In March-special arrangements were made to forward 
certified copies speedily to Ryan and Wauchope for-transmission 
2 
to the respective. Governments., These arrangements were 
completed on 1 April and 'the two : rulers -'formally° recognised 
each other. On the following day they exchanged friendly "-" 
telegrams. 3 A year of extensive work-now ended with'a complete 
success for British policy when the two-parties started 
negotiations later in April on a treaty-of friendship and 
Bon Voisinage. 
4 
_y  
1. Jeddah Report, Feb. 1933, F. O. 371/16875. 
2. Jeddah Report, March 1933, F. O. 371/16875. 
3. Jeddah Report, April 1933, F. O. 371/16875; Umm al-Qura, 
No. 434,16 April, for Arabic text of the telegrams. 
4. Umm al-Qura, No. 471,23 Dec. 1933 for text of the 
treaty. 
Conclusion and Epilogue 
During the interwar period Britain's main concern in the 
Middle East was almost entirely with Egypt, the Mandates and 
Persia. The security of these areas had always been essential 
for the protection of Britain's traditional interests in India. 
In spite of her apparently dominating position at the end of the 
war she soon faced real challenges in the Middle East, as else- 
where in India and Ireland, from the local national movements. 
Not surprisingly peace and order were given top priority by 
the policy makers in London. 
Apart from Britain's concern about the safety of the Muslim 
Holy Places in the Hejaz, little attention was given to Arabia, 
where the British had by now succeeded in almost totally 
excluding the influence of other Great Powers from its shores. 
However, the-interior of Arabia was in a ferment of family and 
tribal feuds and religious fanaticism. Violence soon erupted and 
the balance of=power changed in favour of 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibn 
Saud. His Ikhwan followers posed an immediate threat 
to the security of the Mandates. The attention of British 
policy-makers was abruptly directed-to Central Arabian affairs. 
Ibn Saud, who had formerly played a modest role in Britain's 
calculations during the Great War, now profited from Britain's 
neutral stance-in the Hejaz war and succeeded in making himself 
master of most of Arabia. Recognizing this fact and prone 
to support the strong, Britain began to look towards friendship 
with Ibn Saud as a means of securing the safety of the Mandates 
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and the sea and air routes around his dominions. By 
1926 this had become a major element in Britain's eastern 
policy. 
The Hashemites, abandoned by Britain in the Hejaz war, 
remained under British protection in the Mandates. This 
directly influenced the development of Anglo-Saudi relations. 
So did the attitude of the Ikhwan. Having carried their King 
to power, they began, -on religious grounds, to question his 
policy and in particular his relations with Britain. 
A rift opened between Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan. In the, 
meanwhile, the warlike activities of the Ikhwan were causing 
Britain increasing concern. A common interest in clipping 
the wings of the Ikhwan now began to develop between Ibn 
Saud and the British. Thus, although Ikhwan intemperance 
had impeded Anglo-Saudi friendship, it eventually helped to 
bring Ibn Saud and the British closer together. They were 
not deterred by hostile reactions in other parts of the 
Muslim world where Britain's involvement was viewed with 
disfavour. With the Mandates now protected from the Ikhwan, 
Britain was able to concentrate on the vexed question of 
Saudi-Hashemite relations. Reconciliation between Ibn Saud 
and the Hashemite rulers in Iraq and Transjordan 
became a prime target. Its achievement and the collapse of 
the Ikhwan rebellion brought to an end one of the most 
turbulent eras in Arabian history and thus provided the kind of 
peace that seemed best to suit British interests. 
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The whole process, which brought Britain into a 
close relationship with Ibn Saud, depended on intensive 
labour by the policy-makers in London and by British 
representatives in the Middle East and in Arabia itself. 
Notwithstanding the amount of attention given to Arabian 
affairs, they rarely were discussed either at Cabinet 
level or in Parliament. This was no cbubt because, although 
the complexities of the situation and the number of 
departments concerned imposed the most detailed consideration, 
Arabia itself still seemed to Britain of less importance 
than other parts of the Middle East. 
In Arabia there was no serious challenge to Britain 
from any other Great Power. The French had been successfully 
warned off during the war years. The Russians seemed- 
powerless to interfere. With the Italians Britain had a 
good understanding over the Red Sea. The need for any 
major policy attitude towards Saudi-Arabia was not apparent. 
In the absence of any fixed idea, British policy makers 
simply reacted to local events. Even when Britain played 
a decisive role in Arabian affairs and, in so doing, helped 
to create Saudi-Arabia, this was not the result of deliberate 
policy. 
'By cooperating with Ibn Saud, Britain solved a number 
of awkward problems relating to the security of the Mandates 
and to the stability of an area vital to imperial communications. 
True enough issues such as the Hejaz Railway, the Aqaba 
and Maan question and the Awqaf al-Haramain, remained in 
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contention but, after 1932, they were not, for Britain,, a matter 
of major pre-occupation even though Ibn Saud began to suspect 
British motives in failing to meet his wishes. 
Ibn Saud's biggest disappointment, however, -, was Britain's 
unwillingness to provide financial-assistance.. It was because 
of his own pressing financial problems, that the Americans. 
were able to dominate the eastern half of Saudi-Arabia as an oil 
concession area. Only recognising Saudi-Arabia-in 1931, they re- 
mainedwithout a representative at Jeddah until. 1942.. Their 
main concern was investment and business rather than politics. 
Having established some economic interests ii the Mandates 
through the open-door policy, they succeeded, by the Red Line 
Agreement of 1928, in obtaining a number-of oil concessions in 
areas under British influence. Ibn Saud, ýfinancially embarrassed 
during the lean years which followed his wars in Arabia and the 
Ikhwan rebellion and coincided with the, Great Depression, felt 
constrained to seek other than, British help.. Reluctantly and 
against the will of his people_, heroffered to grant concessions, 
in his country to anyone who could provide him with £50,000. 
The Americans were prompt with the money and in 1933 they obtained 
a vast concession. Sir Andrew Ryan, the, BritishýMinister at 
Jeddah was surprised and horrified_by the news. As Philby, 
a participant in the making of the concession, indicated, more 
was at stake than the, size, of the, concession. It. was a sign 
of changing times and was . in, . fact to -prove 'the moment at which 
Britain! s influence in Arabia began to decline-and-that of. - 
Americai-to rise. 
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The Second World War and the decrease in the number 
of pilgrims to Mecca increased Ibn Saud's financial problems. 
London again disappointed his hopes for assistance and instead 
advised him to approach the American Government for the 
necessary help, urging him to realise that the British were no 
longer his only friends. Notwithstanding this advice the 
to 
British were reluctant to allow the Americans/achieve 
overnight quite the same position in Saudi-Arabia as it had 
taken them long years to build up. Ibn Saud himself was 
cautious in his dealings with his new friends. The Americans 
of their own accord agreed not to pursue any political 
ambitions while Ibn Saud made a point, before the end of the 
war in 1945, in publicly declaring himself to be a friend of 
Great Britain. At the same time the British and the 
Americans concluded an understanding whereby the United 
States recognised Britain's political and strategic interests 
while Britain recognised America's oil interests in Saudi- 
Arabia. More important, however, than these declarations was 
Roosevelt's own meeting with Ibn Saud on board U. S. Ship 
Quincy on the Great Bitter Lake, on 14 February 1945. The 
meeting was decisive for the development of the Saudi-Arabian 
oil industry and for America's future financial aid to 
Ibn Saud. 
From then onwards a close relationship between Saudi- 
Arabia and the United States steadily developed. After the 
war the Saudi leaders like those of many other Middle East 
states, began to look increasingly towards America as a 
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counter-weight to Russia or. Britain or both. A positive 
response notably in the case of Saudi Arabia was to 
characterize future American Middle East policy. With 
America completely in the ascendent, the vestiges of a 
British role in Saudi Arabia had, already by the time of 
the Suez fiasco, virtually vanished. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE ANGLO-SAUDI TREATY OF 1915 
Preamble 
THE High British Government on its own part, and Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur 
Rahman-bin-Faisal Al-Saud, Ruler of Najd, El Hassa, Qatif and Jubail, 
and the towns and ports belonging to them, on behalf of himself, his heirs 
and successors, and tribesmen, being desirous of confirmingh and 
strengthening the friendly relations which have for a long time existed 
between the two parties, and with a view to consolidating their 
respective interests - the British Government have named and appointed 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K. C. S. I., K. C. I. E., British Resident 
in the Persian Gulf, as their Plenipotentiary, to conclude a treaty for 
this purpose with Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur Rahman-bin-Faisal Al-Saud. 
The said Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox and Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur 
Rahman-bin-Faisal Al-Saud (hereafter known as "Bin Saud"), have agreed 
upon and concluded the following articles: - 
I 
The British Government do acknowledge and admit that Najd, El Hassa, 
Qatif and Jubail, and their dependencies and territories, which will be 
discussed and determined hereafter, and their ports on the shores of the 
Persian Gulf are the countries of Bin Saud and of his fathers before him, 
and do hereby recognise the said Bin Saud as the independent ruler 
thereof and absolute Chief of their tribes, and after him his sons and 
descendants by inheritance; but the selection of the individual shall 
be in accordance with the nomination (i. e., by the living Ruler) of his 
successor; but with the proviso that he shall not be a person antagonistic 
to the British Government in any respect; such as, for example, in regard 
to the terms mentioned in this treaty. 
II 
In the event of aggression by any foreign Power on the territories 
of the countries of the said Bin Saud and his descendants without 
reference to the British Government and without giving her an opportunity 
of communicating with Bin Saud and composing the matter, the British 
Government will aid Bin Saud to such extent and in such manner as 
the British Government after consulting Bin Saud may consider most effective 
for protecting his interests and countries. 
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III' 
Bin Saud hereby agrees and promises to refrain from entering 
into any correspondence, agreement, or treaty with any foreign nation 
or Power, and, further, to give immediate notice to the political 
authorities of the British Government of any attempt on the part 
of any other Power to interfere with the above territories. 
IV 
Bin Saud hereby undertakes that he will absolutely not cede, 
sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of the above territories 
or any part of them, or grant concessions within those territories to 
any foreign Power or to the subjects of any foreign Power, * without 
the consent of the British Government. 
And that he will follow advice unreservedly provided that it 
be not damaging to his own interests. 
'V 
Bin Saud hereby undertakes to keep open within his territories 
the roads leading to the Holy Places, and to protect pilgrims on their passage to and from the Holy Places 
VI 
Bin Saud undertakes, as his fathers did before him, to refrain from all aggression on or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrein, and of the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast 
who are under the protection of the British Government, and who 
have treaty relations with the said Government; and the limits of 
their territories shall be hereafter determined. 
VII 
The British Government and Bin Saud agree to conclude a further detailed treaty in regard to matters concerning the two parties. 
* The words "or the subjects of any foreign Power" were accidentially 
omitted in the copies signed by Sir P. Cox and Bin Saud on the 26th December, 1915. Sir P. Cox drew Bin Saud's attention to this omission in a letter dated the 27th December, 1915 (38086/16), and added "I have duly written them in the text of the original document 
which I am submitting to Government, and Government will consider it in this form; so that if the same mistake occurs in the 
copy with you. I trust you will add the words above quoted. " 
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Dated 18th Safar 1334, corresponding to 26th December, 1915 
(Signed and sealed) ABDUL AZIZ AL-SAUD 
P. Z. COX, Lieutenant-Colonel 
British Resident in the Persian Gulf 
(Signed) CHELMSFORD, 
Viceroy and Governor-General of India 
This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of 
India in Council at Simla, on the 18th day of July, 1916 A. D. 
(Signed) A. H. GRANT, 
Secretary to the Government of India, 
Foreign and Political Department 
Source: F. O. 371/12244 
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APPENDIX B 
THE HADDA AGREEMENT 
THE HIGH BRITISH GOVERNMENT on its own part and HIS HIGHNESS 
'ABDU'L-'AZIZ IBN 'ABDU'R-RAHMAN AL-FAISAL AL SA'UD, Sultan of 
Nejd and its Dependencies on behalf of the Government of Nejd, on 
his part, in view of the friendly relations which exist between them, 
being desirous of fixing the frontier between Nejd and Trans-Jordan 
and of settling certain questions connected therewith, THE HIGH 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT have named and appointed SIR GILBERT 
CLAYTON, K. B. E., C. B., C. M. G., as their Commissioner and Pleni- 
potentiary, to conclude an Agreement for this purpose with SULTAN 
'ABDU'L-'AZIZ IBN 'ABDU'R-RAHMAN AL-FAISAL AL SA'UD on behalf of 
Nejd. 
In virtue of which the said SULTAN 'ABDU'L-'AZIZ IBN 'ABDU'R-RAHMAN AL-FAISAL 
AL SA'UD and the said SIR GILBERT CLAYTON, have agreed upon and concluded the 
following Articles: - 
Article 1. 
The frontier between Nejd and Trans-Jordan starts in the north east 
from the point of intersection of meridian 39°E and parallel 32°N, which 
marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and 'Iraq, and proceeds 
in a straight line to the point of intersection of meridian 37°E and parallel 
31°30'N, and thence along meridian 37°E to the point of the intersection 
with parallel 31°25'N. From this point, it proceeds in a straight line to 
the point of intersection of meridian 38°E and parallel 30°N, leaving 
all projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan in Nejd territory; and thence 
proceeds along meridian 38°E to the point of its intersection with 
parallel 29°35'N. 
The Map referred to in this Agreement is that known as the "International" 
Asia Map, 1: 1,000,000. 
Article 2. 
The Government of Nejd undertake not to establish any fortified 
post at Kaf or utilise Kaf or the district in its neighbourhood as a 
military centre; and should they at any time consider it necessary 
to take exceptional measures in the neighbourhood of the frontier 
with a view to the maintenance of order or for any other purpose, 
involving the concentration of armed forces, they engage to notify 
His Majesty's Government without delay. 
The Government of Nejd undertake to prevent, by all the means 
at their disposal, any incursions by their forces into the territory 
of Trans-Jordan. 
Article 3. 
In order to avoid misunderstanding over incidents which may arise 
in the neighbourhood of the frontier, and to promote mutual confidence 
and full co-operation between His Majesty's Government and the Government 
of Nejd, the two parties agree to maintain constant communication between 
the Chief British Representative in Trans-Jordan or his delegate and the 
Governor of the Wadi Sirhan. 
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Article 4. 
The Government of Nejd undertake to maintain all established rights 
that may be enjoyed in the Wadi Sirhan by tribes not under their 
jurisdiction, whether such rights appertain to grazing or to habitation, 
or to ownership, or the like; it being understood that those tribes, so 
long as they reside within Nejd territory, will be subject to such internal 
laws as do not infringe those rights. 
The Government of Trans-Jordan undertake to extend identical treatment 
to Nejd subjects who may enjoy similar established rights in Trans-Jordan 
territory. 
Article 5. 
The Governments of"Nejd and Trans-Jordan severally recognise that 
raiding by tribes settled in their territories into the territory of 
the other State is an aggression which necessitates the severe 
punishment of the perpetrators by the Government to which they are 
subject, and that the chief of the tribe committing such aggression 
is to be held responsible. 
T 
Article 6. 
(a) A special tribunal shall be set up, by agreement between the 
two Governments of Nejd and Trans-Jordan, which shall meet from time to 
time to enquire into the particulars of any aggression committed across 
the frontier between the two States, to assess the damages and losses 
and to fix the responsibility. This tribunal shall be composed of 
an equal number of representatives of the Governments of Nejd and 
Trans-Jordan, and its presidency shall be entrusted to an additional 
person, other than the aforesaid representatives, to be selected by the 
two Governments in agreement. The decision of this tribunal shall be 
final and executory. 
(b) When the tribunal has fixed the responsibility, assessed 
the damages and losses resulting from the raid, and issued its decision 
in that respect, the Government to whom those found guilty are subject 
shall execute the aforesaid decision in accordance with tribal customs, 
and shall punish the guilty party in, accordance with Article 5 of the 
present Agreement. 
Article 7. 
Tribes subject to one of the two Governments may not cross the 
frontier into the territory of the-other Government except after 
obtaining a permit from their own Government and after the concurrence 
of the other Government; it being stipulated, however, in accordance 
with the principle of the freedom of grazing, that neither Government 
shall have the right to withhold such permit or concurrence if the 
migration of the tribe is due to grazing necessities. 
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Article 8. 
The two Goverments of Nejd and Trans-Jordan undertake to stand 
in the way, by all the means at their disposal other than expulsion 
and the use of force, of the emigration of any tribe or section of a 
tribe from one of the two countries into the other unless its 
emigration takes place with the knowledge and consent of its Government. 
The two Governments undertake to abstain from offering any present 
of whatsoever kind to refugees from the territories of the other 
Government, and to look with disfavour on any of their subjects 
who may seek to entice tribes belonging to the other Government or to 
encourage them to'emigrate from their country into the other country. 
Article 9. 
'-The Governments'of"Nejd and Trans-Jordan may not correspond with 
the Chiefs and Sheikhs of tribes subject to the other State on official 
or political matters. 
Article 10. 
The forces of Nejd and Trans-Jordan may not cross the common 
frontier in the pursuit of offenders, except with the consent of both 
Governments. 
Article 11. 
Sheikhs of tribes who hold an official position or-who have 
flags showing that they are the leaders of armed forces may not 
display their flags in the territory of the other State. 
Article 12. 
Free passage will be granted by the Governments of Nejd and 
Trans-Jordan to travellers and pilgrims, provided they conform to 
those regulations affecting travel and pilgrimage which may be in 
force in Nejd and Trans-Jordan. Each Government will inform the 
other of any regulation issued by it in this matter. 
Article 13. 
His Britannic Majesty's Government undertake to secure freedom 
of transit at all times to merchants who are subjects of Nejd for the 
prosecution of their trade between Neid and Syria in both directions: 
and to secure exemption from Customs and other duty for all merchandise 
in transit which may cross the Mandated Territory on its way from 
Nejd to Syria or from Syria to Nejd, on condition that such merchants 
and their caravans shall submit to whatever Customs inspection may 
be necessary, and that they shall be in possession of a document from 
their Government certifying that they are bona fide merchants; and 
provided that trading caravans carrying merchandise will follow 
established routes, to be agreed upon hereafter, for their entry into 
and their exit from the Mandated Territory; it being understood 
that the above restrictions will not apply to trading caravans whose 
trade is confined to camels and other animals, or to tribes migrating 
in accordance with the preceding Articles of the present Agreement. 
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His Britannic Majesty's Government further undertake to secure 
such other facilities as may be possible to merchants who are subjects 
of Nejd and who may cross the area under British Mandate. 
Article 14. 
This Agreement will remain in. force for so long as His Britannic 
Majesty's Government are entrusted with the Mandate for Trans-Jordan. 
Article 15. 
The present Agreement has been drawn up in the two languages, 
English and Arabic, and each of the high contracting parties shall 
sign two English copies and two Arabic copies. Both texts shall 
have the same validity, but in case of divergence between the two 
in the interpretation of, one or other of the Articles of the present 
Agreement, the English text shall prevail. 
Article 16. 
The present Agreement will be known as the HADDA Agreement. 
Signed at Bahra Camp on the 2nd November, 1925 (corresponding 
to the 15th Rabi' Thani 1344). 
(Signed) GILBERT CLAYTON 
'ABDU'L-'AZIZ 
Source: F. O. 371/11437 
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APPENDIX C 
THE BAHRA AGREEMENT 
WHEREAS with a view to securing good relations between the two 
Governments of 'Iraq and Nejd, a Treaty known as the Muhammara 
Convention was agreed upon between those two Governments and signed 
on the 7th Ramadan 1340 (corresponding to the 5th May, 1922), and 
WHEREAS the aforesaid Treaty was supplemented by two Protocols, 
known respectively as Protocol Number I and Protocol Number II 
of the Muhammara Convention, which were signed at 'Uqair on 
the 12th Rabi' Thani 1341 (corresponding to the 2nd December, 
1922), and 
WHEREAS the aforesaid Treaty and Protocols have been duly 
ratified by the two Governments of 'Iraq and Nejd, and 
WHEREAS in Article 1 of the aforesaid Muhammara Convention 
the Governments of 'Iraq and of Nejd have guaranteed mutually that 
they will prevent aggression by their tribes on the tribes of the 
other and will punish their tribes for any such aggression and, 
should the circumstances not admit of such punishment, the two 
Governments will discuss the question of taking combined action 
according to the good relations prevailing between them, and 
WHEREAS it is considered advisable by His Britannic Majesty's 
Government and by the two Governments aforementioned, in the interests 
of friendship and good relations between the two countries of 'Iraq 
and Nejd to come to an agreement regarding certain matters which are 
outstanding between those two countries, 
WE, the undersigned, His Highness 'Abdu 'l-'Aziz ibn 'Abdü'r-Rahman al-Faisal 
Al Sa'üd, Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, and Sir Gilbert Clayton, 
K. B. E., C. B., C. M. G., the duly accredited Commissioner and Plenipotentiary 
of His Britannic Majesty's Government, who has been :. empowered to come to an 
agreement and sign on behalf of the 'Iraq Government, have agreed upon the 
following articles: - 
Article 1. 
The States of 'Iraq and Nejd severally recognise that raiding by 
tribes settled in their territories into the territory of the other 
State is an aggression which necessitates the severe punishment of the 
perpetrators by the Government to which they are subject and that the 
chief of the tribe committing such aggression is to be held responsible. 
Article 2. 
(a) A'special tribunal shall be set up, by agreement between the 
two Governments of 'Iraq and Neid, which shall meet from time to time 
to enquire into the particulars of any aggression committed across the 
frontier between the two States, to assess the damages and losses 
and to fix the responsibility. This tribunal shall be composed of an equal 
number of representatives of the Governments of 'Iraq and Nejd, 
and its presidency shall be entrusted to an additional person, other 
than the aforesaid representatives, to be selected by the two Governments 
in agreement. The decisions of this tribunal shall be final and executory. 
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(b) When the tribunal has fixed the responsibility, assessed the 
damages and losses resulting from the raid, and issued its decision 
in that respect, the Government to whom those found guilty are subject 
shall execute the aforesaid decision in accordance with tribal customs, 
and shall punish the guilty party in accordance with Article 1 of the 
present Agreement. 
Article 3. 
_Tribes subject 
to one of the two Governments may not cross the 
frontier into the territory of the other GoyernmerLt except after 
obtaining a permit from their own Government and after the concurrence 
of the other Government; it being stipulated, however, in accordance 
with the principle of freedom of grazing, that neither Government 
shall have the right to withhold such permit or concurrence if the 
migration of the tribe is due to grazing necessities. 
Article 4. 
The two Governments of 'Iraq and Nejd undertake to stand in 
the way, by all the means at their disposal other than expulsion and 
the use of force, of the emigration of any tribe or section of a tribe 
from one of the two countries into the other unless its emigration 
takes place with the knowledge and consent of its Government. The 
two Governments undertake to abstain from offering any present of 
whatsoever kind to refugees from the territories of the other Government, 
and to look with disfavour on any of. their subjects who may seek to 
entice tribes belonging to the other Government or to encourage them 
to emigrate from their country into the other country. 
Article 5. 
The, Governments of 'Iraq and Nejd may not correspond with the 
Chiefs and Sheikhs of tribes subject to the other State on official 
or political matters. 
Article 6. 
The forces of 'Iraq and Nejd may not cross the common frontier 
in the pursuit of offenders except with the consent of both Governments. 
Article 7. 
Sheikhs of tribes who hold an official position or who have 
flags showing that they are the leaders of armed forces may not display 
their flags in the territory of the other State. 
Article 8. 
In case one of the two Governments were to call upon tribes 
residing in the territory of the other State to furnish armed contingents, 
the said tribes will be free to respond to the call of their Government 
on condition that they betake themselves with their families and 
belongings in complete tranquillity. 
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Article 9. 
In case a tribe were to emigrate from the territory of one of 
the two Governments into the territory of the other Government and 
were subsequently to commit raids into the territory in which it 
formerly resided, it will be open to the Government into whose 
territory this tribe has immigrated to take from it adequate 
guarantees on the understanding that, if a similar aggression 
were to be repeated by the tribe, those guarantees would be liable 
to confiscation, without prejudice to the punishment to be 
inflicted by the Government as provided in Article 1, and without 
prejudice to whatever impositions may be decreed by the tribunal 
specified in Article 2 of the present Agreement. 
Article 10. 
The Governments of 'Iraq and Nejd undertake to initiate friendly 
discussions with a view to concluding a special agreement in respect 
of the extradition of criminals in accordance with the usage prevailing 
among friendly States, within a period not exceeding one year from the 
date of the ratification of the present Agreement by the Government 
of 'Iraq. 
Article 11. 
The Arabic version is the official text to be referred to in the 
interpretation of the Articles of the present Agreement. 
Article 12. 
The present Agreement shall be known as "The Bahra Agreement". 
Signed at Bahra Camp this fourteenth day of Rabi' Thani 1344, 
corresponding to the first day of November, 1925. 
(Signed) GILBERT CLAYTON 
(Signed and Sealed) 'ABDU'L-AZIZ 
Source: F. O. 371/11437 
- 463 - 
APPENDIX D 
BRITISH DRAFT TREATY FOR JORDAN'S GUIDANCE DURING HIS NEGOTIATIONS 
WITH IBN SAUD, DECEMBER 1926 
HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland and of the British Domions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, 
and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its 
Dependencies, being desirous of confirming and strengthening the 
friendly relations which exist between them, and of consolidating 
their respective interests, have resolved to conclude a treaty of 
friendship and good understanding, for which purpose His Britannic 
Majesty has appointed as his plenipotentiary his trusty and well- 
beloved Stanley Rupert Jordan, Esquire, acting British agent and 
consul at Jeddah. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd 
and its Dependencies, and the said Mr. Stanley Rupert Jordan, 
His Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiary, have accordingly 
now agreed upon and concluded the following articles: - 
ARTICLE 1. 
There shall be peace and friendship between His Britannic 
Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd 
and its Dependencies. Each of the high contracting parties agrees 
and promises to use all possible means to prevent his territory 
being used as a base for activities directed against the present 
or future interests of the other. 
ARTICLE 2. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its 
Dependencies hereby recognises the special position of His 
Britannic Majesty in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. 
ARTICLE 3. 
His Majesty the King of. the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and 
its Dependencies hereby undertakes to facilitate the performance 
of the pilgrimage by British subjects and British-protected 
persons of Moslem faith, and to protect such persons during 
the performance of the pilgrimage. 
ARTICLE 4. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and 
its Dependencies agrees that the property of the aforesaid pilgrims 
who may die in the territories of His Majesty shall be handed over 
to the British representative in the said territories, or to such 
authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be disposed of in 
accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British 
representative in the said territories will see that any dues or 
taxes which are payable on such property under Nejdi or Hejazi 
laws are duly paid. 
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ARTICLE 5. 
. His Britannic Majesty agrees to recognise the national status of 
all subjects of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd 
and its Dependencies who may at any time be within the territories of His 
Britannic Majesty or within British-protected territory or territory in 
respect of which His Britannic Majesty has accepted a mandate on behalf 
of the League of Nations. 
On his part, His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd 
and its-Dependencies agrees to recognise the national status of all 
British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic 
Majesty who may be at any time within the territories of His Majesty. 
ARTICLE 6. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its 
Dependencies undertakes, as'his fathers did before him, to refrain 
from all aggression on, or interference with, the territories of 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and of the Sheikhs of Katar and the Oman Coast, 
who are under the protection of the Government of His Britannic 
Majesty and who have treaty relations with the said Government. 
ARTICLE 7. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies 
undertakes to co-operate with His Britannic Majesty in the suppression of the 
slave trade and to recognise the right of manumission of His Britannic 
Majesty's consular officers at Jeddah and elsewhere. 
ARTICLE 8. 
The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be 
exchanged as soon as possible. It shall come into force immediately 
upon ratification and shall be binding during seven years from the date 
of its coming into force, when the treaty concluded between His Britannic 
Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and 
its Dependencies, then Sultan of Nejd, on the 26th December, 1915, 
shall cease to have effect. In case neither of the high contracting 
parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the 
expiration of the said period of seven years of his intention to 
terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration* 
of six months from the day on which either of the high contracting 
parties shall have given such notice. 
The present treaty has been drawn up in quadruplicate in English 
and Arabic. Both texts shall have the same validity, but in case of 
divergence the English text shall prevail. One copy of each text shall 
remain deposited in the archives of the Government of His Majesty 
the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies and one 
copy of each text in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, 
the remaining copies being used for the purpose of the exchange 
of ratifications provided for in this article. 
In witness whereof, &c. 
Source: F. O. 371/11438 
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APPENDIX E 
DRAFT TREATY PRESENTED BY THE KING OF THE HEJAZ ON DECEMBER 4,1926 
PREAMBLE 
Accepted as proposed by His Majesty's Government. 
ARTICLE 1. 
There shall be peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His 
Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and their Dependencies. Each 
of the high contracting parties undertakes to maintain good relations with 
the other, and to endeavour by all the means at his disposal to prevent his 
territories being used as a base for unlawful activities against the other 
party. 
ARTICLE 2. 
His Britannic Majesty recognises the complete and absolute independence 
of the dominions of His Majesty 'Abdul 'Aziz-ibn-'Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-Al-Sa'ud, 
King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and their Dependencies. 
ARTICLE 3. 
His Majesty the King of. the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and their 
Dependencies notifies that the performance of the pilgrimage will be 
facilitated to Moslem British subjects or British-protected persons, 
to the same extent as to all other pilgrims; that they will be safe 
as regards their property and their persons during their stay in the 
territories of His Majesty; and that they shall receive no treatment 
which is contrary to the established laws while in the territories of 
His Majesty. 
ARTICLE 4. 
His Majesty the King of'the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and their 
Dependencies undertakes that the belongings of any of the pilgrims referred 
to in the preceding article of the present treaty who may die in the 
territories of His Majesty and have no lawful trustee in those territories 
shall be handed over to the British representative in Jedda or to such 
person as may be delegated by the latter for the purpose, for transmission 
to the rightful heirs of the deceased pilgrim; it being understood 
that such belongings will not be handed over to the British authority 
until the formalities required by the relevant Shar'ia laws will have been 
accomplished and the dues prescribed in the ordinances of the Hejaz-Nejd 
Government will have been collected. 
ARTICLE 5. 
His Britannic Majesty recognises the national (Hejazi or Nejdi) status 
of all subjects of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd 
and their Dependencies who may at any time be within the territories of His 
Britannic Majesty. On his part His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan 
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of Nejd and their Dependencies recognises the national (British) status 
of all subjects of His Britannic Majesty who may at any time be 
within the territories of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan 
of Nejd and their Dependencies; provided that such persons shall be subject 
to the established laws of the country in which they may be. 
ARTICLE 6. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and their 
Dependencies undertakes to maintain, as did his fathers and 
grandfathers, relations of friendship and peace with Kuwait and 
Bahrain and with the Shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast. 
ARTICLE 7. 
Under consideration. (This article relates to the suppression of 
the slave trade. ) 
ARTICLE 8. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and their 
Dependencies will be at full liberty to purchase and import arms, war 
material and ammunition, and such machines and implements as may be 
required from abroad for the Hejaz-Nejd Government. His Britannic 
Majesty undertakes that no measure shall be taken to prevent the 
importation of whatever arms, war material, ammunition, machines 
and implements as may be required from abroad for the Hejaz-Nejd 
Government. His Britannic Majesty undertakes that no measure shall be 
taken to prevent the importation of whatever arms, war material, ammunition, 
machines or implements which the Hejaz-Nejd Government may consider 
necessary for their own use. 
ARTICLE 9. 
The present Treaty shall be ratified by each of the high contracting 
parties and the ratifications exchanged as soon as possible. It shall 
come into force on the date of the exchange of the ratifications and shall 
be binding for seven years from that date. In case neither of the high 
contracting parties shall have given notice to the other six months 
before the expiration of the said period of seven years of his intention 
to terminate the Treaty, it shall remain in force and shall not be held 
to have terminated until the expiration of six months from the date on 
which one of the parties shall give notice of termination to the other 
party. 
ARTICLE 10. 
The treaty concluded between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty 
the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Neid and their Dependencies on the 
26th December, 1915, when His Majesty was Ruler of Neid and of its then 
Dependencies, shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the 
present Treaty comes into force. 
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ARTICLE 11. 
The present Treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. Each 
text will have the same validity, but in case of divergence in the 
interpretation of any part thereof reference will be made to the 
English version. 
Source: F. O. 371/12244 
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APPENDIX F 
THE TREATY OF. JEDDAH,: 20 May 1927 
TOGETHER WITH NOTES EXCHANGED 19-21 May 
HIS Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions 
beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part; and 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, on 
the other part; 
Being desirous of confirming and strengthening the friendly relations 
which exist between them and of consolidating their respective interests, 
have resolved to conclude a treaty of friendship and good understanding, 
for which purpose His Britannic Majesty has appointed as his plenipotentiary 
Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton, and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and 
of Nejd and its Dependencies has appointed His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal 
On Abdul-Aziz, his son and Viceroy in the Hejaz, as his plenipotentiary. 
His Highness the Amir Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz and Sir Gilbert Falkingham 
Clayton, having examined their credentials and found them to be in good and 
due form, have accordingly agreed upon and concluded the following articles: - 
ARTICLE I. 
His Britannic Majesty recognises the complete and absolute independence 
of the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its 
Dependencies. 
ARTICLE 2. 
There shall be peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His 
Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies. Each of the high 
contracting parties undertakes to maintain good relations with the other and to 
endeavour by all the means at its disposal to prevent his territories being 
used as a base for unlawful activities directed against peace and tranquillity 
in the territories of the other party. 
ARTICLE 3. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies undertakes 
that the performance of the pilgrimage will beýfacilitated to British subjects and 
British-protected persons of the Moslem faith to the same extent as to other 
pilgrims, and announces that they will be safe as regards their property and 
their person during their stay in the Hejaz. 
ARTICLE 4. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Neid and its Dependencies undertakes 
that the property of the aforesaid pilgrims who may die within the territories 
of His Majesty and who have no lawful trustee in those territories shall be 
handed over to the British Agent in Jeddah or to such authority as he may 
appoint for-the purpose, to be forwarded by him to the rightful heirs of the 
deceased pilgrims; provided that the property shall not be handed over to 
the British representative until the formalities of the competent tribunals 
have been complied with and the dues prescribed under Hejazi or Nejdi laws 
have been duly collected. 
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ARTICLE 5. 
His Britannic Majesty recognises the national (Hajazi or Nejdi) status 
of all subjects of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its 
Dependencies who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic 
Majesty or territores under the protection of His Britannic Majesty. 
Similarly, His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its 
Dependencies recognises the national (British) status of all subjects of 
His Britannic Majesty and of all persons enjoying the protection of His 
Britannic Majesty who may at any time be within the, territories of His 
Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; it being 
understood that the principles of international law in force between 
independent Governments shall be respected. 
ARTICLE 6. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies under- 
takes to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories 
of Kuwait and Bahrain, and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who 
are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government. 
ARTICLE 7. 
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies 
undertakes to co-operate by all the means at his disposal with His 
Britannic Majesty in the suppression of the slave trade. 
ARTICLE 8. 
The present treaty shall be ratified by each of the high contracting 
parties and the ratifications exchanged as soon as possible. At shall come 
into force on the day of the exchange of ratifications and shall be binding 
during seven years from that date. In case neither of the high contracting 
parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the 
expiration of the said period of seven years of his intention to terminate 
the treaty it shall remain in force and shall not be held to have terminated 
until the expiration of six months from the date on which either of the 
parties shall have given notice of the termination to other party. 
ARTICLE 9. 
The treaty concluded between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty 
the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies (then Ruler of 
Nejd and its then Dependencies) on the 26th December, 1915, shall cease 
to have effect as from the date on which the present treaty is ratified. 
ARTICLE 10. 
The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. Both 
texts shall be of equal validity; but in case of divergence in the 
interpretation of any part of the treaty the English text-shall prevail. 
ARTICLE 11. 
The present treaty shall be known as the Treaty of Jedda. 
- 470 - 
Signed at Jedda on Friday, the 20th May, 1927 (corresponding to the 
18th Zul-Qa'da 1345): 
GILBERT FALKINGHAM CLAYTON 
FAISAL ABDUL-AZIZ AL SAUD 
(1) 
Sir G. Clayton to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Neid 
and its Dependencies 
Your Majesty, 
I HAVE the honour to remind your Majesty that, in the course of our 
negotiations, which have happily resulted in the conclusion of a treaty of 
friendship and good understanding between His Britannic Majesty and your 
Majesty, the question of the frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan 
was discussed, and I explained to your Majesty the position, as defined 
in a draft protocol submitted by me to you, which His Majesty's Government 
have taken up on this question and to which they must adhere. 
His Majesty's Government regard the above-mentioned frontier as being 
defined as follows: - 
"The fontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan starts 
from the intersection of meridian 38° E. and parallel 29° 35' N. 
which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and 
Transjordan, and proceeds in a straight line to a point on the 
Hejaz Railway 2 miles outh of Mudawwara. From this point it 
proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba 
,2 miles south of 
the town of Aqaba. " 
Respects. 
GILBERT CLAYTON 
His Britannic Majesty's 
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary. 
Jeddah, May 19,1927 (18th Zul Qa'da, 1345). 
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(2) 
Abdul-Aziz'ibn Abdul-Rahman al Faisal al Saud to His Britannic 
p 
Majesty's Commissioner and Plenipotentiary 
(Translation) 
IN reply to your letter dated the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, on the subject 
of the Hejaz-Transjordan frontier, we note that His Majesty's Government adhere 
to their position, but we find it impossible, in the present circumstances, 
to effect a final settlement of this question. Nevertheless, in view of our 
true desire to maintain cordial relations based on solid ties of friendship, 
we desire to express to your Excellency our willingness to maintain the 
status quo in the Ma'an-Aqaba district, and we promise not to interfere in 
its administration until favourable circumstances will permit a final 
settlement of this question. 
Respects. 
(Sealed) ABDUL-AZIZ IBN ABDUL-RAHMAN AL SAUD 
19th Zul Qa'da, 1345 (May 21,1927) 
(3) 
Sir G. Clayton to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Neid and 
its Dependencies 
Your Majesty, 
IN continuation of our conversations relating to the question of the 
slave trade, I have the honour to inform your Majesty that His Britannic 
Majesty's Government feel it their duty to abstain at present from 
renouncing the right of manumitting slaves, which has long been practised 
by His Majesty's consular officers, and which enables them to liberate 
any slave who presents himself of his own free choice with a request 
for liberation and repatriation to his country of origin. 
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I wish to assure your Majesty that His Britannic Majesty's 
Government's insistence on this right is not intended to mean any 
interference in the affairs of your Government or any infringement of 
your Majesty's sovereignty; but that it is due to His Britannic 
Majesty's Government's resolve to carry out a duty which they owe 
to humanity. I would add that His Britannic Majesty's Government 
will be prepared to consider the abolition of the right of manumission 
as soon as it becomes clear to both parties that the co-operation 
stipulated in article 7 of the Treaty of Jeddah has resulted in 
the enforcement of such practical measures as to render the exercise 
of the right of manumission no longer necessary. 
I trust that your Majesty will appreciate the attitude of His Britannic 
Majesty's Government in this matter and that you will see fit to acquiesce 
in the procedure which I have described above. 
Respects. 
GILBERT CLAYTON, 
His Britannic Majesty's 
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary. 
Jeddah, May 19,1927 (18th Zul Qa'da, 1345) 
(4) 
Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdul-Rahman al Faisal al Saud to His Britannic 
Majesty's Commissioner and Plenipotentiary 
(Translation) 
IN reply to your Excellency's letter No. 2, dated the 18th Zul Qa'da, 
1345 (19th May, 1927), relating to the manumission of slaves, I am 
confident that the British agent at Jeddah will always act in accordance 
with the spirit in which our agreement was arrived at, and that he will not 
permit any confusion as this might have undesirable effects on the 
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administrative and economic aspects of this question. 
Respects. 
(Sealed) ABDUL-AZIZ IBN ABDUL-RAHMAN AL SAUD 
19th Zul Qa'da, 1345 (May 21,1927) 
(5) 
Sir G. Clayton to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and 
its Dependencies 
Your Majesty, 
WITH reference to the proposal put forward by your Majesty for the 
inclusion in the treaty of an article providing that His Britannic Majesty's 
Government should take no measures to prevent the purchase and importation of 
whatever arms, war material, ammunition, machines or implements with the 
Government of the Hejaz and Nejd may require for their own use, I have 
the honour to inform your Majesty that His Britannic Majesty's Government 
are of the opinion that this is a question which need not be dealt with in 
the body of the main treaty. 
I am, however, empowered by His Britannic Majesty's Govenment to inform 
your Majesty that the embargo on the export of war materials to Arabia has 
been removed, and that, if your Majesty should see fit to place orders for 
arms, ammunition and war material with British manufacturers, in accordance 
with the conditions set forth in the Arms Traffic Convention (1925), 
for the use of the Government of the Hejaz and Nejd, His Britannic Majesty's 
Government will not prevent the export thereof or place any obstacle to their 
importation into your Majesty's territories. 
I shall endeavour, in answer to your Majesty's desire, to present 
. your 
Majesty with a copy of the convention referred to above as soon as may be. 
Respects. 
GILBERT CLAYTON, 
His Britannic Majesty's 
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary 
Jeddah, May 19,1927 (18th Zul Qa'da, 1345) 
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(6) 
Abdul-Aziz On Abdul-Rahman al'Faisal al Saud to His Britannic Majesty's 
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary 
(Translation) 
In reply to your letter dated the 18th Zul Qa'da 1345 (19th May, 1927) 
relating to arms, I wish to thank you for your statement which makes it clear 
that the importation of arms into Arabia is not prohibited. 
Respects 
(Sealed) ABDUL-AZIZ IBN ABDUL-RAHMAN AL SAUD 
19th Zul Qa'da 1345 (May 21,1927). 
(7) 
Sir G. Clayton to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and 
its Dependencies 
Your Majesty, 
WITH reference to article IV of the Treaty of Jeddah, I have the 
honour to confirm the statements I made to your Majesty in the course of 
our conversations, in which I stated that the sole object of the insertion 
of that article in the treaty is, first, to establish the present procedure 
formally, and, secondly, to furnish His Britannic Majesty's Government 
with such assurances as might enable them to bring that procedure to 
the notice of all Moslems in British territories. 
I wish, moveover, to assure your Majesty that the presence of that article 
in the treaty does not affect and will not be interpreted as affecting the 
procedure relating to the belongings of deceased persons other than pilgrims, 
which remains subject to the rules of reciprocity which are the basis of 
the usual practice between independent countries. 
Respects. 
GILBERT CLAYTON, 
His Britannic Majesty's 
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary 
Jeddah, May 19,1927 (18th Zul Qa'da, 1345) 
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(8) 
Abdul-Aziz On Abdul-Rahman al Faisal al Saud to His Britannic Majesty's 
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary 
(Translation) 
IN reply to your letter dated the 18th Zul Qa'da 1345 (19th May, 1927) 
relating to the disposal of the belongings of our subjects in your territories 
and your subjects in our territories, I wish to assure your Excellency 
that the procedure will be, as you state, in accordance with international 
practice, by which we mean that the belongings will be entrusted to our 
tribunals, who will hand them over to the British agent after the legal 
formalities and the collection of the dues, and that, mutatis mutandis, 
the belongings of those of our subjects who may die in British 
territories will be handed over to us by the British agent at Jeddah. 
Respects. 
(Sealed) ABDUL-AZIZ INB ABDUL-RAHMAN AL SAUD 
19th Zul Qa'da 1345 (May 20,1927) 
Source: F. O. 371/12245 
- 476 - 
APPENDIX G '" 
BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1926-32 
JEDDAH: 
- Jordan, S. R. (Acting Agent and Consul) 1925-Aug. 1926 
- Mayers, N. (Acting Agent and Consul) 15 Sept. 1926 - 26 April 1927 
- Stonehewer-Bird, 
'F. H. W. (Agent and Consul) May-Sept. 1927, 
Dec. 1927-Sept. 1928, Jan. -Feb. 1929 
- Jakins, H. G. (Acting Agent and Consul) Sept. -Nov. 1927, Oct. -Dec. 1928, March-May 1929 
- Bond, `W. L; (Acting-Agent and Consul) June-Dec. 1929, (Charge d'Affairs) 21 Dec. 1929-20 March 1930 
- Ryan, Sir Andrew (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister) 22 April 1930, (Consul-General) May 1930-June 1936 
Hope-Gill, C. G. (Vice-Consul and Charge d'Affairs) 4 June 1930-1933 
CAIRO: (High Commissioners) 
- Lord Lloyd, 1925-29 
-Loraine, Sir P. L. 1929-33 
JERUSALEM: (High Commissioners) 
- Samuel, Sir H., 1920-25 
- Lord Plumer, 1925-28 
- Chancellor, Sir J., 1928-31 
- Wauchope, Sir A., 1931-38 
BAGHDAD: (High Commissioners) 
- Cox, Sir Percy, 1920-23 
- Dobbs, Sir Henry, 1923-29 
- Clayton, Sir Gilbert, 1929 (previously 1925-28 special envoy to Ibn Saud) 
- Humphreys, Sir Francis, 1929-35 
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BUSHIRE: (Political Residents) 
Prideaux, Lt. Col. F. B., 1924-27 
- Haworth, Lt. Col. L. B., 1927-28 
- Johanston, Sir F., 1929 
- Barrett, Lt. Col. C. C., 1929 
- Biscoe, Lt. Col. H. V., 1929-32 
- Fowle, Lt. Col. T. C., 1932-39 
BAHRAIN: (Political Agents) 
- Daly, Lt. Col. C. K., 1922-26 
- Barrett, Col. C. C., 1926-29 
- Prior, Capt. C. G., 1929-32 
- Loch, P. G., Col., 1932-33 
KUWAIT: (Political Agents) 
- More, Major J. C. 1922-28 
- Dickson, Lt. Col. H. R. P., 1929-36 
AMMAN: (Residents) 
- Philby, St. J. B., 1921-24 
- Cox, Col. T., 1924-39 
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APPENDIX H 
Biographical Notes: 
I 
, The list is in alphabetical order using surnames throughout. Leading figures 
are not included. 
Al-Dowaish, Faisal: 
I 
Born in 1882. Took command of the Mutair tribe in 1908 at the death of his 
father Sultan al-Dowaish. Ambitious and reluctant to pay zakat to Ibn Saud. 
Raided Basra in 1912 but driven off by the Turkish troops an n returned to 
Nejd in 1914. Was taught Wahhabi principles and converted his own Mutair in 
1917. Entered Ibn Saud's service and led attacks on Iraq during the early 
. 1920s. Increasingly fanatical, he sought appointment as governor of Hail. Led attacks against the Hejaz and sought to govern al-Madinah. In 1926 
he began to associate with the leaders of the 'Utaibah and 'Ujman tribes 
to overthrow Ibn Saud and to divide his dominion among themselves. In 1927 
he challenged both Ibn Saud and Britain by attacking the Busaiyah post. 
In 1929 he openly declared a rebellion. In 1930 he was caught by British 
forces and handed back to Ibn Saud. Remained in prison until his death. 
Ali, Mohammad: 
Born in 1878 in India. Educated at Oxford. Together with his brother Shawkat, 
known as the Ali Brothers. Leaders of Pan-Islamism and of the Khilafat movements 
in India. Religious motives caused them to encourage the Unity of the East 
to face European Imperialism. They were strongly anti-British. They held 
a Khilafat Conference in 1919 after which Mohammad Ali was sent to London to 
put the Indian case. They had been partisans of Ibn Saud during the Hejaz 
war but ambitious to rule the Holy Places or to make a Democratic Islamic 
Republic there. They challenged Ibn Saud at the Mecca Islamic Conference 
1926 and led opposition to Wahhabism in India until Mohammad's death in 
London in 1931 while on a mission to press for the Indian independence question. 
Barred in al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. 
Antoni. us, George: 
Born 1891 in Alexandria of parents of Lebanese origin. Educated at 
Victoria College, Alexandria and at King's College, Cambridge. Deputy 
Chief Press Censor, Egyptian Expeditionary Force 1917-21. Served in 
the British Mandatory Administration in Palestine 1921-30. Assisted 
Sir Gilbert Clayton on his missions to Ibn Saud 1925-28. Senior Associate 
for the Middle East, Institute of Current World Affairs, an American 
organization established by Charles Crane. Published in 1938 his well- 
known book 'The Arab Awaking, the Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement!. 
1. These notes have been compiled mainly from The Foreign Office List 
and from The Colonial Office List, in the case of the Arabs and Indians mainly from unpublished official reports. 
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Bond, W. L: 
Born 1892. Appointed a student Interpreter in the Levant 1913. In charge 
of Vice Consulate in Crete 1918-19. Promoted to be Vice-Consul at 
Constantinople, 1919-20. Acting Vice-Consul in Morocco 1921-23. Vice-Consul 
at Tangier 1923-25. Acting Consul-General there in intervals 1925-27. Given 
the local rank of Consul at Tangier 1927. Acting Consul-General to 1928. 
Acting Agent and Consul at Jeddah from 13 June 1929. Charge d'Affair 
there 21 Dec. 1929 to 20 March 1930. Then to Athens 1930 and to 
Addis Ababa 1932 and to the French Somali Coast 1933. 
Clayton, Sir Gilbert: 
Born 1875. Educated in the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. 
Entered the army in 1895. Served in the Nile Campaign 1898. Joined the 
Egyptian Army 1900-10. Served with the Saudan Govt. 1910-19. Director of 
military intelligence in Egypt 1914-17. Chief political officer, 
Egyptian Expeditionary Force 1917-19. Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of 
Interior 1919-22. Chief Secretary in the Govt. of Palestine 1922-25. 
Special Envoy to Ibn Saud in 1925,1927 and 1928. High Commissioner for 
Iraq 1929. Died in Oct. 1929. 
Cox, Sir Percy: 
Born 1864. Entered the army in 1884. Entered the Indian Political Dept. in 1890. 
Until the outbreak of the war he served as Vice-Consul at Zaila, Somali Coast, 
Barbara & Muscut. Consul-General at Bushire 1904. Political Resident there 
1909. Sec. of the Foreign Dept., Govt. of India 1914. During the war he 
was Chief Political Officer, Indian Expeditionary Force 'D'. Acting British 
Minister in Persia 1918. High Commissioner in Iraq 1920-23. Persuaded 
Ibn Saud to take the British side in the war. Negotiated with him the 
treaty of 1915. Author of the 'Ugair Protocols and the Mohammarah Convention. 
Damluji, 'Abd-Allah: 
A native of Mosul. Educated in the Turkish Medical College at Constantinople. 
Served in the Turkish army. When Ibn Saud took al-Hasa 1913 he transferred 
his allegiance to the new Conqueror. Attended the 'Uqair Conference and 
signed the agreement on Ibn Saud's behalf. Remained attached to him during 
the Hejaz war. Appointed in 1926 as the first Director for Foreign Affairs. 
Accompanied Amir Faisal to Europe in 1926. Took part in the Anglo-Saudi 
negotiations leading to the treaty of Jeddah in 1927. He was not popular 
among the King's advisers. He was a close friend of Philby's since 1917. 
Seemed to have consulted him regularly on foreign policy issues, their 
relationship aroused British Government suspicions. Went back homein 1928. 
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Dobbs, Sir Henry: 
Born 1871. Educated at Oxford. Entered the Indian Civil Service in 1892. 
Appointed political officer with the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force 'D'. 
Foreign Sec. to the Govt. of India in 1919. Head of British Mission of 
Kabul 1920-21. High Commissioner and Consul-General for Iraq from 1923 
to 29. 
Hamza, Fuad: 
Born about 1900. A Syrian, educated at Beirut Mission College. Had a fair 
knowledge of English beside Arabic, Turkish and some French. Accused of 
plotting against the British Administration in Palestine in 1921. Fled 
across the border to Egypt. Ibn Saud invited him in 1926 to serve the 
Hejaz-Nejd Government at the advice of Yousuf Yasin the then Acting 
Director for Foreign Affairs. Took part'in the negotiations for the 
treaty of Jeddah 1927, and in the 1928 negotiations with Clayton on the 
frontier question. Put in charge of foreign affairs in1929 he was 
viewed with suspicion by London on account of his early anti-British activities. 
When the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was founded in 1930, with Amir Faisal 
as Minister, Fuad remained as his advisor and deputy. Continuing in Saudi 
Foreign Affairs service until the 1960s. Published three books: 'Al-belad 
al-'arabiyah al-saudiyah; galb jazirat al-'arab'and'fi belad 'asir! - 
Hope-Gill, C. G: 
Born 1894. Educated at Oxford. Vice-Consul in the Levant Consular 
Service 1920. Assigned for service as Acting Vice-Consul at Tangier 1921, and 
at Casablanca 1922 and at Saffi and Tetuan 1923. Vice-Consul at Tetuan 1924. 
Served on Anglo-Spanish Moroccan Claims Commission 1924. Acting Interpreter 
at Tangier 1925-26, and Actong Consul-General 1929. Transferred to Jeddah 
4 June 1930 as Charge d'Affairs until 1933. Given the local rank of 2nd 
Sec. in the Diplomatic Service 1932. Transferred to Alexandria 23 April 1933. 
Humphreys, Sir Frances: 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Kabul 1922. Transferred 
to India 1925 on special duty until 1929. Consul-General for the Kingdom 
or Iraq 10 Dec. 1929. Organised the meeting between Ibn Saud and King 
Faisal in 1930. Promoted to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
at Baghdad in Nov. 1932. 
Jäkins, H. G.: 
Born 1897. Appointed Vice-Consul in the Levant Consular Service 1924. 
Assigned for service at Tangier 1925. Acting Vice-Consul at Rabat 1925. 
Transferred to Jeddah on 26 Sept. 1927 as Acting Agent and Consul until 1929. 
One of H. M. Vice Consuls in the Levant Consular Service 1927-29. Acting Consul- 
General at Isfahan and Mashad 1930. In charge of Vice Consulate at 
Mohammarah 1931. Employed in the Dept. of Overseas Trade 1932. 
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Jordan, S. R.: 
Born 1894. Assistant in the Levant Consular Service, 1919. Assigned for 
service at Constantinople 1920-24. Vice-Consul at Port Said 1924-25. 
Acting Consul at Jeddah 1925-26. Accompanied Amir Faisal to London 1926. 
Took part in the preparation for the making of the Treaty of Jeddah. 
Transferred to Albania and given the local rank of-2nd Sec. in 
the Diplomatic Service 1928. Acted as Charge d'Affairs 1928-30. Transferred 
to the Trade Commissioner Service at Durban 1930. Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary at Jeddah 1943-5. 
P'. 4n 
Mallet, V. A. L. 
Born 1893. Educated at Oxford. 3rd Sec. in the Diplomatic Service 1919. 
Appointed to Tehran 1919. Promoted to be 2nd Sec. 1920. Transferred 
to F. O. 1921. Promoted to be 1st Sec. 1925. Transferred to Buenos Ayres 
1926. Charge d'Affair there 1926-8. Transferred to Brussels 1929. 
Charge d'Affairs there 1931. Transferred to F. O. 1932. Appointed 
Actin. Counsellor of Embassy at Tehran 1933. 
Mayers, Norman 
Born 1895. Educated at King's College, London, and Caius College, Cambridge. 
Served with H. M. Forces 1914-19. Assigned for service in Beirut 1923. 
Acting Consul there 1925-26. Acting Agent'and Consul at Jeddah from 15 
Sept. 1926 to 26 April 1927. One,, H. M. Vice-Consuls in the Levant Consular 
Service 1926.2nd Assistant Oriental Sec. at Cairo 1927. 
Monteagle, Lord (T. A. Spring: Rice): 
Born 1883. Entered the Diplomatic Service 19o8. Promoted to be 3rd Sec. 
1910. Transferred to Washington 1913. Promoted to be 2nd Sec. 1917. 
Transferred to F. O. 1918. Attached to the British Delegation to the 
Peace Conference in Paris 1919. Promoted to be 1st Sec. 1919. Transferred 
to Paris 1920 and to Brussels 1921. To F. O. 1924. Succeeded as 3rd Baron 
1926. Promoted to be an Acting Counsellor in F. O. Dec. 1928. A Counsellor 
1929. Resigned Oct. 1930. 
Oliphant, Lancelot: 
Born 1881. Clerk in F. O. 1903. Acting 3rd Sec. in Diplomatic 
Service 1905. Employed at Constantinople until 1906, and at 
Tehran 1909-11. Assistant Clerk 1917. Acting Counsellor 1920. 
Councellor 1923. Acting Assistant Under Sec. of State in F. O. 
Feb. 1928. 
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Rendel, G. W. 
Born 1889. Educated at Queen's College, Oxford. Attache in the 
Diplomatic Service 1913. Appointed to Berlin 1913, to Athens 1914. 
Promoted to be 3rd Sec. 1915. Appointed to Lisbon 1917, to Madrid 
1917. Promoted to be 2nd Sec. 1919. To F. O. 1919. Promoted to 
be Ist Sec. 1923. Promoted to be a Councellor in F. O. 1930. 
Rida, Rashid: 
Syrian. Born 1865. A student of Jamal al-Din al-Afaghani and Mohammad Abdu. Muslim reformer and sufi. Established'Al-Manar`in Cairo 1898. 
His sympathy with the Hanbafi sect made him close to Wahhabism. 
Partisan of Ibn Saud. Attended the Mecca Conference of 1926 and 
planned the Agenda. Defended Ibn Saud'scause at the Conference and 
in his Magazine. 
Ryan, Sir Andrew: 
Born 1876. A student Interpreter in the Levant Diplomatic Service. 
Vice-Consul at Constantinople 1903. Consul 1912-14. Employed in F. O. 
1914-18. Given the rank of Acting Ist Sec. in the Diplomatic Service. 
Returned Constantinople 1918. Promoted chief Dragoman 1921 with the 
local and temporary rank of a counsellor. In charge of Consulate 
General in Rabat 1912. Consul-General 1924. Appointed Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Jeddah 22 April 1930, 
Consul General May 1930-June 1936. Played a leading role in bringing 
Ibn Saud and 'Abd-Allah together. Was not on good terms with., -Ibn Saud. Published in 1951, 'The Last of the Dragomans. 
Shakespear, W. H. I. 
Born 1878 in India. Served in the Indian Army until his appointment in 1904 as Deputy Resident at Bushire and Consul at Bandar Abbas. 
Was sent to Muscat in 1906. Appointed Political Agent in Kuwait 
1909. Was sent to Ibn Saud at al-Riyadh in a special mission in 1914. Remained at his side negotiating for a treaty. Killed at battle of Jarab in January 1915. 
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Shuckburgh, Sir John E.., 
Born 1877. Educated at Cambridge. Junior Clerk at India Office 1900. Private 
Sec. to Permanent Under Sec. of State 1902. Senior Clerk, Political 
Dept. -. 1906. Assistant Sec. 1912. Secretary 1917. Acting Assistant Under 
Sec. of State C. O. March 1921 to supervise the newly established Middle 
East Dept. Assistant Under Sec. of State 1924. Deputy Under Sec. of 
State 1931. 
Stonehewer-Bird, F. H. W.: 
Born 1891. A student Interpreter in the Levant 1913. Assistant 1915. In 
Jassy Legation 1917-18. In Bucharest Legation 1918-19. Acting Vice-Consul 
at Belgrade 1923. Acting Consul at Rabat 1923-24. Vice Consul 1925. 
Acting Consul General 1925-26. Promoted to be Agent and Consul at 
Jeddah 27 April 1927. Transferred to Casablanca March 1930. 
Wahba, Hafez: 
Egyptian. Born 1889. Educated at Al-Azhar and at the School of al-Qada' 
al-Shari. Journalist contributing to Al-Lewa, Al-Ahram, 
al-Helal al-Osmani and other papers. Supporter of Pan-Islamism in Cairo, 
Constantinople and India. Regarded with hostility by Britain 
for his activities even before the First World War. He worked as a 
school-master in Kuwait 1915-20. Counsellor to Ibn Saud in 1923 
and attended the Kuwait Conference. Appointed Governor of Mecca 1924-27. 
Minister of Education and Assistant to Amir Faisal (Vice-Roy of the Hejaz) 
1927-29. First Saudi Minister to Britain and the Netherlands 1930-48. 
Ambassador in London 1948-56. One of the King's advisers during the Bahrah 
negotiations 1925 and the Jeddah--negotiations 1927-28. Sent in special 
missions to Kuwait 1927,1929. Represented the Hejaz-Nejd in the International 
Post Conference in London 1929. Published three books: in 1935, his: 
'Khamson 'aman fi dazirat al-'arab, in 1960 his: 'jazirat al-'arab fi al-qa rn 
al-ishreen'and 1964 his: 'Arabian Days. 
Yasim, Yousuf: 
Syrian. Born 1890. A student of Rashid Rida. School-Master in Jerusalem. 
Chief editor of Al-Sabah newspaper. Joined Amir Faisal Ibn al-Husain at 
Aqaba and accompanied him to Damascus. Expelled from Damascus by the French. 
Served under King Husain at Mecca and Amir Abd-Allah at Amman. Invited to 
meet Ibn Saud in 1923. Accepted the invitation and joined the Wahhabi 
cause. Appointed political Sec. to Ibn Saud and accompanied him to the Hejaz. 
Founded the Saudi Official newspaper Umm al-Qura in 1924 at Mecca. Deputized 
for Damluii and later for Fuad Hamza in directing foreign affairs. He remained 
close to Ibn Saud despite the anti-Syrian campaign in the Hejaz. Joined 
all rounds of negotiations with the British. In 1935 he negotiated a 
Saudi-Iraqi treaty of brotherhood, and in 1942 a Saudi-Kuwaiti agreement. 
